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THE 
PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 
OF PHILOSOPHY 


THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
NEW YORK : BOSTON + CHICAGO + DALLAS 
ATLANTA + SAN FRANCISCO 


MACMILLAN & CO., LimiTED 
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TORONTO 


THE PRINCIPLES AND 
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 
<n OF PRINgc >> 
JUN 20 1927 
<CORIE ew 






wy, 
ROY WOOD ‘SELLARS, Pxr.D. 


PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 


jQew Bork 
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
1926 


All rights reserved 


CopyrieHt, 1926, 
By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. 





Set up and electrotyped. 
Published November, 1926. 


Printed in the United States of America by 
J. J. LITTLE AND IVES COMPANY, NEW YORK 


PREFACE 


Insight into situations and relations, rather than mere 
information, is the heart of philosophy. It follows that a 
sood introduction to the subject must possess an inner mo- 
mentum sufficient to carry the student from stage to stage 
of his intellectual and spiritual adventure. This quality is 
one that cannot be achieved by the mere cataloging of past 
positions. 

Add to this need for vitality the difficulty due to the actual 
divergence in philosophical views, and it is not surprising that 
nearly all teachers of philosophy assert that a satisfactory 
introduction is still to seek. I do not wish to make exag- 
gerated claims for the present work, but I have assuredly 
tried to make it a step in the right direction. 

The Principles and Problems of Philosophy is partly a revi- 
sion, partly a supplementation, of my earlier work, The Essen- 
tials of Philosophy. It still retains, I hope, the good features 
of that work while avoiding its shortcomings. It is my belief 
that the student who goes through the argument will at least 
have a feel for philosophy, that is, will have a sense for its 
problems, methods and aims. And this is by no means an 
unimportant attainment. 

I would recommend that this introductory course be ac- 
companied, or followed, by a semester’s work in logic. A 
year’s work in the history of philosophy, in addition, should 
give an excellent foundation. 

In writing the present book, I have been guided by three 
principles: (1) It should not be superficial, (2) it should 
bring into relief problems and distinctions even to the point 


of technicality, and (3) it should follow the path of my 
Vv 


a PREFACE 


own ascent to the ‘hill of vision.’ A few words in justification 
of these principles may not be amiss. 

Let me confess to pride in philosophy. I am persuaded 
that it has a subject-matter and an internal structure which 
need fear no comparison with the subject-matter and internal 
structure of any of the sciences. Persistent analysis through- 
out the ages has left its fruits behind. There is something 
definite for the student to learn, something for him to master 
by re-thinking what has been thought. Is it fair, then, to the 
student to ignore this structure and these distinctions and 
to offer in their place a not too exigent amount of information 
of a general sort, largely biographical? When physicist, 
chemist and mathematician adopt this method, I shall be 
ready to revise my procedure—but not until then. There is 
no royal road to philosophy any more than there is to geome- 
try. <A certain amount of grind and mental effort there must 
be. An introduction to philosophy cannot avoid technicalities ; 
its task is to illuminate them. So much for my first two prin- 
ciples, which are but two aspects of the same theme. 

At first glance, the third principle would seem to need 
more justification. But that, I think, is an illusion. When 
the personal touch is removed, philosophy tends to become 
lifeless and mechanical. It is something sustained by activity. 
It seems to me, then, an unavoidable condition of a stimu- 
lating book in philosophy that it grow out of the first-hand 
thinking of the author. That is why this introduction has 
followed so closely the path my own mind has taken these 
many years. Over this path I can act as a guide. 

I hope this book will be taken as more than the conventional 
text. It is meant to be a contribution to philosophy as well. 
I have tried to clarify and push nearer to adequacy the theory 
of knowledge called critical realism. In the domain of eos- 
mology I have continued the theory of levels, or gradients, 
in nature which I advocated in nineteen hundred and nine 
in an article on Causality published in the Journal of Philos- 
ophy, a theory which is now usually called emergent evolution. 


PREFACE vii 


Originality in all these things is, of course, very relative. 
By combining critical realism with the theory of levels, I 
have suggested a double-knowledge approach to the mind- 
body problem, which makes it possible to conceive mind and 
consciousness as intrinsic to the organism. There are, also, 
I hope, suggestions of importance in regard to the nature 
of valuation as against pure cognition. 

May I register my belief that philosophy has made remark- 
able advances all along the line during the last quarter of a 
eentury. Linked with the special sciences, it may yet regain 
its once tremendous influence over men’s lives. And it is here 
that I find myself most sympathetically in touch with prag- 
matism. Man is a creator of objectives in the medium of 
nature. Let him create with intelligence and fine discrimi- 
nation. 

In conclusion, I wish to thank those colleagues of mine in 
various colleges who have given me suggestions and encourage- 
ment. In these matters the old adage has held true once 
more. And I wish gratefully to acknowledge the help my 
wife has given me in seeing the book through the press. She 
has not only read proof and made suggestions but has 
also prepared the index. 

Roy Woop SELLARS. 

Ann Arbor. 





CONTENTS 


PARTI 


INTRODUCTION, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF 
PHILOSOPHY, AND THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 


CHAPTER 
I, Wuat PuinuosorHy Is 


1. A Preliminary Definition. 2. Philosophy, 
Science, and Religion. 3. The Competency of the 
Philosopher. 


Il. A Brier SURVEY AND A PROGRAM . 


1, A Glance at the History of Philosophy. 2. The 
Main Divisions of Philosophy. 3. Where and 
How to Begin. 


TU, PERCEPTION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD . 


1. The Common-Sense View of the World. 2. 
Natural Realism. 3. The Recognition of Natural 
Realism in Philosophy. 4. Natural Realism Not a 
Theory or System. 5. Philosophy Should Start 
from Natural Realism. 6. Natural Realism and 
Science. 7. Summary, 


IV. Dogs Naturat Reauism Break Down? 


1. Difficulties Confronting Natural Realism. 2. 
The Content of Perception a Function of Many 
Factors. 3. The Physical Thing and Its Appear- 
ance. 4. The Lack of Correspondent Variation. 
5. The Differences between the Perceptual Data 
of Individuals, 6, Can Natural Realism Account 
for Memory? 7. The Field of Perception Involves 
Construction. 8. The Psycho-Physiological The- 
ory of Perception. 9. Conclusions. 


V. Earuy REPRESENTATIVE REALISM . 


1. The Value of an Historical Approach. 2. 
Cartesianism. 3. Locke. 4. Doubts concerning 
Representative Perception. 


1x 


PAGE 


3 


17 


39 


43 


59 


CHAPTER 


AVAL 


VIL. 


VIII. 


1EXG: 


XI, 


CONTENTS 


THe Rise oF IDEALISM 


1. What Idealism Is. 2. Berkeley’s Position. 3. 
The First Stage. 4. Berkeley’s Attack upon Rep- 
resentative Perception. 5. Berkeley ’s Construction, 
6. Idealism Does Not Change Our Experience. 7. 
Gaps in Berkeley’s System. 


SKEPTICISM AND PHENOMENALISM . 


1. Bewilderment. 2. Hume’s Summary of Results. 
3, Hume’s Attack upon Mental Substance. 4, Con- 
sciousness Is a Flux. 5. Hume’s Rejection of 
Berkeley’s Spiritualism. 6. Hume’s Treatment of 
Causation. 7. Taking Stock. 


THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION 


1. Kant Seeks a Compromise. 2. The Structure of 
Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, 3. Two Meanings 
of the Word Knowledge. 4. Kant and Hume Skep- 
tical of the First Kind of Knowledge. 5. Kant’s 
Doctrine of the Categories. 6. The Categories Are 
Subjective. 7. But Are the Categories Subjective? 
8. The Period after Kant. 


REFERENCES AND DISTINCTIONS WITHIN CoNnN- 
SCIOUSNESS 


1, Significant Points Learned. 2. Descriptive Em- 
piricism. 3. Two Dimensions of the Field. 4. A 
Closer Study of the Cognitive Relation. 5. The 
Distinction between Things and Ideas. 6. Exist- 
ence versus Cognition. 


THe NAtTuRE OF KNOWLEDGE 


1. Perception an Affair of the Organism. 2. The 
Synthetie versus Both the External and the Intro- 
spective View of Perception, 38. Perception Is 
Usually Practical. 4. What, then, Is Knowledge? 
5. The Mechanism of Knowing. 6. The Ambiguity 
of the Term Idea. 7. The Reach and Precise Char- 
acter of Knowledge. 8. Knowledge of Other Per- 
sons. 


PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENDENCIES 


1. The Value of a Summary. 2, The Nature of 
Hpistomology Restated. 38. A Working Division. 
4. Two Kinds of Idealism. 5. Objective Idealism. 
6. Experientialism. 7. Pragmatism. 8. Realism. 


PAGE 


72 


82 


93 


107 


122 


138 


CHAPTER 


ATs 


CONTENTS 


RUTH AND SHRRORW oC Mineo. ee te: 


1. Knowledge and Truth. 2. The Distinction be- 
tween the Meaning and the Criteria of Truth. 
3. The Coherence Theory of Truth. 4. The Veri- 
fication, or Pragmatist, Theory of Truth. 5. Real- 
ism and the Identity Theory of Truth, 6. Con- 
cluding Remarks. 


BARE pt 


GENERAL ONTOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY 


DeLET: 


ALV. 


DAA 


XVI. 


XVII. 


PROBLEMS AND METHODS IN ONTOLOGY AND 
COSMOLOGY . 


1. From Epistemology to oe 2. The Pres- 
ence of Sharp Contrasts. 3. A Word about Method. 


MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM 


1. Traditional Monisms of Substance. 2. Material- 
ism. 3. A Glance at the History of Materialism, 
4. Concluding Remarks on Materialism. 5, Spirit- 
ualism. 6. Types of Spiritualism. 7. Conclusions. 


DUALISM versus EvoLUTIONARY NATURALISM 


1. Natural Dualism. 2, Motives in Favor of Dual- 
ism. 3. Objections to Dualism. 4. Evolutionary 
Naturalism. 5. Conditions Evolutionary Natural- 
ism Must Fulfill. 6. Concluding Remarks. 


THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECT OF THE WORLD . 


1. The Basic Characteristics of the World, 2. The 
Genesis of Our Ideas of Space. 3. Space as a 
Category of the Physical Sciences. 4. The Divisi- 
bility and Extent of Space. 5. Implications for 
Philosophy. 6. Some Remarks upon Number and 
Measurement. 


TimzE, CHANGE AND CONSERVATION. . . 


1. Ours Not an Inert, or Static, World. 2. The 
Genesis of Our Tdeas of Time. 3. Time as a 
Category of Scientific Knowledge, 4. Change or 
Events, the Characteristic of Nature Known in 
Terms of Time. 5. Time and the Cosmos. 6. Con- 
cluding Remarks. 


175 


183 


Loo 


215 


232 


X1i 
CHAPTER 


Vilas 


XIX. 


XX. 


XXI. 


XXII. 


XXIII. 


CONTENTS 


Marrrer, Enercy, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 


1. What Is Matter? 2. Reflection Begins with 
Things. 3. The Generic Traits of Thinghood. 4. 
Primary versus Secondary Properties. 5. Does 
This View Split Nature in Two? 6. How Shall 
We Think Things? 7. Are Things Substances? 
8. Constant Characteristics, Events, Relations and 
Properties. 9. Concluding Remarks. 


Tae NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LIFE. . . . 


1. The Evolutionary Approach. 2. The Materia 
World a Domain of Organization. 3. Living and 
Lifeless Things. 4. The Origin of Life. 5. 
Mechanism versus Vitalism in Biology. 


Sout, Minp anp ConsciousnEss: AN His- 
TORICAL SURVEY . . . 


1. The Nature of Mind a Problem. 2. Primitive 
Notions of Mind. 3. The Mind-Soul in Ancient 
Philosophy. 4. Mind in Modern Philosophy. 5. 
The Kantian-Idealistic Tradition. 6. The New 
Currents in Psychology. 


PsycHoLoay AS A NATURAL SCIENCE. . . 


1. The Situation in Psychology. 2. The Classic 
Tradition, 3. The Method of Introspection. 4. 
The Method of External Observation. 5. A 
Combination of Methods. 6. Different Kinds of 
Behaviorism. 7. A Current Paradox, 8. An In- 
elusive Definition of Psychology. 


THE RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND ORGANISM 


1. The Mind-Body Problem. 2. Solutions Offered. 
3. Dualistie Theories. 4. Interactionism. 5. 
Parallelism. 6. Epiphenomenalism. 7. Monistic 
Theories. 8. Psychical Monism. 9. The Double- 
Aspect Theory. 10. The Double-Knowledge The- 
ory. 


Society AND PERSONS 


1. Society and Culture Emerge, 2. The Primitive 
Group. 38. The Human Organism and the Group. 
4, What Is the Group? 5. Has Society a Mind? 
5. The Relation between the Group and the In- 
dividual, 6. In What Sense Is Personality a 
Social Product? 7. Human Consciousness a So- 
cially Conditioned Consciousness. 8. Conclusion. 


PAGE 


248 


270 


289 


307 


324 


343 


CHAPTER 


CONTENTS 


XXIV. THE THEORY or LEVELS AND Basic PoINtTs IN 


XXV, 


XXVI. 


XXVIT. 


VALLE 


X XIX, 


(OS MOLOG Yer ne Ieee id) Chora RE Tout ar ta 


1, A Crucial Point in Cosmology. 2. Mechanism 
versus Design. 3. The Need for New Categories. 
4. Push, Pull, or Internal Teleology? 5. Does 
Internal Teleology in Nature Imply Mind? 6, 
Purpose and the Efficacy of Consciousness. 7. 
Concluding Remarks. 


PARAL 
HUMAN LIFE AND VALUES 


HuMAN LIVING AND Its PROBLEMS 


1. Human Living from the Inside. 2. Has Human 
Life Intrinsic Value? 


MoRALITY AND ETHICAL THEORY . 


1. The Field of Ethics. 2. Methods of Study. 3. 
Theories of Ethical Knowledge. 4, Temperamen- 
tal Attitudes in Morality. 5. The Nature and 
Conditions of Human Good. 6. How We Value in 
Affairs of Conduct. 


THE SANCTIONS AND CRITERIA OF MORALITY 


1. What is Conscience? 2. Moral Judgment and 
the Nature of the Sense of Obligation. 3. Must 
Not versus Ought Not. 4. The Weakness of Con- 
vention and the Dangers of Novelty, 5. Super- 
naturalism versus Naturalism in Ethies. 6. The 
Final Sanction of Morality. 7. What Should We 
Mean by Moral Responsibility? 8. Free-Will and 


Responsibility. 


THE NATURE AND Locus OF VALUE . 


1. Why Questions of Value Are Basic for Human 
Life. 2. Valuation versus Cognition. 3. Contem- 
porary Theories of Value. 


Kinps, CoNDITIONS, AND CRITERIA OF VALUE 


1, Valuation an Intrinsic Aspect of Living. 2. 
Value in Aesthetic Experience. 3. A General Sur- 
vey of Values. 4. Valuations and Value-Judg- 
ments, 5. Are There Absolute, Eternal Standards? 


387 


395 


413 


434 


451 


xiv CONTENTS 


CHAPTER PAGE 


XXX. First’ anp Dasr THINGS; .. .:° 02) See 


1. Queries and Suggestions. 2. The Status of the 
Belief in Immortality. 3. The Old versus the New 
Naturalism, 4. Why Man’s Realization of His 
Cosmic Position Has Been a Shock. 5. Is the 
Universe Friendly? 6. Fate and Freedom. 


QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 2) "5°72" 220" 0. ee 


INDEX fi Wie deel cache Se tet ate es ts ead 


PART ONE 


INTRODUCTION, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY 
OF PHILOSOPHY, AND THEORY 
OF KNOWLEDGE 





PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 
OF PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTER I 
WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 


A Preliminary Definition — Although it is seldom a difficult 
matter to give a formal definition of a subject, it is a harder 
task to make this formal definition significant for anyone who 
is not familiar with the aims, methods, and problems which 
give it its setting and content. To understand a subject, it 
is necessary to live into it and become acquainted with its 
urgency. But while we must not expect very much im- 
mediate illumination from a definition it is desirable to 
offer at least a general indication of the kind of undertaking 
we are about to launch out upon. Perhaps the following 
will serve our purpose: Philosophy 1s a persistent attempt 
to gain insight into the nature of the world and of our- 
selves by means of systematic reflection. I have selected this 
definition from a large number because it stresses an im- 
portant point. Philosophy is, first of all, an activity. It is 
a continuous seeking of insight into basic realities: the 
physical world, life, mind, society, knowledge, values. 

This preliminary definition stresses the broadness of aim 
and interest characteristic of philosophy. It is an effort domi- 
nated by the thought of the whole fabric of existence, a search 
into fundamentals. We must bear in mind this breadth of 
interest because philosophy has likewise the need of making 
special investigations of its own in furtherance of this inter- 
est. Thus our subject is a collection of sciences, such as 
theory of knowledge, logic, cosmology, ethics and aesthetics, 

3 


4. PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


as well as a unified survey. Yet while there are these divi- 
sions, it is equally true to say that none of them can be com- 
plete by itself. More than any other subject, perhaps, philo- 
sophy feels the interconnection of all fields. It tries to 
penetrate deeply and yet see the bearing of things upon one 
another. 

Let us dwell for a moment upon this breadth of philo- 
sophy. It is, we said, a persistent reflection. Naturally it 1s 
a reflection upon all those basic problems which puzzle and 
fascinate the human mind. It deals with the purpose and 
meaning of life and even asks whether life has a meaning or 
purpose. All this is unavoidable. The human mind wants 
a philosophy of life, some interpretation of the setting and 
possibilities and fate of human beings. Again, reflection 
turns upon the world. What is the world made of? Was it 
created? What are its chief characteristics? Is life natural? 
Is a man a part of nature? There are so many things to re- 
flect upon. Yet these things and problems seem to involve 
one another. They all form some sort of unity. Starting 
with human life, we come around to nature; and starting 
with nature, we come back to human life. It all hangs to- 
gether in some fashion. Philosophy has always been con- 
vineed of this unity and interconnection. It has never been 
content to aim at less than the whole. 

But while this comprehensiveness has always been, to some 
degree, a feature of philosophy, there have been times when 
one set of problems has engrossed it more than others. And 
it is true that some people are more profoundly interested in 
certain questions than in others. Thus, to many, an interpre- 
tation of human life is the theme of greatest significance, 
while others are equally interested in nature and in abstract 
questions of logic. We should note, too, that certain periods 
stressed ethics and religion, while other periods had a wider 
sweep of interest. In every case, however, some attention 
was paid to the total domain of reality, the sense of the 
whole was never completely absent. 


WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 5 


Important as this preliminary definition of philosophy is, it 
is not sufficient. More is needed. What are some of the 
fundamental questions which arouse reflection? How does 
philosophy go about it to answer them? What are its 
methods? Has it succeeded in answering any of these basic 
questions? What is its relation to science? To religion? 

All these are fair questions which we shall take up in the 
course of our study. It is obvious that we cannot give com- 
plete answers to them by means of a few brief statements. 
Just like any other subject, philosophy is something to be 
lived into until the spell of its problems and methods is felt. 
In a very true sense, one can understand philosophy only by. 
learning to philosophize. 

But while this is so, this fact does not absolve us from 
giving answers to the above questions. First of all, then, 
what are some of the fundamental problems which engage the 
attention of the philosopher? Well, in the philosophy of 
nature the following questions would be typical: Does the 
physical world have an existence of its own apart from any 
mind’s knowledge of it? What is the exact nature of our 
knowledge of it? Can we penetrate to the ‘‘stuff’’ of which 
the world is made? Or do we know only the structure and 
behavior and development of things? What is hfe? Is there 
a break between the organic and the inorganic? What is 
mind? How is it related to the body? Rising to the philo- 
sophy of human life, we find such questions as the following: 
Are we free, or are we creatures of necessity? What should 
we mean by freedom? What should we mean by right and 
wrong? What principles ought to control human conduct? 
Finally, we can concern ourselves with those questions of 
man’s destiny and the nature of the universe which have 
always been raised by religion. Is there a providence? Is 
vurs a friendly universe? Is there a God with whom we can 
enter into relations? Is human life good or bad? Can we 
be optimists or must we be pessimists? 

These are but a few of the many questions which philoso- 


6 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


phers have raised. One question leads to another and starts 
others which were before unthought of. Ours is clearly a 
complex world which is not easily understood. And yet it is 
human nature to try to understand it. In fact, people have 
traditional answers to many of these questions, answers given 
by past thinkers. Even those who think that they are avoid- 
ing philosophy have their own philosophy. The fault with 
it is that it is largely a matter of accepted suggestion. Is 
it not the manly thing to bring it out into the open and think 
it over with the help of those who have devoted their lives 
to it? To-day traditional philosophy is no more acceptable 
than traditional medicine, traditional science or traditional 
politics. 

We come now to the next question: How does philosophy 
go about it to answer these basic queries? What are its 
methods? The answer is simple and was contained in the 
definition. The method of philosophy is systematic reflection. 
In short, it has no peculiar tool or source. It does just 
what science does; it gathers information, analyzes concepts, 
compares, relates, organizes. A recent writer speaks of sci- 
entific method in philosophy. We shall have more to say 
about this point when we come to compare philosophy and 
science. We shall there see that there is division of labor, 
science doing more of the experimenting and of the detailed 
observation. The various sciences are invaluable helps to 
philosophy because they specialize in various fields. But phi- 
losophy, itself, is a persistent reflection upon these facts 
and concepts developed by the sciences. Also it adds 
sciences of its own when these are felt to be necessary for 
the solution of its problems. Psychology was such a science. 
So was ethics. And even now logic and theory of knowl- 
edge are sciences maintained by philosophy as necessary ele- 
ments in its systematic reflection upon the world and upon 
human life. 

Has philosophy succeeded in answering any of these basic 
questions? Has philosophy progressed? This is an impor- 


WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 7 


tant question. I think that the philosopher has a right to 
give a decidedly affirmative answer. While there are schools 
in philosophy and while there is divergence of opinion on 
many crucial matters, it is correct to say that philosophy has 
to its eredit analyses upon which all schools agree. Further 
than this, there is a certain common way of handling ex- 
perience which has grown up. There are certain broad trends 
in philosophy which are unmistakable. While I do not wish 
to assert that all philosophers agree, there is far more agree- 
ment than is usually realized. Let us remember that the per- 
sonal equation is prone to enter very largely to determine 
the outlook in this supreme synthesis of human thought. 
Nothing would make some people materialists; and others 
are just as suspicious of romantic idealism. It will be hard 
even for experts to reach unanimity in these matters. And 
yet philosophy has grown in richness of insight, in increase 
of distinction, in the discovery of new possibilities. And 
I would go even farther than this and say that many of these 
basic problems show signs of being conquered. All philoso- 
phers agree that philosophy is very much alive these days 
and that distinct progress has been made along many lines. 

Finally, we asked about the relation of philosophy to science 
and to religion. This topic is so large and important that 
we must devote a section to its discussion. What we shall 
say will, I hope, make clearer the points we have noted in 
this preliminary definition of philosophy. 

Philosophy, Science and Religion.—Since both science and 
religion concern themselves with the fundamentals of human 
experience, the difference between them and philosophy calls 
for consideration. Let us hasten to say that the lines of 
activity of the human mind are not completely distinct. They 
co-exist and influence one another. The demarcation which 
we seek must be one of degree and of emphasis. In other 
words, there is much reflection upon the world and upon 
human life in all three of these fields. 

If we were to arrange these three subjects in a series, we 


8 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


would place philosophy between religion and science. It 
partakes of the nature of both. Like religion, philosophy 
always brings in the question of the bearing of its theory of 
the world upon man, his values, hopes and destiny. A phi- 
losophy of life is an integral part of it and its completion. 
Like science, on the other hand, it puts stress upon reason 
and reflection rather than upon tradition and revelation as 
the means to accomplish its task. It seeks to build a well- 
tested theory of the world upon the foundation of human 
experience in a persistent and rational way. Let us look 
at these agreements and differences a little more closely. 

Religion has been pretty thoroughly investigated these 
days. Anthropologists, historians, psychologists and philoso- 
phers have all studied it in its various levels and manifesta- 
tions. Religions differ so much from one another that it is 
difficult to find a common denominator. Recent writers on 
the psychology of religion point out that religion involves 
behavior, belef and feeling. It is a common mistake to select 
one of these three elements and to neglect the others. Thus 
Frazer defines religion as ‘‘a propitiation or conciliation of 
powers superior to man which are believed to direct and con- 
trol the course of Nature and of human life.’’! There is in 
this definition too much stress, perhaps, upon behavior. Pratt 
defines religion as the ‘‘serious and social attitude toward the 
Determiner of Destiny.’’* We must take attitude to include 
all three of these elements. Perhaps the following definition 
by Thouless is the most satisfactory: ‘‘ Religion is a felt prac- 
tical relationship with what is believed in as a superhuman 
being or beings.’’* We must recognize that there are various 
levels of religion and that it is even possible that the attitude 
and sentiments characteristic of ethical religions may be 
transferred to social relations. 

There is not so much a thing called religion as specific 


*Frazer, The Golden Bough, vol. 1, p. 63. 
* Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. 1. 
* Thouless, An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p. 4. 


WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 9 


religions. And each religion has a pretty definite content and 
spirit. There are beliefs in it and practices and hopes and 
fears. These beliefs are apt to take the form of dogmas, of 
views to be accepted as essential and necessary. The hopes 
and fears concern man’s salvation, his relation to God or 
the gods, his life after death. The practices consist of rituals 
and ceremonies bound up with these beliefs and hopes and 
fears. Now that which, on the whole, characterizes religion 
is its foundation. Tradition, authority, a measure of reflec- 
tion and deep feeling are the main pillars on which it rests. 
There is little serious effort to throw all these questions open 
and to trust to experience and reason to reach the truth. And 
it is at this point that religion and philosophy part company. 
The difference is one of attitude and method. Naturally, in 
a reflective age, religious men can hardly escape some exami- 
nation of their views and there is then an attempt to justify 
them. But such an attempt leads directly to philosophy. It 
is an appeal to reason. Here is a great hypothesis about the 
world; what can be said in tts favor? Theology is a sys- 
tematic presentation of the beliefs of a particular religion. 
Apologetics is a defense of such a theology. Philosophy of 
religion is an examination of religion and a weighing of its 
truth and merits in the light of general philosophy. It favors 
what Kersopp Lake calls experimental religion. 

In the last part of our book we shall have something more 
to say about religion, but we have accomplished our present 
purpose which was to distinguish philosophy from religion. 
It is its impersonal, objective, rational method which marks 
off philosophy. Philosophy is not a cult. It has no ritual. It 
is an activity of systematic reflection which has no recognized 
barriers. It is man’s mind curious to understand and esti- 
mate the world. The philosopher does not try to edify but 
to know the naked truth about life. Of course, it may be 
that the universe is as friendly as the Christian religion has 
supposed. Again, it may be that it is not. The point to note 
is the method and attitude. 


10 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Let us now consider the agreement and difference between 
philosophy and science. 

The attitude of the philosopher is clearly very much like 
that of the scientist. Both have the same mental curiosity 
and keen desire for valid knowledge, the same willingness 
to bend theories into line with experience, the same faith in 
methodical analysis, persistent investigation and reflection. 
Were we defining philosophy by reference to the trained 
mental attitude and intellectual habits, we would identify it 
with science. In this sense it is a science. They have a com- 
mon tradition and inheritance which goes in part back to the 
Greeks. Probably the philosopher should swallow his pride 
of ancestry and emphasize this identity of attitude in this 
day in which so many people know something of the spirit 
of science. The philosopher is inspired with the same dis- 
interested zeal to solve intellectual problems as is the sci- 
entific specialist. 

In this age of early instruction in the various sciences, the 
student who finally comes to philosophy with mixed feelings 
of hope, curiosity and distrust has already some acquaintance 
with the spirit and methods of science. He knows and ad- 
mires in such men as Newton, Galileo and Darwin, their 
whole-hearted endeavor to solve specific problems in the 
domain of nature. It is this spirit, as much as what they 
have accomplished, which attracts those who are generous- 
minded. We can, therefore, best convey to the beginner a 
true idea of philosophy by saying that it has the same general 
attitude toward the world that science has. Both concern 
themselves with knowledge and both seek it openly and 
methodically and in disregard of consequences. The philoso- 
pher is not a mystic nor the advocate of some esoteric cult; 
he is a scientist. 

And yet there is a difference. When a man is ealled a 
scientist, we tend to ask whether he is a botanist or a physicist 
or a mathematician or a chemist and so on, with the other 
possibilities of specialization in view. We do not think of 


WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 11 


a man as being a scientist-in-general. We assume that he 
is pursuing some particular line of investigation which is 
easily classified along with other lines. But to a good many 
a philosopher is just such a strange creature, a man who 
wants to be a scientist-in-general. Let us see whether we can 
explain the difference between the work of a specialist in 
science, a devotee of some particular science, and the work 
of a philosopher, without leaving the impression that the 
philosopher is a sort of jack of all trades and master of none, 
a man who wants to be a scientist and yet will not adopt a 
specific field. 

The answer to this problem lies in the recognition that the 
special sciences do not exhaust science, that is, the demand 
of the intellect for comprehension of the world. And this for 
two reasons. First, because the knowledge claimed by the 
special sciences rests upon experience and upon the work of 
the mind, and this foundation must be studied before science 
is complete in this direction; second, because the results of 
the various special sciences must be coordinated and rounded 
out into a consistent view of the world, a task clearly going 
beyond the aim of any one science. Let us look at these two 
points for a moment. 

Philosophy is a generic term which covers a peculiar group 
of basic disciplines as well as this synoptic effort to interpret 
the universe as a whole. These basic disciplines may be 
spoken of as logical in character. We may call logic the 
science of the principles and conditions of correct thinking. 
It is a science at second remove from things. It concerns 
the way in which experience is used in all the sciences in 
order to achieve true results. It is easily seen that human 
thought is common to all the special sciences and its validity 
and laws, therefore, a common assumption. It is obvious 
that logic and theory of knowledge, parts of philosophy, are 
needed to complete the special sciences. As we advance in 
our study of philosophy, this point will be better understood. 

Philosophy is not a special science with a particular subject- 


12 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


matter as a field for exploitation alongside of and coordinate 
with the subject-matters of other special sciences. It does not 
study a particular range of physical phenomena nor a par- 
ticular range of mental phenomena. What, then, is it con- 
cerned with? It is concerned with the bearing of the results 
of all the special sciences upon the final question of the 
general nature and characteristics of the world. It examines 
distinctions and fundamental concepts and seeks to arrange 
them together in a synthetic way. Sidgwick put this situation 
very well: ‘‘The important distinction is that the sciences 
concentrate attention on particular parts or aspects of the 
knowable world, abstracting from the rest; while it is, in 
contrast, the essential characteristic of philosophy that it aims 
at putting together the parts of knowledge thus attained into 
a systematic whole; so that all the methods of attaining truth 
may be grasped as parts of one method; and all the conclu- 
sions attained may be presented, so far as possible, as har- 
monious and consistent.’’! Much the same idea is expressed 
by another philosopher, Taylor, in the following passage: 
‘“What the metaphysician asserts is not that there are facts 
with which the various special branches of experimental 
science cannot deal, but that there are questions which can 
and ought to be raised about the facts with which they do 
deal other than those which experimental inquiry can 
solve.’’* Philosophy has for its aim, then, not the discovery 
of some province which has not already been worked by the 
usual methods of observation, experimentation and conjec- 
ture, but the interpretation in a critical and coordinating 
fashion of the principles, assumptions and conclusions of the 
special sciences with the large aim we have already indicated 
in mind. We conclude that philosophy cooperates with 
science. It seeks to perform a work of supplementary reflec- 
tion, And it is aided in this by the logical disciplines in 
which it is peculiarly at home. 


a Sidgwick, Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations, p. 11. 
*Taylor, Hlements of Metaphysics, p. 9. 


WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 13 


It is not until the student of philosophy has grasped this 
double functioning of philosophy that he is able to appre- 
ciate its peculiar nature as at once critical and speculative. 
The final aim of securing an interpretation of the nature of 
the world forces it to be speculative. It deals with ‘‘first and 
last things,’’ with that which necessarily surpasses mere 
observation and demands sympathetic insight and imagina- 
tion. In this it differs only in degree from any science, for 
it is foolish to deny the use by science of creative imagination. 
The great scientists are poets who harness their imagination 
to problems of an intellectual sort and feed them with facts 
and relations. Great philosophers are also intellectual poets. 
And they seek to temper and direct their thought by the 
logical analysis instilled in them by the logical disciplines. 
But the emotional pressure back of philosophy is greater than 
that back of any special science, as we have seen; therefore, 
many philosophers have been too speculative and too little 
critical. To combine these two tendencies in the proper 
amount has become the ideal of the philosophy of to-day. He 
who is too speculative and too little critical is apt to be a 
romanticist and to do little good to philosophy. He who is 
ultra-analytie too often lacks constructive power and falls 
into mere scepticism. But when we consider the task which 
philosophy has been set, all this is not strange. What wonder 
that so personal and vital a thing expresses the bias and 
nature of him who seeks to rede the riddle of the universe! 
What wonder that there are schools of various sorts, some 
more closely allied to religion, others to science! The problem 
for him who philosophizes is not so much what will philosophy 
agree upon as what will be his philosophy after he has learned 
to philosophize. 

The Competency of the Philosopher.—To-day we associate 
science with a method, that of detailed investigation and 
tested conjecture. Has philosophy, also, a method, or is it 
forced to rely on unmethodical inspiration or intuition? Is 
the philosopher more like a poet than like a scientist? Much 


14 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


has been said about speculation in a derogatory way. It is 
often hinted that the philosopher spins his conclusions out 
of his own consciousness in an uncontrolled way and that 
they can, therefore, have little tested validity. Such state- 
ments are, however, oftenest made by those who know practi- 
eally nothing about philosophical systems and, themselves, 
entertain the strangest ideas about the world at large. It is 
perfectly true that there is variety in philosophy and that 
many systems of philosophy are but rationalizations of beliefs 
which have had a rather uncritical origin. But the great 
systems and the best tradition in philosophy have expressed 
a high intellectual standard and a really critical approach 
to all the foundations of belief. The chapters that follow 
must justify philosophy to the serious reader if anything can 
that is written in this book; but a few words can be said in 
anticipation of the proof by eating. 

Just because philosophy is a reflective criticism and synthe- 
sis of the theoretical conclusions of the sciences, physical, 
mental and social, it cannot test its conclusions by detailed 
facts of its own finding. It can and must test them by the 
theories and principles put forward by the various sciences. 
In a very real sense, these are its data. It works with science 
and experience at large. Just as a particular hypothesis in 
any field must be comprehensive enough to cover interpreta- 
tively all the facts relevant to it, so a philosophical hypothe- 
sis must be capable of covering the better founded theories. 
It goes further than this, so far as it criticises concepts and 
distinctions which have logical flaws or are too narrow. Just 
as the special sciences seek coherence within their own do- 
main, philosophy seeks coherence in their synthesis. 

The method of philosophy is to raise necessary questions 
of a general character, to examine what the various sciences 
have to say, to suggest modifications and adjustments, to re- 
late all this to its foundation in experience and thought, and 
so to assist the process of unification which is all the time 
under way. And here I would make a very important dis- 


WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 15 


tinction. Many scientists are also philosophers. We must 
not have the idea that a man must be labelled as one or the 
other. He may be both. And he may be scientist and philoso- 
pher in varying degree. There are philosophically inclined 
scientists, and these men help the professional philosopher 
very much. A philosophically inclined scientist is one who 
analyzes his concepts very carefully, sees how they are 
erounded in experience and tries to grasp their bearing upon, 
and relation to, the concepts of other sciences. Young scien- 
tists seldom have the time to do this sort of thing. They are 
too busy getting established in their own field. Often, too, it 
is only as they grow older that they have the larger implica- 
tions of their field forced home to them. The philosopher 
is a synthesist by profession, and his danger is lack of com- 
prehension of the actual movement of the sciences. To be 
competent, the philosopher must have a well-trained and in- 
structed mind and be in close touch with the sciences. It is 
this vast range which makes his task increasingly difficult and 
which makes it desirable that men working in the various 
groups of sciences should aim to assist philosophy by looking 
at their group synthetically. Fortunately, this work is being 
done both in this country and in Europe. Philosophers and 
scientists are less prone to seold each other and more willing 
to cooperate. 

The professional philosopher should possess a peculiar ad- 
vantage by reason of his training in logic and psychology. 
These disciplines afford him a knowledge of knowledge and of 
its conditions and genesis. Why this critical insight into 
the nature and conditions of knowledge is so valuable will be- 
come clearer as we proceed. It is not too much to say that, 
during the last half century, philosophy has emphasized 
theory of knowledge as never before. It is easy to see why 
training in logic should make the philosopher more compe- 
tent, and at present we shall say no more about it. A knowl- 
edge of psychology is of advantage because it is the 
fundamental mental science. A thinker who knew only the 


16 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


physical sciences would be unable to gain as just a view of 
reality as one who was also acquainted with the best knowl- 
edge about mind. We shall see that psychology throws much 
light upon many problems. 

The philosopher has another advantage in his knowledge 
of past attempts at solving basic problems. Distinctions of 
the greatest assistance to reflection have gradually developed. 
What Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hume and Kant—to mention 
only a few—thought cannot but be of value to any thinker. 
There can be little doubt that training in the understanding 
of the various systems of the past develops the power of ab- 
stract thought and gets one familiar with the basic terms of 
philosophy. It also warns the thinker and puts him on his 
guard against ideas which have been outgrown. Thus the 
history of philosophy gives a valuable perspective. We shall 
use it, In some measure, in this text. 

Hard though his task is, the philosopher can claim a train- 
ing relevant to it. He does not work alone nor in a sort of 
internal vacuum called his consciousness. He reflects upon 
a rich material to which science is adding every year and he 
has the benefit of centuries of persistent thought. 


REFERENCES 


BroaD, Scientific Thought, Introduction. 

FULLERTON, Introduction to Philosophy, chap. 1. 

JAMES, A Pluralistic Universe, chap. 1. 

Some Problems of Philosophy, chap. 1. 

PAULSEN, Introduction to Philosophy, Introduction. 

PatTRICK, Introduction to Philosophy, chap. 1. 

SIpGWIck, Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations, lectures 1 and 2. 





CHAPTER IT 
A BRIEF SURVEY AND A PROGRAM 


A Glance at the History of Philosophy.—As every one 
knows, philosophy is a very old subject. It is not surprising, 
then, that its methods and outlook have been greatly altered 
from age to age without affecting a certain identity of pur- 
pose. 

The word, itself, is of Greek origin as are so many of our 
scientific terms. The verb, to philosophize, is found in the 
writings of Herodotus and means the pursuit of knowledge. 
Thus, as Paulsen pointed out, the word was first employed, 
not as a technical term, but as a word in general use. ‘‘The 
reader of Herodotus will find it in the well-known story of 
Solon’s meeting with Croesus. Croesus welcomes the Athenian 
with the remark that the fame of his wisdom and of his 
travels has already reached him, ‘that thou, philosophizing, 
hast visited a vast part of the world for the sake of reflection.’ 
Evidently, the expression, ‘for the sake of reflection,’ intends 
to explain the word ‘philosophizing.’ What makes Solon a 
‘philosopher’ traveller is the surprising circumstance that he 
does not, like the merchant or soldier, pursue a practical 
object in his journeys.’’ + 

There can be no doubt that something of this large general 
meaning adheres to the term to this day. There are levels 
of philosophy, and any deeply reflective man is something 
of a philosopher. Such an individual is surely to be admired, 
but he makes a mistake if he tries to start afresh and does 
not profit by communion with the great and serious minds 
of the past. Plato and Epictetus, Kant and Hegel, Montaigne 


* Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 20. 
17 


18 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


and Pascal, Locke and Hume, have much to tell all of us. 
And it is egotism not to sit at their feet for a while. 

It seems best, therefore, to speak of technical and non- 
technical philosophers. And there are naturally grades of 
both kinds. Some non-technical philosophers have been very 
able men, and some technical philosophers have been far less 
gifted. Moreover, the one class shades over into the other. 
It is often difficult to say whether we should treat a man like 
Emerson as a technical philosopher or not. On the whole, he 
seems to belong more to the class of poet-philosophers, wise 
and reflective men who hardly appear in the history of tech- 
nical philosophy. 

The first technical philosophers were men who sought by a 
sort of reflective inspection of nature to discover the substance 
of which it is made. They were called physicists or cosmolo- 
gists. Their advent was important because they were the 
first to turn their back upon mythology, or the account of the 
world in terms of superhuman agents, and to attempt to give 
an explanation in terms of the stuff of which things are com- 
posed. Their guesses are naturally crude in our eyes and 
yet they were daring. Sometimes, indeed, they showed a 
remarkable measure of insight into principles of explanation 
which have since been further developed and used by the 
special sciences. 

At first, there was far more confidence in direct reflection 
and less awareness of the difficulty of the problems philosophy 
had set itself than was the case later. This heroic age lasted 
down to the period of the sophists and included such men 
as Heracleitus, Pythagoras, Parmenides and Anaxagoras.2 

After reflecting upon nature and developing all sorts of 
speculations, men of this type began to think about man, 
himself, and to enquire into the nature of thinking and of 
human conduct. Consequently, such subjects as logic, psy- 


*The student should look up these names in some history of Greek 
philosophy, as Weber, Windelband, Gomperz, Burnet or Benn. The 
teacher should encourage the class to establish the habit of reading about 
the various thinkers mentioned in the text. 


A BRIEF SURVEY AND A PROGRAM 19 


chology, ethics and politics were begun. This enlargement 
of the field makes itself apparent in the writings of Plato 
and Aristotle. 

At the same time, as men became more accustomed to in- 
vestigation, the special sciences began to arise. Mathematics 
and astronomy grew apace. Observations in meteorology, 
medicine, anatomy and mechanics were carried through and 
theories constructed to interpret them. The specialist began 
to appear. Here we have a situation which has tended to 
maintain itself ever since. On the one hand, there is the 
investigator who limits himself to intensive work in a narrow 
field; on the other hand, there is the thinker who seeks to 
coordinate results and see things together. This division of 
labor was inevitable. Even in antiquity it came to pass, as in 
the Alexandrian period. The technical philosopher concerned 
himself primarily with logic, ethics and the ultimate nature 
of things, while he left to the specialist grammar, history, 
geography, astronomy, mathematics, ete. 

This division of intellectual labor, which is upon us in its 
fullest scope to-day, was checked by the decline of the Ancient 
World. The Middle Ages lived in large measure upon what 
had. been inherited from the Greco-Roman civilization. In- 
vestigation largely ceased. It was not impossible, as a conse- 
quence, for able men to cover very nearly all the knowledge 
possessed by the period. The great scholastics, Albertus 
Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, sought, again, to organize the 
whole field much as Aristotle had done. The result was nat- 
urally often very formal; and yet of the great ability of these 
men there can be no doubt. In those parts of philosophy 
which require the power of formal analysis distinct advances 
were made. And yet philosophy was held back because man’s 
knowledge of his world was too meager. Traditional dis- 
tinctions tended to maintain themselves. 

In the fifteenth century came the Revival of Learning and, 
soon afterward, the experimental sciences with which we are 
now so familiar developed. Mathematics, also, took on new 


20 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


life. This new type of mental activity was certain to have 
its effect upon philosophy. Novel speculations were engaged 
in. The anthropocentric view of the world was challenged. 
The mechanical interpretation of all events was suggested. 
All this had tremendous import for man’s view of himself 
and his world. 

For a brief time philosophers were also scientific investi- 
gators. We have men like Descartes and Leibniz, able to 
cover a large range of special subjects and likewise to create 
novel theories in the more strictly philosophical subjects. But, 
before long, the division of labor initiated in antiquity began 
again. John Locke stresses the problem of the origin and 
nature of knowledge. Berkeley challenges the theory of a 
physical stuff. Hume makes his approach to philosophy from 
psychology. Increasingly, the philosopher busied himself 
with logic and with the nature and foundation in human 
experience of basic concepts. His aim was to supplement 
science by discussing its assumptions and implications. 
Added to this was the motive of synthetic speculation. Thus 
we may say that the philosopher became a specialist in his 
turn, a specialist in logic, theory of knowledge, ontology, 
ethics, ete. 

This adjustment between philosophy and science has taken 
considerable time. Quarrels and misunderstandings have 
frequently occurred. It cannot be said that, even to-day, 
there is no shadow between them. The scientist is often 
afraid that the philosopher wants to dictate to him and the 
philosopher has not always realized to the full the bearing of 
the results of the sciences upon his task. But there is ample 
evidence that a new era of amity and codperation has arrived. 

This brief survey has necessarily been very external but it 
may suggest the proper idea of the relation between philoso- 
phy and the special sciences. Let us now turn to an examina- 
tion of the main divisions of philosophy. 

The Main Divisions of Philosophy.—In distinguishing 
philosophy from science, we pointed out that the detailed 


A BRIEF SURVEY AND A PROGRAM 21 


knowledge gained by the special sciences rests upon experience 
and the work of the mind, and that it involves general assump- 
tions. It is this aspect of science that philosophy studies. 
It often happens that the assumptions of one set of sciences 
do not harmonize with those of another set. Often, for ex- 
ample, there seems to be a clash between the inorganic and the 
organic sciences. Traditions grow up in science, as every- 
where else, and need to be overhauled. 

First of all, then, philosophy devotes itself to a thorough 
study of the nature and reach of human knowledge. This 
is obviously a basic investigation which no special physical 
science itself makes. And it is Just as obvious that it requires 
expertness of its own type. 

The two philosophical disciplines which concentrate upon 
this question are logic and epistemology or theory of knowl- 
edge. These are both very old subjects but have grown of 
late, much as the special sciences have grown. 

Logie covers a wide ground. It may be defined as the 
science of the nature and conditions of correct thinking. It 
studies the structure of knowledge and its foundations and 
development. Whatever else science is, it is supposedly 
knowledge. It consists of propositions. Logic studies the 
various kinds of propositions. Thus ‘facts’ are propositions 
asserted on the basis of careful observation. Theories are 
complexes of propositions supposedly relevant to problems 
and facts. In short, the logician makes a careful analysis 
of all the mental processes involved in thinking and of the 
structures and relations disclosed in it. 

An exceedingly large part of philosophical activity has 
concerned itself with epistemology. One reason, at least, 
for this has been the controversy between realism and idealism 
to which we ourselves will give considerable attention. The 
idealist has maintained that it is impossible to know, or be- 
lieve in the existence of, things which are independent of 
mind, while the realist has argued that it is quite possible 
and intelligible to do so. This controversy had an historical 


22 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


origin and development which casts much light upon it. It 
is our intention to take up this historical material sufficiently 
to give meaning to this basic epistemological dispute. Our 
own position will be realistic but we shall seek to do justice 
to the motives of idealism. 

Epistemology is a pure or theoretical science, not an applied 
or practical one. It has, however, like all theory, very im- 
portant implications. Our whole interpretation of the world 
may depend upon our epistemology. If mind is central in 
reality, the universe may be a friendlier place than if mind is 
episodic and linked with special conditions only seldom 
achieved, as on this earth. 

Epistemological questions have been rather baffling and 
some philosophers have even become impatient with them. 
But I do think that many of these questions have been clear- 
ing up of late and that we have no good reason to be dis- 
heartened. Quite the reverse in fact. We shall make no 
apology for going into epistemology in some detail. The 
student will find it fascinating and will discover that it will 
give him perspective in regard to cosmological problems. 
There seems to be a natural, logical order if we are to make 
an assured advance in philosophy. 

What, then, is epistemology? It is a science, following 
upon logic, which devotes itself to the study of the nature, 
conditions and reach of human knowledge. Let us note some 
of the typical questions it asks. What does knowledge seem 
to be at the level of perception? How is it possible for me 
to know events which belong to the past or objects which are 
far distant? How is it possible to know things which are 
outside my consciousness? Do we know by means of ideas 
or logical contents? Or is the object known given in our 
consciousness? These questions will give an inkling of the 
subject-matter of epistemology. 

There is nothing artificial in all this. These questions are 
unavoidable as soon as we begin to reflect in any systematic 
fashion. As a matter of fact, scientists have often been led 


A BRIEF SURVEY AND A PROGRAM 23 


to ask themselves just such questions and have thereby passed 
over into philosophy. Karl Pearson’s Grammar of Science 
is an instance of this natural extension of interest. The 
writings of Ernst Mach, a physicist, and of Henri Poincaré, a 
mathematician, furnish other good illustrations of the fact 
that epistemology springs up inevitably. Though such types 
of epistemology are usually suggestive, the philosopher invari- 
ably finds that a better acquaintance with the development in 
philosophy, itself, would have been advantageous. 

Many reflective scientists are today on their guard, and 
assert that science neither affirms nor denies a physical world 
independent of mind but that it is merely ordered knowledge, 
a discovery of regularities in experience. Still others affirm 
that we know only phenomena, that is, appearances in our 
experience. We have, in science, agnostics, skeptics, and posi- 
tivists. Agnostics are individuals who say that they do not 
know what ultimate reality is. Agnosticism is a form of 
skepticism. A skeptic is one who doubts man’s ability to 
secure certain knowledge. Skepticism has its degrees and 
moods. Another current position, closely akin to agnosticism, 
is positivism. Positivists are doubtful of the value of all 
enquiries in regard to the ultimate reach of knowledge and 
fall back upon science as consisting of well-tested facts and 
theories within human experience. As a matter of fact, 
agnosticism, skepticism and positivism are all reactions 
against romantic or dogmatic systems of philosophy. They 
are, as 1t were, negative epistemological positions. It follows 
that we have no right to adopt them and even that we cannot 
appreciate their full import until we have studied episte- 
mology in a systematic and technical way. 

Logic and epistemology are preliminary philosophical 
sciences because they prepare the way for the solution of 
what are called metaphysical, or ontological, problems. We 
must know whether we have good reason to believe in an inde- 
pendent physical world before we ask its nature. As we pro- 
ceed, it will become apparent that questions as to the nature 


24 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


of what exists depend in part upon our answer to episte- 
mological questions. 

The student must no more be frightened by these impressive 
names than he would be in a science like physics by its 
technical terms. Metaphysics is the science dealing with the 
ultimate nature of reality, that is, with the basic questions 
which can be asked about the universe. Here, again, a few 
topics may make it clearer. Is reality of the nature of a 
spatial matter and energy? If so, what is mind, and what is 
its locus in reality? Or is reality of the nature of mind? 

These most general and basic questions about what exists 
are the concern of that part of metaphysics which is called 
ontology. Ontology is literally the science of being. Mate- 
rialism is an ontological position. So is spiritualism, which 
may be called its opposite. It is obvious that ontology as a 
science depends in part upon epistemology. 

As ontology enters into more detail, it becomes cosmology. 
Philosophy is led to analyze the basic concepts of the sciences. 
What should we mean by space? by time? Is the universe 
finite or infinite? Is there a break between the inorganic and 
the organic? What should we mean by life? Are physical 
systems necessarily mechanical? What should we mean by 
mind? by consciousness? Questions such as these are in- 
evitable and involve a profound reflection upon the results 
of science in the light of logic and epistemology. 

Finally, philosophy raises the question of the nature and 
status of values in such a world as that revealed by cosmology. 
This division of philosophy is called axiology or the theory 
of values. After the more general questions about values 
are examined, philosophy passes to those special sciences of 
value which have developed with reflection, such as ethics, 
esthetics, and the philosophy of religion. Ethics deals with 
the categories of morality, with good and bad, right and 
wrong, and endeavors to determine their meaning and condi- 
tions. Aiusthetics is a reflection upon the nature of beauty 
whether in art or in nature. Philosophy of religion deals 


A BRIEF SURVEY AND A PROGRAM 25 


in part with the nature of religion and in part with the 
problem of the degree and way in which the universe meets 
the demands and expectations characteristic of religion. 

There is, of course, no reason to limit philosophy to these 
three sciences of value. They are simply taken as typical. 
Every field of human endeavor and experience contains ques- 
tions which only basic reflection can throw light upon. Thus 
there is political philosophy and legal philosophy and also 
a philosophy of history. It is, however, scarcely possible 
to cover such a large domain in an introduction. What is 
primarily desirable is training in the method of philosophy 
and some insight into various solutions of basic problems. 

Where and How to Begin.—It is obvious that there is no 
royal road to philosophy and that patience is a prerequisite. 
One must work one’s way into the subject bit by bit. There 
are different possible paths. A fairly common way has been 
the use of the history of the subject as an introduction. But 
is it not the philosophy of the present with which the begin- 
ner wishes to get acquainted, just as it is the physies of the 
present that he is taught? Philosophy is very much alive 
to-day and is not merely a thing of the past. A more satis- 
factory method is probably the indication of problems and the 
discussion of them in a systematic way. It is this method 
which has here been adopted. 

But while problems and principles must dominate, we must 
not forget that it is almost impossible to get certain of these 
problems before the mind apart from some idea of their 
origin. The distinctions made by thinkers during the last 
three centuries cannot be ignored because they are so con- 
stantly referred to or implied. Hence I have judged it best 
to discuss the theories of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume 
and Kant. The problems thinkers are to-day trying to restate 
and solve are in essentials the problems raised by these men. 
This much of history will be very useful. 

The method we shall adopt may be called genetic for lack 
of a better name. We shall begin with a description of the 


26 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


outlook characteristic of common sense, and gradually pass, 
under the pressure of reflection, to a more critical and ade- 
quate position. We shall not assert offhand what we mean by 
such terms as perception, mind, consciousness, the physical 
world, but we shall seek to discover what distinctions and 
views seem forced upon us as we reflect. 

The student must be prepared to see many of his beliefs 
challenged and the attempt made to define terms which he 
has used vaguely without enquiring into their precise mean- 
ing. And this means that he will be asked to pass from the 
level of common sense to the level of systematic reflection. 

What, then, is common sense? It is, perhaps, best deserib- 
able as the attitudes and beliefs characteristic of a social 
group as a whole. It is the level of outlook attained by in- 
expert thought as a result of the rough pressure of experience. 
While common sense is not fixed and does change through the 
absorption of new ideas, it has certain fairly common ele- 
ments. Thus, in the matter of perception, there is the tend- 
ency to believe that the individual sees things in a direct 
fashion, that physical objects are open to his’ inspection. 
When we pass beyond this attitude toward the physical world, 
we soon find that the tenets of common sense vary from 
group to group and from age to age. There are no fixed 
beliefs about the origin and destiny of things. And common 
Sense now absorbs much of science and becomes enlightened 
common sense. 

In contrast to common sense, which is largely practical and 
personal, science is a method of systematic investigation which 
has been developed by specialized and expert groups in society 
at a certain cultural level. Problems are defined, systematic 
observations carried through, methods of experimentation and 
measurement developed, the imagination called upon to do 
logical service, the complex analyzed into the simple and re- 
current, syntheses made, differences carefully noted, theories 
verified. 

As a result of centuries of this kind of work, nature and 


A BRIEF SURVEY AND A PROGRAM 27 


mind have been carefully explored and well-tested theories 
in regard to the structure and relations of things have been 
achieved. It is really astonishing to find how much has been 
accomplished. To divide is to conquer. But along with 
division has gone cooperation and growth. 

We should not be surprised to find that science includes all 
that common sense can give and much besides. And that is 
why philosophy must build ultimately upon the results of 
science. It is not so much that science is opposed to common 
sense on all points but that it includes that which is valuable 
in it. 

What, then, does philosophy add to science when it builds 
upon its results? How does philosophy supplement science? 

We have already made a few statements in regard to this 
question in the first chapter. Let us recall what we said there 
and relate it to the divisions of philosophy which we defined 
in the present chapter. We pointed out that the special 
sciences, which take up a particular domain to examine, do 
not exhaust all our problems, and this for two reasons: First, 
because the knowledge claimed by the special sciences rests 
upon human experience and the work of the mind, and this 
foundation must be studied before knowledge is complete; 
second, because the larger results of the various special 
sciences, their generalizations and basic concepts, must be 
coordinated and rounded out into a systematic and coherent 
view of the world. 

The first reason obviously concerns the motivation of logic 
and theory of knowledge. We want to know just what knowl- 
edge is, what it rests upon, its validity, nature, and reach. 
Clearly we are unable to give a complete interpretation of 
science apart from an investigation of these questions which 
science, itself, does not deeply concern itself with for lack of 
time. We can easily see the reason. No one science feels 
that these questions are its duty rather than the duty of 
some other special science. Why should physics examine these 
questions rather than chemistry or biology? Their examina- 


298 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


tion has, therefore, always devolved upon philosophy. We 
may say that logic and theory of knowledge have busied 
themselves with the general cognitional assumptions of the 
sciences. Let me again detail a few queries which reflection 
quickly raises. What is experience? Is a fact of perception 
the same as a scientific fact? What is a law of nature? Can 
we know things and events external to ourselves? Has nature 
a determinate structure which we can decipher? What is 
truth? What are the criteria of truth? These are unavoid- 
able questions which the very work of science presses upon us. 

But let it not for a moment be supposed that philosophy 
undertakes to test scientific facts in some super-scientifie way. 
It takes these facts at their face value much as science does. 
If they are faulty, only the technique of science can revise 
them. In no sense, does philosophy undertake to dictate to 
the special sciences. It only wishes to make clearer the as- 
sumptions underlying the whole process of investigation. 

Finally, in metaphysics, philosophy undertakes to examine 
the concepts or categories which the various sciences use and 
to clarify them and to systematize them. It does so in the 
light of logic and theory of knowledge and in view of the 
whole range of the sciences. We saw that this work can be 
partially done by the philosophic scientist. And let us hope 
that the number of these will increase in America as they have 
been increasing in Europe. But no scientist is a specialist in 
more than one field, and so beyond that field he is in much the 
Same position as the philosopher with, perhaps, this handicap 
that he has not been accustomed from the beginning to a wide 
field of interest and is apt to be dominated in his synthesis 
by the principles of some division of science like the inorganic 
sciences or the biological sciences or the social sciences. We 
shall have many occasions to examine such categories as time, 
life, mind, society, mechanical causation, teleology, freedom, 
necessity. This sort of analysis needs to be done. It is not the 
work of any one of the special sciences, though their results 
throw light upon it. 


A BRIEF SURVEY AND A PROGRAM 29 


The aim and method of technical philosophy should now be 
clear. Its work is that of supplementary and systematic 
reflection. The problems with which it deals are not unreal 
and artificial but definite and unavoidable and arise from 
the living movement of well-informed reflection. After read- 
ing these introductory chapters the student will, I hope, have 
a precise conception of philosophy in contrast to the confused, 
almost magical, notion of the uneducated layman such as 
Dickens humorously presents through the mouth of Mr. 
Squeers: ‘‘What’s the reason,’’ said Mr. Squeers, deriving 
fresh facetiousness from the bottle; ‘‘what’s the reason of 
rheumatics? What do they mean? What do people have ’em 
for, eh?”’ 

Mrs. Sliderskew didn’t know, but suggested that it was 
possibly because they couldn’t help it. 

‘“Measles, rheumaties, hooping-cough, fevers, agers, and 
lumbagers,’’ said Mr. Squeers, ‘‘is all philosophy together ; 
that’s what it is. The heavenly bodies is philosophy, and the 
earthly bodies is philosophy. If there’s a screw loose in a 
heavenly body, that’s philosophy; and if there’s a screw loose 
in a earthly body, that’s philosophy too; or it may be that 
sometimes there’s a little metaphysics in it, but that’s not 
often.’’ 

REFERENCES 
KULPE, Introduction to Philosophy, chaps. 1 and 4. 
Marvin, The History of European Philosophy, chap. 7. 
Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, chap. 3. 
Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy, chaps. 1, 2 and 3. 
Ritcuie, Scientific Method, chap. 1. 


SELLARS, Hssentials of Logic, chap. 1. 
THomson, Introduction to Science, chaps. 1, 2 and 4, 


CHAPTER III 
PERCEPTION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD 


The Common-Sense View of the World.—The outlook upon 
the world which people have to-day before they study science 
or philosophy very deeply may be called that of common 
sense. Certain distinctions are accepted as a matter of course, 
although they are not worked out clearly or in detail. Every 
one is aware of, and uses, certain broad contrasts, such as 
between the mental and the physical, the past and the pres- 
ent, the present and the absent, the percipient and the objects 
which he perceives, himself and others. Nature is, again, a 
term for a perdurable realm about whose history something 
is known and which will outlast the human beings who come 
and go upon its surface. 

The philosopher does not attempt to belittle this knowledge 
which hard and constant experience has forced upon man- 
kind. The plain man knows as well as the scientist, the poet 
as well as the philosopher, certain elementary and brutal 
truths about man’s place in nature. The latest dramatist but 
repeats what Job and Sophocles already knew. Man is obvi- 
ously only a part of a larger whole. 

We have good reason to believe that the common distine- 
tions which we all make are the result of adjustments and 
experiences which could have led to no other conclusions. 
I sit in my study and listen to the sounds which come up to 
me from the street. They mean to me a busy life of traffic 
and enterprise. I think of railroad and factory, store and 
farm, and the people who control them and work there day 
after day. I pick up a newspaper and read about the course 
of events in Europe, about an earthquake in Italy or Japan, 

30 


PERCEPTION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD 31 


about the completion of a railroad in Alaska. Or I divert 
myself in the evening by reading a chapter of some history or 
a novel. Thus I distinguish the past from the present, imagi- 
nary people from living people, my thoughts from things. I 
label and interpret the experiences which come to me. And 
I feel a naturalness and necessity in so doing. 

Common sense would seem, then, to present an interpreta- 
tion of many and diverse experiences in terms of a stable 
world of objects and events, classified, on the whole, in a satis- 
factory way. The individual scarcely thinks of escaping from 
these classifications and distinctions. They seem to him natu- 
ral and inevitable. To develop them, as science has done, 
seems to him possible and desirable; to ignore them, absurd. 
When the Spring comes, I look in the cellar for the spade 
I placed there last Fall, find it, and go out to dig up the soil 
to prepare it for the seed I intend to sow. As a matter of 
course, I assume the existence of all these things and the 
results of my action upon them. At every moment in the 
day, I am called upon to make adjustments to my surround- 
ings and to other people, and it does not enter my head to 
doubt that they are as real as myself. I am one thing among 
many in a tremendously large and complex world. 

But in stressing the agreements found in everyday life, I 
must not be assumed to be disregarding the disagreements 
which would arise as soon as any question came up as to the 
nature of existence, the meaning of life, immortality, the soul, 
God, the creation of the world, ete. There is a penumbra of 
theory and tradition of the most heterogeneous sort around 
these things and distinctions which I have been stressing. 
Are things animated by spirits as early man supposed? Have 
they a will? Is life a vital force? Is the soul a chemical 
complex? Or is it an immaterial substance? Are things 
made of matter? And what is matter? Yes, there are dis- 
agreements enough as to the nature of these things and of 
the self; but I do think that the contrasts and distinctions 
which I have mentioned are common and used by all, and 


39 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


that they seem to express the fact that man is an organism 
adjusting himself to an environment and capable of distin- 
euishing himself from the things around him. And as we are 
concerned, first of all, with theory of knowledge, we shall take 
our departure from the facts and claims of perception. What 
does perception seem to be? 

Natural Realism—When the individual comes to examine 
his experience in perception, he will, I am sure, discover that 
he seems to himself to perceive things or objects which are 
around him. These things seem given and open to inspection. 
We see them, as we say. There they are before our eyes and 
exposed to our touch. The very things we handle can thus be 
observed from various angles. And observation is an activity 
of ours which terminates on the very surface of the thing ob- 
served. To see, to inspect, to observe, to intuit, all have this 
sense of exposure, or givenness, on the part of the object 
toward which we are so acting. To perceive an object is to 
be aware of it, to have it given as that towards which we 
are attending. A cross-section of our experience while we are 
perceiving has these two terms in relation. 

Now it is easily noted that certain beliefs and meanings 
are ordinarily connected with perception. We think of these 
objects as continuants, as things which last and continue to 
exist whether we see them or not. We think of them as 
neutral or common to all spectators who look at them. And 
we think of them as unaffected by our mere observation. It 
is this outlook, this experience of perception, which we mean 
by natural realism. 

The physical world is, then, regarded at first as open to all 
observers and yet as independent for its existence and nature 
of this intermittent inspection. Thus when we try to discover 
what perception is experienced as, we are left with the impres- 
sion that it is of the nature of an event in which the individual 
is more or less active and has presented to him in his experi- 
ence a specific colored and shaped thing as his object. The 
chief condition of this event which is clearly recognized is the 


PERCEPTION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD 33 


use of his sense-organs. He who does not have eyes cannot 
see things. But, however conditioned, perceiving is an event 
in which the physical world, itself, is present in the field of 
vision. The individual opens his eyes and turns them in 
this or that direction and notes definite things. As ordinarily 
used, the term ‘seeing’ appears to be simply a name for this 
fact of presence, of presentation, of openness to observation 
when the eyes are used, just as hearing is a name for the 
presence of sounds in experience when the ears are stimulated. 
Perceiving is a more general term having a less definite refer- 
ence to any one of the senses. It would seem, therefore, not to 
explain anything but just to describe a complex fact of ex- 
perience, a correlation of the individual’s felt activity in the 
way of looking and hearing and touching with the givenness 
to inspection of a sensuous object. 

Common sense has no reflective theory of the nature and 
conditions of the event which it calls perceiving a thing. Cer- 
tainly there is no awareness of the activity of any peculiar 
ego or self from which energy goes forth to touch the thing 
and, as it were, to light it up. We see what is around us, 
and we who see these things are definite concrete individuals 
not so very different from the things we see, not at all differ- 
ent when these things are other persons. Probably, the tend- 
ency to-day for most of us is to accept the teachings of science 
and to conclude that our sense-organs must be stimulated and 
that these stimulations must be carried on to the central 
nervous system and that we react in definite ways towards 
the source of stimulation. But just why this physical process 
should lead to the presentation in our experience of the physi- 
cal object is rather a mystery. The suspicion is not absent 
that it is not the thing, itself, which is presented. But more 
of that later. 

Again, as we have already pointed out, there are attached 
to these presentations certain meanings which we firmly and 
automatically assign to them as objects. It is probable that 
these meanings are inchoate, that the child with its ‘‘buzzing, 


34 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


blooming confusion’’ does not yet possess them. Neverthe- 
less, the adult can find them as characteristic of his per- 
ceptual experience. These perceived things are independent 
of the act of perceiving, which is a purely human and organic 
affair. We cannot stare rocks and trees out of countenance, 
though we may break them into pieces by means of dynamite 
judiciously planted and exploded. The physical world is 
also judged to be permanent. The hills and heaths are 
eternal as measured against the brief span of life granted 
human beings. Combined with these two meanings is the 
sense of seeing and meaning the same object, of lifting it, 
handling it, going towards it. These meanings have their 
factual foundations which are not far to seek, and they 
seem to all of us natural and inevitable. We recognize things ; 
we react to them again and again. There would seem to 
be a fundamental validity in these realistic meanings of per- 
ception. Surely, the burden of proof is on those who would 
deny them. 

When, then, in the pages to follow the student is startled 
by the attack upon natural realism, he should bear in mind 
the frank recognition which has here been given of the struc- 
ture and meanings of perception. If I teach that natural 
realism is, in part, untenable and must be corrected by reflec- 
tion, it will be for what appear to me good and sufficient 
reasons, which I shall state. 

The Recognition of Natural Realism in Philosophy.—It 
will not be amiss to gather testimony that humanity is ordi- 
narily realistic, from philosophers who have been led by reflec- 
tion to doubt the independent reality of the world as pre- 
sented. 

Let us first glance at the testimony of Berkeley and Hume, 
two thinkers whose arguments have done much to break down 
natural realism or to put it on the defensive. ‘‘It is indeed 
an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men,’’ writes Berke- 
ley, ‘‘that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensi- 
ble objects, have an existence natural or real, distinct from 


PERCEPTION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD 35 


their being perceived by the understanding.’’? Similarly 
Hume observes: ‘‘That however philosophers may distinguish 
betwixt the objects and the perceptions of the senses; which 
they suppose coexistent and resembling; yet this is a distine- 
tion, which is not comprehended by the generality of man- 
kind, who as they perceive only one being, can never assent 
to the opinion of a double existence and representation. Those 
very sensations which enter by the eye or ear, are with them 
the true objects, nor can they readily conceive that this pen 
or paper, which is immediately perceived, represents another 
which is different from, but resembling it. In order, there- 
fore to accommodate myself to their notions, I shall at first 
suppose that there is only a single existence, which I shall call 
indifferently object or perception, according as it shall seem 
best to suit my purpose, understanding by both of them what 
any common man means by a bat, or a shoe, or stone, or any 
other impression, conveyed to him by his senses.’’? In short, 
Hume agrees that the generality of men regard their percep- 
tions as physical things and physical things as their per- 
ceptions. Hence, he eriticizes a theory to which we shall later 
refer, that our perceptions, that is, what is presented, are 
only copies in the mind of physical things outside the mind. 

In his Microcosmos, Lotze, an able German thinker, de- 
scribes natural realism in much the same way: ‘‘Naive con- 
sciousness always takes sensation to be perception of a 
complete, externally existing, real thing. It believes that the 
world les around us illuminated by its own radiance, and that 
outside of us tones and odours cross and meet one another 
in the immeasurable space that plays in the colours belonging 
to things. Our senses sometimes close themselves against this 
continual abundance, and confine us to the course of our inner 
life ; sometimes they open like doors to the arriving stimulus, 
to receive it as it is in all its grace or ugliness. No doubt dis- 
turbs the assurance of this belief, and even the illusions of 


1 Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, sec. 4. 
7Hume, J'reatise of Human Nature, p. 202. NSelby-Bigge ed. 


86 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


the senses, insignificant in comparison with the preponderance 
of consentient experience, do not shake the assurance that we 
here everywhere look into an actual world that does not cease 
to be as it appears to us when our attention is not turned to 
it. The brightness of the stars seen by the night watcher 
will, he hopes, continue to shine over him in slumber; tones, 
and perfumes, unheard and unsmelt, will be fragrant and 
harmonious afterwards as before; nothing of the sensible 
world will perish save the accidental perception of it which 
consciousness formerly possessed.’’ * 

And, as we shall see later, there is a strong tendency among 
recent thinkers to keep as near to natural realism as possible. 
In America, the new realists and the pragmatists have moved 
in the same direction, though differing on certain technical 
points. In England, also, there is a strong movement in 
defense of the essentials of natural realism. 

Natural Realism not a Theory or System.—But we must 
not make the mistake of taking the outlook which we have 
been describing as a theoretical position. Only as system- 
atized and refined to meet difficulties does it become a theory 
of knowledge. Natural realism is much more a practical 
adjustment which organizes many of the facts of experience 
in a rough-and-ready fashion. When difficulties arise, new 
distinctions are made without any very serious attempt to see 
how they fit into the more usual ones. We have given a broad 
outline of the outlook and must now pass to the qualifications 
which are often made, as difficulties are noted. But we should 
remember that, as qualifications are made, natural realism is 
tending to pass from a description of what perception seems 
to be to a theory. 

Why is it that I see one side of a thing while you who are 
standing in another position see another side? Common sense 
rephes immediately ‘‘because you are standing in one posi- 
tion in regard to it and I in another.’’ Position, then, has 
something to do with what I see. Why is this? Common 

 Lotze, Microcosmos, Book X, chap. 34, par. 1. 


PERCEPTION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD 37 


sense has no answer to give except the empirical fact that 
what we see varies with certain changes in position of either 
the perecipient or the thing. But if perception is merely an 
event in which things are revealed just as they are why can- 
not we see all the sides of a thing at once and even the in- 
terior of it? The fact is that we do not; and common sense 
naturally accepts the fact and notes certain empirical cor- 
relations such as that between position, sense-organs, atten- 
tion and part seen. 

Again, common sense sometimes speaks of seeing the side of 
a thing, as though the side seen were a geometrical part of 
the thing; at other times, it speaks of seeing an aspect of the 
thing or the way a thing appeared from a particular angle. 
An aspect seems to be more intangible and somehow more re- 
lated to the position of the perceiver than does a side. Yet 
common sense uses now one term and now the other. What 
it is certain of is that the physical thing itself is there and 
somehow seen. Further than that it has not worked the 
situation out. It is, as I have said, not systematic enough 
to be called a theory. 

There are many other difficulties which have not been faced 
by the view of perception which we have called natural 
realism. What, for instance, is the work of the sense-organs 
and the brain? Do these organs condition sensations which 
are experienced? Or do they enable the observer to look out 
upon the thing? So strong is the structure of perception with 
its meanings and beliefs that even scientists are led to hold 
what would seem to be contradictory positions. Color is out 
there, a quality of the thing; and color is a sensation in the 
mind. The thing is other than its appearance to us, for this 
differs according to circumstances; the thing is as it appears 
to us. 

In its study of perception, philosophy is concerned with 
the effort to do justice to all the relevant facts. Perhaps, 
natural realism can easily be corrected to meet these facts; 
perhaps, it must be modified very deeply ; perhaps, it must be 


388 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


given up almost entirely. In any case, once entered upon 
the adventure of systematic reflection, we cannot turn back 
and appeal to the instincts or beliefs of the plain man. We 
have a problem to solve and can do so only by a theory. As 
we have examined natural realism thus far, it is a description 
of an outlook which has apparently grown up naturally and 
has much in its favor, but it is most decidedly not a reflective 
theory of perception. 

Philosophy Should Start from Natural Realism.—Philos- 
ophy cannot have an arbitrary beginning any more than an 
arbitrary ending. Like science, it must grow out of ordinary 
experience as a supplementation or correction of it. Science 
arises out of specific problems which must be faced, investi- 
gated and, if possible, answered. This setting gives it its 
strength and significance. The ability to recognize problems 
which must be met and to apply fruitful methods was the 
distinguishing characteristic of men like Galileo, Newton and 
Faraday. Now one of the specific problems which philosophy 
is called upon to meet is the nature of perception. Is a physi- 
eal thing actually given to inspection in perception? Or is 
that which is given mental, though the thing is the source 
of stimulation and is that to which we are responding? Or is 
a physical thing a fiction suggested by the recurrence of our 
sensations? Now the setting of such questions is our experi- 
ence in perception. We must gather all the data relevant to 
it and make the best theory that we can to cover them. 

The specific problem before us concerns the perception of 
an external world. As we have tried to show, common sense 
believes that external things are directly observed. Were 
there no objections to such a view, we would continue to ae- 
cept it, contenting ourselves with refining our terms and show- 
ing their harmony. But since there are difficulties, we must 
see how they bear upon the beliefs which are given. This 
method I call genetic. We pass by a process of relevant criti- 
cism from opinions held without much reflection to opinions 
based on thorough investigation. Accordingly, philosophy 


PERCEPTION AND THE EXTERNAL: WORLD 39 


must begin with a description of the structure and beliefs 
characteristic of ordinary experience. Such a preliminary 
study prepares the foundation and gives a point of departure. 
The advance of philosophy, like that of science, must be 
gradual. Many ingenious philosophies in the past made the 
mistake of despising the day of small things and revelled in 
speculations starting from principles of an abstract sort. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of much of recent philoso- 
phy has been its concern with details and its very careful 
study of the structure and conditions of perception. This 
has given it an analytic and pedestrian character which some 
have not liked. But let us remember that philosophy has no 
peculiar source of knowledge. It, also, is hmited to the indi- 
cations given by experience. 

Natural Realism and Science.—What is the effect of the 
knowledge gained by science upon the beliefs which we have 
found to be so characteristic of ordinary experience? What 
is the drift of enlightened common sense, of common sense 
influenced by the teachings of science? 

The history of philosophy shows that the effect of science 
has always been the rise of a decided attempt at the recon- 
struction of natural realism. The belief in representative 
adeas, somehow intervening between the percipient and the 
thing perceived, has always appeared. This tendency to 
modify the belief that the physical object is literally pre- 
sented to the mind’s eye can be noted in both the ancient 
and the modern world. Let us take the seventeenth century 
in Europe. It was argued that the physical thing is the 
source of stimulation of the sense-organs, but that some- 
thing in the nature of a wave-movement or an emission of 
minute particles must link the object to the percipient. 
There must be a transmission across space, and this trans- 
mission must take time to occur. Is it not, then, the end- 
effect that is given to inspection? Perception, it was held, 
must be an act connected directly with this near effect rather 
than with the remote source. What we can note in the way 


40 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


of sensuous content must consist of transmitted ‘‘forms’’ or 
of sensations and images aroused in the mind when the sense- 
organs and brain are so stimulated. The actual physical 
thing out there, miles, it may be, from our body, is not 
given to direct inspection but rather this present content 
transmitted to us or aroused in us. 

Enlightened common sense finds such an argument very 
plausible. Not that there is any doubt that there are com- 
mon, neutral, independent, permanent physical things out 
there to which we respond and which we need as human be- 
ings, but that it is hard to see how they can be literally given 
to inspection, once the conditions of perception are reflected 
upon. but unless the individual is a serious and persistent 
thinker, the thread of the argument is not kept, and a sort ~ 
of working compromise ensues in which the individual alter- 
nates between the positions and minimizes their conflict. 
Even as serious a thinker as David Hume admitted this ten- 
deney to hold contradictory positions alternately according 
to the attitude of mind which was dominant. In the study he 
would be a skeptic. Out-of-doors he would be a realist. But, 
of course, this is not a satisfactory situation, and philosophy 
must endeavor to push on to a theory which covers all the 
facts in an intelligible way. 

Even the scientist ignores the problem as much as possible. 
He lives and thinks in large measure within the outlines set 
by natural realism. The physical world which physics and 
chemistry study is out there in space and perceivable. It is 
true that color is now considered an effect produced in the 
‘‘mind’’ by light-waves which impinge upon the eye, and 
that sound is a sensation caused by sound-waves. But knowl- 
edge is still thought of as dependent upon the observation of 
things. The power of an habitual outlook with which he has 
not refiectively broken is so great that he can believe at the 
same time that the real world is colored and that it is color- 
less, that it is soundless and that it is sonorous, that it is 
composed of small particles in ceaseless motion and that it is 


PERCEPTION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD 41 


just as it is seen. The reason for this lack of consistency is, 
of course, complex. His particular problems bulk largest in 
the mind of the specialist. The fact of knowledge is more 
important to him than its exact nature and means of attain- 
ment. And, besides, if he is keen, he realizes that these basic 
problems are not easy and require a specialist to handle them. 

While science begins with the outlook of common sense as 
regards perception and seldom reflectively breaks with it, it 
is forced more and more to substitute conception for percep- 
tion. Atoms and molecules and electrons can only be con- 
ceived; they cannot be sensuously perceived. The scientist 
knows that knowledge about the physical world is not as easy 
a matter as the untrained man is apt to suppose. He is 
aware how many hypotheses have been constructed, only to be 
given up, and he more than suspects that the physical world 
as presented in many textbooks is as much myth as science. 
The old presentational assurance has departed. The problem 
of the nature and conditions of perception is ripe for formu- 
lation, and the scientist is aware that philosophy has busied 
itself with it for many centuries. 

Summary.—The points made in this chapter should not 
be difficult to get clearly in mind. We have ealled the ordi- 
nary view of what perception is natural realism. Natural 
realism is not a theory so much as a set of beliefs combined 
with what perception seems to be as an experience. There 
are independent, permanent things which all can perceive, and 
perception is an event in which the individual is more or 
less active and in which things are given in his experience 
much as they are. He may not see all of the thing at once, 
nor perfectly, but it is the thing, itself, which is presented 
and open to his inspection. Philosophers have recognized this 
view of perception as an empirical fact even though their re- 
flection has led them to doubt its adequacy and truth. And 
it is being taken as a point of departure for the theory of 
perception. If a careful study of the conditions and varying 
content of perception permits us to retain the essentials of 


42 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


natural realism, it has the preference. But we must not forget 
that we have advanced in the process from an unsystematic 
outlook to a definite theory. However, many facts discov- 
ered by science in regard to the transmission of the stimulus 
which affects the sense-organs and in regard to the role played 
by the organism in perception suggest doubts as to the ade- 
quacy of natural realism. It has been left to philosophy to 
work these implications out in a systematic way. We shall 
now turn to the consideration of the difficulties confronting 
the ordinary view of perception. 


REFERENCES 


Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, chap. 9. 
FULLERTON, An Introduction to Philosophy, chap. 5. 
HOERNLE, Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, chap. 4. 
RussELL, The Problems of Philosophy, chap. 1. 
SELLARS, Critical Realism, chap. 1. 

Stout, Manual of Psychology, bk. 3, chap. 1. 

JAMES, Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, chap. 19. 


It is, I think, quite essential that the student read the treatment of percep- 
tion in some good text in psychology. I have suggested Stout, but Angell, 
Pillsbury, Titchener, Dunlap, Warren, or Woodworth are equally good. 


CHAPTER IV 
DOES NATURAL REALISM BREAK DOWN? 


Difficulties Confronting Natural Realism.—We have 
pointed out that the outlook of all of us tends to be realistic. 
We observe things, and these particular things are selections 
from a vast field which we think of as there all the time. And 
let us also note that our feelings and our thoughts are also 
given or experienced along with the particular things we 
note. There is no sense of a peculiar boundary line between 
thoughts and things. They are both characteristic elements 
of experience, though with different meanings. Thoughts and 
feelings are regarded as less in the common, neutral space and 
as more private and bound up with the individual percipient. 
But our experience is composed of both kinds of elements. 
In short, we must be careful to observe that the traditional 
dualisms between mind and matter of which every one has 
heard so much have small relevance to the individual’s field 
of experience as it is given. Mind and matter involve theories 
for the discussion of which we are not yet ready. For the 
present, all we wish to note is the kind of things which are 
given together in the individual’s experience, the contents, as 
it were, of his experience. In external perception, we are 
noting what we regard as common, spatial things, 7 our ex- 
perience temporarily by the act of perception, but not lim- 
ited to it nor dependent upon it. The individual’s attention 
is, AS we say, drawn to them or directed to them. 

Now reflection upon the mechanism of perception and upon 
the varying content of such external perception has led to 
the formulation of many difficulties in the way of longer 


acceptance of the view that the content given in experience is 
43 


44 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


literally a part of the object, its surface character; that phys- 
ical things actually enter and leave consciousness. It is with 
the systematic examination of these difficulties that we shall 
be concerned in this chapter. Can these difficulties be met by 
natural realism without a fundamental change in its beliefs? 
Or does natural realism in some measure break down? I do 
not want to suggest too abrupt an antithesis here. Natural 
realism is a vague complex some of whose elements may be 
essentially correct while others need correction. It should 
not surprise us to find that the situation confronting the 
human mind is far more subtle than practical common sense 
supposes. Would it not be strange if it were otherwise? 

Different groupings of the main objections to natural real- 
ism can and have been made. For our present purposes, the 
following points will suffice: (1) the fact that the content 
of perception seems to be a function of many processes both 
extra-organic and intra-organic; (2) the distinction between 
the physical thing and its appearances; (3) the lack of com- 
plete correspondent variation between things and what is 
presented; (4) the differences between the experiences of in- 
dividuals perceiving what they regard as the same object; 
(5) the difficulty met with in explaining images, dream-life 
and memory on the basis of natural realism; (6) the synthetic 
or constructed character of the perceptual field. These points 
overlap but differences in the angle of approach make this 
variety valuable. 

An important question of method arises here. Because of 
these difficulties confronting natural realism, many writers 
have swung entirely away from realism to what is called 
idealism. We must, I think, set our faces sternly against 
any such hasty step. We shall later see that philosophy took 
this hasty step for a while and has only in our own day re- 
turned to a reconsideration of realism. 

Our first endeavor should be to remodel and develop natural 
realism under the pressure of the facts. We shall retain the 
hope that, in spite of critical reflection, the realistic mean- 


DOES NATURAL REALISM BREAK DOWN? 45 


ings of both common sense and science can be retained while 
a more adequate theory of perception and of knowledge—for 
much of knowledge is different from perception—can be sub- 
stituted for the view that in perception the physical thing 
itself is given. 

The Content of Perception a Function of Many Factors.— 
Let us speak of the various characters which we can note in 
external perception as data of perception. These data con- 
stitute together what we shall call the content of perception. 
Thus when I hold up a piece of chalk we can all note its color, 
its shape, its size, ete. To these more visual data we can add 
tactual data. These discriminated data are the empirical fea- 
tures of perception. Clearly, we do not see matter or energy 
but just characters of this sort. The modern philosopher is 
very much of an empiricist and wants to work upward from 
what is undeniably given. 

In perception we seem to be intuiting an object in a sort of 
interpretative way. We must not forget this meaning or ref- 
erence to an object. The psychologist may be satisfied to 
analyze the content of perception as a percept or synthetic 
complex of a fairly high level, but the epistemologist should 
never lose sight of the claim, or meaning, that we are con- 
cerned with objects, that objects appear or are apprehended. 

Again, as we shall see, it was very common for earlier think- 
ers to speak of these data which constitute the content of 
perception as sensations. But this term involves a psycho- 
logical theory as to their status which must be carefully ex- 
amined. Just what are sensations? Are they simple mental 
entities? We shall see good reason to become skeptical of 
mental entities in any dualistic sense. And there is, likewise, 
no good reason to regard sensations as simple in any ulti- 
mate sense. It is best, then, just to be empiricists and take 
these characters as we can note them. Color and shape and 
weight are characters which we find ourselves assigning to 
things. We can speak of them as logical data. This piece of 
chalk is white, small, light, smooth, ete. But when we use 


46 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


these terms we must not forget that in perception we have in 
mind specific shades and shapes and sizes. It is this peculiar 
shade of white, ete. 

Now when we come to study these data of perception, we 
soon discover that they are relative to definite conditions. As 
these conditions vary, they vary. That is why I have spoken 
of them as functions—in.a mathematical sense—of many 
factors. They seem to be conditioned in definite ways. Thus 
color is a function of the source of illumination, the condition 
of the atmosphere, the nature of the reflecting body, the struc- 
ture of the eye, the nervous currents which arise in the brain, 
past training in color perception, ete. Modify any one of 
these factors, and we have good reason to believe that this 
datum of perception would change or disappear. We are 
able to gain this sort of knowledge of the conditions of our 
data, knowledge of the nature of empirical laws. 

These conditions of the data of perception fall naturally 
into two groups, the extra-organic and the intra-organic. 
Physics and chemistry deal with the extra-organic group, 
that is, with the events and processes which lead up to the 
stimulation of the percipient organism, whereas physiology 
and psychology attempt to deal with the mechanism of per- 
ception as an activity of the organism. These conditions to 
which data are discovered to be relative are not given in the 
experience of any one perception. They are known only by 
comparative study. May it not be for this reason that per- 
ception is taken to be the intuition of an external object just 
as it is, a sort of looking out upon the absolute qualities of 
things? Knowledge in other fields often forces us to modify 
hasty conclusions. 

The general facts are so well known that we need not go 
into them in detail. In the case of visual perception, there 
must be a stimulation of a distance-receptor, the eye. This 
stimulation involves the factors we enumerated above. The 
data we apprehend in the object are, accordingly, in some 
sense a function of external and internal processes which 


DOES NATURAL REALISM BREAK DOWN? 47 


ean be studied. The data of hearing are relative in like 
manner. And so of the data which we correlate with the 
other sense-organs. Let us also note the direction of the proc- 
esses which condition an act of perception. It is clearly 
from the physical object to the brain, while the attention 
involved in the act of perception seems to be from the organ- 
ism to the object, that is, we feel outward-looking and adjust 
ourselves to the object which we are perceiving. This dif- 
ference of direction of the causal process impinging on the 
organism as against the selective response of the organism is 
important. It should be noted that the first is unconscious, 
while the second is conscious. May it not be for this reason 
that we experience perception as an event in which we look 
at the object? The given datum is experienced with this 
sense of outward response. We shall have more to say of 
this later when we state our theory of perception. 

Can these data of perception, which make up its content, 
be regarded as intrinsic qualities of external things as they 
seem to be? Or are they not qualities at all, that is, not 
literal features of things, but rather merely data which arise 
in the percipient organism under certain conditions and 
which are used by the organism in connection with its re- 
sponse to stimuli, thus giving the dlusion that physical ob- 
jects are actually given in experience? Reflection suggests 
that we may need to reclassify the data of perception and, 
at the same time, change our notion of what we mean by 
qualities of things. These two points are clearly going to 
develop together. If the data of perception are not literal 
aspects of things, how can they be intrinsic, fixed qualities of 
things? And, if so, can we hope to have the intrinsic qual- 
ties of things—if there are such of the sensuous type—open 
to direct observation? The nature of perception is promising 
to offer subtle and fascinating problems. 

The Physical Thing and Its Appearance.—That a thing 
has a different appearance from different positions and under 
different conditions is a fact very commonly noted. Thus a 


48 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


strip of cloth has one color in daylight and another color when 
the source of illumination is electricity ; a coin has an elliptical 
shape when it is turned somewhat to one side and is round 
when looked at with its surface facing the observer. Every- 
thing seems to have this variety of appearances. How much 
a landscape changes as we approach it! And a house that 
seemed delightful at a distance both as regards shape and color 
may be quite altered upon a nearer approach. We could also 
refer to the problem of mirror-images in this connection. 
What is the relation between a thing and its appearance in 
a mirror? We connect the two for causal reasons and because 
of similarity in appearance, and yet we must admit their 
different location and the peculiar reversal which is charac- 
teristic of the image-object. Another example which has 
always attracted attention is the case of the straight stick 
which appears bent in water. We say that we know that it is 
straight because we can take it out of.the water again and look 
at it. Even while it is in the water, we may test its shape 
by running our hands over it. Of course, science informs 
us that we should see it that way and explains why we do. 
Nevertheless, reflection forces us to distinguish between the 
real shape of the stick and its apparent shape. 

Suppose that an individual walks away from a tree. The 
data of his perception gradually alter. The tree looks smaller, 
its branches seem closer together, its color changes from shade 
to shade, and this alteration of the appearance of the tree 
continues until it becomes a mere speck on the landscape. 
Here is a complex series of appearances considered as ap- 
pearances of the same tree; and this series can be reversed in 
its order by walking back towards the tree. The query is, 
How ean the tree have such a multitude of appearances? And 
iS One appearance more truly the appearance than another? 
If we limit ourselves to the content of perception, can we select 
one shape, one size and one color as the size, the shape and the 
eolor of the tree? Is not any selection essentially practical 
in its motivation? To look at a very large object, I stand 


DOES NATURAL REALISM BREAK DOWN? 49 


quite a distance away from it; while I get close to a small 
object. 

This way of approach to the study of perception brings out 
the varying content observed when we regard ourselves as 
seeing the same tree. Clearly our results harmonize with the 
suggestions made in the preceding section. The appearance 
is not an absolute, intrinsic character of the object, but is 
relative to conditions. To talk about the appearance of an 
object is an elliptical expression. We suppress the reference 
to the place of the observer in relation to the object, as well 
as much else such as external and internal factors. Only 
as these are given do we have something of the nature of a 
definite correlation. But we are now far from the vague out- 
look of common sense. The appearance of an object is a vari- 
able and cannot be attached to it as a possession. 

But what are these complex data which we call appearances? 
Are they physical? Are they out there, as they seem to be, 
in a neutral space? If so, do they interact with the actual 
things with which science deals? Real houses are built by 
masons. Are the appearances of houses wraiths of these? 
But if appearances are non-physical, how am I able to pass 
from my intuition of them to my perception of the actual 
physical things without noticing any marked difference? Do 
I ever intuit anything but appearances? 

The Lack of Correspondent Variation.—The third objec- 
tion to the main thesis of natural realism rests upon facts 
similar to those which we have just been examining. The 
principle under which this further objection comes has been 
formulated as follows: ‘“‘If anything X exhibits variations 
which are not shared by Y, X and Y must be distinct ex- 
istences.’’ 

Now the content of perception, the datum given, the appear- 
ance of a thing varies from moment to moment as we walk 
away from it, while we have good reason to believe that the 
physical thing, itself, does not so vary. We believe that the 
table is square although we see it from this angle as possess- 


50 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


ing obtuse and acute angles. Such is the situation so long 
as we accept the belief in external perdurable things changed 
only by the action upon them of definite forces. Experiment 
shows that the reason for the changes in appearance of things 
is often the position of the percipient. The appearance of a 
thing changes while the thing remains the same. Can, then, 
X be identical with Y? Must not a thing and its appearance 
be different realities? 

Experience forces us to accept a still more basic variation. 
May not physical things have ceased to exist while we are 
perceiving what we ordinarily identify with them? Thus 
far we have stressed changes in position and the resultant 
modifications in the datum of perception. Let us now intro- 
duce the time element along with space. We are informed 
by astronomers, for example, that a star which we just now 
perceive may have been destroyed centuries ago, so long does 
it take light to travel to us through inter-stellar space. How, 
then, can we possibly identify the content we see with the 
star itself? 

The Differences between the Perceptual Data of Individ- 
uals.—The next three arguments against natural realism 
stress the intra-organie factors, especially those which have 
commonly been called mental. 

It is a commonplace that the datum of perception is partly 
determined by the percipient’s interests and training. The 
artist will note shades of color hardly distinguishable by the 
untrained. The same is true for sounds, harmonies, flavors 
and odors. But can these different data exist at the same time 
as qualities of the object? Shall we say that the object is seen 
more truly by the artist than by the untrained observer? 
Perhaps that is so in a sense. And yet we have the problem 
of classifying the less true datum as not really out there, as 
false, subjective, or whatever term we wish to employ. And 
in the case of color-blindness what right have we to regard 
the normal eye as an instrument for the detection of the real 
color out there, while we hold that the other eye gives some- 


DOES NATURAL REALISM BREAK DOWN? 51 


thing subjective? Or shall we hold that the object is both 
grey and red at the same time? Clearly the nature of the per- 
cipient makes a great difference in what is perceived. The 
psychologist is convinced that what is seen is largely depend- 
ent upon what we expect to see; and what we expect to see is a 
function of what we have experienced in the past. But the 
past introduces the personal history of the individual, which is 
always more or less unique. 

The situation is this: If the datum of perception varies from 
individual to individual, how is it possible to select one datum 
as the intrinsic nature of the object? If perception is an event 
in which the object is given to inspection, we would be com- 
pelled to maintain that these individuals saw more or less simi- 
lar things and not the same thing. 

Can Natural Realism Account for Memory?—If percep- 
tion is an event in which the thing is given, how shall we 
account for our memory of it when it is no longer present or 
even existent? Common sense hesitates here and is inclined 
to admit that images are subjective and not physical things. 
But whence do these images come if perception is merely a 
givenness of the object? It is much easier to understand 
images if we regard them, as does the psychologist, as geneti- 
eally connected with the datum of perception. If the image 
is mental may it not be because the datum of perception is 
likewise mental? And if the datum of perception is external 
may not the image be likewise material? They do not seem 
to differ so markedly that one can be given externality and 
independence of the observer while the other is denied it. Cer- 
tainly our images are like our perceptual data. 

Now I think that it is undeniable that we tend to think 
of images and ideas as personal and in some sense mental. 
It is probable that we have no very clear notion at first of 
what we should mean by mental. We know that our sense- 
organ must be stimulated when we perceive things, while this 
is unnecessary for images and thoughts of things. Also 
images and thoughts are more under our control than are 


o2 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


things. We do not lift images and thoughts or break them 
in pieces and modify them in that way. In some sense, we 
can carry them around with us and recall them at will. 
They have an intangible character and are not common. 

But do not data of perception have this same intangible 
character aS soon as we distinguish them from things and 
regard them as appearances? It is the thing we touch and 
break in pieces and not its appearance to us. The similarity 
between the datum of perception and the datum of memory 
now suggests that both are internal and are somehow bound 
up with the individual who is perceiving and remembering. 

Reflecting upon these facts and difficulties, enlightened 
common sense has swung more and more to the conclusion that 
the data which we observe are internal and are bound up 
with conditioned responses in the individual. It is true that 
it easily falls back into natural realism and seems to per- 
ceive the qualified surface of things. But this only means 
that it has been unable to think the new tendency through 
into a stable and satisfactory outlook. We are now more 
than ever convinced that common sense has no systematic 
view of things and that many problems lurk in the back- 
eround. 

The Field of Perception Involves Construction.—The 
logician and the psychologist have studied perception inten- 
sively and have come to agree fairly well on certain points. 
Thus they both affirm that there is much interpretation and 
construction in perception. A few quotations may make this 
point clearer. ‘“‘The results of all the various experiences 
cooperate in giving the object that is seen the appearance 
it has. To put it the other way, the object that is seen is 
the one that serves to explain the earlier experiences; it is the 
one that harmonizes all of the uses and observations of it in 
the past. By constant trial and use, a construction devel- 
ops that proves true when tested in any way. This is ac- 
cepted as the real object as opposed to mere sensations. 
Whenever the sensation presents itself, this developed object 


DOES NATURAL REALISM BREAK DOWN? | 53 


arises in consciousness.’’? William James always stoutly 
protested against the view that percepts are merely clusters 
of units called sensations, and it would seem that psycholo- 
gists are increasingly agreeing with him. There is an organi- 
zation of tendencies at work, and what we see is a resultant. 
‘‘A pure sensation is an abstraction.’’ 

It should also be noted that we can readily distinguish be- 
tween the apprehension of a sensory datum and the developed 
intuition of what we call things. Thus on a Sunday morn- 
ing I hear a scund outside my front door and say that the 
morning paper has come. The sound is discriminated, recog- 
nized, and interpreted. It means the dropping of a news- 
paper on the step. How easily the mind passes from sign 
to thing signified. There is complication, fusion, interpreta- 
tion. Strictly speaking, concepts enter in from past experi- 
ence. The experience of a thing is, therefore, a very com- 
plex process. Motor tendencies, expectations, fusions, con- 
cepts, all blend in a typical experience. Logicians are affirm- 
ing this fact when they assert that a perception involves judg- 
ment. When I look out of a window and see a person pass- 
ing, how much of my experience expresses knowledge which 
I have gradually gained! Our abilities are achievements. 

It would seem to follow from this that the presentation 
of things rests upon many integrated processes. The unit 
of cognition is something richer than sensation. Writes Dr. 
Eaton: ‘‘The cognitive unit, a presentation, is therefore com- 
plex. It includes a concept (and often a belief) as well as 
sensations. If I gaze from my window at the trees bending 
in the wind, there is much more in my mind than impressions 
of color, movement, shape, and relative position. I see the 
trees. My mind leaps beyond sensations to concepts—con- 
cepts of solid three-dimensional objects of a certain nature. 
The fusion of concepts and sensations is the presentation of 
the object, and neither concepts nor sensations by themselves 
would give the peculiar kind of cognition I eall ‘presenta- 

1Pillsbury, Hssentials of Psychology, p. 159. 


54 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


DP SPD 3 


tion. Similar views have been expressed by Dewey, 
Stout, James Ward, Bosanquet and others; and appear to 
correspond to the facts of perception. 

We may conclude that the perception, or intuition, of ob- 
jects is not the simple and immediate act it seems to be to 
the individual interested only in action and results. What 
we see is In some sense a construct expressing stimulation and 
complicated response. And yet we all believe that we see 
an independent object. Here is the paradox which theory of 
knowledge must puzzle over. 

The Psycho-Physiological Theory of Perception.—A very 
good way to gather together the various arguments which 
have been employed against natural realism is to connect 
them with the psycho-physiological theory of perception. 
According to this dominant theory, the sense-organs must 
be stimulated before a veridical or true perception arises. 
This excitation is transmitted to the cortex, and only then 
does there arise what is called by the psychologists a percept 
and by common sense the appearance of a physical thing. 
The percept seems to be of the nature of a response into 
which the higher nervous processes enter. Thus the con- 
tent perceived is connected with the end-term of a complex 
causal process whose direction is from the object to the 
organism. How, then, can this content be identified with the 
physical object which is part of the beginning of this causal 
process? How can the percept which arises in the individ- 
ual’s experience when he is looking at a star be identified with 
the star? This theory seems well based and to work defi- 
nitely against natural realism. 

But we must point out a certain inadequacy in this view 
as a theory of perception. It calls attention to the proc- 
esses underlying and conditioning perception, but it does 
not analyze the perceptual experience itself. Let us look 
at perception from the inside again and try to see why it is 
taken to be the awareness of things. Why is it that the 

2R. M. Eaton, Symbolism and Truth, p. 15. 


DOES NATURAL REALISM BREAK DOWN? © 5d 


datum of perception is taken to be the colored surface and 
outline of independent perdurable things? 

We should note that the datum has a spatial character and 
that it also has a visual locus in the third dimension. It has 
a place in relation to other data. This one appearance of a 
tree is given as before or to one side of the appearance of 
another tree; and the appearance of the individual’s body 
changes position in relation to these other data of perception. 
As we walk up to one of these visual data we encounter 
resistance and add to the datum the new elements of touch 
and muscular effort. I do not think that it is difficult to 
realize how soon from within experience itself the charac- 
teristic meanings and beliefs of natural realism develop and 
how readily the complex datum of perception is regarded 
as the colored, hard surface of an independent, permanent 
thing which has capacities and can affect other things in defi- 
nite ways. The field of the individual’s experience has an 
internal structure in which the actions of looking and walk- 
ing are set over against a visual datum having a definite 
visual place in the third dimension. Attention is a felt direc- 
tion toward these appearances from which good and evil come. 
No wonder that perception seems to be an event in which 
sensible things are given to observation! Sensible appear- 
ances have acquired meanings of a realistic sort. The 
psycho-physiological theory of the mechanism of perception 
should be supplemented by this analysis of the internal 
structure of perception which, by means of visual localization, 
enables the individual to seem to look, in the reverse direc- 
tion from the causal, outward to things. 

Conclusions —This brief examination of the inadequacies 
and difficulties facing natural realism raises many questions. 
It is surely evident by now that serious and prolonged re- 
flection cannot be escaped. He who has gone thus far can 
hardly turn back. Perception cannot be an event in which 
physical things are literally given in experience. That which 
is given is a datum which has a visual place and has ac- 


56 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


quired meanings until it seems to be the very colored and 
tangible surface of a perdurable thing. But the data of 
perception are functions of many conditions and cannot be 
regarded as intrinsic qualities of things as they are at first 
naively taken to be. There is good reason to consider them 
mental, though we must not be too hasty in our classification 
and we must be certain that we have clear ideas of what the 
mental is. 

Another point must be noted. Because the interpretation 
of perception characteristic of natural realism breaks down, 
must we relinquish those realistic meanings and beliefs which 
we find in experience? It does not at all follow. When 
we examine the movement of reflection as directed upon per- 
ception we soon note that the physical thing, while no longer 
held to be open to a bare act of awareness, is assumed to be 
one of the conditions of that which is given, viz.—the con- 
tent of perception. Clearly, the object of our perception 
is still regarded as just as real as ourselves. We have em- 
phasized the causal, or existential, condition of perceptual 
knowledge, which is an organism stimulated by, and re- 
sponding to, an object. It is this foundation of perception 
which is emphasized by the psycho-physiological theory of 
perception. But we must not be so impressed by this knowl- 
edge of the existential basis of perception as to forget that 
in the indavidual’s experience, or consciousness, perception 
is an elementary act of cogmtion. What our analysis should 
lead us to do is to move from the first naive assumption that 
perception is the givenness of the object to the view that per- 
ception is an interpretation of the object in terms of as- 
signed characters. So automatic is this interpretation and 
so conditioned by the object that we often say that the 
object appears, or reveals itself, in perception. We are domi- 
nated by a sense of an object. 

There is good reason to believe, then, that a theory of 
knowledge can be developed that will do justice to these 
realistic meanings and beliefs and yet not be open to the 


DOES NATURAL REALISM BREAK DOWN? | 57 


objections which proved fatal to natural realism. But it 
took philosophy a very long time to master this situation. 
In what is called representative realism the causal founda- 
tion obseured cognition and led to the view that we know 
ideas first and not things, instead of the true position that 
we know things by means of, and in terms of, ideas. This 
representative realism was also distorted by what is called 
Cartesian dualism, a dualism between two substances called, 
respectively, mind and matter. The weakness of this type 
of representative realism led to the rise of idealism. We 
may say that philosophy became perplexed but increasingly 
mastered its material by advances in psychology and logic 
and by the aid of corresponding developments in science 
until the field was ripe for a new advance in our own day. 
To this advance, idealism, pragmatism and realism have all 
contributed, each criticizing the others and preventing im- 
mature conclusions. In the succeeding pages, we shall find 
out what all these movements have stood for. 

In the present chapter, I have in a measure set my face 
against that form of modern realism which seeks to de- 
fena and develop naive, or natural, realism. I have tried 
to show why I think that natural realism breaks down. It 
does not seem to me to understand the nature of perception, 
nor does it seem to me able to account for illusions. No one 
has made greater effort to defend natural realism than Pro- 
fessor Alexander. His ingenuity is astonishing. He is be- 
yond question one of our great thinkers. And yet it seems to 
me that his position is based on the assumption that a form 
of realism which distinguishes between the content of percep- 
tion and the object of perception and which thinks of per- 
ception as the interpretation of the object in terms of this 
content cannot be carried through. Let me quote a passage: 
‘*T cannot help confessing here how much simpler it would be 
and how much laborious explanation it would save, if only 
it were true that our intuitions and sensations were mental 
as is commonly supposed, and how easy it is compared with 


58 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


our procedure to refer all these variations in part to the 
mind or its body.’’? 

The history of modern philosophy presents us with the 
efforts of the human mind to break loose from naive realism 
and still retain a belief in a physical world not too different 
from that which seems revealed in perception and in science. 
To follow this movement will give the student a perspective he 
ean secure in no other way. He will see that, in idealism, this 
belief wavered and was even submerged. Let me suggest, 
again, that two clues will be of assistance: first, that it took 
a long time for thinkers to distinguish between the existential 
foundation of cognition and cognition itself; and, second, that 
the Cartesian dualism—which we shall study—between mind 
and matter as two distinct substances made the first short- 
coming fatal. We shall now betake ourselves to a study of © 
the most influential historical systems of modern times. 


REFERENCES 


BroaD, Perception, Physics, and Reality, chap. 1. 

DRAKE and others, Essays in Critical Realism, chap. 1. 
HOERNLE, Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, chap. 5. 
RUSSELL, Problems of Philosophy, chap. 2. 

SELLARS, Critical Realism, chap. 1. 

HAtTon, Symbolism and Truth, chap. 1. 


+S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, vol. 2, p. 199. 


CHAPTER V 
EARLY REPRESENTATIVE REALISM 


The Value of an Historical Approach.—The human mind 
moves forward very slowly and, as it were, one step at a 
time. Indeed, if the step taken forward is unusually long, 
it is succeeded by a short step backward. Even slightly 
novel ideas must be assimilated and their implications worked 
out and reacted to. To those who come long after, the ad- 
vance made by any period may not seem very great. But 
it is by means of such hesitating steps that the modern view 
of the world has been achieved, or, had I better say, is in proc- 
ess of being achieved. 

Now to a certain extent the individual mind tends to 
travel—though more rapidly—the same path that the race 
has traversed. And the individual who has seriously under- 
taken the task of philosophizing will usually find that many 
of the positions which suggest themselves to him have already. 
been examined by past thinkers. Their interpretations will 
probably not completely satisfy him; and yet what extremely 
able men have so carefully done cannot fail to be of assist- 
ance. This is one reason why an introduction to philosophy 
must give some attention to significant epochs in the history 
of philosophy. 

The seventeenth century witnessed the vigorous beginning 
of modern philosophy. New trends of thought and new prin- 
ciples of explanation, begun during the Renaissance, had 
found sufficient encouragement in observation and experiment 
to awaken interest and even confidence. The result was that 
systems of philosophy arose to interpret both the spirit and 
the general implications of this growing movement. It is 

59 


60 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


in a way invidious to select from the many able thinkers of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a few for special 
consideration. And yet since we intend to subordinate the 
history of philosophy to the analysis of philosophical prob- 
lems, it seems best to present the main ideas of Descartes, 
Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant. We shall take Descartes 
and Locke as typical of a combination of dualism in ontology 
and representative realism in theory of knowledge. Both 
accepted the traditional distinction between matter and spirit 
and thought of knowledge as demanding ideas in some sense 
distinct from their objects. In Berkeley’s earlier writings at 
least, we find a form of idealism developed which has been 
very influential. He attacks the teachings of both Locke 
and Descartes. Hume is the critical skeptic who points out 
flaws and weaknesses in all these positions but does not claim 
to offer any positive doctrine to take their place. Kant sums 
up this movement and attempts to make a fresh start. 

With, perhaps, the exception of Kant, these writers stated 
their own conclusions so clearly and unambiguously that no 
better introduction to philosophical problems than their writ- 
ings can be found. We shall try to benefit by their analyses. 
And yet we shall try to find their mistakes, for mistakes 
they undoubtedly made. The whole movement is especially 
suggestive because these thinkers, as they follow one an- 
other, arrive at a deeper insight into the problems. 

Cartesianism.—Descartes is usually spoken of as the 
‘‘father of modern philosophy.’’ The reason for this eulo- 
oistic designation is that he formulated in a sharp and even 
drastic way the problems with which modern philosophy has 
busied itself. He begins with a dualism between mind and 
matter, an assumption characteristic of Western thought 
since the days of St. Augustine, and makes this contrast be- 
tween the material and the spiritual more extreme than ever 
before. They become for him absolute opposites which have 
nothing in common. But it is by mind that we know. And 
what is given to our awareness is our Own mental states. 


EARLY REPRESENTATIVE REALISM 61 


We can know physical things only by means of these direct 
objects of our thought. Only so far as these represent the 
physical world can we know it. Such is the general posi- 
tion adopted by Descartes. To realize to the full the character 
of his teaching, we should further note that matter is essen- 
tially identified with extension or space, as this is conceived 
in mathematics, and that conception is sharply distinguished 
from sense and imagination. Let us examine these points in 
more detail. 

Descartes is convinced that the physical world is completely 
alien to the spiritual or mental. No matter what change a 
bit of matter may undergo it cannot be transformed and pass 
into something else of an immaterial kind. Mind and matter 
are fundamentally different. The essence of the one is ex- 
tension, that of the other consciousness. Matter is homo- 
geneous, passive, divisible into parts. Mind is active, uni- 
tary, replete with content. It cannot be said that he proves 
this dualism. Rather does he take his departure from it and 
seek to justify it. 

This dualism of mind and matter led to difficulties in re- 
gard to the problem of how mind and body are related. Logi- 
cally, Descartes would have to maintain that there is no genu- 
ine relation, that sensations are not produced in the mind 
by means of changes in the body and that volitions do not 
actually affect the body and lead to specific types of behavior. 
But this extreme position was repugnant to him and he 
taught that the soul was somehow connected with the pineal 
gland of the brain and there received stimuli and directed 
the nervous currents. This compromise position shows how 
impossible such an extreme dualism is, into how many puz- 
zles it leads us. Descartes is forced to contradict himself 
again and again. How ean a non-spatial thing be in space 
to the extent of being influenced and affected by bodily 
changes? And how ean such an immaterial thing induce 
bodily changes in its turn? The effort to overcome this sharp 
dualism has motivated much of modern thought. We shall 


62 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


go into the problem in detail toward the end of the book 
and attempt to show that there is no need to begin with a 
dualism of the Cartesian type. 

Let us next consider the situation in regard to mind. It 
is here that we find the centre of gravity of his theory of 
knowledge. By the method of systematic and forced doubt, 
he seeks to show that the mind is something certain and in- 
dubitable. All external things, he maintains, can be doubted. 
The senses deceive us while we are awake, and we find it hard 
to discover definite marks by which to distinguish waking 
from sleeping states. ‘‘I shall suppose, then,’’ he writes, 
‘‘not that God, who is very good and the sovereign source 
of truth, but that a certain evil genius, no less wily and 
deceitful than powerful, has employed all his ingenuity to 
deceive me. I shall think that the heavens, the air, the ~ 
earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all other external things, 
are nothing but illusions and idle fancies which he employs 
to impose upon my credulity. I shall consider myself as hay- 
ing no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, as having no senses, 
but, as beleving falsely that I possess all these things.’’ 
But, he concludes, there is one thing that I cannot doubt, 
that is ultimate, and that is that I think. I think, therefore, 
I am. Even the most radical doubt involves a doubting. 
Thus Descartes is left with the reality of thoughts of all 
kinds, sensations, images, volitions, ideas. Thus Descartes 
believes that he has found something basic and indubitable 
upon which to build. 

But what is the self, soul, mind or I which Descartes as- 
sumes at this point? As Hume argues later, it should be 
only the thoughts which are experienced. These, alone, are 
empirical. As a matter of fact, however, Descartes assumes 
a soul or mind or self which has these thoughts. Yet if it 
has these thoughts or is aware of them, it must be in some 
fashion distinct from them. How, then, is it known? Des- 
cartes never answered this question clearly. 

The position arrived at is this: We have direct and im- 


EARLY REPRESENTATIVE REALISM 63 


mediate knowledge of thoughts connected with the mind. 
Some of these thoughts claim to represent material things ex- 
ternal to the mind, but we have, as yet, no guaranty that their 
claim is true. Our minds seem isolated from things and shut 
up in themselves. Is there any way to judge these claims? 
At this stage, in a typically scholastic way, Descartes argues 
to the existence of a God who is perfect and will not deceive 
us. Having proven God, he obtains from him the guaranty 
he desires. ‘‘But after I have recognized the existence of a 
God, and because I have at the same time recognized the fact 
that all things depend upon him, and that he is no deceiver, 
and in consequence of that I have judged that all I con- 
cewe clearly and distinctly cannot fail to be true... no 
opposing reason can be brought against me which shall make 
me ever call it in question; and thus I have a true and cer- 
tain knowledge of it.’’ Thus Descartes has to prove the 
existence of God before he can prove the existence and nature 
of the things around us. 

Let us now examine his view of representation and his 
separation of sense and imagination from conception. 

We clothe things with sensuous qualities, but these are 
changeable and come and go while the material things re- 
main. They cannot, therefore, constitute what is essential 
to the external object. Moreover, sensuous qualities are 
obscure and indistinct because we cannot comprehend how 
they are possessed by the object. On the contrary, the 
thought of things as extended is clear and distinct. This 
idea is, therefore, a true representation of the nature of 
physical things. This rejection of sense and acceptance of 
mathematical concepts is clearly present in a famous passage 
in the Third Meditation: ‘‘I find in myself two ideas of 
the sun quite different: the one has its origin in the senses, 
and is to be put in the class of those which come from with- 
out (that is, through sense); by which it appears to me ex- 
tremely small; the other is drawn from astronomical consid- 
erations, that is to say, from certain notions born with me, 


64 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


or at least formed by myself, in whatever way that may be; 
by which it appears to me many times greater than the whole 
earth. Certainly these two ideas which I conceive of the sun 
cannot both be like the sun; and reason makes me believe 
that that which comes immediately from its appearance in 
sense is the one which least resembles it.’’ This opposition 
of an abrupt type between perception and conception must be 
held in mind. It is characteristic of what is called rationalism. 
How are concepts achieved? What are their logical relations 
to the data of observation? We shall see that Locke tried to 
break down this sharp contrast between sense and reason 
but was not consistent in his position. Some historians of 
philosophy have held that the Copernican theory of the solar 
system, so opposed in a way to what we perceive when we look 
up into the heavens, encouraged this excessive rationalism. 
Undoubtedly the rise of mathematics and the mechanical 
theory of nature had much to do with it. The connection 
between perception and conception was not understood, and 
they tended to fall apart into two mental realms having little 
commerce with each other. It is for this reason that we must 
eall Descartes’ position rationalistic representative realism. 
As one student of Descartes puts it, ‘‘Our sense-images are 
but pictures in our minds, and do not represent, but misrep- 
resent, the true nature of the real. There are two external 
worlds, the one rich with its bright variety of diverse quali- 
ties, appearing to the ‘senses,’ the other, poverty-stricken, 
constituted only of matter and motion, and discovered by 
the understanding.’’ 4 

In conclusion, let us note the outstanding features of this 
philosophy. It is clearly dominated by a metaphysical dual- 
ism between two substances called mind and matter. The 
knower is shut up in mind and needs some guaranty that 
certain of his ideas are true of the material world. And 
if the knower is in a very real sense limited to his ideas and 
needs some supernatural sanction before he can have any 

*Norman Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, pp. 16-17. 


EARLY REPRESENTATIVE REALISM 65 


assurance that there is an external world and that his ideas 
reveal it, is not knowledge in a precarious situation? Rep- 
resentative realism is obviously handicapped by this artificial 
metaphysical setting. 

Locke.—The English thinker, Locke, continued the en- 
quiry begun by Descartes. There is no doubt that he was 
very much influenced by Descartes. He, also, was a meta- 
physical dualist regarding matter as distinct from mind. 
But Locke is more aware of the difficulties and is more of a 
skeptic than Descartes. He even hazards the suggestion that 
God might have superadded to matter a faculty of thinking. 
We know so little of substance that we can see no reason 
why there should be two rather than one. On the whole, 
Locke is more of an empiricist than Descartes and seeks 
to lessen the gulf between sense and reason. 

Locke’s purpose was ‘‘to inquire into the original, cer- 
tainty and extent of human knowledge, together with the 
grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and assent.’’ Knowl- 
edge, he teaches, is conversant about ideas. ‘‘Since the mind, 
in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate 
object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can con- 
template, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant 
about them.’’ And here we have the famous definition of 
knowledge which seems to make knowledge of an external 
world impossible, viz.—that it seems to be nothing but the 
perception of the connection of and agreement or disagree- 
ment and repugnancy of any of our ideas. | 

Locke defines an idea in very general terms. It is whatso- 
ever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. 
Sensations, images, concepts are all ideas. What are the 
sources of these ideas? There are two sources, the stimula- 
tion of the sense-organs is one source, and the perception of 
the operations of the mind the other. Locke does not look 
upon the mind as passive but as busying itself with ideas. 
His conception of the mind is, however, very vague. On 
the whole, it is something which lies back of the ideas, oper- 


66 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


ates upon them, and possesses them. ‘The soul begins to have 
ideas when it begins to perceive. 

Ideas are simple or complex. The ideas which have their 
source in the senses are at first simple and unmixed. Color 
is different from sound and both from fragrance. In like 
manner, simple ideas of reflection are gained by introspec- 
tion. These two kinds of simple ideas furnish the materials 
of all our knowledge. Out of them mixed or complex ideas 
are formed. There are three kinds of complex ideas: modes, 
substances, and relations. Modes are those complex ideas 
which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposi- 
tion of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as de- 
pendences on, or affections of, substances; such are the ideas 
signified by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, ete. The 
ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas 
as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsist- 
ing by themselves, in which the supposed or confused idea of 
substance, such as it is, 1s always the first and chief. Locke’s 
idea of substance is peculiar and interesting. There is more 
of the agnostic element in his thought of substance than in 
Descartes’. It is something, I know not what, in which 
qualities inhere or which supports them. Relations are ob- 
tained by comparing one idea with another. 

Now I think that we must pass some criticisms upon Locke’s 
doctrines. Are ideas as simple and distinct as Locke sup- 
poses? It is clear that he neglects the spatial and temporal 
matrix in which color and sound are perceived. His mani- 
fold of sensations had vicious consequences in philosophy 
for it led to a sort of mental atomism which regarded rela- 
tions as fictions. Does the mind create new ideas or is it 
limited to a fixed number which it must add together and 
arrange in various ways? How about relations? Is not the 
idea of similarity or of difference a new idea? What are 
the conditions of ideas? Must not the mind respond in an 
analytic way to the stimulus coming through the sense- 
organs before we note clear sense-data? In short, Locke 


EARLY REPRESENTATIVE REALISM 67 


merely began the study which logic and psychology have 
since been carrying on. So much for Locke’s view of experi- 
ence. 

Were we able to go into the details, we could show how 
puzzled Locke was about the whole problem he had raised. 
Experience is like a small spot of light in the midst of im- 
penetrable darkness. We do not really know what ma- 
terial substance is, nor what spiritual substance is. And 
yet Locke is certain that there is an external world. ‘‘I 
think nobody can, in earnest, be so skeptical as to be uncer- 
tain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels.’’ 
In the following passage, Locke indicates why he is so certain 
that the physical world exists and his reasons certainly ap- 
peal to all of us: ‘‘Thus I see, whilst I write this, I can 
change the appearance of the paper, and by designing the 
letters tell beforehand what new idea it shall exhibit the very 
next moment, by barely drawing my pen over it, which will 
neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will), if my hand 
stands still, or though I move my pen, if my eyes be shut; nor, 
when those characters are once made on the paper, can I 
choose afterward but see them as they are; that is, have 
the ideas of such letters as I have made. Whence it is mani- 
fest, that they are not barely the sport and play of my own 
imagination, when I find that the characters that were made 
at the pleasure of my thought do not obey them; nor yet 
cease to be, whenever I shall faney it; but continue to affect 
the senses constantly and regularly, according to the figures 
I made them.’’+ But the problem for a thinker is to work 
out a system which will justify and explain his beliefs. Let 
us now consider some of Locke’s characteristic doctrines. 

Like Descartes’, Locke’s view of knowledge is usually called 
representative perception. He admits that our assurance 
that there are things existing beyond consciousness cannot 
reach demonstration. ‘‘Yet it is an assurance that deserves 
the name of knowledge.’’ It is a confidence or faith that 

1Hssay Concerning the Human Understanding, Bk. 4, chap. 11, sec. T. 


68 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


has a good basis in experience. I think that this point is 
well taken. We shall have something to say about it when 
we come to develop our own position. 

Like Descartes, he rejects the secondary qualities as sub- 
jective. In this both followed Galileo and the scientific trend 
of the time. Only those ideas of ours which are used by 
physies are primary and significant for nature. And even 
here Locke is uncertain what position to take. Sometimes 
he speaks as though the primary qualities, solidity, extension, 
figure, motion, rest, number, were the physical thing, as Des- 
cartes thinks of extension as being matter; sometimes, he 
thinks of matter as being something unknowable which both 
produces primary ideas and supports primary qualities cor- 
responding to these ideas. Thus his view of scientific knowl- 
edge is that it is a copy of the actual qualities of physical 
things. ‘‘I say, then, that to have ideas of substances which 
by being conformable to things, may afford us real knowl- 
edge, it is not enough, as in modes, to put together such ideas 
as have no inconsistence, though they did never before so 
exist. . . . But our ideas of substance, being supposed copies, 
and referred to archetypes without us, must still be taken 
from something that does or has existed; they must not con- 
sist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our thoughts 
without any real pattern they were taken from, though we 
can perceive no inconsistence in such a combination.’’ In 
other words, the properties which we assign to a particular 
physical substance must have been found to co-exist. Such 
co-existence is discovered. Thus the chemist works out the 
properties of various chemical substances in this fashion. 
“‘And our ideas, being thus true, though not perhaps very 
exact copies, are yet the subjects of real (so far as we have 
any) knowledge of them: which, as has been already showed, 
will not be found to reach very far; but so far as it does, 
it will still be real knowledge.’’ 

Students of Locke point out the conflict between this view 
of real knowledge and his definition of knowledge which seems 


EARLY REPRESENTATIVE REALISM 69 


to confine it to relations between ideas. Another point must 
be noted. Locke is still under the scholastic ideal of grasp- 
ing the real essence of a thing, that is, something unique for 
each thing and independent of its relations to other things. 
He does not stress measurements and causal laws. He 
swings between a vague empiricism of a Baconian type, which 
notes particular instances, and Cartesian rationalism. The 
logie of scientific thought had not been worked out as yet. 
It is seldom easy to make out just what an idea is for Locke. 
Psychology is mingled with logic. It is clear that much 
remained for analysis. Unfortunately, Locke’s vaguenesses 
and inconsistencies laid representative realism open to at- 
tack. It is hardly too much to say that it is only now begin- 
ning to recover from the associations which were then at- 
tached to it. 

Doubts concerning Representative Perception.—On the 
whole, Locke stated his position mildly and undogmatically 
He was even emphatic in his assertions in regard to our ig- 
norance of either material or spiritual substance. Let us 
now glance at a typical objection to his realism. ‘‘How do 
we know that, corresponding to our ideas, there are material 
things, if we have never perceived in any single instance, a 
material thing? And the doubt here suggested may be rein- 
_ forced by the reflection that the very expression ‘‘a material 
thing’’ ought to be meaningless to a man who, having never 
had experience of one, is compelled to represent it by the aid 
of something so different from it as ideas are supposed to be. 
Can material things really be to such a creature anything 
more than some complex of ideas?’’ 1 

Let us recall the description of ordinary experience which 
we made in an earlier chapter. What features of our experi- 
ence led to the development of those realistic meanings and 
distinctions upon which we laid so much stress, such as in- 
dependence, permanence, commonness, changing appearance? 
And was Locke right to regard perception as merely the pres- 

*Fullerton, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 166. 


70 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


ence of ideas to the understanding? Is not perception an 
act involving both body and mind? Do we not have here the 
unfortunate effect of the Cartesian dualism? Again, is 
knowledge the same as the substitution of one thing for an- 
other? It is clear that the nature of the knowledge-claim 
must be analyzed. But it seems to me that, because we can 
think of a material thing only in terms of our knowledge of 
it, it does not follow that we cannot think of it. 

Many have felt the force of this doubt that ideas are like 
things. Are not ideas sensations which are effects in us? 
And need effects be like their causes? Those who approach 
the problem from the standpoint of the psycho-physiological 
theory of perception state it in this fashion: Ideas are looked 
upon as effects and the validity of knowledge is thought of 
as the question whether the one thing, the mental effect, is 
like the other thing, the physical thing. We shall have much 
to say of this interpretation of knowledge when we come 
to our own constructive formulation and interpretation of 
knowledge. In this place, let us note that the Cartesian dual- 
ism stressed the difference between ideas as mental states 
and objects as material. As mere existents they could not 
be like each other. Berkeley saw this point and empha- 
sized it. 

It may be interesting in this connection to call attention 
to one way out of the difficulty called the sign-theory. May 
not sensations be used as signs of things and not as copies? 
In the famous Physiological Optics, Helmholtz wrote as fol- 
lows: ‘‘In so far as the quality of our sensation indicates to 
us the peculiarity of the external influence through which 
it is aroused, it can stand as an indication but not as a copy 
of it... . An indication need be in no way similar to that 
which it indicates. The relation between the two reduces it- 
self to this: that a similar object, coming into action under 
similar circumstances, calls up a similar indication. We gall 
our ideas of the external world true, when they give us suffi- 
cient information about the consequences of our actions 


EARLY REPRESENTATIVE REALISM 71 


throughout the external world, and bring us to proper con- 
clusions regarding its expected changes.’’ This is an inter. 
esting suggestion though it needs much working out. What 
sort of information about nature can be arrived at by a 
systematic study of the clues given by our sense-data? And 
we should note the order, spatial and temporal, of our data 
as well as what Helmholtz calls the quality. 

It is not a far step from representative perception, with 
its dualism and its view of knowledge as indirect, to idealism. 
The weaknesses of this type of representative realism were 
mercilessly exposed. It is in this that the value of Berkeley’s 
thought lies. He who would defend representative realism 
to-day must rebuild it from the ground upward by a new 
analysis of human experience and by a more adequate in- 
terpretation of the content and logical foundation of scientific 
knowledge. 


REFERENCES 


ALEXANDER, Locke, chap. 2. 

DESCARTES, Meditations, 1 and 2. 

FULLERTON, Introduction to Philosophy, chap. 12. 

Gipson, Locke’s Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations, 
chap. 3. 

LockE, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4. 

SANTAYANA, Reason in Common Sense, chap. 4. 

SmitH, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, chap. 1. 


The student will find good summaries of Locke’s position and of Des- 
cartes’ in the histories of philosophy. Hoffding, Rogers, Sorley and 
Thilly are satisfactory. 


CHAPTER VI 
THE RISE OF IDEALISM 


What Idealism Is——The term idealism has had many dif- 
ferent meanings in philosophy, and this variety has led to 
confusion. Thus we must distinguish between ethical ideal- 
ism, which is a moral quality not exclusively possessed by any 
one school, metaphysical idealism or spiritualism, which is an 
ontological theory opposed to materialism, and epistemologi- 
cal idealism, which is a technical position in theory of knowl- 
edge. What we shall seek to do at this point is to take 
epistemological idealism and connect it with the teachings 
of Berkeley. Much of metaphysical idealism, or spiritualism, 
has depended upon the theory of knowledge developed by 
Berkeley and, consequently, his arguments deserve careful 
consideration. 

The cardinal principle of idealism is that being is depend- 
ent upon knowing. Berkeley stressed perception and formu- 
lated this principle in corresponding terms as to be 1s to be 
perceived. Berkeley’s idealism is directed against the repre- 
sentative realism of Descartes and Locke. It is a denial of 
the meaningfulness of a material world of the kind postu- 
lated by them, a world of substances alien to, and entirely un- 
connected with, the ideas of a spiritual self or soul, ideas 
which, alone, are given to inspection. Thus he agrees with 
these thinkers as to what is immediately given in experience 
but maintains that we have no good reason to believe in a 
material world which can only be inferred. Thus his idealism 
is a denial of the existence of a material world and the asser- 
tion that spirits and their ideas, alone, exist. On its positive 
side, it may be described as mentalism. It is often spoken of 

72 


THE RISE OF IDEALISM 73 


as subjective idealism. Nothing exists but spirits and the 
objects of their perception and imagination, which are in- 
separable from them and have no independent existence. 

Berkeley’s PositionBerkeley agrees with Locke and 
Descartes in rejecting natural realism. Instead of taking the 
content of perception as in some measure an interpretation 
of an independent object, he takes it as an idea given to the 
perceiving self. In other words, he takes it as a mere con- 
tent apart from its use in knowing. An idea, so taken, is the 
object of perception. And these objects are sensible things 
analyzable into unit elements such as color, shape, roughness, 
odor, ete. 

There can be no doubt that Berkeley shows great acuteness 
against common sense. We have, in fact, adopted and devel- 
oped many of his arguments against the view that the 
physical thing is, itself, literally given in consciousness. 
Nevertheless, we do not think that any of this group of 
thinkers did justice to perception. Instead of taking ideas 
as elements in an act of perceptual cognition, they took them 
as the direct objects of cognition. This way of taking them 
fitted into the ontological, Cartesian dualism of two distinet 
substances with which they began their thinking. The mod- 
ern thinker, on the contrary, does not begin in this fashion. 
Perceiving and thinking are for him acts of an intelligent 
organism. If he is led to distinguish between subjective 
contents and objects in perception, he does not Jump immedi- 
ately to the conclusion that the organism cannot include these 
contents in a totally natural and non-dualistic way. 

We have been led to put so much stress upon this difference 
of outlook because it will play such a role in our argument. 
Often Berkeley misunderstands cognition and wants to iden- 
tify it with identity of stuff as between idea and object. But 
this will become clearer as we proceed. There is, in fact, no 
better introduction to theory of knowledge than a critical 
examination of this historical movement. 

It is well for us to bear in mind, then, that there are two 


74 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


stages to note. The first stage consists of the effort to prove 
that the data we note in perception are really complexes of 
sensations or elementary ideas. In the Principles of Human 
Knowledge he adopts the terminology made familiar by Des- 
cartes and Locke and speaks of these objects of awareness 
as ideas. In the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Phi- 
lonous, he calls these immediate objects sensible things. His 
thesis is that sensible things cannot exist by themselves, as 
we ordinarily suppose that they do, and that they cannot 
therefore be material realities. The arguments of our third 
chapter have prepared us for this view; and, as we have al- 
ready seen, Descartes and Locke had already broken with 
natural realism. 

The second stage of his thought consists of an attack upon 
material substance and upon representative perception. He 
attempts to show the absurdity of Locke’s idea of substance 
and to demonstrate the impossibility of carrying through the 
theory that ideas can resemble that which is material. It 
is this feature of his philosophy which demands special con- 
sideration, for, as a result of it, he constructs a spiritualistie 
metaphysics. Locke and Descartes, it will be remembered, 
assumed two kinds of substances, matter and spirit. Berkeley 
rejects the one but accepts the other. 

The First Stage.—When we brush away certain techni- 
ealities inherited from his predecessors, Berkeley’s arguments 
against natural realism are of two kinds. He attempts to 
prove that the data we perceive, or are conscious of, are a 
function of the senses and are not substantial enough to exist 
by themselves. They are, as we have argued, conditional 
upon bodily factors. He seems even to go further than this 
and to assert that we apprehend a relation between the self 
and these data which makes it clear that sensible things are 
adjectives of the self. To be is to be perceived. In the sec- 
ond place, he seeks to prove that the qualitative data of which 
we are aware in perception are bound up with elements like 
pleasure and pain which he regards as avowedly mental or 


THE RISE OF IDEALISM 75 


elements within consciousness. Unfortunately, many of his 
terms are insufficiently defined and we are left in doubt as 
to what the senses are and what the exact nature of ‘‘being 
perceived’’ is. As we shall see, his positive doctrine is that 
ideas are created in the finite mind by God and are there 
perceived. But is not this self, mind, spirit, or soul, to which 
he appeals so confidently, a postulate or theory rather than an 
element in experience? It is true that he asserts that we have 
a notion of it. But what is the basis of this notion? Here 
he left a problem for his successors to examine. He seems 
to have retained traditional views in regard to the self or 
soul or mind. Let us give Berkeley’s contention in his own 
words: “‘I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. 
My endeavors tend only to unite and place in a clearer hght 
that truth which was before shared between the vulgar and 
the philosophers . . . the former being of opinion that those 
things they immediately perceive are the real things, and 
the latter that the things immediately perceived are ideas 
which exist only in the mind. Which two notions put to- 
gether do, in effect, constitute the substance of what I ad- 
vance.’’ Real things are perceived and are ideas inseparable 
from minds. 

Berkeley’s Attack upon Representative Perception.—But 
the ordinary man is not easily persuaded that the objects 
he perceives are mental ideas nor was the Cartesian or the 
Lockian convinced that it is the physical thing that is per- 
eeived. As a matter of fact, Berkeley joined hands with 
Locke and Descartes against natural realism, and then parted 
with them on the question of an inferred, substantial world. 
It is to this second stage that we now turn. 

Locke taught that the objects of the understanding or, as we 
would say now, of attention are distinct ideas. Thus color 
is an idea, so is a particular shape, so is a particular tactual 
datum. Let us not raise the question here of the psycho- 
physiological basis and status of such data. Both Locke and 
Berkeley thought of them as mental because they were sup- 


76 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


posed to be elements in the mind as a spiritual reality. 
That is, we have the influence of a metaphysical theory, the 
postulated distinctness of mind and body. But to-day we do 
not begin with Cartesian dualism. In fact, as we shall see 
later, the movement of thought to-day is towards the identity 
of mind with the organism. Now the prime basis of Berk- 
eley’s criticism of Locke’s representative perception lies in his 
denial that mental idéas can be like anything without the 
mind. This point is very important because many contem- 
porary thinkers have turned back to natural realism because 
of their belief that Berkeley’s refutation of representative 
realism was unanswerable. 

In what follows let us remember that we are not trying 
to defend Locke’s formulation of representative realism. 
Instead, we are seeking to understand Berkeley’s outlook. 

In the Three Dialogues, Berkeley undertakes to show the 
absurdity of the Lockian copy-theory. ‘‘Philonous. But 
neither is this all. Which are material objects in them- 
selves—perceptible or imperceptible? Hylas. Properly and 
immediately nothing can be perceived but idea. All ma- 
terial things, therefore, are in themselves insensible, and to 
be perceived only by our ideas. Philonous. Ideas then are 
sensible, and their archetypes or originals insensible? Hylas. 
Right. Philonous. But how can that which is sensible be 
like that which is insensible? Can a real thing, in itself 
invisible, be like a color; or a real thing, which is not audible, 
be like a sound? In a word, can anything be like a sensa- 
tion or idea but another sensation or idea? Hylas. I must 
own, I think not.’’ 

Surely Hylas is very accommodating here. Is not this 
term “‘sensible’’ ambiguous? It suggests something which is 
psychical, or immaterial, in a metaphysical sense. Can some- 
thing which is immaterial be like something which is ma- 
terial? But when we come to look more closely at the facts, 
we soon note that it should mean here only intuited. The 
argument becomes as follows: Material things cannot be in- 


THE RISE OF IDEALISM 77 


tuited while ideas are. Therefore ideas cannot be like ma- 
terial things in any shape or fashion. But why? Does being 
tuted change the nature of a character like shape or color? 
Shape and color are not so much mental entities as charac- 
ters discriminated in a complex pulse of consciousness. If 
so, it would seem to involve a bit of dogmatism to assert that 
what is intuited cannot resemble what is not intuited. We 
must have good empirical reasons if we are to deny resem- 
blance of the sort that would give a foundation for cogni- 
tion. It is certainly the case that in perception we do inter- 
pret objects in terms of characters such as these. At first, 
this assignment is automatic and expresses the mechanism 
of perception. What reflection can make of it remains to be 
seen. 

But Berkeley is so dominated by an ontological dualism 
of stuff in his thought of the problem that he simply argues 
that a mental idea cannot be lke a material thing. But we 
must ask ourselves whether cognition has anything to say 
about stuff at all. What we want to know about things is 
their characteristics, like shape, size, structure and behavior. 
And why cannot we know these characteristics by means of 
intuited characters in our experience? We tend to interpret 
things in terms of what we regard as relevant and informing 
data. Are we not justified in this tendency basic to cogni- 
tion? Did not Berkeley and the first representative realists 
mix up ontological and epistemological questions? We can 
see that Cartesian dualism made this almost inevitable. 

Berkeley next proceeds to criticize the material world as 
conceived by his predecessors. What is the significance of 
such a completely external and scarcely attainable world? 
Let us remember what a hypothetical thing it had become. 
Given Berkeley’s theory of knowledge and his animus against 
a material world as the cause of atheism, it is no wonder 
that he argues that this whole construction of matter and 
absolute space involves abstract ideas and is mythical. Ideas 
are the only real things; the world as you see it is the real 


78 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


world but, contrary to natural realism, it has no existence 
apart from the act of knowing. 

Besides these, Berkeley has other arguments. For in- 
stance, he asserts that matter, as unthinking, cannot be the 
cause of ideas. Does he mean that it cannot stimulate the 
organism to have ideas? If so, this is a dogmatic state- 
ment. External things affect the mind through the senses. 
Here we have the mind-body problem. And we are not so 
sure to-day that the brain is unthinking. Again, Berkeley’s 
arguments are relative to his day and generation. 

His attack upon Locke’s notion of substance was very valu- 
able. Locke had taught that a substance was an unknow- 
able something which supported qualities. But what is the 
nature of this relation between substance and qualities? Are 
not inherence and support mere metaphors? And by what 
right do we separate primary from secondary qualities? And 
is not matter as a mere X meaningless? We shall find that 
Hume asks the same question and answers it in the same 
way. It is clear that fundamental questions have been 
raised and must be answered. I can only hint at the solution 
which I shall offer. It is that we know things and that things 
have characteristics in the sense that they are shaped and 
massive and are capable of functioning and behaving to other 
things in certain ways. Locke’s substance is not our natural 
way of thinking of physical things to-day. But more of this 
later. 

The great value of Berkeley is to force us to think the 
whole situation through very carefully and to try to find 
out what perception seems actually to be. Frankly, the hu- 
man mind was puzzled. Berkeley convinced few but he 
raised insuperable objections to the first form of representa- 
tive realism. The whole thing had to be gone over again. 
And it is only lately, with the growth of psychology, logic 
and the physical sciences, that the indications of a more 
adequate formulation of representative realism became ap- 
parent. ‘The Cartesian setting had to be lived down. Taking 


THE RISE OF IDEALISM Us, 


Berkeley’s arguments in their day, it is small wonder that 
they put physical realism on the defensive. 

Berkeley’s Construction.—Having convinced himself that 
both naive and representative realism were untenable, Berk- 
eley proceeded to a spiritualistic construction. Ideas must 
have a cause and, since, unlike images, they are not under 
our control, this cause must be something active and external 
to ourselves. Now the only experience of activity which we 
have is that of our own minds. In volition we are active, 
and we can have a notion of this activity. Hence, the only 
thinkable cause of ideas must be some reality analogous to 
the finite mind, however different in power and vastness of 
comprehension. Ideas must be conceived as effects in us of 
some supreme mind. In this fashion, Berkeley argues to 
the existence of a divine being who controls in us the pano- 
rama which is spread out before us. 

Thus on the basis of an idealistic theory of knowledge 
which rejects the cognitive significance of the data of per- 
ception, Berkeley is able to build a spiritualistic metaphysics 
of a pluralistic type. Finite souls and God alone exist. 

It is quite possible to give up representative realism and 
still hesitate to speculate so boldly about the nature of that 
which controls in us these orderly percepts of ours. In the 
preceding chapter, we pointed out how such men as Helm- 
holtz and Herz adopted a sign theory. Is the analogy from 
the human mind to a supreme mind a valid one? Histori- 
eally, these doubts were first and best expressed by David 
Hume, to whose development of English empiricism we shall 
next turn. Just as Locke raised questions which he could not 
satisfactorily answer but which led forward to deeper anal- 
yses, so Berkeley forced the human mind to delve deeper. 

Idealism Does Not Change Our Experience.—The beginner 
is only too prone to mis-interpret idealism. It cannot be too 
often stated that idealism does not change the data of per- 
ception but only denies inferences and beliefs which we tend 
to make and cherish. It is for this reason that Berkeley 


80 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


claimed so earnestly that this outlook was really nearer to 
that of common sense than was Locke’s with its separation of 
the primary and the secondary qualities and its assertion that 
the physical world cannot be directly intuited. The sensible 
world, says Berkeley, is the only external world and it is 
as you perceive it. Only it is not independent of mind. 
Thus it is the truth-of those realistic meanings of inde- 
pendence, commonness and permanence, which we so natur- 
ally assign to the objects of perception, which he denies. 
To retain these meanings, Locke and Descartes had asserted 
the existence of a material world only mediately perceived 
and known. Berkeley had rebelled against this hypothesis. 
You cannot, he maintained, separate elements in the sensible 
world and call some more real than others, for these elements 
are inseparable and are mental. And the only external world 
is the one you perceive. In his Reason in Common Sense, 
Santayana describes the resultant position in the following 
admirable way: ‘‘You may indeed, nay, you must, live and 
think as if everything remained independently real. That 
is part of your education for heaven which God in his good- 
ness provides for you in this life. He will send into your 
soul at every moment the impression needed to verify your 
necessary hypotheses and support your humble and prudent 
expectations. Only you must not attribute that constancy 
to the things themselves which is due to steadfastness in the 
designs of Providence. Think and act as if a material world 
existed, but do not for the moment believe it to exist.’ + 
Gaps in Berkeley’s System.—A closer examination soon 
reveals gaps in Berkeley’s system. In the first place, he 
passes too quietly over the question of a common or neutral 
world. We have seen that his arguments lead logically to 
the conclusion that the sensible world, which I ordinarily 
take to be an independent, physical world, is really only my 
idea. It is a complex of my sensations intuited by myself. 
It would seem to follow that we do not in any sense perceive 
4Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, p. 115. 


THE RISE OF IDEALISM 81 


the same world but only corresponding and, supposedly, simi- 
lar worlds. But Berkeley did not wish to break too harshly 
with common sense; so he slurs over this problem. 

Another weakness, as we shall see in the next chapter, is his 
quite inadequate psychology of the self and of volition. He 
assumes that we can apprehend the self in the creative role 
of producing images. In short, he does not distinguish 
clearly between his inherited concept of the self as a soul or 
spirit and the empirical self which he actually experiences. 
Before philosophy could go much farther, a deeper analysis 
of ‘‘mind’’ was necessary. 


REFERENCES 


BERKELEY, Three Dialogues and Principles of Human Knowledge. 
FRASER, Berkeley. 

Horrpvine, History of Modern Philosophy, vol. 1. 

JOHNSTON, Berkeley, chaps. 2 and 4. 


CHAPTER VII 
SKEPTICISM AND PHENOMENALISM 


Bewilderment.—The step from Cartesian dualism to spirit- 
ualism, from representative perception to idealism, was well 
caleulated to produce bewilderment in the minds of those who 
took philosophy seriously. Many, of course, did not try to 
understand Berkeley’s arguments nor to realize what his 
interpretation of the sensible realm was. Thus many of the 
wits and literary lights of the time ‘‘made merry over the 
supposed unrealities in the midst of which the Berkeleian 
must live.’’? They assumed that he drew no distinction be- 
tween what is perceived and what is imagined. And to kick 
a stone was taken to be an adequate refutation of such non- 
sense. But our careful study of the philosophical movement 
has shown us that idealism could not be conquered in that 
way, that it was the expression of genuine difficulties in the 
older views, difficulties which must be faced and overcome. 
Natural realism had broken down: could some form of repre- 
sentative realism be carried through in its place? To deny 
the possibility involved idealism or something very like it. 
Clearly, a more fundamental analysis of human experience 
had to be made. This analysis was begun by David Hume. 
And it is not too much to say that the history of philosophy 
since has been a continuation of his effort, a continuation 
disturbed and distorted by false assumptions at times, and 
yet gradually leading to the outlook of to-day. 

Hume’s reflections led him to a position called variously 
phenomenalism and skepticism. It was a skepticism of the 
constructions of former thinkers; and, positively, a stress 

*Cf. Fullerton, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 169. 

82 


SKEPTICISM AND PHENOMENALISM 83 


upon what is given in experience as ultimate for the human 
mind; that is, it had two directions. He could not see that 
either the traditional dualism of two substances, with all the 
scholastic principles and concepts that went with it, was 
justified, nor that Berkeley’s spiritualism was in much better 
ease. Hence the task which remained was to take stock. To 
get some adequate criterion for abstract principles and so 
build again from the foundation up; to do more thoroughly 
what Descartes and Locke and Berkeley had done inade- 
quately because they had not been empirical enough. How 
often this effort has been made in philosophy! Through these 
accumulated efforts something satisfactory is at last being 
achieved in our days. Hume made as big a contribution 
to this clearing up as we can put to the credit of any one 
thinker. Yet even he, as we shall see, was a man of his age 
and made mistakes. Philosophical advance, like scientific 
advance, 1s cooperative and by degrees. How could it be 
otherwise ? 

Hume’s Summary of Results.——Locke had taught that the 
primary qualities of matter, which are copied more or less 
adequately in certain of our ideas, inhere in a material sub- 
stance of an unknowable nature. Descartes had maintained 
that the basic attribute of matter is extension and that this 
is known representatively by our clear and distinct idea of 
extension developed somehow by the soul. Locke, as we 
pointed out, was less dogmatic than Descartes and more in- 
clined to express himself humorously. It was Berkeley who 
challenged these fundamental theories, demanded an empiri- 
eal origin for the ideas, and maintained that they were full 
of contradictions and absurdities. He developed more rigor- 
ously than Locke what is often called nominalism, a skepti- 
cism of abstract ideas and a demand that they be brought 
into touch with perceptual data. It was this method which 
Hume adopted and applied even more rigorously. For Berke- 
ley, then, a physical thing is only a cluster of data or ideas. 
Let us listen to Hume’s summary: ‘‘ Thus the first philosophi- 


84 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


cal objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of 
external existence consists in this, that such an opinion, if 
rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and if re- 
ferred to reason is contrary to natural instinct, and at the 
same time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince 
the impartial enquirer. The second objection goes farther, 
and represents this opinion as contrary to reason: at least, 
if it be a principle of reason, that all sensible qualities are in 
the mind, not in the object. Bereave matter of all its intel- 
ligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a man- 
ner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexpli- 
cable something, as the cause of our perceptions; a notion so 
imperfect that no skeptie will think it worth while to contend 
against it.’’+ It is clear that Hume thinks that representa- 
tive realism cannot be carried through. He admits that we 
are all naturally realists but 1s convinced that reason is unable 
to justify either natural realism or representative perception. 

Hume’s Attack upon Mental Substance.—Berkeley’s ani- 
mus led him to direct all his critical energy against the idea 
of an external physical world. The result was that he was 
traditionalistic in his treatment of the mind. It was in this 
domain that he left an opening for the keen analysis of Hume. 
Hume was not satisfied to speak of the self, soul, spirit or 
mind as though these were identical terms easily understood. 
Berkeley had spoken of the self as an object of which we 
have a notion or intuition. He seems to have regarded it 
as a substance, that is, something existing and having its own 
nature, and as the active cause of changes in our images. He 
seems also to have held that it somehow possessed the ideas 
which we perceive. Their being was bound up with the act 
of perception. He was convinced that they could not be 
thought of as existing separately and independently. Now 
it is this basic self or soul which possesses ideas which Hume 
undertakes to analyze. 

As a nominalistie empiricist of Berkeley’s own type, Hume 

*Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sec. XII, pt. 1. 


SKEPTICISM AND PHENOMENALISM 85 


asked the vital question, How do we know this self? Is it, 
like Locke’s material substance, an hypothesis? Or is it more 
empirical and present in experience? His conclusion was 
epoch-making and began that psychology without a soul which 
has been dominant ever since. Hume could not find a soul- 
substance by introspection. And since he was inclined to 
doubt representative perception in the case of the external 
world, it was very natural for him to doubt it for a self clearly 
not given in experience. In both directions he was a phe- 
nomenalist ; that is, he limited himself to what is given in 
experience. 

Consciousness Is a Flux.—Psychologists have decided that 
the field of the individual’s experience is constantly chang- 
ing; sensations, images, meanings come and go according to 
the direction of the attention, external stimuli and associ- 
ative processes. This changing field of experience they call 
consciousness. In it are found the data of which I become 
aware or conscious. It is to-day realized that there are 
many false notions to be avoided in regard to sensations 
and ideas and the general make-up of consciousness. We must 
not make entities out of sensations and ideas and think of 
them as acting like mental atoms combining and associating 
and separating. This false view had quite a vogue in psy- 
chology for about a century after Hume and is called asso- 
ciationism and mental chemistry. 

Hume was one of the first to examine the content of 
consciousness in an empirical frame of mind. As we shall 
see, even he had his presuppositions which blinded his eyes 
partially to what is given, but he came pretty near the truth. 
His is such a classic statement that it deserves full quotation 
and interpretation. ‘‘For my part,’’ he writes, ‘‘when I 
enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stum- 
ble on some particular perception or other, of heat, or cold, 
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can 
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions 


86 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I 
insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist... . 
Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our 
perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our 
sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to 
this change; nor is there any single power of the soul which 
remains unalterably the same, perhaps for a moment. The 
mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions succes- 
sively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and 
mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. 
There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity 
in different; whatever natural propension we may have to 
imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of 
the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive per- 
ceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most 
distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, 
or of the materials, of which tt 1s composed.’’ + 

Hume was convinced that we are confined to these changing 
experiences which he called perceptions. Perceptions are 
divisible into two classes which are distinguished by their 
different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible 
and lively are called thoughts or ideas; the other class he 
names impressions. He argues that ideas are copies of im- 
pressions. If the one is a presentation, the other can be 
called a re-presentation. This relationship furnishes him 
with a criterion for abstract philosophical terms. We need 
but enquire, From what impression is that supposed idea 
derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will 
serve to confirm our suspicion.” 

Now he holds that there is nothing permanent or substan- 
tial about these perceptions. They come and go. Another 
point: he teaches that perceptions are distinct units which 
have no intrinsic relations with one another. Hence the mind 
taken as a flux of perceptions is a changing complex of ele- 


*Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. 1, part 4, sec. 6. 
*An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sec. 2. 


SKEPTICISM AND PHENOMENALISM 87 


ments. In the quotation from the Treatise given above, we 
noted his agnosticism. Of a mind other than the successive 
perceptions we have not the most distant notion. If it is sup- 
posed that there is a larger world of existence in which these 
empirical minds, or flux of perceptions, are, we must admit 
that it escapes our apprehension. Only perceptions are given. 
And it is clear that Hume holds that knowledge must be giv- 
enness in experience. This is, of course, a big assumption; 
but one which was natural after Berkeley’s attack upon repre- 
sentative realism. We are left with mental contents as such 
with no assurance that anything les beyond. As directed 
against belief in substantial realities such as matter and spirit, 
this conclusion is called skepticism. As tending to the belief 
that only perceptions or phenomena exist, it is called phe- 
nomenalism. 

Hume’s Rejection of Berkeley’s Spiritualism.—It will be 
remembered that Berkeley based his construction upon cer- 
tain premises. He assumed with Locke and Descartes that 
our ideas must be caused or controlled by something ex- 
ternal. They must have a cause or source, and we are not 
aware of causing them. This source must be active to be a 
cause. But the only active thing of which we have any 
knowledge is our mind or self. Hence this cause of our ideas 
must be a mind. Since our own minds are obviously not 
powerful and comprehensive enough to account for our or- 
derly perceptual experiences, we must postulate a supreme 
mind as the controlling and active agent whose influence 
arouses in us the perception of a sensible realm. Such is 
Berkeley’s chain of reasoning. Let us examine Hume’s ob- 
jections. 

We have already noted that Berkeley had not sufficiently 
analyzed the subjective side of experience. He seems to have 
taken it for granted that he experienced a sense of activity in 
volition of an almost creative or productive sort. It is this 
that Hume denies. Ideas arise in our minds but we know 
not why. The psychologist speaks of the association of ideas 


88 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


and tries to explain their advent and exit by neural changes. 
But assuredly we are not aware of any productive agency in 
our will which brings forth thoughts. When thoughts come, 
we are often enough surprised by them. ‘‘ Volition is surely 
an act of the mind, with which we are sufficiently acquainted. 
Reflect upon it. Consider it on all sides. Do you find any- 
thing in it like this creative power, by which it raises from 
nothing a new idea, and with a kind of Mat, imitates the 
omnipotence of its Maker, if I may be allowed so to speak, 
who called forth into existence all the various scenes of 
nature? So far from being conscious of this energy in the 
will, it requires a certain experience as that of which we are 
possessed, to convince us that such extraordinary effects do 
ever result from a simple act of volition.’’? 

Thus Hume appeals to a keener analysis of experience than 
Berkeley had made to refute the latter’s superficially per- 
suasive argument. We are unacquainted with anything of 
the nature of productive, or creative, activity as much in our- 
selves as in sensible nature. We are aware of what we have 
good reason to consider directed change but not of produc- 
tion. There are some very interesting points in regard to 
this which we must later consider. But I do not think that 
there can be any doubt that Hume was nearer the truth here 
than was Berkeley. We are assuredly not aware of the 
creative activity of any spiritual substance. Let us admit, 
however, that psychologists still dispute as to whether we 
have an experience of conation or whether conation is merely a 
term for organic function in which consciousness partici- 
pates. 

By means of this extension of analysis, Hume showed that 
Berkeley’s arguments against the existence of a physical 
world apply equally against the existence of a creative 
spiritual source of ideas. ‘‘Were our ignorance, therefore, 
a good reason for rejecting anything, we should be led into 
that principle of denying all energy in the Supreme Being 

* Enquiry, sec. 7, part 1, 


SKEPTICISM AND PHENOMENALISM 89 


as much as in the grossest matter. We surely comprehend 
as little the operations of one as of the other. Is it more 
difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than 
that it may arise from volition? All we know is our pro- 
found ignorance in both eases.’’ 

Hume’s Treatment of Causation.—Descartes as a ration- 
alist had identified causation with explanation. He assumed 
that the mind must be capable of deducing an inner relation 
between cause and effect such that the effect could be under- 
stood as following from the cause. But his successors soon 
realized that this view presented difficulties. In the case of 
the external world, can we understand the connection be- 
tween events by mere conceptual analysis? Here, again, 
Cartesianism was found to be vague in the extreme when 
search was made for ultimate principles. God, self and the 
world tended to fall apart. 

Berkeley and those inclined to spiritualism were convinced 
that the external world had nothing of efficacy init. It could, 
or should, be discarded. Spirit is the sole cause. Causation 
is creation. This phase of the development was sufficiently 
dwelt upon in the discussion of Berkeley’s idealism. 

Now Hume could see no basis in experience for this occult 
creative spiritualism. He undertook, therefore, to analyze 
the causal connection anew on the basis of his empirical 
principles. ‘‘Suppose a person, though endowed with the 
strongest faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on 
a sudden into this world; he would, indeed, immediately ob- 
serve a continual succession of objects, and one event follow- 
ing another; but he would not be able to discover anything 
farther. He would not, at first, by any reasoning, be able 
to reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular 
powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never 
appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely 
because one event, in one instance, precedes another, that 
therefore the one is the cause, the other the effect. Their 
conjunction may be arbitrary and casual. There may be no 


90 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of 
the other.’’ + 

After canvassing the situation, Hume can find nothing but 
an external relation between the two events which are called 
cause and effect; and this external relation is nothing but 
a feeling of transition which arises through habit. It is this 
feeling which is the original impression from which the 
thought of necessary connection is derived. A cause is an 
object followed by another, and whose appearance always 
conveys the thought to that other. 

That Hume’s analysis is a distinct advance upon all that 
had gone before there can be no doubt. But we must pass 
two eriticisms upon it. First, it reflects his phenomenalism. 
He is dealing only with events in experience, and these events 
are distinct perceptiors which are by their very nature sup- 
posed to be discontinuous elements. But surely in cause and 
effect we suppose ourselves to be knowing effective processes 
in an external nature. In the second place, his analysis does 
not do justice to the work of testing causal relations which is 
characteristic of scientific investigation. But his analysis 
set a problem to inductive logic which it is only beginning to 
solve. Do we not seem to ourselves to be discoverers of a 
pattern or order in nature by means of the data which we 
note in experience? And how do we eliminate those false 
suggestions which we finally decide are not revelatory of a 
basic order in nature? Hume leaves too much to be done 
by passive association or frequency. We shall see in the next 
chapter how Kant, another important thinker, dealt with this 
problem. And in a later, constructive chapter, we shall our- 
selves discuss causation. 

Taking Stock—What did Hume accomplish? In the final 
analysis, he drove thought back to experience, that is, to a 
careful investigation of our distinctions and their founda- 
tion, back to logic and psychology. He did this by showing 
that the thought of his predecessors led to phenomenalism. 

*Hnquiry, sec, 5, pt. 1. 


SKEPTICISM AND PHENOMENALISM a! 


Thus he reenforced Berkeley’s attack upon the traditional 
type of representative realism, and he added to this a telling 
analysis of Berkeley’s own spiritualism. Now I do not for a 
moment deny that there were points in Locke’s presentation 
to which neither of these later thinkers did justice. What 
they did do was to take one tendency in Locke, the extreme 
empirical or psychological side with its thought of ideas as 
mental entities loosely connected, and develop its implica- 
tions. They refused to take seriously the distinction between 
idea and object and to investigate what we now call objective 
reference. They were convinced that any cognitive tran- 
scendence of the individual’s consciousness was impossible. 
It is this attitude which is called phenomenalism. And we 
must admit that many thinkers, even to-day, hold that they 
were justified. 

What, then, does Hume enable us to do? To make a fresh 
start in which we build from the ground up, in which we 
interrogate experience instead of starting with many insuffi- 
ciently analyzed assumptions. Descartes undertook to do 
this, but he was unable to carry it through because his mind 
was full of medieval philosophy. His doubting was more a 
form than an actuality. The development through Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume was necessary before the human mind 
was ready to study experience carefully and inductively. 

The first revolt against phenomenalism was led by Reid, a 
professor of philosophy at Glasgow. The conclusions drawn 
by Hume startled him and led him to question the assump- 
tions. He wished to return to the view that we perceive 
things directly, that things, not ideas, are the objects of the 
mind when a man thinks. Thus he tries to defend natural 
realism. Now there is a great amount of truth in natural 
realism as compared with phenomenalism. Surely we believe 
that we perceive and know things and not ideas. But may 
we not perceive and know things in terms of ideas? Reid 
wished to reject ideas altogether as leading to subjectivism, 
but the facts were against him and he was forced to contra- 


92 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


dict himself or else fall back on dogmatism. Reid was up 
against a difficult problem, in fact just the one which we 
shall need to face, but he wavered and left his position vague. 
With him began the so-called Scottish School of philosophy 
which, in a too often degenerate form, was influential in this 
country before the spread of German idealism. 

It is generally supposed that Immanuel Kant added certain 
essential elements to the analysis of experience which Hume 
had made. And in a measure this is true. Unfortunately, 
Kant approached his problem in a very technical way and 
under the influence of the rationalism of the Continent. He 
was trying to fuse empiricism and rationalism. The senses 
contribute something and the mind contributes something. 
But, as we shall see, he also tends to be a phenomenalist. 
It is for this reason that his successors swung to idealism 
and founded the great modern movement of romantic ideal- 
ism. They were too willingly convinced that physical realism 
of a representative sort could not be carried through. Mind 
and its activity became the dominant note in philosophy. It 
was not until the teachings of biological evolutionism gained 
power and prestige that mind was again drawn back into 
nature and a truer perspective again dawned. 


REFERENCES 


HumME, Treatise on Human Nature; also, An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding. I do not think that anything can take the place 
of actual reading in these classics. The references in the chapter 
should help to locate important parts. 

CALKINS, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, chap. 6. 

Horrpine, History of Modern Philosophy, vol. 1. 

Huxtey, Hume. 

Rogers, Student’s History of Philosophy, Hume. 

HENDEL, Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume, chaps. 6 and 7. 


CHAPTER VIIT 
THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION 


Kant Seeks a Compromise.—After Hume, the main cur- 
rent of philosophy swings from the British Isles to Germany. 
The German thinker, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) sought a 
way of escape from the barren type of rationalism which had 
grown up in Germany after the days of Leibniz and Wolff. 
There can be no doubt about Kant’s great ability. 

His first period of production has been rightly called the 
‘‘Period of Scientific Eclecticism.’’+ He wrote many essays 
on current topics of discussion among scientists, such as 
“Thoughts on the True Estimate of Vis Viva, and a Consider- 
ation of the Arguments of Leibniz and Others in the Mechan- 
cal Controversy with preliminary Remarks on the Force of 
Bodies generally’? and the famous ‘‘Universal Natural H1s- 
tory and Theory of the Heavens.’’ It was in this latter work 
that he is said in some measure to have anticipated La Place’s 
nebular hypothesis. 

As a result of this interest in science, Kant became aware 
of the type of knowledge which it seeks to achieve and of the 
general character of the basic concepts, such as space, time, 
quantity and causality, with which it works. After all, Kant 
was primarily a philosopher and the problem of knowledge 
pressed ever more heavily upon him. This brings us to his 
second period. Between the years 1762 and 1766 he came 
into contact with the thought of Locke and Hume. For a 
Short while he ranged himself on the side of empiricism. 
But, in 1770, he swings back to rationalism once more. In 


1Wenley, Kant and His Philosophical Revolution. 
93 


94 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


the famous Dissertation of that year he delimits sense from 
intellect much in the manner of Descartes. The intelligence 
is the source of certain notions or pure concepts, and it is 
the work of metaphysics to analyze these notions and thus 
to bring out their implications. We have already seen how 
drastically Hume dealt with such innately given notions. It 
is clear, then, that Kant had not taken Hume to heart. And 
now comes the so-called ‘‘Critical Period.’’ His problem 
was that of bringing together these two sources of experience. 
In a celebrated letter to a friend called Herz, he propounded 
his problem: ‘‘I ventured to say in the Dissertation, that the 
ideas of sense represent things as they appear, while the con- 
ceptions of the understanding represent things as they are. 
But how can the ideas of these things be given to us, if not 
by the mode in which they affect us? Or, if the pure con- 
ceptions of them be due to our own inner activity, whence 
comes the agreement that they are presumed to have with 
objects which, nevertheless, are not their products? How can 
reason prescribe axioms about things without any experience 
of them?’’ 

Now it is quite essential that we note his idea of reason as 
an innate power which, as it were, emits axioms and concepts. 
Kant never got beyond this conception of reason; for him, 
there is no real continuity between sense and under- 
standing. 

What, then, was his critical solution? Essentially this, to 
hold reflective experience with its structure and distinctions 
a product of the arrangement of sensations by forms origi- 
nating in the mind. Sense, alone, is not knowledge; it is a 
mere manifold. Pure concepts, alone, do not constitute 
knowledge; they are empty. Knowledge is a resultant of 
their union. Is it not obvious that we have here an answer 
to a problem set by the two traditions of philosophy which 
met at this time? But it is really a mechanical solution which 
does not go back of the traditions. It does not represent a 
fresh start. He has not re-analyzed either mind or sense; 


THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION 95 


the Cartesian dualism lurks back of the terms. Almost un- 
wittingly Kant suggested a more adequate empiricism than 
Hume’s. As we analyze his system, we shall see why it repre- 
sents an advance and yet leads astray. Kantianism was by 
no means an unmixed blessing. 

Thus it is generally acknowledged that Kant stressed the 
active, constructive character of the human mind. The world 
aS we experience it in knowledge is not a gift to our senses 
but a very complex piece of painstaking architecture. Kant 
tries to lay bare the plans of this mental construction by 
means of which sensations are organized and made into phe- 
nomena regarded as permanent, common and objective to the 
self. He asserts that this work of organization is assignable 
to an Ego which expresses itself through forms. 

The Structure of Kant’s Theory of Knowledge.—The dis- 
tinctions which Kant uses are illuminating. On the side of 
sense, he speaks of the manifold of sensations. These are 
effects produced by an object (thing-in-itself) upon the fac- 
ulty of presentation. These sensations, thus produced, are 
formless but are subconsciously arranged in the forms of 
space and time which are ready for them in the mind. Kant 
speaks of sensations as a posteriori and as the matter of 
phenomena, while he calls the forms a priort. We have now 
reached the stage of orderly perception. But more than this 
is needed before knowledge is attained. These perceptual 
phenomena are given another coating of form. We think into 
them such basic concepts or categories as substance, force, 
divisibility, causality, ete. This new level of form or inter- 
pretation is due to the understanding; and it is only at this 
level that we have science with its notion of nature as a 
quantitative, mechanical system of bodies in causal relations. 
We now have developed experience with objects set over 
against the self. It is such a system of phenomenal objects 
which is rightly called the physical world. These objects 
have no being apart from the field of experience. They are 
not things-in-themselves but experiential constructs. They are 


96 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


objects in experience. The Kantian scheme can be expressed 
in its essentials by the following diagram: 


Transcendental categories experience sense- 


Ego — space and with manifold <—thing-in-itself 
time phenomena a posteriort 
a priort resultant 


Now it is clear that the things-in-themselves perform the 
same function as physical things do for Lockian realism, but 
that Kant regards the cause of our sensations as unknowable 
and merely postulates some reality outside the mind as the 
cause. Physical things are by him considered phenomena 
within experience. This outlook was made easy for him be- 
cause of the speculations of Leibniz, an earlier German 
thinker, which resemble Berkeley’s spiritualism in many 
respects. 

Two Meanings of the Word Knowledge.—From Locke to 
Hume, British thinkers had concerned themselves with the 
problem of the physical world, our knowledge of it if it 
exists, and whether it exists. Starting with the acceptance of 
representative perception, they were gradually induced to 
doubt that there is a physical world outside of the realm of 
ideas which are given. We have seen how their reflections 
culminated in the idealism of Berkeley and the phenomenal- 
ism of Hume. Thus physical realism came to an wmpasse. 
The assumption of both science and common sense that there 
is an independent, neutral world of bodies quite distinct 
from the individual’s ideas was completely challenged. We 
pointed out that, in Seotland, there arose a reaction against 
the “‘way of ideas’’ led by Reid but that it did not master 
the problem. And, until our own day, while there were 
occasional protests, the matter rested much as it was left in 
the eighteenth century. Physical realism was in disrepute. 

But knowledge can have another meaning. It is that which 
the human mind accepts as sufficiently verified to be believed 
in. We all pass judgments and grant propositions. The 
various sciences are, indeed, nothing but systems of knowl- 


THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION 97 


edge in this sense. Facts, laws, theories, what are these but 
instances of knowledge? In this meaning of the word, knowl- 
edge, we may say that human knowledge undoubtedly exists. 
The methods by which it is built up are carefully studied 
by logic. 

Let us be certain that we get these two different meanings 
clearly before us. We can eall the first kind knowledge 
about. It is knowledge of an object by means of ideas or 
propositions. The second kind consists simply of the propo- 
sitions themselves as understood and accepted. Usually these 
two kinds are united because the first requires the second 
kind. Thus we cannot have knowledge of a physical thing 
without the aid of ideas. But, as philosophy attacked the 
belief in an external world, that is, a realm of objects outside 
of the field of experience, it was seen that the second kind 
could exist without the reference to an object which the first 
kind contained. It is obvious that a scientist can devote his 
attention to empirical facts and discovered laws without 
troubling himself with the question of whether there is a 
physical world in the realistic sense. In fact, many reflective 
scientists have been phenomenalists. 

Kant and Hume Skeptical of the First Kind of Knowledge. 
—As a matter of fact, when it comes to the first kind of 
knowledge, there is little to choose between Hume and Kant. 
Neither was a physical realist in the Cartesian and Lockian 
sense. Hume knows only perceptions which largely corre- 
spond to Locke’s ideas. Kant speaks of physical things as 
phenomena and contrasts them with nowmena or things-in- 
themselves. So far, then, as the theory of the first kind of 
knowledge is concerned, there is little to choose between 
Hume and Kant. 

Happily, Kant has expressed himself clearly on this point. 
‘“‘Tdealism consists in the assertion that there are none but 
thinking beings, all other things, which we think are per- 
ceived in intuition, being nothing but representations in the 
thinking beings, to which no object external to them corre- 


98 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


sponds in fact. Whereas I say that things as objects of our 
senses existing outside us are given, but we know nothing of 
what they may be in themselves, knowing only their appear- 
ances, i. e., the representations which they cause in us by 
affecting our senses. Consequently, I grant by all means 
that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though 
quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we 
yet know by the representations which their influence on 
our sensibility procures us, and which we call bodies, a term 
signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is un- 
known to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be 
termed idealism? It is the very contrary.’’? 

While Kant’s use of terms is not as accurate as could be 
desired, it is easy to make out his meaning. The bodies 
within the field of human experience are mental and are to be 
called phenomena, while the things which affect our sensi- 
bility are to be called things-in-themselves or noumena. The 
Kantian thing-in-itself is that ‘‘unknown, inexplicable some- 
thing as the cause of our perceptions’’ of which Hume speaks. 
Because Kant did not doubt the existence of this realm out- 
side the field of experience but only our knowledge of it, his 
position is properly called agnosticism. He held that we are 
forced to believe in such a trans-experiential or transcendent 
realm but that we can never know its nature. 

Kant’s Doctrine of the Categories—wWe have already said 
that, in a blundering sort of way, Kant began a more ade- 
quate analysis of experience than had been developed up to 
his time. His limitation lay in his inheritance and acceptance 
of a dualism or discontinuity between sensibility and under- 
standing, on the one hand, and an ungenetic approach to 
experience, on the other. He never raised the question of 
how the higher levels of experience are reached. ‘‘ Apart 
from the systematized experience obtained through the real 
categories he can find nothing left save what he fancifully 
styles ‘a rhapsody of perceptions which is not knowledge and 

*Kant, Prolegomena, sec. 6, remark 2. 


THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION 99 


could never yield an altogether coherent consciousness.’ How 
in that case the behavior of the lower animals, the gradual 
advance of every normal child and of the human race as a 
whole from such a beginning to ‘the age of reason’ is con- 
ceivable, he never dreamed of explaining.’’+ Thus it has 
been pointed out again and again that Kant’s statement of 
his problem is pre-evolutionary. He does not regard the mind 
as a concrete growth but as an entity endowed once for all 
with certain fixed capacities. Modern psychology, which is 
through and through genetic and biological, enables us to 
view the field of experience as a development expressive of 
bio-psychological functions and operations. But I shall have 
more to say of this when I come to my own constructive inter- 
pretation. 

It is generally admitted that Hume did not do justice to 
the pattern of experience, to its internal structure and con- 
tinuities and relations. He was too much of a sensationalist 
of an atomic sort to be a true empiricist. Also, from Berke- 
ley he had accepted the nominalist theory that we do not 
possess abstract ideas but are limited to impressions and their 
fainter reproductions. He seems to have thought of the field 
of consciousness as simply a collection of such impressions 
and images. 

Now Kant saw that this analysis was quite inadequate. 
Knowledge involves complex thoughts, and such complex 
thoughts contain ordered constructions. Thus ‘‘Columbus 
discovered America in 1492’’ is a complex proposition which 
is understood. In it we have unity in complexity. We dis- 
tinguish and relate at the same time. Kant sought to remedy 
Hume’s denial of relations and continuities by introducing 
another kind of mental element which, combined with sensa- 
tions and images, would account for knowledge as it is in 
science. His problem may be called one in structural psy- 
chology. What is added to sensations to make percepts, con- 
cepts, propositions, and systems of scientific knowledge? 

* Ward, A Study of Kant, p. 65. 


100 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Kant taught that the mind in its own right contributes 
unsensational elements or forms, and these, as taking up sen- 
sation as concrete matter, constitute our actual experience 
at the level of reflection. These unsensational elements which 
the mind contributes are the categories. 

The problem which Kant raised is, as we have suggested, 
one for psychology and logic to solve. Do we ever begin with 
atomic sensations? Or are not sensations rather distinctions 
in a presentational continuum? Are not relations and mean- 
ings present in our experience from the first? It is along 
this line of emphasis on continuity and synthetic motor re- 
sponse that modern bio-psychology is working. The organism 
is stimulated, but the stimulus may be complex and patterned 
as in vision; and the response of the organism expresses the 
synthesis of past experience. There is internal organization, | 
and this organization is brought to bear functionally upon 
the stimulus. The field of experience reflects this basic 
process. We shall have more to say of this point of approach 
later. ) 

Now Kant had not insight into this functional, genetic 
way of approach. For him, the supplementary elements over 
and above the specific sense-content must come from a fixed 
source in reason. They must be contributed by the Tran- 
scendental Ego. Space, time, permanence, quantity, causal- 
ity, all these structural forms of knowledge are injected, as 
it were, into the sense-manifold. And Kant struggles to bring 
the two ingredients together. 

The Categories Are Subjective—For Kant, the categories 
are subjective in a double sense. They are innate and con- 
tributed by the Ego; and they have no significance for the 
realm of things-in-themselves. The second position follows 
from the first. It would be by the merest accident that forms 
and relations thus produced by an independent self would 
have cognitive significance for a separate realm of things-in- 
themselves whose sole function is to cause an inchoate mani- 
fold of sense. Kant shuts himself into agnosticism with 


THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION 101 


respect to this postulated realm by his very approach. He 
taught that the categories exist only in the mind and have 
significance only for phenomena in experience. To refer 
them beyond experience is to misuse them. We might para- 
phrase Berkeley’s argument and say that Kant’s view was 
that a category could be like nothing but a category. Subjec- 
tive spatial order could not in any way correspond to an ex- 
ternal spatial order. And the same with temporal order and 
causal connection. It is obvious why Kant drew again the 
skeptical conclusion already drawn by Hume. Knowledge can 
be only the presentation to the knowing self of constructs 
within experience. It is an awareness of law among phe- 
nomenal bodies. And if the world of things-in-themselves 
is neither spatial nor temporal, it would seem the veriest non- 
sense to speak of it as the physical world. The true physical 
world, that with which science deals, is the world of inter- 
connected phenomenal bodies. And it is because the structure 
of this world is given by mind that we find our understanding 
at home in it. 

Let us for a moment compare his position with that of 
Descartes. Both accept much the same discontinuity between 
sense and reason. Descartes, however, puts his faith in rea- 
son alone and rejects sense as misleading. Yet he wants 
knowledge of an external physical world. Being confined to 
his concepts and being unable to compare them with this 
world, he finds his criterion in the faith that God would not 
deceive us and that, therefore, all our clear and distinct ideas 
are true, that is, reveal to us.the essential nature of this other- 
wise hidden material realm. Kant has much in common with 
Descartes but does not seek to know an external world. In 
the realm of experience, made by the confluence of sense and 
reason, the only significant knowledge exists. The spiritualism 
of Leibniz had intervened for him, much as the spiritualism of 
Berkeley had intervened for Hume. He worked within a set 
of assumptions which hardly exist for us to-day. 

But Are the Categories Subjective?—Recent thought is 


102 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


strongly inclined to challenge the position that the categories 
are subjective in either of the senses mentioned above as 
holding for Kantianism. The categories, I would say, are 
not emitted by a peculiar Ego as characteristic innate forms; 
nor are they without significance for an external world 
transcending the field of experience. These points we shall 
develop in detail later and we can only call attention to them 
here. In the first place, we must begin with experience as 
it presents itself and not with a hypothetical chaos of sensa- 
tions and a hypothetical group of forms. Are not both of 
these artificial abstractions due to a misunderstanding of the 
actual flow and development of experience? We must press 
deeper and seek to understand the content of experience by 
means of a study of mental operations and results. Modern 
logic and psychology will help us much in this endeavor 
though we must keep our own eyes open. We shall find that 
experience has a pattern from the beginning and that, as the 
mind grows in response to the world and its problems, this 
pattern acquires meanings and passes to the interpreted 
thought of bodies in relations to one another. In short, the 
categories are implicit in perceptual experience and are 
elicited and developed by thought rather than secreted by 
a mysterious internal self. And if they are thus objective 
within experience and are seemingly built up in response to 
the external world, may they not be patterned after it and 
revelatory of it? If so, the categories would not be subjective 
in any invidious sense; they would have cognitive significance 
for external things. And these should no longer be spoken of 
as things-in-themselves. 

This basic re-construction of Kantianism which seeks to 
remove its false subjectivism, its inherited opposition be- 
tween sense and reason, and its agnosticism indicates to us 
at the same time the re-construction of Cartesianism which 
is necessary. Here, again, we must not begin with a meta- 
physical dualism between mind and matter. It was this 
Separation which, together with the separation between sense 


THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION 103 


and reason, gave the artificial twist to the problem of knowl- 
edge which led philosophical thought astray. Instead of 
categories growing up in experience under the control of the 
external world and therefore inevitably significant for it, 
we have ideas of reason produced by the mind out of itself 
and not in cooperation with the external world to which 
they are to apply. What wonder that their cognitive signifi- 
cance must be a matter of preestablished harmony, as it were, 
to be guaranteed by God, or a mystery which we humbly 
accept because God would surely not deceive us and implant 
in us clear and distinct ideas which were not true! It is 
obvious that we are to-day largely free from these sets of 
assumptions and approach the problems of philosophy in a 
more empirical and inductive spirit and in the light of the 
biological setting and function of mind. This much in the 
way of anticipation and suggeston. 

The Period after Kant.—It has not been our purpose to 
go into the history of philosophy for its own sake; we have 
desired only to grasp the typical problems of modern philoso- 
phy and to appreciate the way in which they were ap- 
proached. The period after Kant was remarkable chiefly for 
the rise in Germany of a romantic idealism called variously 
absolute and objective idealism, and for its spread to other 
countries including England and the United States. It must 
not be denied, however, that the older empirical tradition 
persisted and found able advocates in such thinkers as Mill? 
and Sidgwick,” and that, after the fervor of absolute idealism 
had spent itself, this tradition in a modified form again came 
to the front. In the meantime, advances made in mathe- 
matics, logic and psychology, together with the success of the 
sciences, gave a new orientation to philosophy. Since these 
later developments will appear in detail in the constructive 
part of this book, they can be neglected at this point. A few 


4John Stuart Mill (1806-18738), author of System of Logic, Utili- 
tarianism, etc. 

7Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), author of Philosophy; its Scope and 
Relations, ete, 


104 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


words about the rise and general character of absolute ideal- 
ism will finish our brief historical sketch. 

We must admit that Kant’s position, for all its suggestive- 
ness, was a rather mechanical compromise between sensation- 
alism and rationalism. All order is contributed by the mind 
from its own resources. And this mind is still thought of as 
something essentially beyond the scope of science. Later we 
shall argue for the naturalization of mind; so this point must 
be carefully noted. Furthermore, Kant’s position was a 
half-way house between realism and idealism. While domi- 
nated by the problems he had inherited—we might almost call 
them puzzles—he sought to maintain a balance between ex- 
tremes. He was neither quite a realist nor an idealist. If we 
think of him as a realist, it must be as an agnostic realist, 
a believer in unknowable things-in-themselves. And he 
speaks in terms of condescension of the ‘‘good Berkeley.’’ 

But his suecessors took the bit between their teeth and en- 
tered on a career of speculative construction. There is no 
reason to belittle their ability. In social, ethical and political 
matters they made genuine contributions. But it is doubtful 
whether they did justice to the natural sciences and to the 
problems connected with perception and the relation between 
mind and body. In their hands, Experience became a sort 
of autonomous reality. We can easily see why this was, and, 
because the assumption has been so important in its continued 
influence on philosophy until the recent rise of realism, it is 
well to get the basis of it clearly in mind. It was the thing-in- 
itself as a cause of sensations which was attacked. Are not 
the categories forms contributed by the mind for the ordering 
of sense according to Kant? If so, are they not limited in 
their significance to this application to sense to form experi- 
ence? If so, we cannot use the category of causation outside 
of experience -and speak of things-in-themselves as causing 
the manifold of sense. Causation is only a relation within 
experience and it is really quite meaningless to refer to 
realities outside of experience. 


THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION 105 


Let me raise a query here. Psychology and logic have seen 
good reason to doubt that we ever begin with a chaos of mere 
qualities like color and sound. There is pattern, order, corre- 
lation from the first. Spatial and temporal relations are ex- 
perientially primitive even though they develop and deepen 
as the organism continues to function. We shall argue that 
the categories grow in a natural way from the cues and sug- 
gestions given in experience and that they are not contributed 
by a transcendental mind. But, if so, they are assigned to 
things just as colors and sounds are. It is things which are 
in spatial relations and it is external events which are in 
temporal relations. In short, the content of experience is 
from the first directed to, and concerned with, the things to 
which the organism is adjusting itself. Experience is not 
substantive, as idealists tend to hold, but a phase of the 
functioning of the organism. We perceive and think things 
in terms of discriminated characters among which are. rela- 
tions. 

But philosophy had not yet grasped this functional view. 
The Cartesian dualism had prevented it. It is only recently 
with the growth of biology and psychology of a biological 
setting that this more functional type of realism could arise. 
Man has a complex world to master and it is not surprising 
that assumptions hold his eyes from what seems to later gen- 
erations the obvious outlook. It is all a matter of growth, 
the greater part of which we owe to the steady, cooperative 
advance of science. 

As we would expect, the idealists of this period were weak- 
est in their philosophy of nature. In the social and political 
fields they attacked extreme individualism and appreciated 
the idea of development. It would be absurd to deny their 
keenness and speculative fertility. Fichte was an ethical 
genius and emphasized the will; Schelling stressed feeling 
and was led to postulate a world-mind of an intuitive and 
creative type, thus moving in the direction of pantheism; 
Hegel was a rationalist and tried to work out the inner logic 


106 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


of an absolute reason. All of them believed that intense 
speculation could by itself lead the thinker into the heart of 
reality. They had gotten rid of an independent physical 
world and were convinced that reality was akin to that in 
themselves which seemed to them central and important. 
Unfortunately there was not enough cooperation with science 
in this romantic wave of speculation. 

This movement exhausted itself and, as time passed, the 
more empirical and realistic traditions which had always kept 
more closely in touch with science began to regain attention. 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, we hear of prag- 
matism and realism. It is in these movements that the most 
hopeful recent philosophical work has been done. Yet the 
idealistic tradition may be said to have exercised a steadying 
influence upon both of these rather emphatic novelties. 

We shall now endeavor to do definitely constructive work 
in theory of knowledge and at the same time orientate the 
student in regard to the present situation in philosophy. It 
will be our aim to bring out problems and to suggest analyses 
and solutions. In this way, it is hoped, the student will learn 
to philosophize because he will see that the problems are at 
once unavoidable and tremendously important. 


REFERENCES 


Kant, Critique of Pure Reason and Prolegomena. A glance at Watson’s 
Selections will, perhaps, be best, since Kant is hard reading. Any 
of the histories of philosophy will be of assistance. 

Horrvine, History of Modern Philosophy, vol. 2. 

PAULSEN, Kant. 

PricHARD, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. 

WarD, Kant. 

WENLEY, Kant and His Philosophical Revolution, chap. 1. 


CHAPTER IX 


REFERENCES AND DISTINCTIONS WITHIN 
CONSCIOUSNESS 


Significant Points Learned.—As a result of the careful 
studies made in the preceding chapters we should now be 
ready to make a constructive advance in epistemology. We 
are at one and the same time acquainted with the difficulties 
eonfronting natural realism and with the dangers which 
threaten any attempt to pass beyond it. And in this case 
to be forewarned is to be forearmed. We know what mistakes 
to avoid. It is also clear that there has been an historical 
growth in these matters, a gaining of insight. Through many 
centuries philosophy has been feeling out possibilities and 
acquiring a competent knowledge of the human situation in 
knowing. There is good reason to believe that all this infor- 
mation is at last beginning to fall into order. 

Let us, first of all, take stock of the points we have learned. 
On the whole, the following three seem to be the most im- 
portant: (1) the error of separating sense and reason into 
two domains having distinct sources; (2) the error of the 
assumption that mind and matter are two distinct substances 
isolated from each other; and (3) the theory, connected his- 
torically with this two-substance view, that knowledge is di- 
rected at ideas rather than at objects. In our historical 
sketch we saw that these assumptions controlled the outlook 
and problems of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant. 
A few words about each of these points may be of assistance. 

In place of the contrast between sense and reason, the mod- 
ern thinker puts the recognition of levels in experience. 
Suppose that we take sense-perception as the first level of 
prime interest to the epistemologist. We soon discover that 

107 


108 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


(1) there is structure, or pattern, in what is presented in 
sense-perception and (2) that there is interpretation and 
judgment at work. Explicit reasoning is a term for methods, 
operations and processes which build upon and add to this 
level. It is a term for analysis, the discovery of relations, 
the seeking of more facts, the development of concepts, the 
application of experimental methods, etc. Thus reasoning is 
a term for operations, methods and capacities which carry 
our experience farther and deeper than sense-perception 
alone can. But it is not a term for a special faculty. 

We may say, then, that the old dualistic, faculty psychology 
and logic have been replaced by a keener and more empirical 
sense of the gradual growth and complication of experience 
and of the processes upon which this complication and con- 
ceptualization rests. However far down we go, there is a 
form, or pattern, to the content of consciousness. It was 
this form which Hume with his atomic sensationalism neg- 
lected and which Kant artificially brought in. May it not 
be that this pattern of experience reflécts the pattern of the 
world to which the conscious organism is adjusting itself? 
To take the stream of consciousness as something isolated 
and independent would be a mistake. 

Thus we are led to the second point. The two-substance 
theory of Descartes set problems which could not easily be 
answered and gave a bias to epistemology which it has 
found it hard to overcome. Locke’s inability to carry through 
a representative realism led to idealism and phenomenalism. 
If there are substances, how can we know them, was the seem- 
ingly unanswerable query. What do we mean by a substance? 
Berkeley’s arguments have seemed to many convincing. We 
shall find that, even in contemporary philosophy, there is a 
strong bias against the belief in any kind of stuff. 

If we know only our ideas we cannot know substance. 
Hence this second point leads to the third assumption which 
confused philosophy for so long a time. Are we confined to 
ideas of a subjective sort? Let us remember that, on the 


REFERENCES AND DISTINCTIONS 109 


two-substance theory, the mind is confined to its own ideas 
which are, as it were, a part of its substance. This was what 
was meant for a long time by saying that ideas are mental. 

But cannot we say that ideas are subjective in the sense 
that they are bound up with the individual organic knower 
and those operations which we call mental. In this sense, 
to say that ideas are mental has nothing to do with the two- 
substance theory. It is to localize them and the operations 
which go with them. It is just to admit the fact of con- 
sciousness. What consciousness is and how it is bound up with 
the organism becomes a specific question which metaphysics 
must busy itself with. 

Lastly, it is now recognized that our attention and our 
cognition are from the first directed toward things. It is 
things, and not ideas, which we perceive and know. It is 
things which we seek to interpret and pass judgment upon. 
In this regard, consciousness would seem to reflect the activ- 
ities of the organism. It would seem to be empirically cor- 
rect to say that we look out through ideas at objects. We 
mean, act toward, adjust ourselves to things as these are pre- 
sented or appear. An introspectionism dominated by the 
two-substance theory with its isolation of mind did not do 
justice to this sense of direction in consciousness. It isolated 
presentational contents, like color. and shape, from the per- 
ceptual situation and attitude. 

What we shall now undertake in the remainder of this 
chapter is a study of knowing as an empirical kind of ex- 
perience. We want to get acquainted with our own minds, 
with their references, structures and claims. Of late years 
much attention has been given to this kind of preparation for a 
theory of knowledge. All schools of philosophy have made 
their contributions. Recent movements in logic and psy- 
chology have also helped. There is good reason to believe that 
a sufficient foundation for theory of knowledge is thus being 
achieved, and, sooner or later, this will lead to general agree- 
ment in philosophy. 


110 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Descriptive Empiricism—wWith this preparation, let us 
begin our constructive exposition by a survey of conscious- 
ness. We shall note its distinctions and claims. Instead of 
beginning with a hasty view of what knowledge is, we shall 
try by close study to find out what it is. Instead of be- 
ginning with a fixed notion of mind and matter, we shall work 
up to a critical view of both. And our point of departure 
must be the field of conscious experience as light is thrown 
upon it by the sciences. 

First of all, be it noted that we shall try to study the field 
of the individual’s consciousness as a working complex with 
its structures and processes and meanings and claims. We 
began this task in the third chapter; we should now be able 
to carry it through systematically and without bewilderment. 

A structure which immediately attracts our attention is the 
contrast between the knower and the known, a contrast 
bridged by what is usually spoken of as the cognitive relation. 
There are, quite obviously, levels of this structure. The 
first level is perception; a higher level is a conceptual theory 
of an object. 

In our study of natural realism we became acquainted with 
the structure and meanings characteristic of perception. We 
were later to conclude that, while there was a profound truth 
in this structure and these meanings, the situation was not 
completely understood by common sense. 

On the knower side of this contrast, we can discover the 
empirical self with its interests and its sense of bodily set 
and attitude. Thus a short time ago when I was trying to 
catch a hen whose cackling was disturbing me, I had a very 
definite sense of myself and of my bodily attitude toward the 
hen. To speak in a technical way, my self-experience was 
flooded by motor sensations and dominated by a purpose. Over 
against me was the changing complex of characters which 
meant hen to me, that is, a thing as real as myself which 
was dodging around and trying to escape my clutches. The 
reader’s imagination can surely work out in detail the mean- 


REFERENCES AND DISTINCTIONS 111 


ings which illuminate the individual’s field of consciousness. 
It is the possession of these structures and meanings which 
makes consciousness what it is to the epistemologist. It would 
seem that consciousness is a kind of complex which can mould 
itself upon the situation in which the individual is and reflect 
its structure into itself. That a certain perceptual appearance 
means to me ‘‘hen’’ depends upon what the psychologist 
ealls the acquirement of meaning through association. A 
whole grows up in an interpreted way. We must never forget 
this interpretative richness of consciousness. To neglect it 
is to make knowledge an insoluble riddle. 

On the known, or object, pole of consciousness there develops 
in the above described fashion the category of thinghood. 
The essential meanings, or elements, of this category are not 
difficult to discover. A thing is a continuant, something which 
endures much as we do and which is spatial and resistant. 
It moves as a unit and can be pointed at. Now there is 
nothing mysterious in any of these elements, nothing which 
cannot arise in consciousness in our constant dealings with 
things. It would seem that in these meanings consciousness 
develops a valid interpretation of the organism’s surround- 
ings. Since these traits are general, or generic, they apply to 
all the objects to which the organism is responding. Within 
this framework arise and are assigned those specific traits 
which distinguish one thing from another. 

Into the study of the generic development of this structure 
and these meanings we need not enter. That would carry us 
too far into detail in both psychology and logic. As episte- 
mologists, we have a right to recognize their presence and their 
empirical character. We should also note that this structure 
and these meanings are used in perception by everyone. The 
result is what we have called natural realism. We are out- 
ward-looking and interested in things which we appear to 
apprehend. The underlying processes and developments are 
hidden or not known. 

Upon this structural foundation within consciousness more 


112 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


complex meanings and distinctions are reared. Things form 
together the spatial-temporal-causal system of the external 
world which the knower seeks to comprehend under the 
guidance of gense-perception abetted by experimentation and 
reflection. Here we enter upon the scientific level of knowl- 
edge. It is interesting to note that the knower, as an organism, 
is considered a part of this physical system. 

But there is a certain ambiguity about the knower. The 
‘ndividual’s field of consciousness, which we have been exam- 
ining, is the seat of conscious, or explicit, knowing. And it 
has been one of the problems of philosophy to relate it to 
the organism or, rather, to understand its relation to the 
organism. 

As natural realism breaks down under reflection, conscious- 
ness grows to include the whole field which we have been 
examining with its structures, claims and meanings. Hach 
man’s consciousness is a centre of experience and cognition. 
While the physical world forms a unitary system, this other 
domain does not. Of it, pluralism 1s characteristic. In the 
one domain we seem to have a large measure of continuity ; in 
the other, discontinuity is the feature. Communication be- 
tween person’s minds is by means of the organism as in 
speech, gesture and writing. 

The results of what I have called descriptive empiricism 
must not be confused with Berkeleian idealism. Berkeley 
ignored the significance of what I have called thinghood and 
discarded as illusions those meanings of independence and 
ecommonness on which I have laid stress. Hence he could 
not think of perception as an interpretation of a thing. 

Two Dimensions of the Field.—Descriptive empiricism 
finds that the individual’s consciousness has two dimensions 
which may be called the co-existentval and the temporal 
respectively. 

We have already indicated a characteristic contrast in 
the co-extential dimension, viz—that between the percipient 
and the objects perceived. And we have noted that this 


REFERENCES AND DISTINCTIONS 113 


concrete contrast lends itself to the introduction of meanings. 
Thus the objects perceived are interpreted as substantial and 
independent realities in definite relations with one another, 
while the percipient is similarly interpreted. The adult, cer- 
tainly, lives at this level of outlook. 

But the field of consciousness has not only a co-existential 
structure but also a temporal growth. Objects acquire mean- 
ings and absorb new data. We learn more about things and 
they change for us accordingly, although we are convinced 
that we now interpret them and know them better than we 
did before. Thus the sun is perceived as a round disk in the 
heavens but careful study has persuaded us that it is actually 
tremendously large and millions of miles away from us. 
We have good reason to believe that there is no contradiction 
here because, if the sun is this large and at this distance, we 
should perceive it the way we do. 

The temporal dimension of consciousness brings home to us 
the fact that adequate knowledge is something slowly acquired. 
It introduces us to the part played by wider experience, by 
comparison, by reasoning. From this point of view we realize 
that knowledge is not an immediate and simple affair but a 
resultant of effort. It is a matter of accumulation and of 
increased interpretative insight. 

The philosophical movement called pragmatism has laid 
decided stress upon this temporal dimension of consciousness. 
It has pointed out that knowing is an enterprise of a concrete 
sort arising as an attempt to solve a problem and that it 
involves instruments like perception and ideas. The value of 
ideas lies in the fact that they are substitutes for immediate 
experience. By them we can mean things not present and we 
can condense and select our experience. In this fashion our 
experience deepens and accumulates until we become masters 
of a wide range and are able to think penetratively and ex- 
tensively. 

What occurs for the individual has also occurred for the 
race. As our experience enlarges, we know more about things. 


114 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


In like manner, we can compare by means of history the ideas 
of things held in the past with those held at present. How 
little was known of the chemical constitution of objects even 
a few centuries ago! Again, how ignorant people were of 
the causes of disease! Each generation can inherit what has 
been learned and add to it something new. 

It is interesting to point out that the co-existential dimen- 
sion of consciousness favors realism because it is pervaded 
by realistic meanings and attitudes. Until we reflect a little, 
it even favors natural realism for we seem to ourselves to see, 
or become aware of, things in a sort of immediate way. There 
they are; we can refer to them denotatively, this book, that 
table, this person, that vase, ete. But attention given to 
the temporal dimension soon makes us aware that knowledge 
is genetically not the immediate sort of thing it seems to be. 
We note the growth and change in our ideas of things. We 
become conscious of the silent processes which condition our 
knowledge of the world. A mediate realism tends quickly 
to take the place of the immediate realism of common sense. 
Knowledge is now considered an affair of ideas and concepts. 
We know by means of, and in terms of, ideas. But knowledge 
is just as direct as ever in its references to objects and in 
its claim. 

A Closer Study of the Cognitive Relation—We have 
called attention to the structure within consciousness at the 
level of perception in which the knowing self is set over 
against the object perceived. Because, at this level, the con- 
tent of perception is not distinguished from the object of 
perception, it seems as though there were a compresence of 
a literal sort between knower and known. This compresence 
has been called the cognitive relation. 

Recent thinkers have used such terms as awareness, con- 
sciousness of, contemplation, minding, perceiving, for this 
compresence of knower and object. Thus I am aware of this 
book. I contemplate it. S. Alexander, a very able con- 
temporary thinker who inclines to a restatement of natural 


REFERENCES AND DISTINCTIONS 115 


realism, speaks of enjoying the self and contemplating the 
object. Lloyd Morgan talks of the ing and the ed sides of 
experience. The subject side is minding and the object 
side is minded. Thus perceiving implies something perceived ; 
remembering something remembered, ete. 

In this structure and distinction we obviously have some- 
thing very important for epistemology. We must ask our- 
selves, however, whether we have here a literal relation be- 
tween the knower and the object or an interpretative reference 
to the object. We shall speak of the first as involving an 
apprehensional view of knowledge. I mean that this view 
imphes that the object itself is literally present to the knower 
in much the same way as a table is present to those who are 
sitting at it. The opposed view maintains that cognition is a 
selective interpretation of an object which is not literally 
given in consciousness. We intend, or mean, an object, this 
intention being at the perceptual level bound up with the 
motor set of the organism perceiving. Thus I literally ‘‘look 
at’’ this tree before me. Others can note what I am doing. 
Thinking of an object in its absence from the neighbor- 
hood of my organism is an act reared upon the tenden- 
cies and structure of perception; it is simply more com- 
plicated. 

We can readily distinguish three possibilities at least with 
regard to the cognitive relation. The first is the idealistic 
position and holds that to be is to be known. For this view, 
cognition implies a relation which makes the object known 
dependent on the knowing. The customary formulation of 
this view of the cognitive relation is that it is internal and 
makes the object in some sense an adjective of the knowing 
mind. Both terms of the relation are mental for this philo- 
sophical tradition. The second position maintains that the 
cognitive relation is external and that the object in no sense 
depends upon its being known. This is the theory held by 
what is called the new realism, which is clearly a revival of 
the essentials of natural realism in opposition to idealism. 


116 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


And then there is the third possibility, which I myself favor 
and which is called critical realism, which denies the literal- 
ness of the cognitive relation and makes the distinction be- 
tween the content of knowledge and the object of knowledge. 
The knower selects and means the object, and knows it in 
terms of a cognitive content, but such an act of knowing does 
not involve the literal presence of the object known. It will 
be noted that these two kinds of realism have much in com- 
mon and yet that they differ profoundly in their views of 
cognition and the cognitive relation. We shall have more 
to say of this contrast when we examine in a later chapter 
the epistemological positions of the present. 

The Distinction between Things and Ideas.—Since this 
chapter is devoted to the distinctions within the individual’s 
consciousness, it will be worth our while to devote some time 
to a contrast which has developed within consciousness as a 
result of knowledge. We know physical things and, in 
another fashion, we know our consciousness. It would seem 
that we intuit, or experience, the various features of our 
consciousness in the sense that they are open to our inspection ; 
while we know objects by means of, and in terms of, such 
features. There is a givenness about the one domain that does 
not hold for the other. At least, this is the conclusion to 
which we must come if natural realism breaks down and we 
do not resign ourselves to idealism, 

Each individual is seemingly confined to his own conscious- 
ness in an existential sense. He cannot share the feelings, 
emotions and thoughts of another in any literal fashion. 
Sometimes this has been denied, especially by those whose 
epistemology would make such existential isolation involve the 
denial of knowledge of that which lies outside consciousness. 
Thus the new realists in America deny the existential ex- 
clusiveness of minds. For them, two people ean literally 
share the same idea. But, in spite of their asseverations, the 
older tradition and the tradition of psychology on this point 
seem the better founded. Thus I agree with Miss Washburn, 


REFERENCES AND DISTINCTIONS 117 


‘That the mind of each human being forms a region inacces- 
sible to all save its possessor.’’? 

This position must not be misunderstood. There is no 
denial that we can know and appreciate the thoughts and 
feelings of others but only that we can existentially possess 
those thoughts and feelings. Perhaps Miss Washburn’s term, 
inaccessible, was ill-advised. I do not think that another’s 
consciousness is hidden from my knowledge but only that it 
eannot be a part of my consciousness. 

Let me, again, call attention to the fact that I am distin- 
guishing consciousness from mind. Consciousness is a part of 
mind but not the whole of mind. And by consciousness I 
mean the empirical field which one experiences at any one 
time, a field which has a unity and an openness to awareness. 
Knowledge resides in this field so far as it is actual and not 
merely potential, but the object of knowledge is not in this 
field except in introspection. 

It is well, once more, to note that the term, consciousness, 
is Somewhat ambiguous, especially in the English language. 
To be conscious of means to be aware of; and this expression 
has a cognitive significance. It is very natural that many 
epistemologists—especially those who are trying to carry 
through some form of natural realism—should identify con- 
sciousness with these acts of awareness. My own thinking 
has compelled me to consider these acts of awareness very 
complex and inclusive of perceptual and conceptual content. 
In short, it seems to me preferable to keep the term con- 
sciousness for the whole field with its structure and contents 
and to recognize that “‘to be conscious of’’ is a function 
within that field. Once the distinction is made and under- 
stood, there should be little difficulty about it. 

We are now prepared to appreciate the existential contrast 

2M. F. Washburn, The Animal Mind, p. 1. R. B. Perry has written 
the clearest attack upon this position in his Present Philosophical 
Tendencies, chap. XII. I suggest that he confuses knowing and being 


present in consciousness and thus begs the question or, rather, merely 
applies his epistemology in an a priori fashion. 


118 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


between the realm of consciousness and the realm of physical 
things. 

It has become a commonplace that the elements of con- 
sciousness do not have the same properties and characteristics 
as physical things. Thus physical things have size and weight 
and offer resistance. These same statements cannot be made 
of the contents which we can discriminate. Weight as a 
meaning does not itself have weight. Such meanings as size, 
location and causal efficacy apply interpretatively to objects. 
It is to objects that they are directed from the first. And it 
is absurd to direct these meanings upon themselves and to 
say that a meaning, or content, has size, locus, causal efficacy, 
GEC 

This distinction will have considerable significance for our 
own theory of knowledge, for it will lead us to assert that 
science is right in believing in a stuff which, through organiza- 
tion, constitutes the physical world. In consciousness, itself, 
we assert traits of physical things which we do not assert 
of consciousness. It would seem to follow that we apprehend, 
or understand, ideas in consciousness by means of which we 
know things outside of consciousness. Ideas must be dis- 
tinguished from things. 

The distinction between thing and idea has been very defi- 
nitely developed by psychology. Consciousness comes to be 
a term which covers all contents which are experienced or 
which are capable of being experienced such as feelings, 
sense-data, meanings, concepts, etc. And opposed to this 
varied class of contents is the physical world as this is some- 
how known. The psychologist does not bother his head very 
much over the problem of how the physical scientist can know 
his realm. He is, himself, a specialist and simply follows the 
logic of his own field. But it is obvious that the epistemologist 
has this task assigned to him. 

Existence versus Cognition.—We are now in a position to 
eall attention to a contrast whose full significance has often 
been neglected. We have maintained that for psychology 


REFERENCES AND DISTINCTIONS 9 


consciousness is a realm of existents of a peculiar sort which 
it is its duty to study. For the physical sciences, physical 
things also constitute another kind of realm of existents. As 
to the relation between these two realms we shall say nothing 
at present, only declaring that we shall give good reasons for 
rejecting Cartesian dualism. We shall, in fact, find many 
excellent reasons for holding that the organism includes these 
contents which are really qualitative events in it. 

Now the sciences have laid so much stress upon existence 
that they have ignored cognition. The reason for this is 
easily seen. Science takes cognition for granted and con- 
centrates on its objects. But psychology, unfortunately, fol- 
lowed this example. It had to, in one sense, for that was a 
part of its duty. But it should have seen that cogmtion was 
a peculiar function of consciousness; that it had to deal with 
something which was unique and had a special task to per- 
form. 

Cognition is built up around reference to an object. This 
reference to an object rests upon a structure in consciousness 
and upon activities of the organism accompanying and find- 
ing expression in this structure. In the present chapter we 
ealled attention to this structure in the contrast between per- 
eipient and object perceived, subject and object, knower and 
known. We sought to point out the growth of this structure 
and the meanings which qualify both poles. Thus I look at 
this apple tree and estimate what limbs must be lopped off. 
in order to let the sun into it. The capacity to develop mean- 
ings and to apply these meanings is the gift of consciousness 
upon which cognition depends. It is within consciousness that 
we develop the idea of an independent object; and it is within 
consciousness that we interpret such an independent object 
by means of, and in terms of, discriminated characters. 

We shall see that one of the weaknesses of much of episte- 
mology has been its timidity in regard to consciousness. It 
has not studied its structures and meanings empirically and 
carefully enough, Berkeley’s attack upon Locke impressed 


120 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


it too much. Hume, for example, studies consciousness almost 
entirely from the existential standpoint as consisting of im- 
pressions and images. But I do not hesitate to assert that 
the important fact for the philosopher is that the organism 
uses and develops these impressions and images for the sake 
of cognition. 

The suggestion which we shall put forward is that, in 
consciousness, we can mean and know objects which transcend 
consciousness. To those who stress only the existential aspect 
of consciousness and think of it as only so many sensations 
and images, this view is nonsense. To them we must reply 
that they have completely ignored consciousness in the con- 
crete with its structures and meanings. We can even add that 
psychology is beginning to see that isolated sensations and 
images of the Humian type are artificial entities. The field 
of consciousness at any one time is a complex structure ex- 
pressive of the functioning of the organism. 

In the next chapter we shall try to explain the nature of 
knowledge on the basis of the empirical analyses we have 
made in this one. We shall seek to show that cognition in- 
volves its own peculiar kind of transcendence of conscious- 
ness, a transcendence which is in no sense existential. To 
know objects which are outside our consciousness existen- 
tially, we do not need to get outside our consciousness in any 
but a cognitive way. That is, we make a reference and a 
knowledge-claim. Thus to think truly of Paris I do not need 
to travel in some mysterious mental fashion to Paris. It is 
enough that Paris is the object of my thought and reference. 

It is very necessary to bear the above points in mind and 
to appreciate how these distinctions appear in some fashion 
even at the level of practical perception. In perceptual 
situations I am looking at objects like books and trees. There 
is a structure here which we must acknowledge and try to 
analyze. To call it animal faith, as Santayana does, is very 
poetic but misleading. There does not seem to me to be any 
mysterious leap to a transcendent object but a contrast and 


REFERENCES AND DISTINCTIONS 121 


a development of that contrast by meanings. Nor js there a 
mysterious inference from the content of perception to the 
object of perception. In fact, the distinction between the 
content of perception and the object of perception is a later 
development due to the application of reflection to the stand- 
point of naive realism. As soon as we have perception we 
have the interpretation of objects. 


REFERENCES 


ALEXANDER, Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1910-11. 

BRADLEY, Appearance and fReality,. chap. 9. 

FULLERTON, Introduction to Philosophy, chap. 4. 

RuSSELL, The Problems of Philosophy, chap. 5. 

SELLARS, Critical Realism, chap. 5; Essays in Critical Realism, chap. 6. 
Luoyp MorGANn, Hmergent Evolution, lect. 4. 


CHAPTER X 
THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 


Perception an Affair of the Organism.—We have good 
reason to believe that we now have our material fairly well 
in hand. Let us attempt to get as clear an idea as possible 
of the nature of knowledge. 

In order to free ourselves completely from the misleading 
associations of Cartesian. dualism, it may be well to begin 
with the situation in perception. After that, we can pass 
to the kind of knowledge we have in judgment. 

Perception is an affair of the organism. The organism co- 
operates with the influences coming from surrounding things 
so that stimulus meets with a ‘directed response. The per- 
cipient organism attends to, turns toward, selects, behaves in 
relation to, things, and thus makes them its objects. Hence, 
we should not speak of things as though they were objects 
in their own right. They are existents in their own right, 
but they are objects of the organism’s behavior and conscious 
attention. ‘‘Object’’ is thus a relative term and implies an 
activity focussed upon a thing. It is for this reason that we 
can speak of a thing as an object of perception or of thought. 

The following diagram indicates the double relation between 
a thing and a percipient organism: | 


a el 


The lower, continuous line represents the causal relation 
from the thing to the organism, while the upper, discontinuous 
line represents the cognitive, perceptual relation. The direc- 
tions of the two lines differ. One is from the thing; the other 
is to the thing. The cognitive perceptual relation is one of 


behavior and conscious attention directed to the thing, 
122 


THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 123 


We have sought to examine this situation both externally 
and within consciousness and to see how a proper view blends 
these two in an intelligible manner, 

Is it not true that this position rises above the historical 
controversy between naive realism and subjective idealism? 
As against subjective idealism, it stresses the active reference 
to an object. which is believed to be external, independent and 
lasting, and it holds that this object is interpreted in con- 
sciousness rather than given in consciousness. As against 
naive realism, it maintains that the apparent givenness of the 
object of perception in consciousness is an illusion due to 
the structure of consciousness in perception and the lack of 
reflection upon the conditions of perception. In other words, 
the content of perception is identified with the object of per- 
ception because they are, as yet, not distinguished. In con- 
sciousness, cognitive reference and interpretation dominates 
over the existential situation. Neither the range of conscious- 
ness nor its function is at first understood. Only reflection 
brings the whole situation clearly into view. 

It is interesting to note that recent psychology is increas- 
ingly inclined to regard consciousness with its structure and 
references as an expression of organic activities in actual 
situations. Perceiving and thinking are activities. What is 
active? Evidently the organism, the conscious person. We 
must, therefore, think of the field of consciousness as sus- 
tained by the brain-mind of the organism in its response to 
external things. To the empirical self within consciousness it 
would be as though it saw things or as though things appeared 
to it. 

The Synthetic vs. Both the External and the Introspective 
View of Perception.—A good beginning in these matters is 
so important that we shall run the danger of some repetition. 
It is very essential, as we said, to free ourselves from the 
tradition that perception is merely the apprehension of a 
mental state. The separation emphasized by Descartes be- 
tween mind and matter led to this notion that the mind was in 


124 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


perception brooding on its own contents. We saw that Locke 
speaks of ideas as the objects of the understanding when a man 
thinks. Berkeley continued the same tradition and dropped 
what seemed to him the useless realm of matter. Hume wrote 
of impressions and Kant of phenomena. In every case, the 
total situation was ignored or misunderstood. Philosophy 
started off on a non-realistic tangent, and it is only recently 
that it has been able to make a fresh start. 

If our own analysis is correct, these contents, or ideas, are 
elements in perception rather than objects of perception. 
They constitute the way in which the object is characterized 
in perception instead of being the object of perception. 
Or, to put it in another way, they are the appearance of the 
object of perception. We must get rid of the purely intro- 
spective tradition that the idea is the object of perception. 

If, as in introspection, we break loose from the natural 
interests and direction of behavior of the organism in per- 
ception and swing our attention to the characters like color 
and shape, which we can note, we can speak of these char- 
acters as objects of awareness. But they are not objects of 
perception. When we consider these characters for their 
own sake and do not perceive through them, we are not per- 
ceiving in the strict sense. We are neglecting meanings, be- 
liefs and interests which constitute the affirmation of a 
physical object. 

It is difficult to get a good terminology which is at once 
expressive and simple. With the above suggestions in mind, 
the distinction we have used between the object of perception 
and the process of perception with its use of discriminated 
characters of perception is satisfactory. It is the object which 
we mean and select and which we characterize in terms of the 
content of perception. 

The synthetic view enables us to harmonize both the be- 
havioristic observation that an organism responds to an object 
and the internal experience of meaning, noting and inter- 
preting an object. 


THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 125 


Perception Is Usually Practical.—The content of percep- 
tion or the appearance of the object serves usually as a guide 
to conduct. It is not surprising that this complex absorbs all 
the meanings which arise as relevant to the thing. <A razor 
is something to shave with. An apple is something to eat. 
All the information which we acquire joins itself to the 
sensory nucleus and interprets the object we seem to ourselves 
to be apprehending and which we are certainly in some sense 
knowing. As both psychologist and logician point out, judg- 
ment enters into perception. We think the object by all that 
we come to know about it, what it does to ourselves and to 
other things, its spatial relations, structure, ete. Thus think- 
ing supplements perception. 

It is only as science replaces our usually practical attitude 
and interpretation of things that an effort is made to get 
data which will enable us to penetrate more deeply into the 
nature of the object. Analysis, comparison, experimentation 
and theory are operations used under the control of the 
desire to know; and everyone is aware how much additional 
knowledge is thus gained. 

What, Then, Is Knowledge?—We must now press on to a 
determination of what knowledge is when it is made explicit 
as regards both its conditions and claims. 

Perception is a primitive sort of knowing in which sensory 
data are corrected and interpreted in relation to an object. 
But we must pass to explicit, judgmental knowledge as 
we find it in science before the actual situation is under- 
stood. 

Let me offer a verbal description of knowledge. Knowledge 
of the physical world is an interpretative comprehension of 
the characteristics of things by means of, and in terms of, 
characters within consciousness. Here we have the factors in 
knowledge distinguished and the peculiar claim involved in 
knowing made explicit. When I claim to know a thing, I 
make an assertion, backed up by belief, that an idea of mine 
reveals the actual characteristics and relations of the thing, 


126 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


I assume therein that the real world has a structure which 
I can think or intellectually grasp. 

Whence do we get this idea? Clearly from perception. 
The external world seems to us there to be revealed or to 
appear, and we gain the notion that it has a nature and struc- 
ture of an intrinsic sort which can be noted by us. All reflec- 
tion and deeper thinking has done is to confirm us in this 
view by the detail which has been worked out and tested. 
There is nothing in science which, when properly understood, 
condemns perception. We should see the sun round, and 
things should look small to us at a distance, and a stick should 
look bent in water. Why? Because perception involves a 
personal, biocentric perspective. It is this perspective which 
science seeks to overcome by measurement and axes of refer- 
ence. Descartes did not appreciate this relation between per- 
ception and ey as it has been fade out by modern logic 
and psychology 

The thesis is, then, that the very nature and claim of 
knowledge is derived from what seems to be the situation in 
perception, We interpret things and assign meanings to 
them at that stage. We but carry this further in thought. 
To put the situation very succinctly, it is by knowing that 
we learn that we know and what knowledge is. It is by re- 
fiection on the conditions of knowledge that we 2an learn to 
the full what the instrumentalities and claims of knowing are. 
This is but another way of saying that epistemology works 
upon the fact of knowledge. 

I wish now to point out that there is a development of our 
idea of knowing. At the level of natural realism, while there 
has still been little, if any, reflection upon knowledge, knowing 
appears to be an apprehension of an object. The object seems 
to be given in a literal way. This fact is very important, for 
both subjective idealism and the new realism build upon it 
after their own fashion. But we have argued that the break- 
down of natural realism forces us to rise to a more mediate 
view of knowledge. Knowledge is then seen to be a grasping 


THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 127 


of the nature of the object by means of and in terms of a 
content. The claim remains, however, the same. 

There are, of course, many cases of knowledge besides 
perception, and, in these other cases, this instrumentality of 
contents comes out quite obviously, so obviously, in fact, 
that even common sense is inclined to acknowledge it. Thus 
in knowledge of the past, say of the deeds of Lincoln, we are 
at once inclined to reject the notion that these deeds are them- 
selves given to us in an existential way. We feel that they 
are given cognitively and by means of ideas which we have 
secured by reading history. In the same fashion, knowledge 
of distant objects which cannot be perceived is thought of 
as being mediated by our ideas. We were once there, or 
people have told us about them. Again, the knowledge of 
the chemical and physical structure of things, as worked out 
by science, far surpasses the reach of perception alone. Yet 
it is knowledge. 

The essential thing about knowledge comes to be the revela- 
tion of the object. Whether this is due to the literal entrance 
of the object into our consciousness, as seemed at first the 
ease, or whether it is a revelation in terms of a content is a 
secondary matter which the facts must decide. In neither 
ease can knowledge be more or less than knowledge, although 
its grasp may not be quite the same in the one ease as in the 
other. 

The structure of perceptual knowing is developed and 
carried over into what is often called representative knowing, 
that is, the knowing of objects in their absence. In this con- 
nection, I might call attention to a mistake which many phi- 
losophers have made. It is the idea that representative know- 
ing or thinking, is just an effort to reinstate the original 
experience. It may be this, as in memory, but it is often an 
attempt to penetrate by more data and reflection very deeply 
into the nature of the object. It is really nonsense to assert 
that scientific knowledge is merely a summary of perception. 
The tradition of Hume has encouraged this former notion 


128 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


among scientists as, for instance, with such a writer as Karl 
Pearson. Empiricism was seldom entirely free from this 
error, which is characteristic of phenomenalism. Whether 
presentative or representative in mode, knowledge is direct 
in its aim. 

The Mechanism of Knowing.—We can readily distinguish 
three factors in an act of knowing: (1) the selection of an 
object, (2) the assigned idea, and (3) the belief. In the 
background of all this is the self as knower. These three 
factors play different roles in the one complex experience. 
As we have suggested, the best way to appreciate them is 
to begin with the level of perception and work upward. 

We have laid so much stress upon the structure and mean- 
ings of consciousness in perception and its harmony with the 
situation and behavior of the percipient organism that we 
need say nothing more about it now. 

As conception replaces perception, we build up a con- 
struction of an external world the parts of which can be 
measured and located with reference to each other and not 
merely with reference to a particular percipient. Such a 
system of reference is used in social intercourse. Thus I 
speak to another person of a house located on a certain street 
in a certain city. The technique of such systems of reference 
is familiar to all these days. And we know how it has been 
developed by physics and astronomy. The object thus selected 
is interpreted in terms of certain predicates which are now 
consciously assigned to it. In this way I think the object. 
We may say that knowing an object at this level is thinking 
it in terms of predicates. These predicates are supposed to 
give the actual characteristics and relations of the object. 
The impulse, which we noted at the level of perception, to 
assign characters to objects continues even though the assign- 
ment is made more critically. 

In an act of knowing, then, these three factors, selection of 
an object, assigned characters, and belief, work organically 
together. Just as we perceive an object in terms of its appear- 


THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 129 


ance, SO we conceive it in terms of its corrected appearance, 
which may be ealled the predicates of judgment. There is no 
doubt, then, that I am capable of distinguishing an external 
realm from my thoughts and beliefs. It is the constant aim 
of the scientist to apply the proper predicates to the object 
of his thought? What are the proper predicates? Surely the 
predicates which reveal its structure, comparative size and 
behavior. We are convinced that, when we think objects in 
certain ways, we think them as they are. We are trying to 
do in a sophisticated way what perception has suggested to us. 

The Ambiguity of the Term Idea.—But we are not 
through with our difficulties. Philosophy found that it must 
make a distinction between two standpoints, and it became 
confused. Probably the Cartesian dualism with its assump- 
tions to which we have already frequently referred aided in 
this confusion. The difficulty concerns the distinction be- 
tween the use of the term idea as a discriminated character, 
predicate, or universal which we use in the interpretation of 
objects, and idea as a psychological existent or event. 

In critical knowing we are quite aware that our minds are 
working and that these characters arise as elements in the 
total complex of consciousness but we are not concerned at the 
time with the question of their existential status. They are 
ingredients in the total act of interpreting the object. We 
think the object in terms of them. 

It is the task of psychology to dwell upon this total act of 
interpreting an object and to study it as an event in the 
history of the organism. In so doing, psychology will take 
logical ideas and make them parts of psychological ideas 
or conscious events. But, clearly, this is a task which cannot 
modify the nature of the act of knowledge and its claim. 
It is a supplementary, scientific problem. 

But the whole setting of epistemology in the seventeenth 
century forced this problem into the foreground. Logical 
ideas, that is, discriminated predicates, were flatly taken to 
be simple mental entities, that is, immaterial realities. Also, 


130 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


it was supposed that these mental entities were the first objects 
of knowledge. It was a bad epistemology plus a very hasty 
ontology. We have, on the contrary, emphasized the actual 
situation in the complex act of knowing and have brought 
out the fact that these characters, universals or predicates are 
instruments of knowledge and not objects of primary know- 
ing. In short, the characters which we discriminate and assign 
in a complex act of knowing are not other than they appear. 
The existential question is additional. But we are not to-day 
inclined to begin with the assumption of an immaterial sub- 
stance. The organism seems, instead, to be the unit. At 
present, I can only assume that all characters used in cogni- 
tion have a natural origin and locus in the brain-mind of the 
knower. Many of these predicates involve a large amount of 
construction and discrimination. They arise only at a high 
level of what we call mental activity. : 

It is to logic that we usually go for a study of the reflective 
level of thinking and knowing. The logician sees that the 
direction of cognition is objective and that the knower seeks 
to be under the control of things so that his thinking may not 
be arbitrary but moulded and conditioned by things as they 
are, 

It would seem to be the business of philosophy and psy- 
chology, working together, to determine the existential status 
of 1deas. That we know by means of their internally appre- 
hended content seems undeniable. And that cognition does 
not assume, as Berkeley supposed, an identity of stuff be- 
tween idea and object but, rather, an identity of character 
which comes out in our claim to think objects in terms of 
this apprehended content of ideas follows from this. In short, 
the existential nature of consciousness becomes an additional 
problem which can never justify a denial of knowledge. 

It is really not at all surprising that a philosophy which 
began with a dualism of two kinds of substances and thought 
of mental entities as the first natural objects of thought mixed 
existential and cognitional problems. We, on the contrary, 


THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 131 


realize that we think objects in terms of specific contents 
and that such thinking does not imply an affirmation of 
existential likeness. This assertion is directed against 
Berkeley’s belief that, because an idea as psychical event 
ean be existentially like nothing but an idea, we cannot know 
objects in terms of the characters of which we are aware. 
How important our stand against Berkeley’s position is will 
be realized when we remember that the cognitive value of 
ideas was relinquished as a result of his analysis and phe- 
nomenalism flourished in Hume and in Kant. 

It would seem to follow from all this that consciousness is 
a peculiar kind of reality whose very function it is to mould 
itself upon the world and to develop distinctions and refer- 
ences of a cognitive kind. The spiritual substance notion of the 
seventeenth century obscured this intrinsic nature of con- 
sclousness because it ignored the peculiar and basic relation 
consciousness has to the organism. A more bio-centric ap- 
proach was needed. We shall see that a contemporary move- 
ment, called pragmatism, has aided here. Unfortunately 
pragmatism was weak in epistemology and was not able to 
make the final epistemological synthesis. It moved toward 
it, but was so engrossed in its controversy with objective ideal- 
ism that it did not re-examine the possibilities of realism. 
In these matters—as in all others seemingly—the inevitable 
development is one step at a time. 

The Reach and Precise Character of Knowledge.—Cer- 
tain fascinating questions remain which quickly lead us to 
the borders of ontology. What is the reach of knowledge? 
And how should we distinguish knowledge from existence? 

We have argued that an act of knowing is the thinking 
an object in terms of contents or characters which may be 
called logical ideas. We assign predicates to things; we con- 
ceive them in certain ways; we make propositions about them. 
All these expressions stand for essentially the same kind of 
act whose first stage we noted in perception, The significant 
fact is that we hold before our attention an understood con- 


132 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


tent which we regard as revealing the characteristics and 
relations of the object. And the object is presented, or 
grasped, in no other way than this. To put the situation 
concisely, the object is not existentially given in conscious- 
ness but is known. When, in what follows, I assert that 
we do not apprehend the object in the act of knowledge, it is 
this contrast which I have in mind. It is not cognitive appre- 
hension that I deny but existential apprehension. But I 
must not harp on this point. The reader should brood over 
it and seek to comprehend its exact meaning. 

This critical view makes explicit the precise situation in 
which the human mind is with respect to external things. 
There is no use bemoaning the fact any more than it 1s worth 
while rebelling against any other ultimate fact which is 
beyond our control and a part of the ultimate structure of the 
world. But, in truth, it seems to me admirable and remark- 
able that the organism has been able to evolve this mechanism 
of knowing and has been successful in achieving and using 
data of significance for things around it. And, of course, 
the basis of this achievement must be the functional relation 
between the organism and the environment and the evolved 
abilities and mechanism of the organism. 

It follows from our analysis that the object of knowledge 
is one thing and the knowledge of it another. Suppose that 
I gather all the knowledge about this table before me that I 
can glean from physics, chemistry and botany; still this 
systematic knowledge is not the table. Because it is knowl- 
edge, it is a revelation of the characteristics of the object 
but it is not existentially the object. 

It has taken the human mind a very long time and tremen- 
dous effort to make this distinction between cognition and 
existence and to carry it through systematically. When it 
was only half carried through, as in early representative 
realism, confusion resulted which threw the mind back into 
phenomenalism and idealism. It was then maintained that 
knowledge does not involve a peculiar kind of transcendence. 


THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 133 


What is it about the object which is revealed in the logical 
contents which arise in our consciousness and are used in 
cognition? The only way to get an answer to this question 
is to interrogate the actual knowledge-claims made by science. 
Roughly speaking, we seem to know the structure, the relative 
quantity, the relations and the behavior of things. We shall 
go into this question in more detail in our treatment of 
cosmology. We shall there call the basic distinctions of 
knowledge the categories and regard them as corresponding to, 
or revealing, the structure or form of physical existence. 

We are now prepared to broach a second question which, 
as we said, takes us to the borders of ontology. Have we 
empirical reasons to maintain that this cognitive revelation 
has its reach set by its character? My own answer is affirma- 
tive. Let me explain. 

If knowledge is a grasping of the temporal order of events, 
the relative sizes of things, their causal and spatial relations, 
their internal structure and their behavior, it is seemingly 
only these characteristics of the physical world which can 
be reproduced and mentally grasped. We might say that 
these characteristics constitute the form of the physical world 
and the form, alone, can be reproduced and thus revealed. 
Here, again, we are skirting the edge of ontology. 

But is the world merely form? Is it not formed stuff? 
The empiricist tradition has led many thinkers to look 
askance at this idea of stuff in spite of all that science says 
about matter and energy. What can we say to justify it and 
interpret it? 

First of all, we know things by means of contents which 
reflection informs us arise in consciousness. Thus when I 
assert that dynamite explodes and blows rock to pieces, it 
is the rock as an external reality which I am thinking in 
terms of these meanings. I can later turn my attention to 
the meanings for their own sake and make them objects of 
thought. It is clear that they are not themselves physical 
objects and make no claim to be. Thus it is nonsense to say 


134 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


that a meaning explodes. Empiricists have never done justice 
to this distinction which falls in line with the objective refer- 
ence of knowledge of physical things. To assert that a 
body is active involves the meaning, activity, as an interpre- 
tative predicate; but this does not imply that the meaning 
must be active. So to hold ignores the distinction between 
the content of knowledge and the object of knowledge. 

It is this recognized difference between characters and 
the physical object which les at the foundation of the belief 
in substantial existence. Stuff is but another term for exist- 
ence. The physical world is a conserved realm in which all 
sorts of executive changes arise and which is differentiated 
into an infinite variety of things. Now we have sought to 
demonstrate that to know is not to be, that cognitive appre- 
hension is not existential apprehension, that knowledge grasps 
the characteristics of things but must fall short of being the 
things. Things are formed stuff, and it is the form which 
we cognitively apprehend or which is revealed. Neverthe- 
less, we must recognize that knowledge is not an existential 
givenness, or intuition, of the object. It is a cognitive appre- 
hension, if you will, but not a literal apprehension of the 
sort natural realism gives the human mind at first the illusion 
of. 

Knowledge of Other Persons.—The problem of the na- 
ture of knowledge of external things is so basic that we have 
devoted our chief attention to it, believing that many asso- 
ciated problems would be less difficult to handle once we saw 
our way clear in regard to this primary one. Now that we 
have the essential distinctions in hand, let us examine the 
question of the nature of our knowledge of other persons. 

It is far better to speak of other persons than of other 
minds, for the simple reason that we know nothing of dis- 
embodied minds, and ‘‘persons’’ is a far more realistic and 
localizable term than ‘‘minds.’’ We desire to escape from 
the intangible influence of Cartesian, or traditional, dualism. 
The exact nature of mind is an ontological problem which 


THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 135 


must be taken up in its own place. We may mention the 
fact that the drift in psychology is to regard mind as a term 
for operations and capacities intimately bound up with the 
nervous system of organisms and directly expressed in con- 
sciousness. 

When we come to the treatment of the mind-body problem, 
one of the points we shall need to make is the vagueness and 
inaccuracy of the general use of the term mind. A warning 
in this place will, I hope, be of some avail. Before the student 
can make any advance he must be ready to brush aside the 
cobwebs which have accumulated through the ages and look 
at the facts in the light of science and epistemology. 

When we say that persons have minds, we should not mean 
that they carry around with them a peculiar kind of thing 
called a mind. We mean, rather, that persons have thoughts 
and act intelligently, using the word thought for any phase of 
consciousness. Consciousness and intelligent action rest upon 
a foundation intrinsic to the person. And a person is a 
developed, trained, human organism. 

How do we know other persons? In part, just as we 
know other physical things, by observation. Hence our re- 
jection of idealism has relevance for this special domain. We 
ean study the behavior of persons just as we study the be- 
havior of sticks, stones and animals. In all these cases, there 
is objective reference and the need to distinguish between 
content and object. But there is another way to gain knowl- 
edge of persons; and that is by communication, by language, 
that is, by understood signs. It is absurd either to deny 
or to belittle the importance and significance of this condi- 
tion of additional knowledge. It interacts with the more 
primitive condition, that of observation, in determining our 
complex knowledge of other persons. We can learn what 
people think by their own confession. We can ignore the 
cases of lying as not bearing on epistemology. 

We think, and our body acts overtly in accordance with 
our thought. This correlation we early learn to note. As a 


136 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


matter of fact, intentions and actions are noted together in 
other persons probably sooner than in ourselves. This genetic 
question is interesting but need not be taken up now. The 
main point is that we interpret other people all the time in a 
sort of complex way. You can notice a baby looking at 
its mother or nurse in this interpretative fashion. In short, 
we know persons, not minds and bodies as separate entities. 

But while communication is a condition of additional 
knowledge of the plans and attitudes of other persons, it 
is of special interest to us here because it suggests to us that 
we have a right to believe that other people have experiences 
similar to our own when they use the same words. When a 
youth asks a girl whether she loves him after confessing his 
own love, and she replies affirmatively, he believes that the 
tender passion is holding her in thrall as it is him, that 
similar emotions and hopes reign in their minds. 

Here we have a new kind of knowledge which we must add 
to knowledge of things. We may eall it knowledge of ex- 
periences. It is only in the case of things having conscious- 
ness, and those nearly like our own—all this being a matter 
of knowledge-claim or belief—that we make this new claim. 
It is not a knowledge of things in terms of a few abstract 
characters, but a knowledge of contents in terms of contents 
or a believed similarity of experiences in two consciousnesses. 
Persons are richer objects for human knowledge than are in- 
organic things. This distinction connects up with the one 
we have already made between things and consciousness. We 
find that we are common knowers knowing the same world in 
the same way by the same means. But here, also, there is 
objective reference. In this knowledge, likewise, we trans- 
cend our own mind cognitively, though not existentially. All 
this means, let us remember, is that we know objects by 
means of contents and a structural mechanism in ourselves. 
There is no existential miracle in knowledge. Those things 
which do not have these contents and this mechanism cannot 
know what is outside them. And this structure and this 


THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 137 


mechanism is intimately bound up with sense-organs and 
motor responses, in short, with the structure of the organism. 
It is probable, for example, that something analogous to per- 
ceptual knowledge exists in other animals in descending 
degrees. 

There are many fascinating questions along these lines 
of enquiry but we cannot linger upon them. Our purpose has 
been to indicate the general nature of knowledge and its 
kinds. Our conclusion has been that, without consciousness, 
knowledge would be impossible, but that we know objects 
outside our own consciousness. 


REFERENCES 


In addition to the references given for the preceding chapter, the 
following are suggested: 

MontaGauE, The Ways of Knowing, chap. 8. 

Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, chap. 12. 

RoGers, What is Truth? chap. 1. 

SELLARS, Evolutionary Naturalism, chaps. 2 and 3. 


CHAPTER XI 
PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENDENCIES 


The Value of a Summary.—In the preceding chapters 
we have been engaged in the effort to gain perspective in 
epistemology. By means of history and by aid of an analysis 
of the structure and references characteristic of conscious- 
ness, we gradually attained a definite view of the nature 
and conditions of knowledge. This view is the one commonly 
ealled critical realism. But an Introduction to Philosophy 
must acquaint the beginner with the other positions currently 
held. Two reasons for this policy can be advanced: (1) with- 
out such a statement of contemporary positions the student 
cannot appreciate the references contained in other books and 
in the remarks of people educated in philosophy, and (2) he 
cannot make an intelligent choice between positions until he 
has an idea of all of them, Moreover, a summary should 
bring the whole subject together and make it more definite. 
Let us not forget that the learning of philosophy is a matter 
of growth. 

Epistemological positions have little meaning for a person 
until he has felt the force of epistemological problems. What 
meaning can idealism have to one who has no knowledge of 
its rise? To an American impressed by modern industry, 
it would seem, surely, the veriest nonsense to assert that the 
physical world is but an idea. Does he not see the firm and 
stable world around him, and does he not know from sad 
experience how brutally real it is? Yet people with other 
traditions might not feel the same conflict with their natural 
outlook. However that may be—and probably mood and 
training have much to do with first plausibilities—the student 
who has carefully followed the steps of our argument and 

138 


PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENDENCIES 139 


has done some thinking for himself will, I am sure, be now 
ready to compare epistemological positions understandingly. 

The Nature of Epistemology Restated.—Epistemology 
has been such a perplexing subject that even philosophers have 
at times been discouraged. Some few have even gone to the 
extreme of crying out against epistemology. We feel it neces- 
sary, therefore, to give some space to a brief statement of its 
exact nature. 

This science has nothing to do with the determination of 
the facts or results of the particular special sciences. It is, 
instead, a reflective science which takes for its domain a 
study of the nature and conditions of actual, human knowl- 
edge. It moves within an already complex experience and 
seeks to answer specific questions about knowledge in the 
light of the actual knowledge already gained by the physical, 
mental and social sciences. It is neither logically nor tem- 
porally prior to them but is, like philosophy as a whole, a 
reflective examination of their general results in the attempt 
to answer inevitable questions about the nature, locus, devel- 
opment, conditions and reach of knowledge. And the more 
we know about nature and man, the more we are able to answer 
these questions. I do think that the recent advances in 
biology and psychology have aided the epistemologist very 
much. <A corresponding improvement in logic which has 
brought it more in line with modern science has also been of 
great assistance. 

Knowing is clearly a natural event which somehow takes 
place in the human organism. And the various sciences take 
the fact and possibility of knowing for granted and go on 
with their particular investigations. And they are quite right 
in so doing. Nevertheless, when the final interpretation of 
it all is to be made, decision as to the nature of knowledge is 
imperative. When we come to ontology and cosmology, we 
shall constantly see the light which epistemology throws upon 
ultimate questions. One who is an idealist in epistemology 
eannot be a materialist in ontology, for example. 


140 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


We have stressed the question of the nature and reach of 
knowledge. Other thinkers have at various times stressed 
the conditions and development of knowledge. In the follow- 
ing presentation of contemporary theories we shall be obliged 
to give some indications of the general texture of the phi- 
losophy with whose epistemology we are concerned for this 
very reason. And it must be remembered that epistemology, 
though a pwotal part of philosophy, is only a small part 
of the whole. 

A Working Division.—Just because there has been no 
settled opinion in epistemology and historical tendencies 
have been influential, it is really difficult to contrast positions 
in a clear-cut way. Fortunately, we have an unambiguous 
outlook to guide us. Taking our departure from this and 
noting deviations and denials, we can secure the following 
broad division: 

(Critical Realism 


Realism{ Neo-Realism 
Agnostic Realism 


Pragmatism 
Experientialism, Positivism 
Phenomenalism 


Tadcalism, Op jective 
From the strictly logical standpoint, idealism and realism 
are in the sharpest opposition; hence I have placed them at 
the extremes. Experientialism represents a blurring of this 
opposition and a hesitation with respect to epistemology. The 
influence of idealism is always present in experientialism, 
but it may there meet with, and adjust itself to, a realistic 
tendency. Thus phenomenalism is in certain regards an 
agnostic realism; in others, a form of idealism. Something 
very similar holds of pragmatism, which has constantly 
swung between idealism and realism. In what I have ealled 
experientialism the epistemology is seldom clear-cut. The 
emphasis in pragmatism, for instance, has been upon the 


PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENDENCIES 141 


office of ideas in human thinking and its dearest enemy has 
been objective idealism. Let us begin with idealism. 

Two Kinds of Idealism.—We have had occasion to refer 
to idealism in two connections: first, while discussing Berke- 
ley and, second, while indicating the speculative systems 
reared by the successors of Kant. It is really quite difficult 
to find a common denominator for the two. The chief one is 
opposition to a frank physical realism. In all idealism the 
object of knowledge is regarded as dependent on the knowing 
of it. The claim to know an object which transcends experi- 
ence is considered inadmissible, and experience is a broad 
existential realm. Objective idealism has more admitted fol- 
lowers than subjective idealism. 

Since we already have the historical background of sub- 
jective idealism or mentalism, we can now aim to bring out the 
logical structure and implications of the position. We have 
noted the fact that it is directed against physical realism of 
the kind defended in the first stage of representative realism. 
Since Berkeley was glad to destroy physical realism because 
he thought it led to atheism, he did not seek to improve upon 
Lockian realism. 

If we take the basic principle of subjective idealism to be 
this, to be is to be perceived, we find that it asserts an internal 
relation between subject and object. In ordinary language, 
this means that we can know only the states of our own 
mind. We can put the position even more sharply by saying 
that it involves the denial that an individual can refer to, or 
know, anything outside of his own mind. But, then, how can I 
know that there are other persons even? It would seem that 
the social world disappears with the physical world. The 
logical outcome is solipsism, that is, the position that an 
individual can know only his own ideas and that he has no 
good logical reason to believe in other individuals. He is 
confined, as we say, to his own consciousness. 

The difficulty which confronts the subjective idealist is 
of interest to us because it brings out the importance of the 


142 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


organism. Deny a physical world, and you deny the organism. 
Now our means of communication, to say the least, seems to 
rest upon the organism and the senses. By destroying the 
organism, Berkeley left the self a homeless ghost, a mere 
spiritual substance. And since the physical world and sense- 
organs do not exist Berkeley was forced to postulate a supreme 
self to arouse ideas in us. Leibniz, a contemporary idealist, 
had the self produce all its own ideas in a sort of pre-estab- 
lished harmony with other selves. If we relinquish physical 
realism, we seem forced to such daring hypotheses as these. . 

But it would be foolish to take subjective idealism lightly. 
Able men have been wrestling with it for two centuries. 
We shall see that the new realism was a protest against subjec- 
tive idealism. The question it asked was, Are these ideas 
really subjective and bound up with a knower? It tried to 
re-analyze experience in such a way as to leave out the tradi- 
tional, mental interpretation. 

Objective Idealism.—Objective idealism is a form of ideal- 
ism which, as we saw, arose after Kant. The assumptions 
which determine it are not difficult to formulate. 
Kant accepted the position that we know only phenomena, 
that is, constructs which our thought in large measure con- 
stitutes. But he still retained a belief in things-in-them- 
selves as sources of a sense-manifold. To hold such a posi- 
tion is self-contradictory because it involves the application 
of categories outside of experience or, as it is expressed 
technically, it involves the transcendence of experience. Caus- 
ality is an a priori concept whose critical significance is 
its use in experience. And we must remember that Kant 
makes the Ego the source of the categories. The Ego is 
creative, basic. What more natural than the exploration of 
this creative source! Another point. The Ego of which Kant 
spoke tended to be universal. It is certainly not the organism. 
And it tended to have the same universality as the laws of 
science have in which he was interested. The chief problem 
was now the relation between the finite and the infinite self. 


PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENDENCIES 1438 


We may say that objective idealism was a position dominated 
by the thought of a universal or absolute mind. In my 
opinion, then, objective idealism was founded on two things: 
Kant’s assumption of a universal consciousness, and the 
inability to solve the problem of knowledge in a truly realistic 
way, common to Hume and Kant. 

The basic thesis of objective idealism is, then, that thought 
is reality. To study thought is to study the very structure 
and stuff of reality. But thought seems to exist at different 
levels of adequacy. At the lower levels we deal with appear- 
ance rather than with reality at its best and truest. The task 
of the philosopher is to pass by a sort of inner logic from 
the part to the whole, from the less real and true to the 
more real and true, and so to attain at least a partial com- 
prehension of what reality is like from the standpoint of 
the whole. 

Hegel was, perhaps, the most influential thinker of this 
movement. For him the basic philosophical discipline is logic; 
and logic consists of the intensive study of the dialectical de- 
velopment of the categories from the simplest and emptiest to 
the richest and most inclusive. This internal relation of the 
categories is logical and timeless. In fact, time is essentially 
appearance and without deep significance. The Hegelian 
movement spread to England and America, as well as else- 
where, and attracted some of the ablest minds. Usually, how- 
ever, the form which it took represented a modification by 
other traditions and emphases. To-day, we usually associate 
Anglo-Hegelian idealism with the names of Caird, Green, 
Bradley, Bosanquet and Royce. A similar movement in Italy 
is led by Croce and Gentile. 

From the standpoint of epistemology, the principles of ob- 
jective idealism to note are (1) the denial that it has any 
meaning to try to transcend experience, (2) the treatment 
of the problem of perception as essentially a question of the 
interpretative supplementation of a partial datum by per- 
ceptual judgment until it fits in with a system of knowl- 


144 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


edge, and (3) the doctrine of internal, or modifying relations, 
which brings it about that the part is transformed in the 
whole. Truth and reality are identical, and anything short 
of the whole truth is partially error and illusion. In short, 
experience is the ultimate term; and the really real is the 
absolute, or comprehensive, experience. 

It is clear that the emphasis in such an outlook is upon the 
whole, upon the infinite and complete. Our finite experi- 
ence is shot through with contradictions. Change is appear- 
ance, moral distinctions are significant for our human level 
of existence only, time is unreal. The real is the harmonious, 
the perfect, the all-inclusive. It was against this interpreta- 
tion of the inner logic of experience that pragmatism arose 
as a protest. In many ways, it was a return to the older 
tradition of empiricism, but a return with a difference due 
to the intervening development of the biological, psychologi- 
eal and social sciences. 

Experientialism.—There are many philosophical move- 
ments afoot to-day and for many years back which it is 
practically impossible to classify in terms of the contract be- 
tween idealism and realism. Some of these positions are more 
sympathetic with idealistic traditions, others with realistic 
traditions; and even in the same movement we find one wing 
nearer to idealism and another wing nearer to realism. What 
they do have in common is the belief that it is impossible, 
if not meaningless, to try to transcend experience. The influ- 
ence of Hume and Kant is still at work in a very effective 
manner. Under experientialism can be brought such move- 
ments as positivism, phenomenalism, neo-Kantianism, and 
pragmatism. None of these movements are sympathetic with 
speculative idealism. 

Positivism is a form of empiricism in which there is a confi- 
dent acceptance of the methods and results of science. Here, 
alone, do we have anything deserving the name of knowledge. 
In contrast to science are set the earlier stages of theological 
and metaphysical speculation, which sought to explain events 


PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENDENCIES 145 


in terms of spirits and essences. Thus positivism is an outlook 
dominated by the movement of the special sciences and averse 
to speculation. It is skeptical of the significance of the search 
for anything which can be called transsubjective or metem- 
pirical. It does not want to raise the question of whether 
anything lies beyond experience; and it uses experience as a 
sort of blanket-term for that within which scientific method 
ean work to give tested knowledge. It is clear that we have 
in positivism an outlook which reflects (1) the prestige of 
science, and (2) a skepticism of the aims and achievements 
of traditional philosophy. While philosophy is partially to 
blame for the rise of such an outlook there can, I think, be 
little doubt that positivism represents a hasty conclusion 
rather than a systematic position. Positivism may best be 
associated with the name of Comte. A good English repre- 
sentative of the outlook is G. H. Lewes. 

Phenomenalism is, logically, little different from positivism. 
In fact, positivism is virtually a form of phenomenalism. In 
both, there is the desire to keep within experience. It is usual 
to speak of Hume’s position as phenomenalism; and Kant’s 
emphasis is of the same sort. We cannot transcend experi- 
ence for only in relation to it does knowledge have any sig- 
nificance. This point of view should be very familiar to us 
now. And we should not be surprised to find phenomenalism 
swinging between the extremes of sensationalism and logical 
construction of a very abstract sort. A good example of 
modern sensationalism is the position of Karl Pearson in his 
Grammar of Science. He asserts that objects are combina- 
tions of immediate sense-impressions and past, stored impres- 
sions. And the laws of nature are résumés in mental short- 
hand of the sequences of our sense-impressions. Pearson’s 
work is full of self-contradictions on the epistemological side. 
The logical and experimental side of science was more fully 
considered by Henri Poincaré. His knowledge of science was 
first-hand for he was one of the greatest mathematicians of 
his day. And yet his outlook is essentially Kantian. Crude 


146 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


facts must be worked up before they become scientific facts. 
And what we finally discover are persistent relations or laws 
between phenomena. 

Phenomenalism is attractive to thinkers because it invites 
a logical analysis of the data and conclusions of science and 
contains no appeal to anything more substantial than the 
elements given. Hence we find that an ingenious logician like 
Bertrand Russell is fascinated by its apparent logical economy 
and devotes his talents to a construction of reality in terms 
of sense-data, actual and possible. Objects are classes of 
perspectives of this sort. The ideal which Russell at times 
seems to hold in mind is a logically ordered solipsism. 

Neo-Kantianism is a reaction against speculative or abso- 
lute idealism. It stresses the critical, or logical, aspect of 
Kant’s thought. Because it agrees with the anti-realistic tra- 
dition which we have spent so much time in tracing it is fre- 
quently called critical idealism. The texture of critical ideal- 
ism and its close connection with Kant’s thesis of conscious- 
ness-in-general appear in the following quotation from Cas- 
sirer’s Substance and Function: ‘‘If we determine the object, 
not as an absolute substance beyond all knowledge, but as the 
object shaped in progressing experience, we find that there is 
no ‘epistemological gap’ to be laboriously spanned by some 
authoritative decree of thought, by a ‘transsubjective com- 
mand.’ For this object may be called ‘transcendent’ from 
the standpoint of a psychological individual; from the stand- 
point of logic and its supreme principles, nevertheless, it is to 
be characterized as purely immanent. It remains strictly 
within the sphere, which these principles determine and limit, 
especially the universal principles of mathematical and scien- 
tific knowledge. This simple thought alone constitutes the 
kernel of critical idealism.’’ 1 

There can be no doubt that neo-Kantianism has done excel- 
lent work in the study of the logic of the sciences. But is 
there any necessity for this opposition between tested knowl- 


*Cassirer, Substance and Function, p. 297. Open Court Publishing Co. 


PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENDENCIES 147 


edge and the psychological individual? Is it not the indi- 
viduals who do the thinking in a cooperative way by under- 
standing one another and reaching tested conclusions? Ger- 
man thinkers have found it very difficult to Keep logic in touch 
with the individual’s thought, and have been afraid of 
what they call psychologism. We have tried to show how 
epistemology supplements ordinary scientific psychology by 
raising the question of the nature and reach of knowl- 
edge. 

Pragmatism.—Pragmatism is the name of a movement in 
contemporary philosophy which seems to link truth with what 
is useful and verifiable in human experience. Because it is a 
tendency hard to define, its opponents often do it injustice 
while its advocates do it more than justice. Like all new 
movements, it has a negative, or critical, side and a positive 
side. In the space at our disposal, all we can try to do is 
to show its general drift, chief doctrines and obvious 
assumptions. 

First, a word about its history. In 1878, Mr. Charles S. 
Peirce wrote an article for the Popular Science Monthly 
in which he proposed a test for ideas: ‘‘Consider what effects, 
which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive 
the object of our conception to have. Then our conception 
of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.’’ 
This article attracted little attention for nearly twenty years 
when it was at last referred to by William James and woven 
mto his criticism of what he considered to be a disregard of 
eonerete human life in both science and philosophy. As we 
have already pointed out, it was objective idealism of the 
absolutistic type to which James objected. James’s gift as a 
writer and his standing as a suggestive thinker soon made 
the term pragmatism widely known both in America and 
in Europe. From an attitude, pragmatism became a fairly 
definite body of doctrine arranged around a theory of truth 
as its point of departure. Its most distinguished advocate 
in America to-day, now that James is dead, is Professor John 


148 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Dewey; in England, its chief advocate is Dr. F. C. SB. 
Schiller. 

The critical side of pragmatism is an attack upon what it 
variously calls absolutism and intellectualism. There can be 
no purely formal and logically internal criterion of truth that 
is adequate. There must also be practical, empirically appli- 
cable, experimental, non-logical criteria. We shall find that 
there was a healthy emphasis in this aspect of pragmatism. 
But there was at times vague thinking from the standpoint 
of modern realism. To do it justice we must take it in its 
period. 

Pragmatism makes a healthy advance when it calls atten- 
tion to situations in which human thinking takes place and 
refuses to ignore purposes. It stresses psychology rather 
than abstract logic and calls attention to thought as an empiri- 
cal process aiming at the successful accomplishment of pur- 
poses. In this regard, it reflects the growth of biology, psy- 
chology and the social sciences and stands for what may be 
called temporalism. There is nothing in all this which is 
strictly epistemological, and the majority of realists would be 
quite willing to admit much of what pragmatism stands for. 
James and Dewey in America worked along the same line in 
an attack upon Bradley and Bosanquet. They identified 
themselves with the empirical tradition of Hume and Mill 
brought up to date in its biology, psychology and Iogie. 
The categories in terms of which they chiefly thought are bio- 
logical and psychological categories. Dewey admittedly thinks 
in terms of evolution, especially social evolution. 

But when we seek to trace the epistemology which crops 
to the surface now and then, we find that it is distinctly of 
the experiential type. Schiller suggests that our thought 
makes reality. It is not our thought of reality which changes 
but reality itself, for he seems not to admit that these are 
separable. Realty is plastic and thought modifies it. And 
so far as Schiller has recognized epistemology, he has in- 
clined to the idealistic tradition that a transcendent object 


PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENDENCIES 149 


is unthinkable. The object known is a part of experience. 
William James distinguished between pragmatism, as a 
method of interpretation of thought and truth, and a general 
theory of reality which he ealled radical empiricism. And 
when we come to examine his theory of knowledge, we find it 
stresses transitions within experience. An idea means a thing 
when it leads up to it and enables us to get in touch with it. 
His treatment is detailed and complex, and it is impossible 
to do justice to it in the present specialized survey. The 
point which seems to stand out is that he neglects knowl- 
edge of an object as we have analyzed it because he is an 
experientialist. Dewey puts the main stress upon the future. 
Ideas are instruments of adjustment and creative interpreta- 
tion. It is the social, guiding function of ideas which now 
interests him, and he is even bitter in his attacks upon the 
futility of the traditional problems of philosophy. Dewey 
claims that his outlook is realistic, and I think that there is no 
doubt that it is. But it is a realism akin to that of common 
sense. It is a sort of denotative experiential empiricism very 
much like positivism. 

The influence and suggestiveness of the pragmatists cannot 
be denied. They have done much good in stressing the nature 
and conditions of human thinking. It is knowing as an event 
which they have investigated. Thus they have demonstrated 
the close connection between psychology and logic. Neverthe- 
less, it is to my mind doubtful whether they have much aided 
—except indirectly—the solution of the basic problem of epis- 
temology which arose in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- 
turies. In fact, it has seemed to me that they have been 
strangely perverse here. Perhaps the fact that most of them 
were brought up philosophically under the influence of the 
great experientialist, idealistic movement may account for 
this. And we must remember that the centre of gravity of 
their attack was absolute or objective idealism. Perhaps the 
fact that they were interested in biology and psychology 
rather than in physics and chemistry had something to do with 


150 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


it. As we shall see later, pragmatists have concerned them- 
selves little with cosmology. 

Realism.—The axiom of realism has been stated as fol- 
lows: ‘‘Knowledge unconditionally presupposes that the real- 
ity known exists independently of the knowledge of it, and 
that we know it as it exists in this independence.’’ The opposi- 
tion between idealism and realism is thus a sharp one. It 
must be admitted that objective idealists deny this, but that is 
because they shift their standpoint between an absolute 
knower and a human knower. The modern realist is always 
thinking of a human knower. He is suspicious of a conscious- 
ness-in-general and of its relevance for epistemology. 

Epistemological realism is a very old doctrine, much older 
than strict idealism. The recent development of it—with 
which, alone, we shall be here concerned—began as a reaction 
against idealism. Idealism was ego-centric and stressed the 
self and its thoughts. In itself, this was not a bad thing, but 
for the historical reasons we have indicated, it went to an 
extreme. The reaction was certain to manifest itself. It is 
my opinion that this reaction over-reached itself in neo- 
realism and that critical realism is a more balanced outlook. 
Nevertheless, these last two movements have much in common. 

There are two species of neo-realism, the one more character- 
istic of Great Britain, the other of the United States. We 
ean speak of them both as apprehensional realisms. JI mean 
by this that both hold that non-mental entities are literally 
given in what we may call the field of consciousness. We 
have already become acquainted with this outlook in our refer- 
ence to S. Alexander in the ninth chapter. It may be called 
an analytic development of natural realism. The American 
movement was influenced by the English one but, as we shall 
see, swung in the direction of behaviorism and the denial of 
the traditional, empiricist conception of consciousness as a 
subjective realm connected with the organism. 

The English movement is historically associated with the 
names of G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, Prichard, Laird and 


PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENDENCIES 151 


S. Alexander; and, farther back, with Reid, Hamilton and 
others. It is a curious fact that representative realism was 
discarded as incapable of redemption. 

For Alexander, primary knowledge consists of an act of 
awareness directed upon an object which is contemplated. 
This act, alone, is mental, the object of the act being non- 
mental. Thus all characters, such as colors, shapes, sizes, 
which we described as elements of the content of perception, 
are qualities and relations of things. We have here, he be- 
lieves, an ultimate compresence which has analogies all 
through nature. 

Using a term of R. B. Perry’s we may eall this position epis- 
temological monism. This means that idea and object are 
existentially, or numerically, one. A real tulip and the idea 
of a tulip are for this position identical element for element. 
Our seeing the tulip is an event which is external to the tulip. 
We have here the doctrine of external relations applied to 
cognition. That we are aware of non-mental realities is a 
fact which, for these thinkers, we must simply accept. 

But how is this position going to meet the objections which 
we regarded as sufficient to break down natural realism? 
That is its chief difficulty. It is hard to see how it can dis- 
tinguish between appearance and reality and make allowance 
for perceptual perspective and error. The realistic faith is 
strong in these thinkers; they are convinced—and I think 
rightly—that we in some sense perceive and think objects 
existent in their own right and not mental states. Suffice 
it to say that if I were persuaded, as they are, that the choice 
lay between some form of apprehensional realism and sub- 
jective idealism, I, also, would seek to carry through such a 
position and might even ride rough-shod over difficulties. 

Let us point out in addition that, if cognition implies the 
existential givenness of the object to a simple, mental act of 
awareness—the English position—or the givenness of the ob- 
ject in the field of consciousness—the American position—cer- 
tain startling results follow. Thus in knowledge of a past 


152 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


event the past event itself must be compresent with the pres- 
ent act. My mind must be capable of leaping in a truly re- 
markable fashion across space and time. ‘Thus when I think 
of Napoleon that person, himself, must be given. When I 
perceive the moon, the moon itself must be compresent with 
my act of awareness or be a member of that collection of 
objects I call my consciousness. Cognition would seem to be 
a miraculous power which enables the knower to penetrate the 
vasty deep and to explore the past. And in a sense this is 
true. But may we not conceive knowledge in such a way 
as to remove the literalness of this mental journeying? But 
before we proceed any farther, let us examine the American 
position. 

The American group of neo-realists allied themselves with 
biology and behavioristic psychology and were, from the first, 
skeptical of this act of awareness of a mental sort of which the 
English neo-realists spoke. They were influenced in this by 
Hume’s analysis of the self, by Mach’s attempt to change sen- 
sationalism into realism with neutral elements, and by William 
James’s later teaching called radical empiricism which worked 
along the same lines as Mach’s attempt. The logical doctrine 
of external relations, that is, relations which do not modify 
their terms, also influenced them. It cannot be denied that 
the whole movement was a very daring one. It broke com- 
pletely with the traditional conception of consciousness. 

It is best to give quotations in order to avoid the dangers 
of misinterpretation. ‘‘It is important, therefore,’’ writes 
Perry, “‘in expounding the general realistic theory of knowl- 
edge, to distinguish two component theories. ‘The first I shall 
call the theory of ‘immanence!’ This is the same theory as 
that which I have in another connection termed ‘epistemologi- 
cal monism.’ It means that when a given thing, a, is known, a 
itself enters into a relation which constitutes it the idea, or 
content of a mind. The second I shall call the theory of ‘inde- 
pendence,’ and it means that although a may thus enter into 
mind, and assume the status of content, it is not dependent on 


PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENDENCIES 153 


this status for its being, or nature.’’? Notice the word enter. 
This means that the independent existent itself enters con- 
sciousness. A man’s consciousness is an aggregate of en- 
tities selected by the reaction of his organism. 

The position which we have been developing in this book 
is variously called non-apprehensional realism, epistemological 
dualism, transcendence, and critical realism. The first few 
expressions are descriptions which differentiate critical real- 
ism from neo-realism. 

The difference between it and neo-realism lies in this that it 
holds that the human organism can select and mean physical 
objects by means of consciousness which can never literally 
enter consciousness but only appear there in terms of a con- 
tent. The object is transcendent but the content is regarded 
as revealing the characteristics of the object. It is through 
what may be called the cognitional identity of characters in 
consciousness and the characteristics of the object that knowl- 
edge is possible. In short, we think objects outside our con- 
sciousness in terms of discriminated characters in our con- 
sciousness, a process beginning with perception. 

Critical realism represents the clear recognition of the dif- 
ference between the cognitional presence of an object and 
the existential presence of an object. It is also the realization 
that knowledge is a unique kind of event involving the logical 
identity of the characteristics of an object and the content 
held before the mind and is not the asserted likeness of two 
kinds of entities the one psychical and the other physical. It 
was Berkeley who saw the inadequacy of this latter view of 
knowledge built upon Cartesian dualism. The question of 
psychical existence is not directly raised in knowledge. Just 
what psychical existence is and how it is related to the organ- 
ism we shall examine in our cosmology. 

One more point remains. Critical realism maintains that 
objects are more than their characteristics and believes in an 
existential stuff which does not enter consciousness. The neo- 

*Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 308, 


154 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


realist identifies objects with logical contents and does not be- 
lieve in an existential stuff. The world is transparent or given 
for the neo-realist in a way that it is not for the critical real- 
ist. This difference will likewise be influential in our ontology. 

In conclusion, let me remark that, in spite of superficial ap- 
pearances to the contrary, there has been a gradual and re- 
markable growth in epistemology. These distinctions were 
not easy for the human mind. It is, I think, not difficult to 
see that the range and character of the human mind was slowly 
discovered. Critical realism owes much to English empiri- 
eism, Kantianism, pragmatism and neo-realism. It is my 
persuasion that it includes, and does justice to, the valid ele- 
ments of these movements. 


REFERENCES 


CASSIRER, Substance and Function, chap. 6. 

DEWEY and others, Creative Intelligence. 

Hout, PERRY, and others, The New Realism, Introduction. 
MACINTOSH, The Problem of Knowledge, passim. 

Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, parts 3 and 4. 
MonTacurt, The Ways of Knowing, passim. 

JOAD, Modern Philosophy, chap. 1. 
Sinciarr, May, A Defense of Idealism; and The New Idealism. 


CHAPTER XII 
TRUTH AND ERROR 


Knowledge and Truth.—Having carefully studied the 
typical epistemological positions of the present, we are now 
in a position to discuss a question which has been one of 
perennial interest. The problem of truth logically follows the 
general formulation of the problem of the nature of knowl- 
edge. Without a theory of knowledge it would be hardly 
possible to have a theory of truth. 

That there is a very intimate connection between our no- 
tions of truth and of knowledge is apparent in the fact 
that the expression, ‘‘true knowledge,’’ is felt to be a tau- 
tology. It is like speaking of a round circle. We should not 
be surprised, therefore, to discover that the various views of 
knowledge which we have been examining have their corre- 
sponding theories of truth. 

We must get clearly before our minds the exact type of ex- 
perience which is connected with the question of truth. As 
long ago as Aristotle’s time, it was seen that truth and error 
are relative to judgment. Presentations of all sorts are 
neither true nor false; they are simply experiences or con- 
tents. Thus I can have a feeling, be aware of a pain, allow a 
plan to engross my consciousness, entertain an idea. But 
wherever, and to the extent that, there are believed interpre- 
tations of objects the possibility of truth and error enters. 
Assertions, or knowledge-claims, involve a risk of error for 
they are interpretations of objects. ‘‘In the actual felt 
toothache knowing and being are not only inseparable—they 
are indistinguishable. If, however, I think of my toothache 
as part of an independent order of reality, my knowledge of 
it may be true or false. I am then thinking of it as the effect 

155 


156 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


of an exposed nerve, or of an abscess or of an inflammation— 
as something, that is to say, that is conditioned independently 
of my consciousness and that will cease to exist when the con- 
ditions are altered.’’? 

It has been customary to speak of non-assertive experience 
as feeling. All the elements of the field of consciousness that 
are merely experienced as present, such as emotions and ideas, 
are neither true nor false. They simply are after their own 
kind. For our present purpose, there is no need to be over- 
subtle and to study border-line cases. We can be satisfied 
with the distinction between explicit assertions and feeling. 
And let us admit that we are more often willing and dream- 
ing and experiencing than explicitly judging. Pragmatism 
has, in fact, made much of this difference between immediate 
experience and reflective experienc. 

The question of truth has, then, to do with the type of ex- 
perience which we speak of as belief, assertion, interpretation, 
judgment. In all such experiences, there is a sense of con- 
trast. We are all more or less aware that what we are judg- 
ing about has a nature independent of our judging. We seem 
to assert some sort of identity between the content of our 
judgment and the characteristics of the object. We are 
assured that the content reveals the object. The act of judg- 
ing takes place at a certain time and in a certain knower, but 
we think of the content as not concerned with this fact but 
with its revelation of the object of thought. 

The Distinction between the Meaning and the Criteria of 
Truth.—The problem as to the exact nature of truth came to 
the front with the controversy between pragmatists and ob- 
jective idealists. This controversy raged in full vigor for a 
decade or so. The objective idealists identified truth with 
reality and laid stress upon purely logical criteria, the chief 
one being coherence. ‘The pragmatists rejoined by stressing 
human utility and even satisfaction. This debate turned 
around general philosophical differences as much as anything, 

1Carr, The Problem of Truth, p. 18. 


TRUTH AND ERROR 157 


for the pragmatists believed in the basic importance and 
reality of time while the idealists held that time is essentially 
appearance. These differences will be taken up later in some 
detail. 

It cannot be denied that the pragmatists put their chief 
stress upon the verification of ideas which claimed to be true. 
They saw truth as a human achievement. This way of ap- 
proach led them to regard verification as an essential element 
in the very meaning of truth. They were aided in this iden- 
tification by the tendency to regard ideas as plans of action 
or as instruments for adjustment. This tendency went with 
their interest in human achievement and their emphasis upon 
living as a process. There can be little doubt, I believe, that, 
for a while at least, the pragmatists did not do justice to 
the desire to know the world apart from the use such knowl- 
edge could have or, to put the same thing in another way, 
they did not see that knowledge was different from action 
even though it aided action. Let us admit the value of their 
revolution while calling attention to the extreme to which it 
went. They were just oversimplifying human life by think- 
ing of it as a ceaseless movement with no time for, or interest 
in, contemplation. 

This first stage of the controversy was followed by the 
erowth of realism. It was not long before the distinction was 
made and enforced between the criteria of truth and the 
meaning of truth. By truth we mean a definite thing, but 
we must have tests before we can be certain that an idea is 
true. 

On the whole, both objective idealists and pragmatists re- 
jected the belief in an independent object with which an idea 
must somehow agree if it is to be true. Realism tended to 
bring this principle in and make agreement with an object 
the essential element in the meaning of truth. We shall see 
that critical realism makes a sharp distinction between the 
criteria used to determine whether an idea is true and the 
precise meaning of the statement that an idea ?s true. 


158 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


To summarize, objective idealists thought in terms of 
logical systems of a self-sustaining sort; pragmatists rebelled 
and treated ideas as instruments for human adjustment and 
achievement; and realists moved in the direction of the 
distinction between idea and object and the stress upon the 
difference between the meaning of truth and the criteria of 
truth. It is undeniable, then, that theories of truth reflected 
systems of philosophy. 

The Coherence Theory of Truth.—It will be remembered 
that for objective idealism experience is the ultimate term. 
On the whole, it is characterized by what is called a monistic 
outlook. The whole includes and swallows up the parts. 
Everything finite is more or less illusory and unreal, for its 
meaning can be seen only in its total relations to all else. 
Thus reality is regarded as a highly organized whole. To 
separate anything is to see it out of its relations. Let us 
remember that space and time are looked upon as not really 
valid and as full of contradictions. Instead of these cate- 
gories, so characteristic of physical realism, we find such 
terms as ‘‘organic’’ and ‘‘individual.’’ The whole is an all- 
inclusive individual. 

But, it may be said, this is a theory of reality and not of 
truth. To which it must be replied that the idealist refuses 
to make such a distinction. Truth in the strict sense is 
reality; it is a coherent system of meanings. Partial truth 
is something incomplete and more or less incoherent. Let us 
remember that the idealist does not admit a transcend- 
ent object existentially distinct from our thought of it. It 
follows that that which characterizes truth must be some- 
thing internal to experience. And, from the logical stand- 
point, what is more conspicuous than system and coher- 
ence? 

The objective idealist has before him, then, the standard 
of a timeless and complete system of meanings. Everything 
short of this is a mixture of truth and error. Unfortunately, 
it is in this lower region that we humans dwell. Our truth 


TRUTH AND ERROR 159 


is more or less error. But, of course, there are degrees even 
here. 

The coherence theory of truth rests upon two principles: 
(1) the epistemological one above mentioned, and (2) a logi- 
eal one ealled ‘‘internal relations.’’ This logical doctrine is 
interesting but it cannot be said to be generally accepted. 
It is to the effect that no proposition taken by itself is com- 
pletely true. Thus the proposition that Charles I was be- 
headed is not completely true. Truth is an affair of systems 
and demands all the knowledge relevant to an event, and 
this involves everything else. 

But surely we are not claiming in a proposition, such as 
the one about Charles I, to state all we know about this per- 
son. We are merely stating one fact about him. Yet herein 
lies the difference. For the idealist no fact is complete by 
itself. Hence, every fact leads to every other fact, and so 
implies the whole universe. Personally, I have never been 
able to see this. As a realist, I would make a sharp distine- 
tion between the relations of objects and the logical relations 
of my propositions. Thus the relations of objects seem to me 
largely spatial, temporal and causal, while the relations be- 
tween my propositions are those of indifference, identity and 
contradiction. For instance, the two propositions, ‘‘Charles 
I was beheaded’’ and ‘‘ Washington was the leader of the 
American troops’’ seem to me to have no logical relations. 
They do not even have reference to the same subject. Never- 
theless, I can quite understand how the idealist is led to his 
position. He is thinking of the growth of human experience 
and of how one proposition supplements another in throwing 
light upon complex subjects of discourse; and he takes this 
supplementation to be a modification. 

This outlook has enthusiastic advocates and has been very 
inflential. It therefore deserves careful consideration. 

The Verification, or Pragmatist, Theory of Truth—We 
have already pointed out that the pragmatist view of truth 
expressed a rebellion against objective idealism and the co- 


160 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


herence theory of truth. The stress is now upon time and 
upon human achievement and needs. William James, John 
Dewey and F. C. 8. Schiller, the pragmatists, had Bradley, 
Bosanquet and Royce for opponents. As we have noted, 
there was here a general opposition against what was 
called variously absolutism and intellectualism. We are 
already far enough away from this controversy to have per- 
spective. 

The pragmatist laid stress upon the biological and psycho- 
logical conditions of judgments and the purpose of them. As 
a consequence, he made much of human situations and the 
time-factor. But he did not put sufficient stress upon the 
content and objective reference of judgments. There was a 
tendency to think of ideas as plans of action to the exclusion 
of objective cognitive claims. 

The main thesis of the pragmatist was that ieee ean be 
no adequate formal criteria of truth. There must be prac- 
tical, empirically applicable, external tests. The next point 
to note is that, for the pragmatist, truth is an adjective of 
ideas. Ideas are ways of thinking. As such, they arise in 
human minds and have a definite function to perform. What 
is this function? There’s the rub. Is this function primarily 
that of guidance or of cognition? Now we would all be 
willing to admit that nearly all ideas can have practical 
value: but is their practical value identical with their 
cognitive value or dependent upon it? In other words, 
do ideas work because they are true? Or are they true be- 
cause they work? And, to complicate matters, are there not 
different kinds of ideas, some plans of actions and others 
judgments? 

It cannot be said that pragmatists were always crystal 
clear in regard to these matters. J am inclined to hold, for 
example, that Dewey quibbles somewhat in regard to ideas 
and tries to make all of them have a future reference like 
plans of action. And the reason for this is not hard to find. 
The pragmatists refuse to think of truth as involving a 


TRUTH AND ERROR 161 


present relation of identity with an external and independent 
object. Here is where their experientialism or half-idealism 
enters. The truth of an idea must, therefore, le in its future. 

We are now ready to state the pragmatist’s theory of a 
true idea. It is one that works successfully, one that per- 
forms its function. ‘‘True ideas,’’ wrote James, ‘‘are those 
that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. 
False ideas are those we cannot. That is the practical dif- 
ference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, 
is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known 
as. 

It is obvious that the critical realist cannot accept this 
definition of truth which is to him a confusion of truth and 
verification. Yet he can see that it is a very natural position 
for the pragmatist. 

When we come to examine the methods of verification 
which give a truth-meaning to ideas, we find that the prag- 
matists have several and that it is not always certain whether 
they give equal weight to all of them. Much of the early 
objection to pragmatism was due to this ambiguity. I think 
that it is only fair to say that, as time has gone on, the lead- 
ing pragmatists have inclined more and more to stress the 
more logical tests of agreement with facts and coherence with 
other tested judgments. And yet they feel that the larger 
background of successful working in life is important. I 
presume that is because they think of ideas as plans of action. 
Let me quote from Dewey in this connection: ‘‘If ideas, 
meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems are instru- 
mental to an active reorganization of the given environment, 
to a removal of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the 
test of their validity and value lies in accomplishing this 
work. If they succeed in their office, they are reliable, sound, 
valid, good, true. If they fail to clear up confusion, to elimi- 
nate defects, . . . they are false... . That which guides us 
truly is true—demonstrated capacity for such guidance is 
precisely what is meant by truth. The adverb ‘truly’ is more 


162 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


fundamental than either the adjective, true, or the noun, 
train, 

Can we not sympathize with this emphasis upon the estab- 
lishment of ideas as worthy of our confidence and yet hold 
that the disregard of the view that cognitive ideas claim to 
be revelatory of their objects is quite unjustified? Professor 
Dewey opposes what he calls the spectator-view of knowledge 
to an active, experimental view. And this opposition seems 
to him to express a profound advance. But may not a 
spectator be foreed to do much work before he can take a 
survey of a country? The mountain climber earns his de- 
lightful vista. In short, I cannot see the justification for this 
opposition which bulks so large in the pragmatist’s eyes. Is 
it not a hold-over from the attack upon absolutism? 

In this connection, let us consider the actual methods of 
verification to which human beings make appeal. These are 
surely of significance apart from any system of philosophy. 
We may name the chief ones as follows: verification by agree- 
ment with facts, often of a directly perceptual status, con- 
sistency, operation and sentiment. 

Verification of a proposition by its agreement with simple 
propositions, very near perception, is the method which in- 
ductive science uses. An idea always has, as a part of it, 
a reference to a particular field of objects and events. Thus, 
to use a simple instance, my idea of the surface of the moon 
must agree with what astronomers can observe in regard to 
that surface. The basis of this demand is the belief that 
both perception and theory deal with the same object. 

Verification by consistency is the same as verification by 
coherence. A new idea must fit in with other ideas on the 
same subject. Thus my idea of the surface of the moon 
should not conflict with general physical principles. 

These two methods of verification are the ones most ap- 
pealed to in science and can be spoken of as the logical 


* Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 156. This book is the best 
resumé of American Pragmatism. 


TRUTH AND ERROR 163 


eriteria of truth. All schools of thought admit the value of 
these criteria. 

We come now to something more characterstic of prag- 
matism. 

Verification by operation is the putting an idea to a prac- 
tical test by making it the basis of an action. But this 
method either concerns plans of conduct which are obviously 
based upon mere probability or else it aims at the securing 
of further perceptual data and leads back to the first eri- 
terion. There has been much equivocation on this point. An 
idea can suggest an experiment for its own verification, but 
surely, it is the data, thus secured, which are used to test the 
original idea. On the other hand, a plan of action is based 
on cognitional ideas; but it, itself, is a purpose rather than 
a cognitional idea. And a purpose may be intelligent but 
ean scarcely, as such, be called true. 

Verification by sentiment is the testing of an idea by the 
personal or social satisfaction the idea gives. But there are 
different causes of pleasure. We may take pleasure in an 
idea because we believe it to be true, or we may take pleasure 
in it because it fits in with our prepossessions and desires. 
Are certain dogmas true because their promises please us? 
The individual soon learns that pleasant ideas must be 
guarded against or they will lead to disaster. And the human 
race has been slowly learning in the hard school of experi- 
ence to relinquish first feelings as tests of truth. To the ex- 
tent that extreme pragmatism first suggested the revival of 
such a tendency to hold that true which pleases us in the 
thought of it, it is to be condemned. Though the leading prag- 
matists did not countenance such a view, there was about 
their view of truth a certain vagueness which encouraged 
lesser men to think of sentiment as a test. 

It is clear that pragmatism stressed the experimental at- 
titude and looked upon truth as a human achievement. 
Thinking is an activity, and ideas are bound up with the 
whole process of thinking including all sorts of organic ef- 


164 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


forts. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the data, thus 
secured, must be sifted and interpreted before the bar of 
reflective thought and that, when this is done, the criteria 
are logical in character. 

Let us now summarize this necessarily brief survey of 
pragmatism and its theory of truth. In the first place, we 
pointed out that pragmatism was a revolt against objective 
idealism under the influence of biology, psychology and the 
social sciences. As a general philosophy, it stressed the 
significance of time and change. Since it was idealistic 
enough to reject the realistic notion of an external object 
which our ideas claim to know, it followed the suggestion of 
biology to an extreme and held that all ideas are primarily 
plans of action. I think this was a mistake. But back of 
this bias of pragmatism lies its theory of knowledge. Its 
exploration of the criteria of knowledge and the bio-psy- 
chological foundation of thought has done much good. Nev- 
ertheless, it has had such an extreme interest in thinking 
as a process that it has neglected the structure of thought 
as a content. In other words, it has been weak in structural 
logic. It is the old story of one step at a time. 

Realism and the Identity Theory of Truth—As a result 
of the above discussions of objective idealism and pragma- 
tism, certain points with respect to truth should begin to 
stand out. In the first place, critical realism and neo-realism 
both reject the organic view of thought. Understood propo- 
sitions have only logical relations to one another such as 
identity, indifference and contradiction. And propositions 
which refer to different objects are neutral to each other. 
Thus factual propositions about an object supplement one 
another but do not modify one another. They may modify 
our total idea of an object,. which, however, is a complex, 
by addition or by leading us to reject some other proposition. 
We have here a technical matter into which an introductory 
book cannot go any great distance. In the second place, 
critical realism and neo-realism emphasize the distinction 


TRUTH AND ERROR 165 


between the meaning of truth and the verification of truth. 
I am inclined to think that this distinction has more signifi- 
eanee for critical realism than for neo-realism even. We 
saw that pragmatism tended to swallow up meaning in veri- 
fication. 

Let us first of all examine the meaning of truth for critical 
realism or epistemological dualism. For this position we 
mean and know objects in terms of contents. An act of 
knowing is act of judging, and it makes a claim that the 
object has the characteristics which we think it has, that it 7s 
as we think it. We have here an ultimate claim whose genesis 
and development we can follow from perception upward. 

We must be very precise here. For critical realism, the 
content of judgment is existentially bound up with the act 
of judgment of a knower but in judging we are not concerned 
with this existential question but with the logical content 
which we consciously grasp and which we assert to be revela- 
tory of, and thus cognitionally identical with, the character- 
istics of the object. In brief, in cognition we are not concerned 
with the stuff of the object but with its characteristics. And 
it is the logical content of our thought which we take as re- 
vealing these characteristics. 

The ultimate epistemological question is, accordingly, the 
nature of this appearance or cognitional revelation of the 
object. What does it involve? It can only be a peculiar kind 
of identity which, for want of better names, we can eall 
either logical or cognitional identity. The basic point is, that 
we must not think of this identity as of an existential, or even 
semi-existential, kind. There is not something which flits 
between the object and the mind. Some of those thinkers 
who hold much the same position as I do speak of an identity 
of essence in knowledge. In knowledge, they assert, the 
essence held before the mind and asserted of the object is 
identical with the essence embodied in the object. If this is 
but another way of saying what I have said, I have no ob- 
jection to it; but it may easily be taken to mean the belief 


166 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


in entities of a peculiar sort, called essences or universals, a 
tradition which goes back to Plato. 

To critical realism, as I understand it, therefore, there are 
in knowledge of things two existences: the human knower and 
the object known. The object known has its characteristics 
in the sense that it has a structure and ways of behaving. 
Ultimately through perception of it or of something similar 
to it, the knower has achieved a logical content in terms of 
which he thinks the object. How he has achieved it’ we have 
more than once indicated. When we come, in our cosmology, 
to examine in more detail the distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities, we shall see that the order of the world 
is reproducible and that the whole perceptual mechanism of 
the organism is adapted to such a reproduction. In the 
medium of consciousness there arises a sense of order, or 
pattern, which undoubtedly has a motor backing. A careful 
study of space-perception as developed in a good psychology 
will bring out what I mean. Thus somewhat as an artist re- 
produces the pattern of the scene before him does the organ- 
ism reproduce the pattern of its objects and the empirical 
self become aware of this pattern in the field of consciousness 
and use it in the act of cognition. 

Once this situation is understood, we can speak of the 
pattern of the world as being reproduced in the mind. Shall 
we then say that the pattern is identically the same or shall 
we say that the patterns correspond? It depends upon what 
we are thinking of. If we have the different locations of 
the pattern in mind we are likely to speak of corresponding 
patterns. We do this for copies of the same scene or the 
same piece of statuary. But if we have in mind just the 
logical aspect we are more apt to say identical than corre- 
spondent. When comparing contents before our own minds, 
we speak of logical identity. This color is the same shade 
as that; this shape is the same as that. When we are think- 
ing of existences, we speak of similarity. This thing is like 
that. But in cognition we are in a peculiar situation. We 


TRUTH AND ERROR 167 


are thinking objects in terms of contents and not comparing 
two contents in our own minds. That is the situation, and it 
seems to me that we can do nothing but recognize its ulti- 
macy. 

In the past, the chief objection to the correspondence 
theory was the impossibility of comparing idea—regarded as 
a psychical existent—and object to see directly whether they 
did correspond. Because Locke bungled the problem by 
approaching it from the causal side, he spoke of similarity. 
But similarity involves two compared things. And we can 
get at only one. The point is that Locke missed the real 
claim of cognition. We cannot get cognitively nearer to 
things than our cognition of them. To compare the thing 
with our thought of it is just to take our thought’s content 
over again. Underlying this mistake of the older representa- 
tive realism was the belief that we first know ideas as entities 
and then know things because of their similarity to them. 

What, then, is the precise meaning of truth? It is the re- 
affirmation of a knowledge-claim after doubt. It is the asser- 
tion that the object is revealed in the idea-content. And 
error is the denial of a knowledge-claim. To say that an idea 
is false is to say that the content does not reveal the object, 
does not give the actual characteristics of the object. The 
meaning of truth and the meaning of knowledge go together. 

But how can a knowledge-claim be verified and shown to 
be true on the basis of critical realism? Obviously, we are 
not going to try to do the impossible thing that representa- 
tive perception was challenged to do, to compare idea-content 
and object. Comparison would presuppose a prior knowledge 
of both. In epistemology we cannot get back of knowledge. 
No; we must recognize our actual situation. Knowledge in 
detail is a complex which must justify itself by the way its 
parts fit together to reveal an intelligible and massive world. 
And here we in a measure lay stress upon the same test that 
objective idealists have called attention to—and yet in a 
different setting. Fitting together is not the same as organic 


168 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


interdependence; the logical theory is somewhat different. 
And, again, we admit a world whose structure is revealed in 
this tremendous mass of coherent knowledge which the vari- 
ous sciences have achieved. Since the sourees of knowledge 
are so many acts of perception of so many people, this union 
of tested propositions into the view of a massive world is the 
best test of the reality of human knowledge. It reenforces 
and confirms the cognitive value of perceptual data upon 
which all advanced knowledge rests and upon which it builds. 
Understood in this sense, coherence of results, the detailed 
and continuous picture of the world presented, is the best 
criterion of knowledge and truth. The human mind begins 
with a faith in the revelatory power of perception and, 
though it learns to correct it by noting conditions, refuses to 
regard as arbitrary and subjective that which apparently 
gives insight into a gigantic domain independent of our 
human thought. And I can see no argument for skepticism 
strong enough to cast doubt upon this belief. What skep- 
ticism accomplishes is the casting of doubt upon false and 
inadequate views of knowledge, such as natural realism. 

Working within this basic criterion of knowledge and truth 
we can note two others which we may call respectively the 
power of prediction and gwidance-value. By means of 
claimed knowledge we can precict the course of external 
events as in the well-known case of eclipses of heavenly bodies. 
All through science there reigns this power of relative pre- 
diction. And it seems to me that such a power implies in- 
sight into the course of things. Without knowledge, predic- 
tion would be a work of chance more likely to fail than to 
succeed. Finally, the guidance which perceptual knowledge 
gives to our organism is to me a sign that the relations and 
behavior of things are revealed. More complicated adjust- 
ments require the prevision and range of scientific knowledge; 
yet the situation seems to me essentially the same. 

My conclusion is, that there are definite tests of the reality 
of knowledge even though, by the very nature of the case, we 


TRUTH AND ERROR 169 


cannot have a more intimate awareness of things than knowl- 
edge itself. 

It seems inadmissible to leave the question of truth without 
some reference to neo-realism. 

There is a large consensus of opinion that neo-realism finds 
it hard to offer a theory of error. If things are just given in 
consciousness, how can there be error? Neo-realists have 
differed widely on this question, and they have in this, as in 
other points, exercised great ingenuity. Need I indicate 
again how much critical realism and neo-realism have in com- 
mon with respect to logic and general realistic outlook? Nev- 
ertheless, they differ profoundly in regard to the situation 
in knowledge. For the critical realist, knowledge does not 
involve the existential presence of the object; for the neo- 
realist, it does. Hence the very ingenuity of the neo-realist 
may make his position all the more perverse. Bit by bit, it 
is leading the neo-realist to behaviorism of the extreme sort 
that denies consciousness. It has led Professor Perry there, 
and I have the personal statement of S. Alexander that he 
suspects that it will lead him there. Let us note Perry’s 
theory as given in a paper before the French Philosophical 
Society. 

We are able to prepare a reaction even in the absence of 
the thing which it would require if the reaction were to be 
completely carried out. When this prepared reaction is 
adopted without reserve, that is, when the whole organism 
engages in it, there arrives that which we eall belief. A 
belief is a confident awaiting of something. To await one 
thing rather than another is to arouse the reaction proper 
to it. If this complementary thing appears to complete the 
reaction, the belief is demonstrated to be true. If not, the 
belief is false. 

It should be noted that this behavioristic view leaves out 
of consideration knowledge-claims in terms of ideas to stress 
the total organic setting. The critical realist feels sympathy 
with this stress upon the organic basis of belief—and I think 


170 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


that the pragmatist does also. But is justice done to the 
actual content of experience at the moment of belief by this 
behaviorism? I cannot feel that it is. More light will be 
cast upon this topic when we come to consider the mind-body 
problem. 

Concluding Remarks.—It should be clear by now that 
critical realism represents a decided break with the typical 
outlook of the nineteenth century. Yet it owes much to the 
analyses of thought made during that time. 

In the first place, it breaks completely with the assumptions 
and beliefs of idealism and experientialism. It holds that 
we can know objects which are outside our consciousness in 
terms of contents inside our consciousness. Hence it regards 
knowledge as an interpretation of an object rather than its 
literal presence. In the second place, it refuses to accept as 
adequate the compromise, which neo-realism suggested, that 
an idea is existentially identical with the object. Thus it 
has daringly proclaimed the heresy that we can know objects 
which transcend our consciousness existentially. And it has 
analyzed out the mechanism of such cognitive transcendence. 
Cognitive transcendence is not existential transcendence. 

Need I point out that this position is not in the ‘least ag- 
nostic? The range of knowledge is as wide as the world of 
objects. But—and here is an important point—we now see 
more clearly the nature and intrinsic limits of knowledge. 
Knowledge is an interpretation of objects in terms of specific 
contents revealing structure, relations, composition, behavior. 
These we shall call the categories. Under these all the details 
come as instances. But when I say that an object moves I do 
not say that I thought that this object moves, itself moves. 
When I say that a thing is active I do not mean that 
my meaning, or logical content, is itself active. What 
exists is not identical with knowledge; it is known. This 
view breaks completely with the tradition that existence is 
of the nature of logical universals or contents, a view which 
neo-realism and Hegelian idealism both tended to accept. 


TRUTH AND ERROR 171 


We shall quickly see that this difference has ontological im- 
plications. It will lead us more in the direction of a critical 
naturalism than has been usual in academic philosophy. 
And it will bring us more into touch with the actual move- 
ment and problems of science than has been characteristic of 
idealism. 

Without this epistemological preparation I do think that 
ontology would have been meaningless. But we are now 
ready to explore the world. 


REFERENCES 


BRADLEY, Essays on Truth and Reality. 

Carr, The Problem of Truth. 

DEWEY, Reconstruction in Philosophy. 

JAMES, Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth. 

PERRY, Present Tendencies, chap. ix. 

Rogers, What is Truth? 

ScHILLER, Studies in Humanism. 

MUIRHEAD, Contemporary British Philosophy. See especially the state- 
ments of Bosanquet and Hobhouse. 

JoAcHIM, The Nature of Truth. 

Rew, Knowledge and Truth, chap. 2. 















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PART TWO 
GENERAL ONTOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY 





CHAPTER XIII 


PROBLEMS AND METHODS IN ONTOLOGY AND 
COSMOLOGY 


From Epistemology to Ontology.—On the whole, the prob- 
lems we have thus far studied and the distinctions we have 
made have been dominantly epistemological. There were two 
reasons for this emphasis. In the first place, epistemological 
difficulties have undeniably given tone and perspective to 
modern philosophy. Without an appreciation of them, it is, 
in fact, scarcely comprehensible. In the second place, it was 
needful that the student become acquainted with the basic 
point of departure for a critical philosophy, namely, the 
working of the human mind in the face of the stimuli and 
suggestions which come to it. He must be able to stand back 
and take stock of knowing as an activity and an adventure. 
It is this persistent analysis of the very nature and founda- 
tion of human knowledge which in a measure differentiates 
philosophy and the philosophical attitude. 

But we are now ready to discuss what 1s known as well as 
knowing. And the two enquiries are supplementary. What 
kind of a world does ours turn out to be? What views of 
the general pattern, and even stuff, of the universe have 
thinkers entertained? What light does our own epistemology 
and the advance of science throw upon these traditional 
views? We shall, I am sure, find this new investigation more 
concrete, and perhaps even more interesting, than the prob- 
lems which have thus far engaged most of our attention. 
But we shall find, I am convinced, that what we have already 
done was a necessary preparation. 


It will be remembered that in the second chapter we gave 
175 


176 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


a brief outline of the main philosophical disciplines or 
sciences. We are now about to plunge into the age-old prob- 
lems and distinctions of metaphysics, the science of reality. 
Metaphysics falls naturally into two main divisions: general 
ontology and cosmology. These two divisions are not com- 
pletely separable any more than they are separable from 
epistemology. And we shall see that cosmology has thrown 
much light back upon traditional ontology. 

Under general ontology, then, we shall discuss such ques- 
tions as the following: Is reality spiritual, or is it material? 
Or are there, perhaps, two distinct kinds of realty which 
somehow exist cooperatively to make one universe? Or is 
there another possibility which the theory of evolution and 
a critical epistemology open up? ‘These general questions 
are typical of ontology and obviously concern themselves 
with the problem of the stuff of the world. It will be our 
endeavor to show that epistemology and the results of the 
special sciences together have direct bearing upon this 
problem. 

It is within the domain of ontology that much of the specu- 
lation that has tended to give philosophy a bad name took 
place. The checking of general ontology by cosmology has of 
late years had a healthy effect. The fault with much of this 
older speculation was that it began with the belief in some 
superlative reality which could be glimpsed in a formal way 
by a priori dialectic. The ideal held before thought was de- 
duction. While I cannot for a moment admit the truth of all 
the harsh things that. have been said about ontology of this 
sort, I am quite ready to grant that it was too formal and 
equivocally deductive. Beliefs of all sorts crept in. The spirit 
of contemporary philosophy is much more analytic and 
inductive. 

Another set of questions which have usually been discussed 
in connection with ontology concerns itself with the contrast 
between singularism, or, as it is often called, monism, and 
pluralism. Historically, the problem which is here under 


ONTOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY 177 


consideration is that of ‘‘the one and the many.’’ One tradi- 
tion in philosophy has laid stress upon the whole as against 
its parts. Along with this emphasis has gone the belief in 
centralization and unified authority. Opposed to this tradi- 
tion is the acceptance of de-centralization and the belief in 
a looser union in the universe. 

These opposed traditions are complex and have absorbed 
different elements in logic, ethics, and epistemology. The 
student must feel his way into an appreciation of these cur- 
rents and traditions. On the whole, singularism has allied 
itself with absolutism and transcendentalism. It has stood 
for what is analogous to monarchism in politics; only analo- 
gous, however, because any earthly monarch is only one 
among many other individuals. This tradition is skeptical 
of any free play among the parts. It senses control and 
unity. Pluralism, on the other hand, represents a rebellion 
against this tradition of centralization and an internally-com- 
pelling unity. It stands for a relative autonomy of the parts. 

During the nineteenth century absolutism was definitely 
championed by the dominant group of objective idealists. 
The individual was regarded as an adjective of the whole 
- which somehow transcended and included it. Bradley and 
Bosanquet are excellent representatives of this tradition. 
And, as we have already pointed out, pragmatism was in 
part a revolt against this outlook. It asserted the relative 
independence of the individual. For it, the universe was 
split up into various centres of activity loosely connected. 

But we must not forget that physical science also had its 
traditions which were those of a dead-level mechanism. When 
all is said, there was much in common between the absolutism 
of idealism and the absolutism of science. For neither did 
the individual count for much. Perhaps he does not anyway. 
But it is at least a question which we must investigate. 

To illustrate the tangle of traditions in speculative on- 
tology, we might point out that idealistic absolutism was 
dominated by the categories of personality. There was in it 


178 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


an obvious kinship with theology. Scientific or mechanical 
absolutism, on the other hand, was of a naturalistic type and 
stressed space, time and causality. 

We shall endeavor to show that philosophy has been moving 
from one stage to another with respect to these questions. 
Pragmatism attacked idealistic absolutism but had relatively 
little to say about scientific naturalism. It was, however, by 
tradition opposed to it and favorable to personality. With 
the growth of realism and the fuller grasp of the implications 
of modern science, cosmology has come to its own again. 
What is the place and destiny of human personality in the 
kind of world science is revealing? Is there such a thing as 
freedom for the individual? Are there levels of capacity and 
initiative among things? Such questions as these are again 
pushing to the front, but in a more naturalistic context than 
was usual a few decades ago. 

Questions about the ultimate stuff of the universe combined 
with the problem as to whether it is loosely or closely knit 
to furnish sufficient subject-matter for speculation. Techni- 
eal differences in logic and epistemology played their part 
in this complex, and it is highly probable that temperament 
and religious traditions affected the position adopted. We 
must feel our way into these outlooks and learn to appraise 
them. This will take time, but the time will be well spent. 

Quite naturally, the interest of mankind has always been 
greater in questions of the kind just indicated than in those 
of epistemology. The latter is a technical subject with only 
indirect connection with the great problems of life and 
destiny. Yet it had its implications. Thus the controversy 
between idealism and realism gained much of its vigor from 
its bearing upon ontological problems. A realist is almost 
certain to have a different attitude toward science than the 
idealist. 

We have not desired to linger upon epistemology longer 
than necessary. Having achieved some clear ideas on the 
subject, we wish now to come to an understanding in regard 


ONTOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY 179 


to the characteristics and structure of the cosmos, the proper- 
ties of physical things, the origin and nature of life, the rela- 
tion between mind and body, the possibility and meaning of 
freedom, etc. 

The Presence of Sharp Contrasts.—Both science and 
philosophy have been replete with sharp contrasts such as 
living and dead matter, the physical and the psychical, the 
material and the immaterial, mechanism and teleology, free- 
dom and necessity, law and chance. These abrupt antitheses 
have puzzled reflective thought, for they have been the expres- 
sion of apparently unavoidable discontinuities. The world 
has seemed to break up into parts and processes which could 
not be brought together. If living matter is so different from 
dead matter, how do they happen to be so closely connected ? 
Does not the one seem to be transformable into the other? 
And if life is something new, appearing only at a certain 
stage in the history of the earth, whence did it come? Is cre- 
ation a solution? It is not difficult to see that much the same 
set of questions must be raised for the human mind also. 
Can science deal with minds and fit them into the physical 
processes which it has mainly studied? Mind seems to be 
_ selective and purposive, while physical processes have usually 
been regarded as mechanical and blind. That there is need 
for systematic thinking is obvious. 

At one time, such problems did not greatly trouble the 
human mind. I suppose that the majority still ignore them 
or have traditional solutions for them. 

This new orientation of science has been brought about by 
the growth of the biological and the social sciences and by the 
extension of evolutionary ideas into the inorganic sciences as a 
consequence of the new discoveries in those fields. It is this 
richness of the content of science which bids fair to burst the 
old bottles of rigid mechanicalism and to force a development 
of a more adequate cosmology. The situation affords a beauti- 
ful example of the naturalness and inevitableness of philo- 
sophical questions. Philosophy is not something superim- 


180 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


posed upon science so much as something which science cul- 
minates in. 

While this revolutionary change was occurring in the do- 
main of the special sciences, an analogous change was taking 
place in philosophy. Here, also, the time-spirit was operating 
in the way of the advance of man’s knowledge of himself 
and of the world at large. The result was the rise of prag- 
matism, realism and naturalism and the decline of the tradi- 
tional, formal ontologies. It is not too much to say that the 
growth of realism and of naturalism made just that difference 
in philosophy which fitted it to cooperate sympathetically 
with science in the necessary work of fundamental reconstruc- 
tion. | 

And yet for ages man has sensed the essential problems. 
Birth and death forced them upon his attention. The tragedy 
of war, the succession of the seasons, madness, the apparent 
destiny of individuals, all these gaunt traits of man and his 
world made certain implications stand out. Struggling with 
these implications was the dream of a kindlier spirit running 
through all things, a providence. So speculation is a basic 
expression of human life and only the prosaic can, or wish 
to, escape it. What matters is that to-day we have a wealth of 
knowledge and analytic power which gives hope of deeper 
penetration into the nature of things. : 

A Word about Method.—Incidentally, we have been dis- 
cussing the method of philosophy. We have pointed out 
that very often philosophy was dominated by the idea of 
deduction. It was supposed that the human mind could by 
dint of intense thought discover some pregnant principle from 
which reason could deduce the main traits of reality. Philoso- 
phy was regarded as a, search for a first principle which 
would illuminate and explain the confused detail of appear- 
ances. 

This tradition was rationalistice in a vicious sense. It 
postulated something of the nature of an intuition in 
the first place in which first principles would be’ revealed. 


ONTOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY 181 


But such systems found it impossible to make connection 
with the detail of human experience in an interpretative 
way. 

The method which philosophy is coming frankly to adopt 
in ontology and cosmology may be ealled an analytic survey 
of the world as known to determine its most general features 
or structure. I would not speak of this survey as dominantly 
either inductive or deductive. The inductive-deductive work 
of the special sciences must precede, and what the philosopher 
seeks to do is to analyze closely the broad outlines and rela- 
tions revealed in the sciences. He analyzes with the aim of 
synthesis always before him. The world contains a broad 
variety of domains and he must discover the characteristics of 
these domains and see how they yet fit together into one 
universe in which man’s life runs its course. 

Our world is a spatio-temporal world. What, then, are 
space and time? Our world is a material world. What, then, 
is matter? Our world contains living things. What, then, 
is life? In short, the method of philosophy is an analytic- 
synthetic reflection upon the world as it is spread out before 
a mind full of the knowledge gained by the sciences. It aims 
to be a penetrative survey of reality as known. It does not 
so much have a source of knowledge all its own—as at times 
has been supposed—as a duty to bring human knowledge to 
its stage of clarification and synoptic synthesis. With our 
epistemology behind us, all this can be more clearly grasped. 
We shall seek to press on to a solution of basic problems by 
means of an analytic-synthetic survey which correlates and 
pieces together the world as science spreads it out before the 
mind’s eye. What are the characteristics of our world? And 
what variety and play of parts does it admit? 

Perhaps there is no better way of introduction to the es- 
sential aim of general ontology than to examine the tradi- 
tional monisms of substance which have disputed the field for 
SO many centuries. What is spiritualism? What can be said 
for and against it? What is materialism? What can be said 


182. PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


for and against it as it has been formulated in the past? 
It is to this task that we shall now proceed. 


REFERENCES 


FULLERTON, Introduction to Philosophy, chap. 14. 
PAULSEN, Introduction to Philosophy. 

JAMES, A Pluralistic Universe. 

SELLARS, Evolutionary Naturalism, chap. 1. 
Tayior, Elements of Metaphysics, bk. 2, chap. 1. 
Warpd, The Realm of Ends, chap. 1. 
WINDELBAND, Introduction to Philosophy, chap. 1. 


CHAPTER XIV 
MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM 


Traditional Monisms of Substance.—Let us now examine 
the two great, traditional forms of metaphysical monism or 
monism of substance: materialism and spiritualism. Every 
one has heard of materialism and most have been warned 
against it. The fundamental principles of spiritualism, on 
the other hand, are not so well understood. We speak of these 
positions as monistic because they teach that reality is com- 
posed of one type of stuff, appearances to the contrary not- 
withstanding. For materialism, this one primordial stuff is 
matter; for spiritualism, it is mind or spirit. There is a 
slight difficulty here for the spiritualist does not like the terms 
stuff and substance. 

We shall examine these positions carefully and try to see 
both their good and their bad features. On the whole, our 
conclusion will be that both positions—at least as they have 
been formulated in the past—are inadequate. Spiritualism 
is a one-sided outlook founded on an idealistic type of episte- 
mology and dominated by religious demands and by the cate- 
gories of personality. It is opposed to materialism which 
was founded on a vague sort of realism and upon the mechani- 
cal atomism of science and of early speculation. 

Because our own epistemology ss realistic, we shall find less 
objection to materialism than spiritualistic philosophers do. 
We shall, however, point out that traditional materialism has 
always been weak in epistemology, in its treatment of the 
categories, and in its presentation of the nature and condi- 
tions of human values. It has usually been nothing more than 
a sketch containing insufficient analysis. It is from this side 
that I shall estimate it. 

183 


184 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Materialism.—In discussing materialism the danger to 
avoid is to set up a figure of straw and then to pull it to pieces. 
Materialists have been partly to blame for this situation, for 
it is very seldom that they have told us exactly what they 
have meant by matter and what its relation to mind and con- 
sciousness was on their theory. Analysis of terms has seldom 
been their strong point. If questioned, they would probably 
reply that they meant by matter what the scientists meant 
by it. Reality would be, then, the physical world as con- 
. ceived in terms of the results of the physical sciences, some- 
thing occupying space and in motion according to mechanical 
laws. For such a view, the physical world is basic, the mother 
of all things, and mind and consciousness and society must 
make their peace with it. Of course the dominant view of 
matter may change with the discoveries of science. Formerly 
matter consisted of very small, solid particles which im- 
pinged upon one another in purely mechanical ways. Such a 
position is now called mechanical atomism. Matter was sup- 
posedly inert, and all changes were merely changes of posi- 
tion in space. To-day with the astounding advances of 
physics and chemistry matter is conceived as organized energy 
arranged in patterns. Each kind of atom has its own struc- 
ture of positive proton and negative circling electrons. More- 
over, the theory of evolution has come increasingly to the 
fore. Both of these changes are certain to affect materialism 
profoundly. To be fair to materialism, we might need to 
speak of the old and the new materialism. 

Another point is important. Materialists have seldom of- 
fered the enquirer well analyzed ideas of mind and conscious- 
ness. Only of one thing did they have an inner conviction, 
viz.—that mind and consciousness must somehow be tied up 
with matter and be dependent upon it. Otherwise, they felt 
sure that there would be dualism and a gateway for all sorts 
of superstition. 

In what follows I do not wish to do injustice to materialism, 
for I have much sympathy with what it tried to do, and that 


MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM 185 


was to develop a naturalistic outlook. Unfortunately, the 
usual run of materialists over-simplified their task, did 
not analyze the difficulties which confront naturalism and have 
been satisfied with statements which are absurd on their face 
or else too vague to mean much. Passing, then, from material- 
ism as a name for naturalism, let us examine the two theories 
which have been most popular among past materialists. 
There is, first, the theory that consciousness is identical 
with the motion of the material constituents of the brain or, 
another formulation, is a form of nervous energy. It is felt. 
that consciousness has its seat in the brain and is to be con- 
nected with nervous changes. And this is likely true. But 
the technical problem is to conceive this relationship clearly 
and to state 1t im a meanmngful way. And the reply which 
practically all philosophers make is that a mere identification 
of consciousness with motion or energy, these terms being taken 
in their scientific sense, is a form of words which can have 
no more meaning than to say that black is white or heaviness 
is virtue. A more penetrative analysis of the whole situa- 
tion and of the nature and reach of our scientific knowledge 
is necessary. Let me quote the assured statements of Profes- 
sors Pratt and Windelband. Writes Pratt: ‘‘The identifica- 
tion of consciousness and motion indeed can never be refuted ; 
but only because he who does not see the absurdity of such 
a statement can never be made to see anything. If he cannot 
see that, though consciousness and motion may be related as 
intimately as you please, we mean different things by the two 
words, that though consciousness may be caused by motion, 
it 7s not itself what we mean by motion any more than it is 
green cheese—if he cannot see this there is no arguing with 
him.’’* Windelband takes much the same attitude though he 
goes farther than, I think, he has a right to go in his assertion 
of dualism: ‘‘Every such statement, however, that conscious- 
ness or psychic activity is merely some superior sort of mate- 
rial existence or movement is a quite arbitrary pronounce- 
1Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 12. 


186 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


ment, and tries to give unusual meanings to the words. In 
the face of our direct experience, which continually teaches 
us that physical and psychic reality are fundamentally differ- 
ent, the Materialistic position remains a paradox. One might 
just as well say: Apples are a sort of pears, or, A dog is a 
sort of cat.’’? 

Now the second typeof theory has been already suggested. 
It is that consciousness is an effect of physical processes. It 
is held that consciousness is a by-product of certain compli- 
eated changes in nervous tissue. It is something which arises 
like a shadow and has, itself, no executive influence upon 
these physical processes. It is an epiphenomenon or passive 
accompaniment of the integrative activities of our cortex. 
To use Mr. Santayana’s now famous expression, it is ‘‘a lyric 
ery in the midst of business.’ A crude form of the idea of 
causal materialism is Vogt’s? dictum that the brain secretes 
thought as the liver secretes bile. 

What objections can be raised against this second type of 
materialistic theory? In essentials, there are three. There 
is, first, the objection that the creation by physical processes 
of a kind of reality which is by hypothesis alien to them is a 
miracle of the worst kind. Let us remember that the material- 
ist has usually been pretty naive in his thought of matter— 
though recent developments have probably resulted in more 
critical views—because he has given little attention to theory 
of knowledge. He has tended to assume that matter could be 
exhaustively known in terms of the physico-chemical sciences. 
Now just what could we mean by saying that consciousness 
is produced by matter as a separate thing? It is the assump- 
tion of alienness, of dualism of stuff, to which objection must 
be raised. Thus materialism does not help us to understand. 
the relation between brain and consciousness but leaves it an 
ultimate mystery. Now it may be that we cannot do better 


+ Windelband, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 118. 
*Karl Vogt, Biichner and Moleschott were leaders of a materialistic 
movement in German thought in the GO’s of last century, 


MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM 187 


than this, that we are confronted by an ultimate fact, but we 
have no right to take this attitude until we have analyzed all 
our terms more thoroughly and seen what suggestion theory 
of knowledge can give us. We come now to the second objec- 
tion. It is this, that the production of consciousness or the 
psychical involves the absolute loss of energy if the psychical 
is non-physical and is produced or secreted; and such a loss 
is opposed to the principle of conservation which is accepted 
by science. It is a ghostly production but surely must in- 
volve some slight loss of energy. And the only way to avoid 
a loss is to hold that the psychical is a form of energy, which 
brings us back to the first type of theory. There is, finally, 
the objection that materialism of this type denies the efficacy 
of consciousness and makes man an automaton whose actions 
are expressive only of the blind, though very complicated, 
discharges of nervous energy in his brain. Purpose, planning, 
reflection, deliberate choice are not effective processes which 
guide conduct but only reflections of cortical processes of 
shunting in the internuncial cells, reflections which may give 
us some idea of what goes on in the brain but which do not 
affect its course. This objection is a very important one be- 
cause it raises fundamental issues in regard to cortical proc- 
esses. Is the brain a mechanical system? Are there levels 
of response in nature? Have we a right to carry over into 
our thought of the brain atomic, kinetic theories of change 
and disregard the fact of integration and apparent novelty 
of action? Do logical perceptions have anything to do with 
the brain discharge selected? These are basic questions of 
the sort that philosophy must meet by analysis. It is unde- 
niable that materialism was too negligent of them in its de- 
sire for a facile solution. 

A Glance at the History of Materialism.—For even a fair 
understanding of materialism, a glance at its history is 
necessary. The general purpose and aim of materialism will 
be found a valuable feature, something to be reckoned with 
even after criticism has undermined any particular formu- 


188 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


lation. As we have already pointed out, materialism has 
always been the expression of the belief that the physical, 
spatial world is the only reality and that all forms of reality 
must somehow be included in it. It represented a persistent 
drive toward a spatial naturalism. We may also point out 
that materialists have been the constant foes of super- 
naturalism. 

The atomism of Democritus was the first definite expression 
of materialism of which we have adequate record. He taught 
that the universe consists of atoms and empty space. These 
atoms differ from one another in size, shape and position. 
Changes are due to the motions of these elementary particles 
which collide and combine in various groupings. Thus far 
we have a philosophy of nature very similar to the mechani- 
cal atomism of our pre-electronic days. But where is there 
place for mind in such a world? Democritus thinks to meet 
the difficulty by asserting that mind, also, is composed of 
atoms, the smallest, roundest and most mobile there are. 
What, however, does he mean by mind, and what was the 
relation of mind to the actual sensations and ideas which 
people have? His notion seems to have been somewhat as 
follows: The soul pervades the body and consists of very 
mobile atoms of the nature of fire. In the head these psychic 
atoms constitute the human reason. It would seem that 
Democritus thought of perception as a reception of emanations 
or images of a physical sort through the senses. Higher than 
perception was reason which involved processes of diserimi- 
nation. Such a mind or soul is physical and perishes with 
the body. It should be noted that Democritus had a more 
directly physical idea of sense-data than is common to-day. 
It is needless to say that much was left unexplained. 

The Englishman, Thomas Hobbes, was the first noted mod- 
ern materialist. He taught that sensations and ideas are the 
reactions of the inward parts of the organism to impressions 
coming from without. Thus he tends to identify conscious- 
ness and motion. Materialism reached its height in France 


MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM 189 


in the eighteenth century. The physician, La Mattrie, in his 
book, Man a Machine, endowed matter with the capacity of ac- 
quiring motor force and sensation. The mind has its seat 
in the body and is extended and material. Much the same 
view found expression in Holbach’s System of Nature. His 
chief purpose was to combat all forms of supernaturalism. 
Mind is the body regarded under the aspect of certain fune- 
tions or powers. The physician Cabanis also developed much 
the same outlook. 

Metaphysical materialism breaks out recurrently. It is as 
though, with the advance of science and the increase of facts 
which show that man is a part of the system of nature, it is 
felt that mind and body must be brought together in some 
naturalistic way. Thus after the decline of Hegelianism in 
Germany we have scientists like Vogt and Moleschott and 
Buchner urging crude forms of materialism while, in Eng- 
land, we have the famous Belfast Address of John Tyndall 
declaring that matter contains the potency of life. Let me 
quote a passage: ‘‘Abandoning all disguises, the confession 
that I feel bound to make before you is that I prolong the 
vision backward across the boundary of the experimental evi- 
dence, and discern in that matter which we, in our ignorance 
and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, 
have hitherto covered with opprobrium the promise and po- 
tency of every form and quality of life.’’ 

In recent years the form of psychology called behaviorism 
is regarded by many as materialistic in its outlook. Such 
psychology has little concern with, or interest in, a subjective 
consciousness. It is the development of forms of action which 
it studies. Even neo-realism has been considered as near 
akin to materialism since it lays so much stress upon the re- 
action of the centralized nervous system. American prag- 
matism with its return to naive realism and its dislike of a 
private consciousness appears to many to be moving in the 
same general direction as neo-realism. It cannot be said, then, 
that materialism is dead. It is simply being transformed. 


190 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Historically it set problems rather than answered them. It 
was a philosophy of affirmation rather than a philosophy of 
analysis. 

Concluding Remarks on Materialism.—At the very be- 
ginning of this discussion I pointed out how difficult it was 
to do justice to materialism. It is, I think, fairest to regard 
it as an immature form of naturalism pretty definitely con- 
nected with mechanical atomism. Its weakness was three- 
fold: (1) it did not ask itself the reach of human knowledge 
and therefore tended to take the descriptive terms of physical 
science too literally; (2) it thought of the physical world in 
terms of atoms in motion and tried to bully mind and con- 
sciousness into the framework thus set; (8) it did not take 
growth and organization seriously because it was essentially 
a pre-evolutionary system. The traditional criticisms of 
materialism which we examined turned upon these points. 
Consciousness cannot be simply identified with motion, nor 
is consciousness a kind of physical energy. Inert atoms can- 
not secrete consciousness, nor can consciousness be thought of 
as controlling or directing the movements of atoms as these 
are usually conceived. It is clear that, if we are to solve the 
problems suggested by materialism, we must bring to bear 
the results of modern science and the suggestions which 
epistemology may have in store for us. In short, mate- 
rialism has essentially been an attempt to take metaphysics 
by storm. 

While philosophy was under the influence of epistemologi- 
cal idealism it was customary to dismiss materialism because 
it assumed the actual existence of a realm independent of 
mind. Atoms, it was said, are only imaginary constructions 
for the descriptive purposes of science; they are not realities. 
If we could grant such an epistemology, this objection would 
be final and conclusive. Unfortunately the development of 
philosophy these years has been in the direction of realism, 
and so this long-valued epistemological argument has lost 
much of its force. It still retains the partial value of calling 


MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM 191 


attention to the epistemological query, Just what do we know 
about matter ? 

The growth within science itself has been away from the 
simple schema of earlier days which saw all things as a mere 
complex of independent atoms of a brick-bat sort striking one 
another; in other words, a universalization of the kinetic 
theory of gases. Science has been able to penetrate into the 
atom and now speaks of electrons and quanta of energy. 
What is usually called an electrodynamie view has taken 
the place of the inert and opaque unit of former days. Now 
I do not mean to suggest that this better knowledge has 
destroyed materialism; it has only transformed it. But some- 
thing else has occurred. The growth of the biological and 
the social sciences has led to a realization of the significance 
of time. We no longer think that it is enough to understand 
the ultimate material out of which things evolved; we want to 
know what things actually are after they have evolved, what 
their properties and capacities are. Because biology and 
psychology have secured standing in science, no scientist plays 
fast and loose with such terms as consciousness and mind. It 
is realized that the grave, primary problem is to find out what 
we mean by these terms and how we ean relate them, not to 
primitive matter, but to evolved organisms. In brief, neither 
science nor philosophy is any longer tempted to take reality 
by storm. Traditional materialism may, therefore, be said 
to be a thing of the past. We must press beyond its external 
identifications and assertions to an analysis of fundamental 
concepts like space, time, quantity, quality, relation, organ- 
ization, novelty, behavior, content, life, mind, consciousness. 
We must penetrate more deeply into the hfe of nature and 
follow it, as it were, from level to level until it rises into 
mind and consciousness. 

One last point in conclusion. Metaphysical materialism 
does not imply ethical materialism or low ideals and values. 
There is, in fact, no logical connection between the two. No 
theory seeks to deny the facts of human life. And if people 


192 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


find satisfaction in beauty and friendship and are moved 
to conserve and increase them, that is a fact which any meta- 
physics must acknowledge. Again, it is not true that meta- 
physical materialism necessarily has evil consequences. Many 
noble and high-minded men have been materialists. But it 
is true that, in the final analysis, ethical categories like free- 
dom, deliberation and.responsibility must be met and inter- 
preted in the light of our view of reality. From the time of 
Kant, at least, thinkers have found it difficult to confine hu- 
man action in the strait-jacket of atomic mechanicalism. 
Freedom for man, necessity for nature, has been one ver- 
dict. But this antithesis is itself a crucial challenge to the 
traditional materialism. 

Let us now examine the other type of traditional meta- 
physical monism. We shall, I think, find that it brings out 
certain facts which should be emphasized and yet that it also 
seems unable to do justice to all the facts. Like materialism, 
it is a too hasty and one-sided metaphysies. 

Spiritualism.—Spiritualism is the accepted antithesis of 
materialism. These two systems have been like doughty cham- 
pions in the lists ready at all times to break a lance together. 

Spiritualism may be defined as the doctrine which main- 
tains that all existence is mental or spiritual. It is a better 
term than idealism for two reasons: First, idealism has come 
to be identified in exact philosophy with epistemological ideal- 
ism ; and, second, idealism as a term has too many associations 
with ethical and religious idealism, that is, with eulogistic 
attitudes, to serve well as a technical metaphysical expression. 
Philosophy has as much need as any other science for unam- 
biguous terms. When we say that spiritualism is a metaphysi- 
cal position we mean that it is a theory of the ultimate nature 
and character of the stuff of reality. In essentials we may say 
that it holds that the physical world is an appearance and 
that personality is nearer the nature of ultimate reality. 
Some spiritualists are pluralistic and assert the relative inde- 
pendence and autonomy of individual souls or minds, while 


MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM 193 


others are singularistic and stress the inclusive and dominat- 
ing unity of the whole. 

Spiritualism is founded on two basic arguments. The first 
is idealistic epistemology of the Berkeleian or Kantian tradi- 
tion. This argument is directed against physical realism. 
We have already examined this argument sufficiently and 
tried to show its erroneousness. We have also tried to dem- 
onstrate that Kantianism and Hegelianism rested on this re- 
jection of physical realism no matter how earnestly they 
aimed to overcome subjectivism in their treatment of experi- 
ence and of the relation of the individual to the whole of 
reality. It is generally acknowledged that Hegelianism never 
did justice to nature and the sciences of nature. Its strength 
lay in the social and historical fields and in its influence on 
philosophy of religion. To appreciate spiritualism, then, we 
must realize that it is founded on the supposed absurdity of 
physical realism. 

Supplementing this first argument is the second, that we 
have an intuition, or sense, of our own existence as spiritual, 
or immaterial, beings. Augustine, Descartes, Berkeley, Leib- 
niz, Bergson, all contain this element. Descartes expressed 
it in the famous phrase, ‘‘Je pense, done je suis,’’ ‘‘J think, 
therefore I am.’’ Berkeley stressed the same point in his 
assertion that we have a notion of the self as active in con- 
trast with the passive ideas we perceive. In our own day, 
we are fortunate in having a philosopher who is also an 
artist in the use of language to express this intuition of the 
self. In his An Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson writes 
as follows: ‘‘There is one reality, at least, which we all seize 
from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is 
our own personality in its flowing through time—our self 
which endures. We may sympathize intellectually with noth- 
ing else, but we certainly sympathize with our own selves. 
When I direct my attention inward to contemplate my own 
self (supposed for the moment to be inactive) I perceive at 
first, as a crust solidified on the surface, all the perceptions 


194 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


which come to it from the material world . . . Next, I notice 
the memories which more or less adhere to these perceptions 
and which serve to interpret them. These memories have been 
detached, as it were, from the depth of my personality, drawn 
to the surface by the perceptions which resemble them; they 
rest on the surface of my mind without being absolutely my- 
self. Lastly, I feel the stir of tendencies and motor habits— 
a crowd of virtual actions, more or less firmly bound to these 
perceptions and memories. ... But if I draw myself in 
from the periphery towards the centre, if I search in the depth 
of my being that which is most uniformly, most constantly, 
and most enduringly myself, I find an altogether different 
thing. There is, beneath these sharply cut crystals and this 
frozen surface, a continuous flux which is not comparable to 
any flux I have ever seen. There is a succession of states, 
each of which announces that which follows and contains that 
which precedes it . . . Whilst I was experiencing them they 
were so solidly organized, so profoundly animated with a 
common life that I could not have said where any one of them 
finished or where another commenced. In reality no one of 
them begins or ends, but all extend into each other.’’? Thus 
introspective intuition lays bare the surging continuity of 
the self. 

Probably Leibniz was the first thorough-going spiritualist. 
Beginning with the conception of substance as that which 
exists per se, he added the further premise that only that 
which has power of action can exist. But, he maintained, 
matter is passive since extension is its essence (Descartes). 
Therefore, reality must be immaterial and unextended. Now 
it is clear that this argument is relative to Cartesianism. 
Modern science has moved far from Cartesian cosmology. En- 
ergy goes along with spatial structure in the physies of to-day. 
Why cannot the active be material and extended? Certainly 
we have here a question which we cannot lightly pass over. 
Let us remember how it arose in the thought of Berkeley also. 

1 Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 9 ff. 


MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM 195 


Let us briefly examine the system of a recent spiritualist, 
the great German psychologist, Wilhelm Wundt. Wundt 
seems to argue that the contrast between the physical and the 
psychical is one which grows up within experience. He then 
points out that the physical sciences develop the one term 
of the contrast and arrive at the atom as the ultimate physical 
unit, while psychology investigates the other term and reaches 
the assumption of an ultimate qualitative unit called the will. 
It is the task of the metaphysician to harmonize these two 
units. The hypothesis which, according to Wundt, does this 
most satisfactorily is the assumption of a will-atom as the 
primary element of reality. Now, as Hoffding points out, 
Wundt really argues much as Leibniz did: ‘‘The world must 
be cogitated either as material or else as spiritual unity. We 
can no other. Wundt’s choice is not doubtful. The only ac- 
tivity immediately given is, and remains for us, our will.’’? 
But is this dilemma unavoidable? Cannot the world at a 
certain level be both material and spiritual? It is this ques- 
tion which we shall later investigate. 

But another point must be raised. Do we have in psy- 
chology atomic units analogous to chemical atoms? And, as 
Hoffding notes, in his psychology, Wundt ‘‘does not even 
reckon will among the elements of consciousness. He treats 
the phenomena of will as the most composite and special form 
of conscious life, and numbers only sensations and feelings 
among the psychical elements.’’ Thus it cannot be denied 
that Wundt’s metaphysical hypothesis of a qualitative will- 
atom as the primary element of reality has sight connection 
with the facts of psychology. Psychology is coming more and 
more to stress function and integration. Its physical parallel 
is integrative physiology rather than physics. But more of 
that later. 

Types of Spiritualism.—While all spiritualists are deadly 
enemies of materialism and naturalism, they are not without 
internal dissensions. The older tradition is represented by 

1 Hoffding, Modern Philosophers, pp. 29-31. 


196 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Berkeley and Leibniz. Berkeley is a theist who seeks to do 
without the physical world which is for him a misinterpreta- 
tion of the orderly sequence of perceptions or ideas aroused 
in a plurality of souls by God. Leibniz is a pluralist of much 
the same fashion except that he denies causal interaction be- 
tween souls and postulates a preestablished harmony or agree- 
ment between their internal states. After Kant, a new form 
of spiritualism arose which stressed a world-mind or self. On 
the whole, the tendency now became singularistic. The abso- 
lute came to the front. Anglo-American Hegelianism repre- 
sents this phase; and, as we saw, this stress on the whole, which 
regards anything short of the whole as appearance, dominated 
English thought until the end of the nineteenth century. 
Bradley and Bosanquet are striking exponents of this outlook. 
It is customary to speak of this form of spiritualism as ob- 
jective idealism. And I do think that this term is descriptive. 
It is founded on an idealistic epistemology and yet tries to 
escape subjectivism. It does this through an appeal to a more 
inclusive experience than that of the individual. But there 
are still other forms of spiritualism. With Schopenhauer, the 
basic reality back of physical appearances is Will; with Von 
Hartmann, it is the Unconscious. And there is, finally, a 
movement which has had many recent advocates, the movement 
whose thesis is that the psychical is the reality of which the 
physical world is the appearance. This is panpsychism. It is 
represented by James Ward and C. A. Strong among others. 

It is worth while pointing out that, with the development 
of spiritualism, the idea of substance became modified. In both 
objective idealism and panpsychism the old associations of 
a substance existing by itself and possessing attributes in an 
intrinsic way disappeared. In place of it arose the stress 
upon the psychical and upon the process of experience. We 
have in this the mutual influence of the two arguments to 
which we called attention, the epistemological and the intro- 
spective, both of which may be said to have worked along the 
lines of a psychological approach to metaphysics. Let me in- 


MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM 197 


dicate very briefly the working of this motive in recent objec- 
tive idealism and panpsychism. 

It is easy to see how the objective idealist who is strongly 
influenced by psychology of the introspective type and who 
is an expert in psychological analysis is led to this empirical 
type of spiritualism. Thus F. H. Bradley’s chief argument 
in favor of spiritualism boils down to the argument from 
content: “‘Find any piece of existence, take up anything 
that anyone could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense 
assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in 
sentient experience.’’? Combine this with the logical stand- 
ard of coherence or systematic unity, and objective idealism 
of the absolutist type inevitably follows. 

The panpsychist is more of a pluralist and more interested 
in the physical world. Traditionally, he has either been un- 
der the influence of Leibniz or has reached his world by 
analogy. The psychical is the only kind of reality that we 
are acquainted with; why not hold that it is a fair sample 
of reality? Here again we can see the influence of the two 
arguments basic to spiritualism. <A surprisingly large num- 
ber of psychologists have been drawn in this direction. C. A. 
Strong, for instance, has been doing his best to harmonize 
panpsychism and eritical realism. 

We must leave it to the historian of philosophy to present 
and analyze the many variations of spiritualism. Human 
ingenuity and mental keenness of the highest order have 
been at work constructing speculative systems which are at 
the very least of great imaginative and artistic interest. But 
no system is stronger than its premises. 

Conclusions.—Our study of these two great traditional 
types of metaphysical monism has confirmed us in the sus- 
picion that each is one-sided. The world is a spatial, dura- 
tional, executive system of whose general, and even detailed, 
structure and behavior the sciences give us knowledge. It 
is the massive realization of this condition which spiritualism 

1 Appearance and Reality, p. 145. 


198 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


has never done justice to. It is a world in which men are 
born in accordance with the laws of heredity from a germ- 
plasm which reflects the hazards and chances of millions of 
years. Ever more clearly, we realize that man and nature, 
the human mind and its setting, are inseparable. To all this, 
traditional spiritualism has been partially blind. But, as 
knowledge has accumulated in the biological and psychologi- 
eal sciences, such an attitude is less and less plausible. In the 
second place, subjectivism in epistemology has also lost stand- 
ing and this support has been removed. 

Materialism and spiritualism can be best understood as 
extremes, each strong in its own favorite realm. Thus each 
challenged and supplemented the other. While materialism 
sought to express the implications of the first broad general- 
izations of the physical sciences, spiritualism was at home 
in society and in the subject of values. It insistently called 
attention to the conscious self and to the concepts of purpose, 
reasoning and valuation which the physical sciences had ig- 
nored because they were not in their purview dealing, as 
they did, chiefly with inorganic nature. We may justify 
both extremes by saying that their warfare forced attention 
to the genuine problems of philosophy. It is clear that the 
modern thinker with his greater resources must sink his shaft 
deeper. But before we begin this systematic work, let us 
examine the other traditional position, dualism. 


REFERENCES 


BUcHNER, Force and Matter. 

LANGE, History of Materialism. 

CLIFFORD, Lectures and Essays. 

PAULSEN, Introduction to Philosophy. 

HAECKEL, The Riddle of the Universe. 

Pratt, Matter and Spirit. 

AutoTrTa, The Idealistic Reaction against Science. 
MUIRHEAD, Contemporary British Philosophy. 
BRADLEY, Appearance and Reality, chap. 15. 
Warp, The Realm of Ends, chap. 1. 

Strone, The Origin of Consciousness, Preliminary. 


CHAPTER XV 
DUALISM VS. EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM 


Natural Dualism.—In the preceding chapter, we exam- 
ined two characteristic forms of monism, materialism and 
spiritualism. These, we saw, were opposed efforts to reduce 
the world to one fundamental kind of reality. One of the 
interesting things about them was just the fact that they 
were both so assured and yet so far apart. This, in itself, 
would lead us to doubt the adequacy of either to cover all the 
features of human experience. The materialist proclaims that 
reality is matter and that there can be no question as to 
gveneral characteristics of matter. The spiritualist 1s equally 
certain that all reality is mental and that every one knows 
what the mental is. Our own conclusion was that both on- 


‘tologies are too facile. Neither is founded on a satisfactory 


epistemology, and neither does justice to the distinctions 
which we seem inevitably to make in our experience. Each, 
as we said, is right in its main emphasis and wrong in its 
denial. Materialism expresses the fact that we are children 
of nature, and that nature is a tremendous spatio-temporal 
process which we are forced to acknowledge. Spiritualism 
takes its stand on what is quite obviously true of human 
nature and the purposive activities of human, social beings. 
It is not ‘surprising that reflection on the inadequacy of 
both materialism and spiritualism has led many thinkers to 
champion dualism as at least a more valid position. Jf one of 
these two realities cannot be reduced to the other, why, then, 
we must accept both. It is held that both physical things and 
selves are revealed in experience and that these two classes 
199 


200 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


of things are obviously different from each other and equally 
ultimate. A few quotations will make this rejection of ma- 
terialism and spiritualism in favor of both matter and mind 
somewhat clearer. 

‘‘The plain man,’’ writes Fullerton, ‘‘finds himself in a 
world of physical things and of minds, and it seems to him 
that his experience testifies directly to the existence of both. 
This means that the things of which he has experience appear 
to belong to two distinct classes.’’+ Now let us recall our 
epistemology sufficiently to remember that the plain man is 
a naive realist and thinks that he ‘‘sees’’ physical things in 
a literal sort of way, that the physical thing is open to his 
inspection or given. Such being the ease, is it surprising that 
he contrasts these physical things with the flow of his thoughts, 
feelings and emotions? These are private and personal; those 
are public and common to all observers. Is it not absurd 
to try to reduce the one class of things experienced to the 
other? 

A moderate statement of the position of the natural dualist 
is to be found in the writings of Henry Sidgwick. Natural 
dualism is for him the position of common sense. ‘‘ For there 
is this advantage in putting questions from the point of 
view of Common Sense: that it is, in some degree, in the 
minds of us all, even of the metaphysicians whose conclusions 
are most opposed to it—such as the extreme Sensationalist or 
Idealist. It is the view with which we all start when we begin 
to philosophize. . . . In saying this I do not mean to affirm— 
as some who have maintained Natural Dualism as a philo- 
sophical conclusion have affirmed—that Natural Dualism is 
involved in the original presentation of the objects of experi- 
ence to the experiencing mind. All I affirm is that we find 
it in our ordinary thought when we begin to reflect on it, 
nor can we by the utmost effort of memory recall a time when 
we did not explicitly hold it. If the belief in an external ma- 
terial world existing as we know it independently of our 


*Fullerton, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 202, 


? 


DUALISM VS. EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM 201 


knowing it—so that our knowledge of it does not affect its 
existence—if this belief is the result of inference from data 
given originally as merely mental fact, this process of infer- 
ence preceded the stage of conscious reflection. I ought fur- 
ther to explain that in speaking of Common Sense I do not 
mean entirely unscientific Common Sense, but the Common 
Sense of educated persons rectified by a general acquaintance 
with the result and methods of physical science.’’* From this 
recognition of epistemological realism—for that is what we 
have here—Sidgwick passes quickly to metaphysical dualism. 
‘*Sinee Descartes, philosophical thought has found no diffi- 
eulty in distinguishing the thinking, feeling, willing thing 
that each one of us is conscious of being, from the complex 
aggregate of extended solid particles which each of us calls 
his body.’’? 

Cartesian dualism and the motives which sustain it are the 
concrete opponents which any attempt at a more critical and 
inclusive monism than materialism or spiritualism must face. 
It will be well for us, therefore, to recall it. It will be re- 
membered that Descartes taught that the essence of the world 
of thought is thinking. In other words, Descartes formulated 
a dualism of substances, alien to each other, whose respective 
essences or depths are revealed in extension and thought. 
Thinking reality is not extended, and extended reality does 
not think. But this formulation reflects the scholastic notion 
of substance and essence. Thought is supposed to grasp in a 
completely revelatory way what is distinctive of these two 
kinds of reality, to light them up, as it were. But let us recall 
our own epistemology. When we say that the physical world 
is extended, does this mean any more than that it is measur- 
able and that the parts exclude each other dynamically? 
And this is surely knowledge of a descriptive sort about phys- 
ical things, but it is just as surely no such complete revela- 
tion of the stuff of the physical world as Descartes assumed. 


*Sidgwick, Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations, pp. 42-43, 
*Tbid., pp, 52-53, 


202 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


While we should not go to the other extreme to which Leibniz 
and the idealists in general have gone and assert that scien- 
tific knowledge is not knowledge, we must bear in mind the 
reach and character of it. We shall, in fact, argue that 
science deciphers the structure and behavior of physical ob- 
jects. We have seen good reason to be skeptical of Cartesian- 
ism both as regards the nature of matter and as regards the 
mind-soul. We shall try to show that the situation is more 
subtle than dualism admits. 

Motives in Favor of Dualism.—Let us now seek to ap- 
preciate the reasons why mind and consciousness are so fre- 
quently thought of as alien to the organism. It is well to 
become aware of these motives because they are constantly 
operating in our minds. I shall try to be as explicit and 
clear as possible because I regard this problem as very crucial. 
We shall, of course, examine the question in more detail when 
we come to consider the mind-body problem in the light of 
modern biology and psychology ; but certain general considera- 
tions which determine a sort of customary attitude can be 
studied at this stage. 

It is well, I think, to have definite terms for these dualistic 
motives even though they may sound a little formidable. I 
shall accordingly speak of the epistemological, the methodo- 
logical, the categorial and the religio-animistic motives. These 
motives re-enforce one another. 

We are now so familiar with the epistemological motive 
that we need add little to what we said above. Natural dual- 
ism is largely the expression of naive realism. If we accept 
critical realism, the whole situation alters. We must antici- 
pate here what we shall bring out in more detail in our later 
study of the mind-body problem. The essential point is this, 
that we have a double knowledge of the organism, what may 
be called a descriptive, external knowledge by means of, and 
through data of the sort the physical sciences achieve, and 
an introspectional knowledge of the sort that psychology gains. 
Now the first kind gives us descriptive knowledge of the char- 


DUALISM VS. EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM 203 


acteristics of physical things, such as position, shape, size, 
internal structure, composition, behavior but it does not 
offer us an intuition of the very stuff of its objects. The 
very situation of the knower prevents that. Knowledge is 
mediated by data, which alone, are given. But, in the ease 
of introspection or in knowledge of the psychical in general, 
there is not the same separation between the data and the 
object. We are simply trying to know a little better what we 
already experience or feel. But only the epistemological 
expert realizes this situation. The ordinary level favors the 
view that we can just see that physical things cannot contain 
consciousness. 

It seems to me that the advance of science of recent years 
with its subtler views of matter is gradually working against 
anything akin to naive realism and, consequently, against 
natural dualism. I suggest that the student think pretty 
persistently about this drift. 

The methodological motive is as follows: The physical sci- 
entist’s interest is in the physical world as this can be shown 
by the methods and technique of the physical sciences. Is it 
not inevitable that he come to think of the physical world 
solely in terms of the knowledge so gained? The physical 
is that which can be known and handled in this fashion. 
This methodological consequence shows itself in the attitude of 
the man trained in physical science toward psychology and 
the question of mind. These fields are additional to nature. 
Thus Hobson is philosophically alert and yet in his book 
entitled, The Domain of Natural Science, this methodological 
division asserts itself: ‘‘We are thus led to what must be 
regarded as a limitation upon the claims of Natural Science, 
in the sense of the term here adopted, to the power of theo- 
retically extending itself so as to become a complete philosophy 
of Physical Nature, independent of all psychical factors. 
Physiology is completely justified in assuming this inde- 
pendence as a methodological principle, and experience alone 
ean decide how far it will be able to extend its present far- 


204 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


reaching results in accordance with that principle.’’* The 
physical world tends to be considered as that which can be 
studied and understood only in terms of the methods of the 
traditional physical sciences.’ 

This methodological attitude fits into, and is reenforced by, 
what I have called the categorial motive. The knowledge 
gained by the physical sciences is in terms of spatial structure, 
quantity and behavior. What has this to do with conscious- 
ness, with feeling, volition, purpose, memory, character? The 
basic concepts are obviously different ; how can they be corre- 
lated? This disparity in the categories, or fundamental con- 
cepts, of the two realms is readily interpreted in terms of the 
epistemological and methodological motives which we have 
already discussed. Perhaps this contrast has most clearly 
come to a head in what has been called a dualism of process. 
The physical realm has been thought of as a domain of purely 
mechanical happenings, while the mind is notoriously selective, 
synthetic and teleological. If this dualism of process be true, 
the two domains undeniably fall apart. The assertion of a 
dualism of process arose with the development of the mechan- 
ical interpretation of nature and was an element in Cartesian 
dualism. The laws of the two substances were, he held, differ- 
ent. The animal body is a mechanism. 

A recent statement of this dualism of process by a defender 
of dualism will enable us to do justice to its significance. 
‘What I mean by a Dualism of Process is now, I trust, plain 
enough. Whether reality is made up of one kind of stuff 
or whether there are two or more kinds of being within it, 
there are at any rate two kinds of laws, two kinds of processes 
to be found in the activities of the real beings of the world. 
Throughout the vast spaces of the physical universe where 
matter and energy come into no immediate relation with con- 
scious persons, the laws of physics and chemistry have abso- 


4 Hobson, The Domain of Natural Science, p. 70. The third chapter of 
this work is extremely interesting. 

7As we shall later see, one of the great controversies now on is 
whether psychology is a physical science. 


DUALISM VS. EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM 205 


lute sway. Here no energy is created or destroyed, regular 
mechanical sequence holds, and on the basis of the eternal 
physical laws and the actual configurations of matter and 
energy an omniscient mechanic could predict with unerring 
exactness the whole course of the future. . . . The beings we 
know as persons have their own ways of acting, their own 
‘laws,’’ if we insist on preserving the word and transferring 
it to a new realm—ways of acting which are not reducible to 
physical laws. These personal beings have, as I said above, 
become ‘‘organic’’ to parts of the physical world. In the 
activities of the human body, therefore, the two forms of 
process, the two kinds of ‘‘law,’’ meet. The result is both 
cooperation and conflict. . . . The determining power in some 
of the acts of human bodies is to be found not in the physical 
and chemical processes but in processes of an utterly dif- 
ferent nature, namely, those of the rational and purposive 
will.’’? 

This is a forceful statement. But let us note the assump- 
tions within it. Very few careful scientists would make as 
sweeping statements about the reign of mechanical laws and 
the possibility of prediction in nature by a postulated omni- 

~seience as Professor Pratt does. The laws of science are de- 
scriptive formule which comprehend the data gathered by 
science; and the days of the deductive and dogmatic interpre- 
tation of the whole of nature in accordance with a few simple 
laws has passed. The various sciences have become more 
autonomous and empirical. Just what the range and variety 
of physical laws is is one of the pressing problems of the day. 
The philosopher must be on his guard against having the 
dramatic simplifications of the past in place of the actual 
situation of the present. But this quotation reveals in strik- 
ing fashion the force of the categorial motive back of dualism. 

We come, finally, to the religio-animistic motive back of 
dualism. Animism is the position that the human body is 
inhabited by an anima, or spirit, which is temporarily active 

*Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 184 ff. 


206 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


in it but which can depart and exist for some time at least 
outside of it. Such a belief is very ancient. Dreams, trances, 
death, and memory are probable causes of its appearance 
and acceptance by the human mind. When we come to ex- 
amine the mind-body problem in more detail, we shall discuss 
animism more fully. At this point, we are more concerned 
with its persistent influence in favor of dualism. It is ob- 
vious that animism is involved in the traditional religious 
notion of the soul, and the hope of immortality seems bound 
up with the acceptance of some such notion and the dualism 
it implies. It is not to be wondered at, then, if this religio- 
animistic bias acted as an emotional support for the other, 
more technical, motives back of dualism. 

This completes our discussion of the reasons why the physi- 
cal and the mental are so readily held to be distinct. The 
inability of past thinkers to achieve a satisfactory monism 
must also be regarded as an influence in favor of dualism. 
Neither naive materialism nor spiritualism is satisfactory ; 
what other possibility is there? 

Objections to Dualism.—We have, I judge, done full jus- 
tice to dualism. And that, of course, has been our purpose, 
for philosophy is science and not casuistry or mere dialectics. 
It is our desire to develop an outlook which will cover the 
facts in a synoptic and comprehensive way, not forcing us 
to belittle this feature or to hurry rapidly past that other one. 
Having, therefore, brought out the reasons which have seemed 
to so many to lead inevitably to dualism, let us now consider 
the objections which dualism must face. 

We can summarize the queries and objections which spring 
to our minds when thinking of dualism under three headings: 
(1) The status of mind and consciousness, (2) difficulties in 
understanding the relations of two such opposed kinds of 
realities as mind and the physical world; and (3) the greater 
simplicity of monism. These queries are interwoven but rep- 
resent different angles for reflection. Their discussion will 
prepare us for the exposition of a standpoint which, I am 


DUALISM VS. EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM 207 


persuaded, is by far the most plausible offered to metaphysics, 
viz.—evolutionary or emergent naturalism. 

The first query turns around this point that the physical 
world seems to our knowledge of its self-conserving nature 
far more self-sufficient than mind and consciousness. After 
we examine the ideas we have of space, time, matter and 
energy in later chapters, this difference between the two 
realms which dualism posits will become even more obvious 
but the main contrast can be stated even now. Mind has had 
an evolution from humble beginnings step by step with the 
development of the central nervous system. Levels of intelli- 
gence is one of the commonplaces now of psychological sci- 
ence. The scale from positive and negative response with 
reflexes and tropisms to well differentiated instincts and 
thence to generalized intelligence is discernible. Mind is 
clearly organic to nature and to the conditions and demands of 
the environment. It is directed to the survival and well-being 
of the creatures which have sprung into life under this sky. 
And everything indicates to us that, just as life had an origin 
at some time in the geological past, so did mind get born in 
relation to possibilities which life offered. So relative to the 
total situation is mind that to assign it a separate being and 
status, intrinsic to it apart from physical nature, seems un- 
justified. Such an assignment would present itself as a last 
resort if all else failed. I am quite aware that this sense of 
the intrinsic relation of mind to nature is the product of the 
shifting of outlook which has come about with the growth 
of the biological sciences of the nineteenth century and which 
the work of the twentieth century has reenforced, and that it 
is in opposition to the animistic tradition; nevertheless, I am 
convinced that this new perspective has come to stay. And 
what is true of mind seems even more true of consciousness. 
It is so evanescent, so much a process of change which varies 
with the state of the organism, so dependent upon external 
stimuli and upon emotional tensions, that it seems more an 

organized complex of events than a self-sufficient substance 


208 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


able to stand over against the physical world as autonomous 
and sovereign. 

Dualism’s strength, as we have taken pains to show, hes in 
the weakness of materialism and spiritualism. It is time that 
we called attention to the fact that it, also, has weaknesses. 

From Descartes to the present, dualism has been hard 
pushed to make in any degree intelligible the nature of the 
relations between two kinds of reality, one of which is spatial 
and the other supposedly non-spatial. How can they meet 
to influence each other? If that which is non-spatial inter- 
penetrates the spatial and so brings itself to bear upon it, is 
it not itself active in space or into space? And, in so think- 
ing it, are we not making it at least quasi-spatial and cogni- 
zant of spatial relations? It must either know where to act 
or its non-spatial dimensions and distribution must somehow 
analogically correspond to space. My mind acts in relation to 
my organism and does not pass to yours. How is it able 
thus to cling and attach itself, to grow as my brain grows, to 
weaken as my brain becomes senile? Of a verity, dualism, 
also, has its difficulties. 

And, then, besides the spatial dilemma—which has become 
more, rather than less, obtrusive with the growth of realism 
in philosophy these last decades—there is the causal quag- 
mire. Science is ever more persuaded that nature is a closed 
system in which energy is perpetually being transformed, in- 
tegrated and dissipated but never lost. But dualism of the 
metaphysical type cannot accept such a closed system without 
denial of the efficacy of mind and consciousness, There are 
many dualists who are parallelists, it is true, and take refuge 
in the belief that mind and energy perform a shadowy minuet — 
which never ends in an embrace; but parallelism is rather a 
counsel of despair for the dualists. They realize well what 
it implies for events in this sublunary sphere, for nature and 
nurture, for ethics and social reform, for artistic creation. 
Who plays the music for the minuet? Why should matter 
take on the delightful shape of MacMonnies’ Bacchante be-_ 


DUALISM VS. EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM 209 


cause the artist dreamed a dream of joyous abandon? Why 
should two great oceans be joined because a president and a 
Congress decreed it? Is the belief in the efficacy of mind 
the last stronghold of magic? But if the dualist is so con- 
vineed of the efficacy of mind that he asserts that interaction 
rather than parallelism is the truth of the situation, he must 
make clear to us something of the method and application 
of this interaction. How does mind insert itself into physical 
processes? And how do physical processes control the ten- 
sion and direction of mind? Few have offered to inform us 
how this is done. And then there is the question of entrance 
of physical energy into the mental realm, and of the corre- 
sponding transference of mental energy into physical energy. 
What, then, becomes of the disparateness of the two domains? 
It is clear that dualism, also, has its obstacles to overcome. 
Finally, dualism is a more complex interpretation of reality 
than is monism. Other things being equal, the human mind 
prefers the simplest solution. Just as, in chemistry, thought 
was never satisfied with the mere admission of eighty odd 
elements having nothing in common except general physical 
properties and welcomed the analysis, made possible by recent, 
experiments, which made the elements comparable, so in meta- 
physics the human mind will always seek a bond of union 
between mind and matter. Particularly will this be true of 
the scientific, naturalistic direction of reflection. 
Evolutionary Naturalism.—We have already hinted that 
there is still another possibility, that materialism, spiritualism 
and dualism, the traditional solutions, by no means exhaust 
the subtle situation which confronts the human mind in its 
effort to locate itself within reality and to gain some notion 
of the nature of reality. Perhaps the chief fault with the 
traditional solutions was that they tended to take their terms 
ready-made like the parts of a picture puzzle and merely 
sought to put them together. Could there be much hope for 
such a method? Surely this basic problem requires that all 
our terms be analyzed in the light of our present knowledge 


210 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


and of the results of a critical epistemology. What are matter 
and energy? What are mind and consciousness? How are 
they known? What is the reach of this knowledge? Are 
mind and consciousness alien to a spatial system? Is the 
physical world always a blind, mechanical system, or are there 
levels of process in nature genetically related to one another? 
These questions surely give point te the assertion that philo- 
sophy continues, and builds upon, science and that it cannot 
do this unless it critically probes the terms used. Unless it do 
analytic and constructive work of this sort as a preparation 
for its own hypotheses, it is dogmatics rather than philosophy. 

At the present stage of our study of metaphysics, we are 
in a position only to outline the probable results of such a 
critical mode of procedure, their general tenor, so to speak. 
It is always difficult to select a satisfactory name in such a 
ease; and yet the history of human thought has been kind 
in this instance and presented us with the term naturalism. 
We saw that materialism was a hasty sort of naturalism. 
What, then, is naturalism? Jt is an outlook or attitude to- 
ward reality rather than a fixed and dogmatic set of principles 
or formule, And, as an outlook, its ideas will grow and 
ripen with knowledge and reflection. The spirit of naturalism 
is very well expressed, curiously enough, by a broadminded 
German theologian. I quote from Professor Otto’s Naturalism 
and Religion: ‘‘ At first tentative, but becoming ever more 
distinctly conscious of its real motive, naturalism has always 
arisen in opposition to what we may call ‘supernatural’ 
propositions, whether these be the naive, mythological explana- 
tions of world-phenomena found in primitive religions, or 
the supernatural popular metaphysics which usually accom- 
panies the higher forms. It is actuated at the same time by 
one of the most admirable impulses in human nature—the 
impulse to explain and understand, and to explain, if possible, 
through simple, familiar and ordinary causes.’’ It is evident 
that the spirit of naturalism is identical with the spirit of 
science. 


DUALISM VS. EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM 211 


Naturalism’s tendency has always been monistiec rather than 
dualistic. For it, the world has been a spatio-temporal, causal 
process. So significant for the comprehension of this process 
is the idea of evolution that the position which I am suggest- 
ing may best be called evolutionary naturalism. 

Conditions Evolutionary Naturalism Must Fulfil—We 
have successively examined and questioned materialism, spi- 
ritualism and dualism. Consequently, we should by this time 
be well aware of the conditions which evolutionary naturalism 
must fulfil if it is to be acceptable. These conditions may 
be brought under three heads: First, evolutionary naturalism 
must do justice to the different kinds of process, inorganic, 
organic, mental and social, which exist in our world; second, it 
must make comprehensible the efficacy of mind and conscious- 
ness ; third, it must meet the arguments for metaphysical dual- 
ism which we discussed under the headings epistemological, 
methodological, categorial and religio-animistic. While the 
remainder of the book with its detailed analyses will alone 
make clear the sort of cosmology which is implied by evolu- 
tionary naturalism, we can in this place briefly discuss these 
general conditions which evolutionary naturalism must fulfil. 

The first condition calls attention to the strength of dualism 
as against a purely mechanical type of naturalism. Here we 
may again use that stout defender of dualism, Professor Pratt, 
as our witness: ‘‘If evolution be taken to mean a process of 
continual change in the time stream such that, at certain 
junctures, something genuinely new may arise, then evolution 
and the Dualism of Process are by no means incompatible. 
If, on the other hand, by evolution we mean a perpetual 
unrolling of the eternally given, such that each new stage was 
predictable from the preceding one, that no really new thing 
is possible, and that 

‘With the first clay He did the last man make,’ 
then plainly we must choose between evolution and Dualism. 
They can hardly both be true. For conscious selves and their 
ways of acting are different in kind from material things and 


212 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


their mechanical laws. . . . Purely mechanical processes can- 
not account for that which is by definition non-mechanical.’’ + 
Is this not excellently stated as a sort of dialectical contrast? 
While there is in it too little awareness of the situation in 
the sciences, of the re-analysis of mechanics, of the replace- 
ment of the inert atomistic mechanics of the past by electro- 
magnetic mechanics, ofthe admission of integration and new 
modes of behavior in nature, of a more empirically-minded 
recognition of novelty in nature, there is a stubborn refusal 
to reduce the higher to the lower that is admirable. Evolu- 
tion must, as I have said elsewhere, be taken seriously. The 
first condition of a satisfactory evolutionary naturalism is an 
interpretation of the meaning, and the limits of the validity, 
of the so-called mechanical view of the world. 

The second condition is that evolutionary naturalism must 
make comprehensible the efficacy, or functional significance, 
of mind and consciousness. In this regard, it is to be differ- 
entiated from materialism, as materialism has ordinarily been 
interpreted. It is clear that, as a monism, mind and con- 
sciousness must be held by evolutionary naturalism to work 
uithin individual systems rather than wpon them as dualism 
holds. The problem is that of the general nature of an inte- 
grated system which may, at one and the same time, be said 
to be physical and mental and to contain consciousness. No 
matter how ‘organic’ dualism may hold the relation of mind 
and body to be, the influence of one on the other must be ex- 
ternal or of the interactionistic type. It is the task of na- 
turalism to conceive of the efficacy of mind and consciousness 
as intrinsic to the organism. It follows that this second 
condition is insoluble apart from the first condition. A sys- 
tem truly characterized as mental in its action cannot be 
purely mechanical. 

The third condition demands a revision of the ordinary, 
confused interpretation of epistemological realism. Because 
an object of our knowledge is independent of any personal 

1Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 186-7. 


DUALISM VS. EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM 218 


act of knowing which occurs in the consciousnesses of indi- 
viduals, it does not follow that this object is in its nature 
alien to consciousness. Mor example, because another human 
individual is independent of my act of knowing him, it does 
not follow that he is unconscious. Now the sort of knowledge 
gained by the physical sciences may be perfectly true without 
exhausting their objects. If, as we have concluded, this 
knowledge by means of the data of external observation does 
not involve an intuition of the stuff of the object but only 
knowledge about the characteristics of the object, there is 
no epistemological foundation for the metaphysical dualism 
of two kinds of stuffs, which goes back to Descartes, There 
has been, however, both in common sense and in much of sci- 
ence a tendency to assume that matter is penetratively intu- 
ited. Something of what might be called a naive substantial- 
ism lingered in the background of thought; of this we must 
get rid. We must not take human knowledge of the physical 
world for more exhaustive and penetrative than it is. We 
must appreciate its categories and nature at their true worth, 
neither belittling them as the agnostics do nor overestimating 
them as do those uncritical dogmatists who have little imagi- 
native appreciation of the stark uniqueness and complexity 
of the situation. 

It is a curious fact that many scientists of a speculative 
or synthetic temper who were at first inclined to naive ma- 
terialism swung later to what may be called the double-aspect 
theory, viz..—that organized matter has other sides to it, 
or possibilities, which mechanical atomism did not recognize. 
In his own way, Haeckel saw this. He endows matter with 
sensation and will.t And we have seen that Tyndall saw in 
matter the promise and potency of life. In fact, science is 
much more modest in its claims than the dualist, who claims 
to tell us what the physical world is according to science, 
actually is. 

Concluding Remarks.—This chapter has been unavoid- 

*Cf. Ernst Haeckel, The Riddle of the Universe, p. 220. 


914 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


ably difficult. Its purpose has been to do justice to dualism 
and yet to indicate the assumptions which dualism tends to 
make. We are surely beginning to see that there is no royal 
road to metaphysics but that we must make a careful analysis 
of the basic concepts of science in the hght of a critical 
epistemology. The suggestion which we have thrown out is 
that the principle of evolution will lift us beyond the flat 
oppositions of dualism. We must study the results of the 
various sciences to see what they indicate. In other words, 
we will come back to ontology after we have thoroughly ex- 
amined the problems of cosmology. It is to cosmology that 
we now address ourselves. 


REFERENCES 


ALEXANDER, Space, Time and Deity, vol. 2. 

Hux ey, Man’s Place in Nature. 

Pratt, Matter and Spirit. 

SeLuars, Evolutionary Naturalism, chap. 1. 

Smwewick, Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations, lect. 3. 
Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, chap. 4. 
Warp, Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. 2. 

Lioyp MorGan, Emergent Evolution, lect. 1 


CHAPTER XVI 
THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECT OF THE WORLD 


The Basic Characteristics of the World.—The theory of 
knowledge which we have been led to adopt as the most 
plausible maintains that the physical world is real and sub- 
stantial and has a specific nature, or characteristics, which 
our minds seek to comprehend. The claim that there is a 
logical identity between the characteristics of the world and 
our true thought of them seems to be an ultimate demand 
which we can examine and seek to justify but which we can- 
not reduce to something still more ultimate. If the world 
is not revealed in our thought, our basic intellectual efforts 
are futile. But we have seen no good reason to become skep- 
tics in this matter and will therefore proceed on the assump- 
tion that the characteristics of nature are comprehended in 
- eritical thought. 

The degree of insight into the nature of things which we 
possess varies with the accumulation of fact and theory. The 
human mind has been forced to besiege reality and to wrestle 
with it through the centuries. The history of both philosophy 
and science is a chronicle of effort and of earned success. It 
cannot be too often repeated that knowledge is an achieve- 
ment. And knowledge is a sustained growth in breadth and 
depth. From a mere formal outline, it becomes insight into 
structures, relations, energies, levels, possibilities. 

It is the task of the special sciences to examine the details 
and to do persistent exploratory work. What we are con- 
cerned with in philosophy is the general structure of reality as 
this stands out for logical reflection. Now it is the custom of 
philosophy to speak of the general characteristics of nature 

215 


216 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


as revealed in our thought as the categories. The categories 
are the basic features of our thought of the world. And it 
is the belief of the critical realist that there is the amount and 
kind of identity which knowledge requires between these 
categories and the actual characteristics of things. I presume 
that such a belief les at the basis of the whole intellectual, 
or rational, tradition of human thought. The world has a 
categorial structure which thought discovers and reflects. 
Let us admit that many thinkers, especially those of the ideal- 
istic tradition, such as F. H. Bradley and Henri Bergson, 
dissent from such a belief. They have attempted to show 
contradictions and inadequacies in the forms of human 
thought. We can only refer to this fact here as showing the 
profundity of the questions raised by philosophy. In what 
follows we shall frankly follow the intellectualistie tradition 
that thought is in large measure equal to its task of compre- 
hending the characteristics of reality and that reality has a 
categorical structure. 

When I assert that the world is spatial, I am thinking 
affirmatively that my idea of space reveals the form of the 
world. However I have built up this idea—and it is the task 
of psychologist, mathematician and physicist working to- 
gether or through the philosopher to throw lght upon this 
question—I regard it as revelatory of the actual structure of 
the world. 

In cosmology, we are concerned with the grand outline of 
the world rather than with its multitudinous detail. It is 
essential that we get before our minds and comprehend those 
basic, common features of objects and their relations which 
stand out as recurrent and significant. Is it not impossible 
to think of physical bodies without such traits as spatiality, 
diversity and mass being in mind? An object which had no 
shape, size or mass and was not assignable to some place would 
not be what we consider a physical thing. Thus, to repeat, it 
is equally right to say that the categories are fundamental 
features of thought and fundamental characteristics of things. 


THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECT OF THE WORLD 217 


This view is distinct from Kant’s. Kant was concerned 
with the question of the source and function of categories 
in our experience. They came from an impersonal Trans- 
cendental Ego and had no significance for the causes of our 
impressions. He was not a physical realist but a phenomenal- 
ist. 

The history of human thought—whether in the race or 
in the individual—makes us aware that the categories first 
arose in an uncritical form. They are experiments in organi- 
zation and interpretation growing out of the activities of the 
organism. At first, they are dominated by perceptual per- 
spective and needs; and it is only gradually that they develop 
a more impersonal reference and axis. We shall note how 
a conceptual framework is constructed which brings out the 
relations of things to one another. There is no more striking 
feature of modern science than this system of objective meas- 
urements and references. 

It is to this gradual and increasingly critical evolution of 
the categories of knowledge that I shall have occasion to call 
attention in my examination of space and time. But, of 
course, the final interest will be in the developed category 
as this reveals, more or less adequately, the characteristics of 
things. It will become clear that science and philosophy must 
cooperate to develop and employ the categories. 

I do not doubt that, as we proceed, the value of systematic 
analysis of the categories will become evident. Nevertheless, 
the following excerpt from a discussion of just this question 
may be of value: ‘‘The most fundamental task of philosophy 
is to take the concepts that we daily use in common life and 
science, to analyze them, and thus to determine their precise 
meanings and their mutual relations. Evidently this is an 
important duty. In the first place, clear and accurate knowl- 
edge of anything is an advance on a mere hazy, general fa- 
miliarity with it. Moreover, in the absence of clear knowledge 
of the meanings and relations of the concepts that we use, 
we are certain sooner or later to apply them wrongly or to 


218 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


meet exceptional cases where we are puzzled as to how to 
apply them at all. For instance, we all agree pretty well 
as to the place of a certain pin which we are looking at. But 
suppose we go on to ask: ‘Where is the image of that pin 
in a certain mirror; and is it in this place (wherever it may 
be) in precisely the same sense in which the pin itself is in 
its place?’ We shall-find the question a very puzzling one, 
and there will be no hope of answering it until we have care- 
fully analyzed what we mean by being in a place.’’? 

The Genesis of our Ideas of Space.—It has taken some time 
for the human mind to become aware that its idea of space 
has varied from period to period. We are, however, very 
conscious of this fact now. Three influences have chiefly 
been at work to arouse this consciousness: (1) psychological 
investigation of levels in our spatial experience; (2) the 
appearance of non-Euclidian geometries; and (3) the rise of 
the notion of relativity. A few words in regard to each of 
these influences will help us to gain perspective. 

In the eighteenth century there arose the controversy be- 
tween sensationalistic empiricism and intuitionalistic nativism. 
Hume may be regarded as representing the first theory of 
spatial experience while Descartes and Kant are the cham- 
pions of nativism. As an opponent of nativism, Hume sought 
to reduce the experience of space to an arrangement of quali- 
tative sensations. His work was taken up and continued by 
associational psychologists such as Mill and Spencer. The 
association of touch and movement sensations was supposed to 
generate the experience of extensity. In contrast to this 
effort, Descartes and Kant held space to be an intuition which 
dominated the qualitative sensations of color and pressure. 
Unfortunately, Kant did not sufficiently realize the fact that 
our perceptual experience of space is different from our con- 
ceptual experience. Not wishing to go into controversial 
matters in psychology, it will be sufficient for our purposes 
to point out that it is now generally recognized that even 

1 Broad, Scientific Thought, p. 16. 


THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECT OF THE WORLD 219 


perceptual space has an immense range and variety of in- 
ternal quality. ‘‘In the concrete,’’ writes Professor James 
Ward, ‘‘the body is the origin or datum to which all positions 
are referred, and thus ‘here’ for the individual percipient 
is an absolute position, one that has no counterpart in the 
thoroughgoing relativity of pure space. Also ‘the body- 
sense’ in contrast with what may be called ‘the projecting 
senses’ (particularly the eye) yields the further absolute 
distinction of internal and external, marking off the bodily 
self from its environment. The environing space, again, for 
the percipient, varies in character, intimacy, and even in di- 
mensions as perception recedes from the foreground towards 
the background, from objects to which we can adjust by 
changes of posture to objects only to be reached by locomotion. 
... It is a long way from these facts of perception, which 
the brutes share with us, to that scientific concept of space 
as having three dimensions and no qualitative differences, 
which we have elaborated by the aid of thought and language; 
and which reason may see to be the logical presupposition of 
what in the order of mental development has chronologically 
preceded it.’’? 

The march of physiological and psychological knowledge 
has developed a position in regard to spatial experience which 
is far from sensationalistic empiricism, on the one hand, and 
intuitionalistic nativism, on the other. That there are levels 
of spatial experience is one of the things best agreed upon. 
Again, visual space is not quite the same as tactual-motor 
space. He who would have a thorough knowledge of space 
should study the details of the psychology of spatial percep- 
tion. For our present purpose, however, it will be sufficient 
to contrast perceptual space with conceptual space and with 
the abstract space of geometry. 

Man’s visual perceptual space is suffused with tactual and 
motor meanings. It has, however, a peculiar perspective of 
its own. Let us now examine the specific characteristics of 

% James Ward, Psychological Principles, p. 144-5. 


220 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


perceptual space. It is, first of all, selective. Very distant 
things do not stand out as sharply or clearly as things nearer 
to the percipient. It is obvious that relationship to the per- 
cipient’s sense-organs explains this characteristic. That stands 
out clearly which is near and attended to. In the second 
place, perceptual space is decidedly limited in extent. In 
front, there is the horizon; and, at the sides, there is increas- 
ing indistinctness until the field disappears. In the third 
place, perceptual space is filled with color and sound and with 
all those sensuous qualities which we tend to assign to things. 
Things have shape and size and position, and there is not as 
yet much sense, if any, of a separation between space and 
that which fills it. 

The development of space-experience continues, and space 
becomes increasingly conceptual in character. A process of 
both synthesis and analysis goes on, and the sense of vastness 
and impersonal, objective relations grows upon the mind. 
It thinks now of a physical world which stretches out indefi- 
nitely in every direction and which engulfs any ‘‘here’’ with 
its personal perspective. It is at this level that science arises, 
and it soon reacts to further this conceptual development. 
Before long, space is thought of as a container or receptacle 
in which physical things exist or which they occupy. Empty 
space is distinguished from filled space, a distinction which 
has its origin in the interpretation of resistance to muscular 
effort. It is, of course, at this stage that danger arises, the 
danger of too hasty theory. Shall we separate space from 
things and make of it thus a new kind of reality? 

This tendency to separation is encouraged by the con- 
struction of mathematical space. We have already seen how 
Descartes was led by his rationalism to geometrize the physical 
world and reduce it to mathematical space. Both science and 
philosophy have come to regard this procedure on his part 
as a grave error. The position we shall adopt and defend is 
that mathematical space is a construction made by the human 
mind working upon normal conceptual space under the guid- 


| 


THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECT OF THE WORLD 221 


ance of mathematical interests. We do not infer mathematical 
space in some mysterious way but create it out of conceptual 
space by abstraction and idealization. We disregard any 
aspect of the sensible world but its extension. It is direction, 
distance, position which we study. And then we create such 
ideal elements as points, absolutely straight lines, surfaces, 
etc. After this fashion, the human mind has constructed the 
concept of an empty space homogeneous in all directions and 
thinkable in terms of elements and relations such as those 
mentioned above. There can be little doubt that this process 
of abstractive construction has been aided by the fact that 
physical bodies change their relations without changing their 
forms. It is the form that counts. It is this form which 
mathematicians have studied so intensively. And their results 
have been in no sense arbitrary. 

The second influence which we pointed out as affecting 
our idea of space was the development of non-Euclidian geo- 
metries. Descartes and Kant were, we saw, innatists. They 
believed that physical space, that is, the spatial character 
of the material world was of the Euclidian type. But the 
advance of both geometry and physics has made this hasty 
identification of mathematical space and physical space im- 
possible. It was soon seen that mathematical space involved 
more than a passive intuition, that it involved assumptions. 
Now these assumptions were so naturally made that their 
existence and significance were not at first realized. But the 
development of two different systems of mathematical space 
by Riemann and Lobachewsky respectively drove home the 


problem: To which of these three possible types of space 


does the physical world correspond? There was seen to be no 
a priori certainty as to the spatial character of the world. 
Physics was seen to be in some sense other than mathematics. 
If these three systems are equally free from internal self-con- 
tradictions, they are equally meritorious candidates, Each 
is therefore an hypothesis which the facts must decide be- 
tween ; and these facts must be physical and not mathematical. 


222 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


And this leads us to the third influence. The physical 
theories of relativity have been concerned with the problem 
of the measurement of physical distances and events. Now 
measurement is a physical operation, not a mathematical one. 
As a very able French philosopher has put it: ‘‘ At the dawn 
of modern science the geometrization of experience meant the 
mathematician’s right to dictate his orders to physics, and 
physies had to obey. To-day, on the contrary, the most subtle 
mathematics is at the service of the physicist, and he alone 
decides what is true or what is false, because he alone is in 
nature’s councils. The problem of mathematical physics has 
definitely and radically changed its meaning: it no longer 
needs to impose the apodeictic form of geometry on the world, 
but to adapt a certain type of geometry to the indications 
which the universe furnishes on its own account.’’ } 

As a consequence of the influence of psychology, mathe- 
matics and physics, our present ideas of space are pretty clear 
and eritical. Let us now examine their implications. 

Space as a Category of the Physical Sciences.—In our ex- 
aminations of the traditional distinction between conscious- 
ness and the physical world, we saw that extension, or spa- 
tiality, is a fundamental characteristic of the physical world. 
So much was this the case, in fact, that it has long been 
customary to use it as a defining trait. The physical is spatial 
or that which occupies space. Since Descartes’ time, it has 
been more or less assumed that consciousness cannot be in 
space. Whether that is a dogma we shall later determine, but, 
at present, we must try to find out what we should mean 
when we speak of the physical world as spatial. What does 
space as a category of physical science mean? 

The study we have already made of the growth of our idea 
of space should prevent confusion. We are not now concerned 
with the mathematician’s constructions of various types of 
spatial systems nor with empty, homogeneous space. Rather 


1Leon Brunschvicg, “The Mathematical and the Physical,” Aristotelian 
Society Proceedings, 1924, p. 45. 


THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECT OF THE WORLD 223 


are we asking ourselves what is known about the physical 
world under the heading of space. The physical world is 
known as measurable and ordered in a side-by-side fashion. 
Thus the more we know about the structure and dynamic rela- 
tions of the physical world, the more do we have content for 
physical space. To assert that nature is spatial does not mean 
that nature is 7m a semi-reality called space nor that abstract 
mathematical space is an attribute of the physical world but 
simply that our knowledge involves measurement in terms of 
real units, that things exclude one another and are ordered in- 
ternally and externally. Such knowledge is preliminary and 
needs filling out, yet it is true so far as it goes. It is readily 
seen, however, that, far from making nature completely trans- 
parent, it only furnishes the framework for the continued 
investigations of the experimental sciences like physics, chem- 
istry and biology. 

This interpretation of space as a physical category con- 
cerned with what may well be called the form of nature should 
be contrasted with what may be called respectively the essence 
view and the receptacle view. 

The essence view is the Cartesian identification of the phys- 
ical world with space. Such a view holds the world to be 
intellectually transparent to the geometrician. It is clearly 
a deductive, analytic view of things which has little apprecia- 
tion of induction and experimentation. The advance of sci- 
ence has undermined this outlook though it still lingers and 
fascinates the human mind. We must recognize the corre- 
spondence of mathematical space and physical space but 
refuse to admit any flat identity. And this correspondence 
rests upon the fact that mathematics has been built up by the 
human mind working upon certain features of our perceptual 
experience. 

The receptacle view holds that real space is a sort of con- 
tainer for matter and energy. It is pretty obvious that such 
a view is only a step from the Cartesian outlook. There are 
two objections. In the first place, what is the nature of this 


224 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


relation between the filling and the receptacle? The analogy 
of pail and water clearly will not hold, for this absolute space 
is not a world-pail made of something. In the second place, 
how could we know such an absolute space if only matter 
and energy affect our sense-organs? We would have to infer 
it from the form of things, and by what right? 

The relativity view of space has come to the front and, 
aside from the special form it has taken with Einstein, it 
stands for the rejection of these older views. Space is a 
physical category connected with measurement. It is not a 
kind of entity by itself. The physical world is not so much in 
space as it is spatial. It is physics and astronomy that must 
give us the definite information about this basic characteristic 
of our world. Mathematics, alone, could never solve our 
problem ; though it is equally true that, without mathematics, 
we would be intellectually helpless. 

The Divisibility and Extent of Space.—There are certain 
problems which always present themselves in connection with 
space and time. These are the fascinating questions as to the 
infinite divisibility and infinite extent of these expanses. Our 
minds try to imagine vastnesses and become dizzy at the 
thoughts which are conjured up. We are all familiar with the 
popular methods of making infinite time concrete, and 
we have all thought in a bewildered fashion of the pos- 
sibility of worlds beyond worlds without a limit. What 
has philosophy to say in regard to these puzzling enig- 
mas? 

Philosophy proceeds, first of all, to make distinctions. The 
first distinction is that between mathematical space and phys- 
ical space. Let us note the bearing of this. 

I see no reason why the philosopher should not agree with 
the mathematician who asserts that mathematical space is 
continuous and infinite. As is well-known, the mathematician 
thinks space in terms of the theory of numbers and makes 
certain assumptions in regard to the division of lines by points 
or positions. The result is a conceptual scheme. Such con- 


THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECT OF THE WORLD 225 


ceptual schemes are valuable for the mathematician’s work 
but they should not be naively read into nature itself. When 
a mathematician speaks of an infinite number of points being 
between any two positions on a line, he means that the bit 
of line-room is a continuum. In a continuum, there is no next 
position but always one between and so on indefinitely. Let 
us remember that a point is not a bit of space, that it does 
not have extension itself. What we have in mind, then, is a 
process of division in accord with arithmetical theory. The 
series one-half, one-fourth, one-eighth, etc., never meets the 
series one-third, one-ninth, ete. It is not the passive intuition 
of space which the mathematician desires but a series of 
operations in accordance with mathematical symbols and 
methods, a way of handling spatial objects conceptually. It 
is this pragmatic view of mathematics which the student 
should try to bear in mind. Mathematics is a tool of analysis 
and construction. The following quotation from a mathema- 
tician who is also a good bit of a philosopher may bring this 
point out more clearly: ‘‘The fact that Mathematical methods 
are, in a very large class of cases, unable to deal with objects, 
or with processes, except by breaking them up into parts, 
and increasing indefinitely the number of those parts, is a 
significant example of a limitation imposed upon us by what 
appears to be a definite characteristic of our modes of appre- 
hension. We appear to be unable to grasp some of the revela- 
tions of a whole, without breaking it up, as it were atomisti- 
cally, and then proceeding to reconstruct the whole by a 
synthetic process which is confined to a continual approach 
to the whole along the path of an endless regress, which by 
its very nature, is such that the whole is never actually reached 
within the process, although a scrutiny of the laws of the 
regress may enable us to obtain a knowledge of the relations 
of the whole.’’ + 

Now it is clear that there is nothing to limit these con- 
ceptual processes or methods in either direction. Space as 

* Hobson, The Domain of Natural Science, p. 121. 


226 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


conceived by the mathematician is a continuum which can 
be divided or extended infinitely. 

But is the physical world finite or infinite? That, as we 
have seen, is another question. We must now consider the 
information which physical science offers. 

For a very long period this problem was treated dialec- 
tically, that is, in the light of a priori concepts. And since 
space was usually thought of as a receptacle in which matter 
existed and since mathematical concepts were not yet clearly 
analyzed, much confusion resulted. Kant may be said to 
represent a transition stage. He thinks of space and time 
as forms of the mind rather than as forms of reality; and 
he is interested in showing that we cannot take a realistic 
view without falling into contradiction. Thus he tries to 
prove both that the world is enclosed within spatial limits and 
that it is infinite in regard to space. We cannot in the small 
space we have at our disposal go into the details but an exami- 
nation of one of Kant’s arguments is desirable. He seeks to 
prove that the world is infinite by disproof of its contradic- 
tory, that the world is finite. If the world were finite, he 
argues, it would exist in an empty space without limits. We 
should therefore have not only a relation of things in space 
but also a relation of things to space. But such a relation 
would be a relation to no object and therefore it is nothing. 
Hence the world is not limited with regard to space, that is, 
it is infinite in extension. But this conclusion seems a bit of 
dialectic of the worst sort. Why must the physical world be 
infinite because it is not limited externally by space? Our 
consideration of space as a physical category has shown us 
that the characteristics of the world must be discovered in 
an empirical way. The world is either finite or infinite. 
Which is it? Have we as yet any way of deciding between 
the alternatives? 

There has been much discussion of the matter but, as yet, 
it 1s generally admitted that our data are insufficient. The 
pendulum seems to swing back and forth between the two 


THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECT OF THE WORLD 227 


positions. The relativists, on the whole, believe that physical 
space is Riemannian in type and that the universe is like a 
finite sphere of this kind warped by gravitational tensions. 
Many astronomers are loath to accept a finite universe but 
postulate some infinite system of stellar arrangements. I 
do not see that philosophy has any means of deciding between 
these theories. The movement of science will, alone, decide. 
But a few words in regard to basic concepts may be worth 
while. 

We must not think too pictorially in these matters. Even 
if, genetically, empty space meant that which does not offer 
resistance to movement, it does not mean that for science. 
Science simply recognizes that chemical matter is not homo- 
geneously distributed in the physical world. There are con- 
densed bodies and there is the vast region between these con- 
densed bodies. That there is something in these regions more 
primitive, perhaps, than chemical matter is suspected at pres- 
ent, something which may be called energy or unorganized 
matter. The point is that we should not feed ourselves with 
such terms as empty space or the void. These are negative 
terms, not positive terms. It is probable that the physical 
world is dynamically continuous in some fashion. Again, 
latest physical speculations should warn us against thinking 
of the universe like a ball or an orange in relation to which 
we have the habit of reaching or stepping beyond. In this 
regard, perhaps, we are somewhat in the position of the con- 
temporaries of Columbus who worried about the danger con- 
fronting the inhabitants of the antipodes of falling off the 
earth. We must develop a trained imagination in these mat- 
ters and remember that the whole may not be exactly lke the 
part. 

We have not said anything about physical divisibility. 
Here again, we are in the realm of physics rather than of 
pure mathematics. There are, undoubtedly, units in nature 
corresponding to the atoms of modern science and to 
the electrons. We must not picture these too much in terms 


228 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


of molar bodies with apparently hard and fast outlines. That 
was the mistake of the older mechanical view with its billiard- 
ball atoms. In some sense the physical world is both differ- 
entiated, or discrete, and a dynamic continuum. It seems 
quite clear to me that the distinction between mathematical 
space and physical space will assist our thinking in these 
matters. Some questions bearing upon this point will arise 
as we later consider organic and chemical integration. 

Implications for Philosophy.—The influence of the Car- 
tesian view has been so pervasive that it will be worth our 
while to point out just what the implications of our own real- 
istic view are. In the first place, we do not begin with an a 
priors idea of a material substance. We simply say that there 
is a physical world and then try to find out what is known 
about it. To assert that the essence of material substance is 
extension meant for the rationalist that the mind grasped na- 
ture in a sort of transparent way in this concept. We, on the 
contrary, believe that the physical world has a spatial form or 
characteristics but that it has many other characteristics, all 
of which must be duly discovered by investigation. Spatial 
form does not exhaust a material object any more than mass 
exhausts 1t. My body has a spatial form and a definite mass, 
and so does this desk; but that does not mean that my or- 
ganism has only the properties of the desk. Thus our realism 
has a more empirical tinge. We must find out by hard work 
just what kind of a physical world we have in all its differen- 
tiations and levels. 

In the second place, we do not begin with the assumption 
that there are two kinds of substances, as Descartes did. That 
thinking goes on in the world is quite undeniable since we all 
think. But we will not begin with antithetical essences of 
substances. It may easily be that an extended thing is also 
a thinking thing. Why not? Here, again, we are confronted 
by a question which must be answered empirically by investi- 
gation. Can the operations of thinking and the individual’s 
stream of experiencing be assigned to the organism? It is 


THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECT OF THE WORLD 229 


this question which will become crucial when we seek to inte- 
grate the results of biology and psychology. It is the mind- 
body problem as it is presenting itself to-day. The point is, 
that we have no right dialectically to begin with a dualism ; 
and that the acceptance of space as a physical category does 
not involve it. Let us first of all find out what we can know 
about the physical world in its various parts and levels. 

Some Remarks upon Number and Measurement.—The de- 
velopment of the idea of number rested upon our human 
capacity to perceive and think of objects. So long as we 
single out some complex in our field of attention and treat 
it as a practical unit, we have one thing to deal with. But 
we can also distinguish instances of two, three or more things. 
This capacity to distinguish things which somehow act in a 
unified way and to which we can return again and again is 
quite basic for our thought of the world. It is clear that na- 
ture meets the human mind half-way and that the idea of 
number reflects the extensity and diversity of our environ- 
ment. Thus I can distinguish and count nine books on my 
desk at the present moment. 

Let us now very briefly examine such ideas as unity, plu- 
rality, an aggregate, order and correspondence which are 
characteristic of this first general survey of objects. It is 
probably to the act of attention that we must appeal for the 
explanation of the sense of unity. Attention is, however, 
assisted by the behavior and character of the object attended 
to. Certain objects tend quickly to stand out from their 
background and attract attention. Into the details of this 
problem we cannot here enter for lack of time. It is desirable 
to note, however, that any kind of an object arouses this 
sense of unity. It is a sort of formal feature common to all 
objects. 

A plurality of objects is called an aggregate. An aggregate 
is a whole which is made up of units. The component ob- — 
jects may differ widely in every physical feature such as — 
size and weight and color and yet be equally units of the 


230 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


aggregate. Their unit-character is thus purely formal or 
logical. 

An aggregate becomes an ordered aggregate as soon as the 
idea of order is introduced. Counting is a usual method of 
introducing order. We then have first, second, third, etc.; 
and this way of ranking objects in an aggregate gives us 
the ordinal numbers. ~ But other ways of ordering the units 
are often used. They may be ranked by size or weight. When 
we have in mind the degree of plurality of an aggregate, we 
have the cardinal numbers. Thus one aggregate is three and 
another four. And we can also take a part or a section of 
an aggregate and correlate with it a certain number to ex- 
press its plurality. 

Another operation which is important is that of correspon- 
dence. Two aggregates are thought of as corresponding when 
a unit in one is related by our thought to a unit in the other 
and so on. Tallying is a good practical instance of corre- 
spondence. A notch stands for one thing in another aggre- 
gate. 

Arithmetic is the science which results from the logical 
development of this formal way of thinking objects. Opera- 
tions, such as addition and abstraction, and symbols, such as 
the Arabic notation, have increased the reach of arithmetic. 
But, at present, we are more concerned with the physical 
sciences because we are stressing certain cosmological ques- 
tions. It is, then, through the application of arithmetic and 
mathematics generally to the operations of measurement that 
the exact sciences take on their familiar mathematical form. 
What, then is measurement? 

Measurement is the technical operation of determining 
any quantitative characteristic of an object in terms of an 
appropriate unit. The result is always a ratio and consists 
of two elements, the numerical part and the name of the unit. 
_ It is because there is this numerical part that mathematics 
is an essential ingredient of the exact sciences. It is really 
quite necessary to appreciate the kind of knowledge thus 


THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECT OF THE WORLD 231 


acquired if there is to be an adequate comprehension of the 
nature of scientific knowledge. It is clearly knowledge about 
this desk to know that it is five feet long and four feet wide; 
and yet it is not the intuitional sort of knowledge which per- 
ception at first leads us to expect, for how long is a foot or a 
yard? Do we intuit the absolute size of our unit in terms of 
which we give the size of measured objects? 

In physies we have the fundamental units and the derived 
units. Length, mass and time are the fundamental units and 
such things as area, volume, force, velocity are derived units. 
The laws of the exact sciences are expressed as relations be- 
tween quantities achieved in this manner. It is this kind of 
knowledge in which operations of a technical sort are guided 
by sense-data and interpreted by the mind that much of sci- 
ence achieves. So far as possible, science attempts to make 
physical things speak in terms of one another wherever quanti- 
tative characteristics can be discovered. And ours is clearly 
a numerable and quantitative world. The philosophical sig- 
nificance of this discovery will become clearer as we proceed. 


REFERENCES 


Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, chap. 7. 

JAMES, Principles of Psychology, vol. 2. 

Macu, Space and Geometry. 

RUSSELL, Principles of Mathematics, vol. 1; and The A, B, @ of 
Relativity. 

SELLARS, Evolutionary Naturalism, chap. 5. 

Hosson, The Domain of Natural Science. 


CHAPTER XVII 
TIME, CHANGE AND CONSERVATION 


Ours Not an Inert, or Static, World.—That ours is a world 
in which changes are always occurring seems to common 
sense the most obvious and undeniable of facts. Each indi- 
vidual is born, grows, in the usual course of events, to man- 
hood or womanhood, plays a brief part on the world’s stage, 
and dies. Everywhere is change, change of position, growth, 
decay, alteration of color, size, structure, behavior. The 
Ancients recognized this feature of earthly things, but be- 
lieved that the heavens at least were changeless. But the 
penetrative growth of knowledge has disclosed change every- 
where. Worlds grow old and lose their radiant energy. No- 
where can we find that which is protected from the teeth 
of time. 

On the other hand, our world is not a mere flux, a mere 
welter of alteration. Hven in change there is order. There 
are laws of change, recurrence of pattern, conservation of 
matter and energy. There is continuance as well as occur- 
rence; things as well as events. 

The recognition of the presence of both of these traits in 
the world has led to much puzzling on the part of the human 
mind. Strange as it may seem at first, the tendency has been 
to reject one of them for the sake of the other. Very early 
in the history of philosophy, there arose a division of opinion 
between those thinkers who held nature to be a process and 
those who maintained that change is illusory. We may speak 
of the first group as temporalists. The other group may be 
called the Eleatics after an ancient school of thinkers which 

232 


TIME, CHANGE AND CONSERVATION 233 


denied the reality of change. This controversy has lasted 
until our own day. 

Although we shall be examining this question from the 
point of view of physical realism, it may not be amiss to 
point out that the older school of spiritualists, called the 
absolutists, denied the reality of change. Change is appear- 
ance. It is a self-contradictory category. In the Absolute, 
which transcends and includes the finite beings which we are, 
there is neither desire nor shadow of turning. We shall 
have comparatively little to say of this criticism of time be- 
cause we have not the space at our disposal to go into the 
arguments upon which it is based. We must content our- 
selves with pointing out that a very large number of philoso- 
phers—especially those trained in mathematics—are uncon- 
vineed of the cogency of these arguments against time and 
that many spiritualists—especially those of the pluralistic or 
personalistic persuasion—are temporalists. In fact, tempor- 
alism has been waxing in influence of late. Moreover, we 
are primarily concerned at present with the categories of 
science of which time is surely a most important one. 

It will be our purpose in the present chapter to examine 
_ those large, general questions which are inseparable from 
time as a concept. There are many of them, and tremen- 
dously fascinating ones. To get a clear grasp of principles 
at this point will save us much bewilderment later. We 
cannot avoid being somewhat technical in places, but we shall 
limit our technicalities as much as possible. We shall begin 
with an examination of time as an experience and proceed 
as quickly as we are able to an examination of time as a 
category, or basie concept, of our knowledge of events. 

Perhaps the formulation of a few questions might furnish 
a stimulating introduction to what follows. They might 
show how unavoidable the enquiry into the nature of time is. 
The following may serve this purpose: Is a thing which 
changes still the same thing? How are events related to 
things? Is time a receptacle in which events occur? Or is 


' 234 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


time but another word for the relations and overlapping of 
events? Did the physical universe have a beginning in time? 
Or is time meaningless apart from a world of events? 

The Genesis of our Ideas of Time.—It will be advisable to 
follow the same method we used in our study of space. All 
concepts are based upon experiences. We pass from the 
vague and implicit to the defined and explicit. Our idea of 
time is complex, and it is necessary to distinguish the vari- 
ous meanings of time as well as to acknowledge the common 
elements. We can trace the clarification of time as a category 
as we pass successively from perception to conception and 
thence from mathematical distinctions to time as a category 
of scientific knowledge. It is a well known fact that the ad- 
vance of science has led to the interweaving of time and space 
in our knowledge of events. In the terminology of modern 
thought, nature is a four-dimensional continuum with time 
as the fourth dimension. What is the basis for all this in our 
experience? Let us begin with a study of the distinctions 
characteristic of our perceptual experience. 

The elementary experience which is at the foundation of 
what we roughly call time is the sense of ordered change. 
When we listen to a factory whistle, we note its rise and fall, 
its variation in intensity, its increase or decrease in shrillness. 
Such awareness of ordered change in ourselves and our sur- 
roundings is a constant experience. In their search for the 
basic experience out of which temporal distinctions have 
developed, psychologists have been led to stress what is called 
the ‘‘specious present.’’ In the specious present we have a 
complex of presentations which are at once simultaneous and 
successive, that is, we have a time-perspective. There is that 
which occupies the focus of attention, that which is retreat- 
ing or dying out, and that which is coming. Our experience 
is a directed stream or process. 

It is important that we get clearly in mind this basic 
temporal experience in order that we may contrast it with the 
more abstract time of conception which neglects the concrete 


TIME, CHANGE AND CONSERVATION 235 


filling of personal time. Perhaps we ean best do this by the 
aid of a quotation from James: ‘‘In short, the practically 
ecognized present is no knife-edge but a saddle-back, with a 
certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from 
which we look in two directions into time. The unit of com- 
position of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow 
and a stern, as it were—a rearward and a forward-looking 
end. It is only as parts of this duration-block that the rela- 
tion of succession of one end to the other is perceived ... 
The experience is from the outset a synthetic datum, not a 
simple one; and to sensible perception its members are in- 
separable, although attention looking back may easily decom- 
pose the experience, and distinguish its beginning from its 
end.’’+ Pereeptual experience knows nothing of mathemati- 
eal instants. 

Personal time is raised to a higher level by the addition of 
memory and expectation. The stability and scope of our 
time-meanings—the past, the present and the future—depend 
upon the supplementation of the specious present by a wider 
range of events which continues it in both directions. We 
are thus lifted into a wider temporal perspective. The mind 
- outstrips what can be given in perception proper and can 
swing from a remote past to the possible future through an 
ordered series of events. Consciousness is not in time but 
temporal. In other words, time becomes ever more clearly 
the form of our experience and of our thought. 

Perceptual time with its personal perspective and its 
‘‘now’’ corresponding to the bodily ‘‘here’’ of perceptual 
space shades genetically into common or socially standardized 
time. We should note the gradual infusion of a spatial 
framework and of a method of measuring duration or time- 
lapse. Yet we must not jump to the conclusion that social 
intercourse is alone responsible for these additions. The need 
is there from the beginning. Felt estimations of duration 
are too dependent upon subjective or bodily factors, such as 

4 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 609. 


236 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


hope, fear, hunger, to be trustworthy. A wider perspective 
and more objective foundation is required. And men help 
each other to secure this more adequate perspective. The 
group finds it natural to resort to orderly changes in per- 
ceived objects, the movement of the sun across the heavens, 
the slow burning of the candle, the sifting of the sand 
through the hour-glass. It is in the attempt to get beyond 
the purely personal basis of time-estimation that resort is 
had to changes which have a temporal order and harmonize 
with the sense of duration. 

Thus time gradually got its cues and standards from the 
external world. The result was a commonly accepted chron- 
ology. Between this measured duration and felt duration 
there is often a conflict. ‘‘Shakespeare tells us that time 
travels ‘in divers paces with divers persons’; Newton tells 
us that time moves at a constant rate. Shakespeare’s time 
is evidently subjective time, and Newton’s objective time.’’ ? 
So by degrees time becomes a measured duration of events. 
In so becoming, it arrives at the level where it is a category 
of physical science. As nature is a realm of events which 
are simultaneous, successive and overlapping, time deals with 
ordered and precise knowledge of this undeniable character- 
istic of nature. It takes its place beside space as an irre- 
ducible element in our knowledge of nature. 

Common time easily links itself with mathematical space 
to become mathematical time, infinitely divisible into mo- 
ments and infinite in extent. Let us observe how this trans- 
formation occurs. The old English thinker, Thomas Hobbes, 
expressed the transfer so clearly and yet so naively that I 
eannot do better than quote his words: ‘‘As a body leaves a 
phantasm of its magnitude in the mind, so also a moved body 
leaves a phantasm of its motion, namely, an idea of that body 
passing out of one space into another by continual succession. 
And this idea, or phantasm,’is that which I eall time. And 
yet when I say that time is a phantasm of motion, I do not 

1Stout, Manual of Psychology, p. 498. 


TIME, CHANGE AND CONSERVATION 237 


say this is sufficient to define it by; for this word time com- 
prehends the notion of a body inasmuch as it is first here and 
then there. Wherefore a complete definition of time is such 
as this, time is the phantasm of before and after in motion.”’ 
Movements are best represented symbolically by a line with 
a direction —————; in such a symbol there is contained 
the idea of an order as well as a quantity. The line sym- 
bolizes both duration and succession. Thus a portion of linear 
space, so interpreted, measures duration, while positions on it, 
apprehended together and yet thought as successive, repre- 
sent temporal order. 

As in the case of mathematical space, we must avoid two 
extremes. Personal time is inseparable from the concrete 
filling of experience. Order and duration are characteristics 
of the stream of our life. To be so dominated by the abstract 
form of time as to forget this is one mistake. We may then 
seek to find moments of a mathematical sort in our experience 
or underlying it; whereas we can only find events or changes. 
The other extreme is to forget that objective time grows up 
with measurement and to make it a mere construction without 
objective significance. Mathematical time must not be reified 
~ any more than mathematical space. We must not think of an 
absolute external time out there which events occupy in 
some mysterious fashion. There is no such empty, infinite, 
homogeneous receptacle. On the other hand, events have a 
natural order and a measurable duration. 

Time as a Category of Scientific Knowledge—wWe can 
now push forward to the investigation of the significance of 
time as a category. Upon what characteristic of nature does 
it bear? What is the nature of the knowledge it mediates? 
We shall again see that knowledge is a gradual comprehension 
of the form of nature. It is only by a great effort and with 
the development of a subtle technique that human thought 
grasps comparative information about events. 

Nature is a realm of events or changes as well as a realm 
of things which have magnitude and are in the order of side- 


238 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


by-sideness. Our knowledge is in both cases directed to an 
objective realm and reflects the characteristics of that realm. 
And in both cases, measurement is the operation which makes 
possible the refinement of this knowledge. What kind of 
knowledge can this measurement give us as regards the tem- 
poral characteristic of nature? 

The general character of temporal measurement is so well 
known that we need not linger upon it. Some process of a 
recurrent and uniform sort is taken as the measuring rod 
and other processes are referred to some unit of it. If two 
processes begin and end together, they are said to occupy the 
same time. We should speak of them as having the same 
duration if we wish to avoid misleading ideas. Let us take 
an example to make this correspondence clearer. Suppose 
that we wish to know how long a certain chemical process 
takes to occur. We note the positions on the hands of a 
clock at the moment the chemicals are put together and 
again when the reaction ceases or comes to an equilibrium. 
This method means that we seek to establish a quantitative 
correspondence. This correspondence, which is at the basis 
of the scientific measurement of the temporal characteristic 
of nature, is for temporal knowledge what superposition of 
things is for spatial knowledge. In both cases, we obtain 
knowledge in terms of ratios and not in terms of intuitions 
of absolute dimensions. Science selects some uniform process 
as a standard, like the rotation of the earth, and adheres to 
it so long as it is convinced that this process is uniform. 
The delicacy of such determinations is remarkable. ‘‘Thus 
astronomers have come to the conclusion that the earth as a 
clock is losing at the rate of 8.3 seconds per century and they 
have given up the earth as their time-keeper and substituted 
for the sidereal time ¢ a certain function T = ¢ (t), slightly 
differing from t, as their new kinetic time.’’! 

But while scientific time concerns itself with the measure. 
ment of various processes in nature by reference to a stand- 

+Silberstein, The Theory of Relativity, ch. 1. 


TIME, CHANGE AND CONSERVATION 239 


ard process, it retains the idea of order which is characteristic 
of personal time. And it is this order which differentiates 
it from space. We ean conceive of the physical world as 
inert and changeless, and for such a world time would have 
no meaning. But the actual physical world is different. It 
is dynamic and replete with change. How fundamental these 
changes are, and how they are related to the conservation 
side of nature is one of the deepest of problems. Life and 
mind are instances of this penetrative advent of change. 
Something describable as creative synthesis appears to be a 
characteristic of our world under favorable conditions. 

Science relates events cognitively by means of a chronology. 
It is knowledge about nature that an eclipse occurred in the 
sixth century B. C. It is also knowledge that Columbus dis- 
covered America in 1492. Such knowledge is obviously about 
what no longer exists but it is knowledge, nevertheless, a fact 
which shows that scientific knowledge is not an apprehension 
but a valid judgment. Is not knowledge about the past a 
knowing which relates events cognitively in the order in which 
they occurred? Thus the content of knowledge corresponds to 
the relations in which events are born. But what ceases in 
nature is often retained in the mind or inferred. The situa- 
tion can be indicated as follows: 


Nature eeeeeceeeHKE — Past events, Present events 
Knowledge PPPPPPPP’?P’P’ FFFF— Past, Present, Future 


In nature we have only the present processes of change or 
events which may overlap in various ways. These are to be 
contrasted with past events or processes whose course has 
been run and whose effects alone may remain, as is exemplified 
in geology and archeology. In knowledge, past events are 
cognitwely retained and related to present and possible future 
events. The order of arrangement in knowledge corresponds 
to the order of occurrence in nature. 

Change, or Events, the Characteristic of Nature Known 
in Terms of Time.—But what is in the temporal order in 


240 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


nature? The answer we have already clearly suggested is 
change, events or processes, essentially synonymous terms. 
It is these events or processes which science studies and tries 
to get information about. Events are local and may be 
exactly simultaneous with other events, or overlap them, or 
occur within them, ete. Here, again, we may say that physics 
dictates to applied mathematics rather than the reverse. 
Science seeks to measure events and determine their laws or 
temporal structure. We must relinquish a receptacle view 
of time just as we must relinquish a receptacle view of space. 

We have already pointed out that it is only man with his 
memory who connects the past with the present in a scheme 
analogous to the specious present; that is, he plots events in 
a diagram in which coexistence is combined with the order 
of succession. Thus the scientist furnishes us with knowledge 
about a moving body by describing the path traversed and 
giving the time-rate of the motion. But the moving body 
does not carry its path with it. Only man with his memory is 
able to connect a past position with a later position; the 
moving body has no such coordinating capacity. Thus we 
see that knowledge about motion is not the same as the actual 
motion and yet is true knowledge. We must say, then, that 
in nature there are local events which have a duration, and 
that these durations include or exclude one another for our 
measurement and temporal localization. Thus they possess 
relations which are grasped by man and plotted in his thought 
in terms of past, present and future and a temporal frame of 
reference. The present of nature is the processes which are 
occurring. Instead of nature being in time, time, that is, 
events or changes, 1s 1n nature. We must think nature in 
four dimensions and thus bring physical space and physical 
time together. Nature is a stereometrical, more or less or- 
ganic, domain differentiated into parts in which processes or 
events of different types are constantly occurring. 

Time and the Cosmos.—The human mind has always been 
fascinated by the idea of absolute beginnings and absolute 


TIME, CHANGE AND CONSERVATION 241 


endings. Organic life first attracted attention, and this, of 
course, is subject to origin and death. It is not surprising 
that this way of approach was applied to the earth and the 
heavens. They, also, must have had a beginning and will 
have an ending. Many of these cosmogonies have come down 
to us and are extremely interesting because they show how 
the human mind works and what material it ordinarily has 
to work with. None of them really begins with an absolute 
beginning, so to speak. There is an aboriginal chaos which 
is then ordered by a fiat of a god, or there is a world-egg, or 
the earth and sky are themselves deities. Creation myths are 
of many forms, but in every case the material with which the 
human mind has worked is concrete. It has thought in terms 
of growth and procreation and magical power. It is clear 
that the human mind has never thought in terms of absolute 
beginnings. There was always something to begin with. And 
our analysis of time as an order of events shows that the 
human mind has been right. Without events there is no 
time. Recall our refusal to identify abstract, empty, homo- 
geneous mathematical time with physical time. This refusal 
was quite of a piece with the denial that mathematical space 

is identical with physical space. Physical space and time are 
characteristics of the physical world. 

While developed religions have usually tried to think the 
world as a creation of a spiritual power and so subject to it, 
science has simply attempted to understand the spatial and 
temporal order of the world. Science knows nothing of 
absolute origins. It tries to explain one state of the solar 
system, for instance, by reference to preceding conditions and 
the laws of physical change. And the solar system is a very 
small part of the sidereal universe. It is held, for example 
that stars pass through certain changes, that, from the stand- 
point of energy-content they reach a maximum and then grow 
old and die. Our own sun is a yellow dwarf which will some 
time become dull red and, perhaps, even cold and dark. 
Just as, on this earth, human beings are to be found in all 


242 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


stages of development from infancy to old age, so it is among 
the denizens of space. The universe is not a linear process 
but a complex, spatio-temporal one. Cosmical theories are as 
yet very speculative because astro-physics is not very far 
advanced. Very little is known for certain of conditions 
within nebulas. There are many different kinds of nebulas, 
recent evidence has shown that some may be millions of light- 
years away and outside our own sidereal system. The uni- 
verse is an empirical expanse which must be studied. 

Is there any good reason to hold that the physical universe 
is a contingent, dependent kind of being, that it does not, as 
it were, exist by itself and in its own right? Is there any 
good reason to assume a First Cause beyond the universe 
which produced it and even sustains it? Many have made 
this assumption, but there seems to be nothing back of it but 
the bias in favor of a creation, a bias which rests upon a 
primitive view of the world. According to our own analysis 
of time—an analysis which is widely held to-day—an infinite 
regress 1s quite thinkable. Every event had its antecedent. 
We have here an order in terms of which we think the events 
which occur in the universe. Why should we want a first 
event? Of course if we try to imagine these things rather 
than to think them our imagination soon gets tired. I con- 
clude that there is no good reason to think of the physical 
universe as contingent, or dependent, being as the scholastics 
and theologians have judged it to be. The ultimate puzzle is 
not a temporal one but just the fact that, anything is. But 
since we do have experiences and do know a world, we are 
compelled to acknowledge this fact of existence. It is the 
task of the understanding to grasp the characteristics of what 
is; and, in default of a guaranteed revelation, that is, a revela- 
tion which satisfies reason of its authenticity, the best we 
can do is to investigate the universe by means of science and 
philosophy. 

The companion problem, Is the physical universe eternal? 
can be dismissed in a few words since it is on all fours with 


TIME, CHANGE AND CONSERVATION 243 


the first. The empirical data are entirely in favor of con- 
servation as a characteristic of the energy-content of reality. 
Some philosophers have argued that conservation is an a 
prior. principle bound up with the very idea of causality. 
This is more than doubtful. Conservation is a discovery 
erected into a principle. It is, however, speculatively very 
attractive. It suggests that reality does not use itself up 
but is eternally fresh. It is upon this basic characteristic 
of reality that our idea of eternity should be grounded. 
Mathematically, eternity can be symbolized by the number- 
series which is theoretically inexhaustible. 

Concluding Remarks.—In the introductory section of this 
chapter, we formulated a few typical questions as a method 
of showing the reality and interest of the problems connected 
with time. Some of these questions we have already an- 
swered. Thus we have tried to prove that time is not a 
receptacle but an order of events or changes, and that it is 
therefore rather meaningless to ask whether the physical 
universe had a beginning in time. But there are other 
questions which remain about which we should say a few 
words. 

Is a thing which changes still the same thing? A little 
reflection shows us, I think, that we have here largely the 
equivocalness of the term, same. A thing cannot change and 
not be different in this feature or that, in its size, color, shape, 
chemical constitution, properties. But while it is different 
in some of its characteristics, it is yet the same thing. What 
do we mean by same in the second case? Surely that we 
believe that there is a continuity of substance and history 
which justifies a common reference. It is the same object 
of our thought and the same persistent thing which has 
changed. In logical terms, we speak of the same subject of 
judgment to which we at different times for sufficient reason 
ean rightly assign contradictory attributes. Socrates is bald, 
but the same Socrates was at one time not bald. We conclude 
that a thing permits change, and that there is therefore no 


244 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


contradiction in a thing which changes and is yet the same 
thing. 

How are events related to things? Events seem to be 
changes in things, and the relation is an intrinsic one. It 
refers to some alteration in constitution and properties of the 
thing so that it is different from what it was. Sometimes 
the chief conditions of this alteration are external to the 
thing, sometimes internal. Involuntary attention in animals 
or change of shape due to pressure would be instances of the 
first, while voluntary attention and locomotion would be in- 
stances of the second. We shall have something more to say 
of this difference when we come to consider life and mind. 

Modern science has been becoming much more philosophieal 
and analytic in its outlook upon all these matters. Thus it 
is well known that the relativity theory asserts that events 
and time are always local. The old, absolute time has been 
rejected. On the face of it, it is obvious that this change of 
outlook is in line with the analysis which philosophy offers. 

In an introductory text we cannot go into the question of 
relativity to the extent that the subject deserves. A survey 
like this ean only discuss the main principles of cosmology, 
and the subjects are so numerous that much that is important 
must be omitted. The hope that the writer has is that a 
foundation for further investigation will be achieved and 
that along with it a genuine interest will be aroused that will 
lead the student into advanced work. 

We have seen that space and time are two basic kinds of 
order which are studied in their detailed and specific patterns 
by science in terms of the results of measurement. It has 
been found that the measurement of space, when systems in 
motion with respect to each other are concerned, requires 
a reference to time. Hence the physicist speaks of the space- 
time manifold or continuum. To locate an event accurately 
requires four dimensions, three spatial and one temporal. 

It was not out of the pressure of our ordinary experience 
that the theories of relativity arose but out of conflicts and 


TIME, CHANGE AND CONSERVATION 245 


difficulties in physics. Perhaps the difficulties in the older 
theories came to the front most clearly in the Michelson- 
Morley experiment. The purpose of this experiment was to 
compare the times taken by a beam of light in passing from 
one point to another and back again in two eases; in the one, 
the direction was that of the earth’s motion in its orbit, in the 
other, the direction was perpendicular to the first. The ex- 
perimenters expected a decided difference and found none. 
It was to account for this fact that Einstein analyzed the 
general assumptions underlying classical mechanics. | 
The controversy is still on in physics. On the whole, the 
relativity theory in both its special and its general form 
seems assured of some measure of acceptance. Whether it 
will be modified by other discoveries in electro-magnetics is 
uncertain but possible. The field under discussion is very 
complex and technical. Deductions are made from mathe- 
matical formulas, and it is then the question whether obser- 
vations will verify them. It is admitted that the deductions 
drawn by Einstein have been verified in three cases, the bend- 
ing of light near the sun as noted in photographs taken dur- 
ing an eclipse, the orbit of Mercury, and the calculated masses 


~ and motions of electrons in their atomic orbits. 


The part played by light in measurements of the sort 
stressed in relativity should be noted. The constant velocity 
of light for all observers, no matter what the source of emis- 
sion of light or the motion of that source, is a basic assump- 
tion. It is then shown that events which seem simultaneous 
to one observer will not seem so to another observer in motion 
with reference to that observer. Thus for different measure- 
ment-systems the same events may be simultaneous and suc- 
cessive. The inference is that simultaneity and succession are 
not intrinsic, fixed, objective time-relations but rather datings 
relative to the measurer. At least, this is the inference in 
the special relativity theory. Each measurer works out his 
time order. 

It is obvious that there is nothing in this schema which 


246 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


conflicts with our own analysis. For us, real time is change, 
or the actual local events, and there is no good reason to 
assume an absolute time distinct from the events. And it is 
not surprising to find that any ordering of these events with 
reference to one another requires certain conditions of which 
the position and motion of the observer is an important one. 
Events do not carry their date with them. And yet are we 
not haunted all the time with a feeling that local events do 
happen in total disregard of light transmission and relative 
motions of estimators? They happen in an objective spatial 
system. Do we not feel that a cause-and-effect relation is 
always local and spatially mediated and that dating cannot 
make the effect the cause? I would suggest that we have 
here the old question of the distinction between knowledge 
and its objects on which critical realism puts so much stress. 
The form of knowledge is not necessarily simply equivalent 
to the object known. There are complications and standards 
in knowledge which do not exist for the object. Thus our 
physical knowledge is always in terms of ratios, but these 
ratios do not literally exist in the object. When I say that 
a table is five feet long, this statement is true, but it means 
that I can superpose a measure on the table five times. 

A similar question is raised by the special relativity theory 
in regard to the size of an object. It is shown that the 
same object is estimated differently when it is at rest with 
regard to the observer and when it is moving with approxi- 
mately the speed of light. Has it, then, a real length? Why 
not? We must not confuse the object with our knowledge 
of it. Our knowledge has conditions which we must know 
enough about to take into account. In this case, the question 
would seem to be under which conditions do we have more 
adequate knowledge of the real size of the object. I am in- 
clined to stress the situation in which we are in one motion 
system with the object and can actually superpose a standard 
on it. But even here we have only a ratio. 

The first writings of Einstein dealt with the special rela- 


TIME, CHANGE AND CONSERVATION 247 


tivity theory, and the philosophy in terms of which he was 
inclined to interpret it was phenomenalistic, almost Kantian. 
Many philosophers and even scientists like Eddington have 
followed this lead and regard relativity as a movement in 
favor of idealism. The general relativity theory is more 
realistic in its trend. The philosophical controversy is not 
over, but second thought is bringing out the realistic implica- 
tions of relativity. It is a theory of measurement primarily. 
And the main point is that it tries to understand the complex 
nature and conditions of measurement in cases of velocities of 
a high order. 


REFERENCES 


BERGSON, Time and Free Will. 

EINSTEIN, The Meaning of Relativity. 

SELLARS, Evolutionary Naturalism, chap. 6. 

Stout, Manual of Psychology, bk. 4, chap. 6. 

Taytor, Elements of Metaphysics, bk. 3, chap. 4. 
WHITEHEAD, Concept of Nature. 

Article on ‘‘Time’’ in the Ency. of Religion and Ethics. 


CHAPTER XVIII 
MATTER, ENERGY, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 


What is Matter?—In the chapter dealing with traditional, 
metaphysical monisms we examined the vague, general the- 
ories to which the belief in matter gave rise. We there 
decided that more analysis was needed before these theories 
could be well formulated. We wanted to know more about 
matter and energy and mind and consciousness and evolution. 
The assertions of materialism and the counter-assertions of 
spiritualism seemed too unanalytie to be satisfactory. Per- 
haps, we suggested, if we united our epistemology with an 
exploration of the cosmology being disclosed by scientific 
research we would get light on these ontological questions. 
In the two preceding chapters we have studied the spatial and 
temporal order which seems characteristic of nature; let us 
now examine the ‘filling’ of this order. 

We can distinguish two stages in the theory of matter, the 
speculative and the experimental. I do not mean that these 
two stages can, or should be, sharply opposed. But it is, 
nevertheless, true that for a long time thought did not have 
adequate data for reflection. It is only recently that physics 
has been enabled to penetrate to those minute particles and 
their arrangement which apparently form the stuff of matter. 

It is very well known that the Greeks tried to conceive a 
stuff in nature in terms of which they could account for the 
visible and tangible world of things. Such an attempt was 
epoch-making because it involved a complete break with 
mythology and its explanations in terms of spirits and gods. 
This new departure reached its climax in the Ancient World 
in the theory of Democritus, which was a form of mechanical 

248 


MATTER, ENERGY, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 249 


atomism. It will be remembered that we discussed his theory 
in some detail in connection with materialism. Aristotle, 
also, developed a very influential theory which was anti- 
mechanical and distinguished between form and matter, 
form being directive and matter a potential stuff. 

But it remained for experimental work in chemistry and 
in physics to give us information of a more penetrative 
sort than the keenest speculation without this method could 
achieve. John Dalton (1766-1844) connected atomism with 
chemistry and advanced the idea of combining numbers. It 
is now believed that there are some ninety odd chemical ele- 
ments of which the hydrogen atom is the simplest. These 
atoms are made of the same stuff, which is electrical in nature, 
and differ in complexity and in the properties which go with 
complexity. Not so very long ago, an atom was conceived 
literally as indivisible, a sort of intrinsically hard and solid 
ball of stuff. It is now thought of as an energy-system with 
a definite structure. The properties of things are regarded 
as functions of the combination and aggregation of these 
minute systems. It was the logical pressure of facts discovered 
in connection with radio-activity and with the use of the 
Crookes tube that led to this set of judgments about matter. 

The results of these investigations are most fascinating. 
The calculations in regard to the number of atoms in a cubic 
centimeter of gas are astonishing. Thus it is said that there 
are 54,000,000,000,000,000,000 atoms in such a volume. But 
while all this is interesting and important in its own place, 
the task of philosophy only begins where such concrete data 
leave off. How shall we conceive these electrons and protons? 
What is the reach of our knowledge in regard to them? 

One way of answering the question is to point out that we 
can know them only through data in our experience which is 
relevant to them. Science knows something of their size and 
Sphere of influence and knows that they affect one another 
and behave in relation to one another. Some of the numeri- 
cal laws of electronic mechanics are thus being worked out. 


250 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Another way of putting the same thing is to say that we know 
how electricity behaves and have reason to believe that it 
is partially granular in character. Let us bring to bear 
upon this knowledge the implications of epistemology. We 
decided that knowledge is not an intuition of the stuff of the 
object perceived or thought of. Rather are some characteris- 
tics of the object revealed by data. Comparative sizes, rela- 
tions, structure, behavior are just the characteristics which are 
fitted to reveal themselves and which science always brings out 
most clearly in its information. But the mechanism for a 
veritable glance at the very stuff of the world seems precluded. 
Patterns and quantities alone can be deciphered. Why? Be- 
cause we are in knowing external to the things known. 

It is quite possible that electrons are complex entities, 
although no indication of complexity has yet been discovered. 
It is possible that they are based on something more ultimate, 
like ether. Science does not yet know, nor does it even have 
data relevant to such an hypothesis. Let us frankly admit 
that philosophy can be of no assistance here. It is data alone 
that count. Once we are realists, we are modest in our atti- 
tude toward nature and its possibilities. What we as philoso- 
phers try to do is to think the situation through as regards 
the categories involved and their relation to our human 
knowledge. Once grant atoms and electrons as real entities, 
and problems enough arise in the philosophy of nature, as 
we shall see when we come to consider life and mind. 

We must not neglect to call attention to one implication of 
all this new knowledge. Matter is an evolved system rather 
than a primal material. It is electricity, perhaps, which is 
the primal material. But if matter is a name for a stage of 
physical evolution, may there not be higher stages of evolu- 
tion, more complex systems with new properties? A chemi- 
cal substance would be such a new level, and so might an 
organism be. This suggestion, which we shall try to follow 
out in the later chapters, gives a new perspective to ma- 
terialism. In some sense an integrated thing is more than, 


MATTER, ENERGY, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 251 


or other than, the elements into which it can be disintegrated. 
We have here the whole question of growth, of becoming, 
_ which the older materialism disregarded because it was domi- 
nated by atomic mechanicalism. This much in the way of 
suggestion. 

Ether we will leave to one side because so little is known 
of it and its functions. Some physicists even doubt whether 
it is a necessary hypothesis for physics. It has stood for 
continuity between things and for a mediwm in which energy 
processes occur as in the transmission of light and heat. If 
we pay attention to our ordinary views of location, it cer- 
tainly seems to follow from the data of science that atoms 
and molecules are mainly void. An atom is compared with 
a solar system, and we know how little of the volume of the 
solar system is taken up by the sun and the planets. How, 
then, are they bound together? Is each a center of electro- 
magnetic tension which needs no medium? Or is a medium 
of connection necessary? These are ultimate questions which 
science has not answered and which philosophy has no data 
of its own to answer by. 

Besides ether and electricity, one other term is basic in 
~ modern science and that is energy. What does science mean 
by energy, and what is its significance for the philosopher? 

Not many years ago a school of scientists arose which re- 
garded energy as the basic, unifying term for physics and 
chemistry. This position is called energism. It was a reac- 
tion against the older atomism. Certain thinkers went so far 
as to make energism a rival of materialism and to assert that 
consciousness and life are forms of energy. After our dis- 
cussion of materialism, we realize that such a blanket state- 
ment by itself is not very meaningful. Just what is energy, 
and how does one form of energy differ from another? Just 
what happens when chemical energy is transformed into vital 
energy, and vital energy into consciousness? There is a 
double problem here. What is energy in itself? And what is 
the nature of these transformations ? 


252 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Energy is ordinarily defined by the scientist as the capacity 
for doing work. This capacity is a measurable quantity when 
work is done and energy is actual. In contrast to work we . 
have equilibrium, and we speak of a system’s potentialities as 
potential energy. The term energy, then, seems to refer to a 
measurable character of processes of all sorts, mechanical, 
chemical, electrical, physiological, ete. The kind of energy 
is relative to the kind of process which is involved. In each 
case a different unit is taken, though these units are 
equatable. 

It seems best to keep energy as a term for work done, or 
capable of being done, by a system rather than as a term for 
a kind of stuff. It appears that work is done in quanta or 
discrete quantities. Just what changes correspond to these 
quanta it is hard to say. Mr. Russell speaks of them as atoms 
of action. The energies of a body are the atoms of action of 
which it is capable under certain conditions. This amount, 
and the character it takes, seems to reflect the organization 
of the body. Thus chemical energy is bound up with chemical 
organization, and it is quite plausible to assert that vital 
and nervous energy are likewise relative to organic and 
neural conditions. Energy as a category does not carry us 
beyond the categories characteristic of scientific knowledge, 
but it does emphasize the dynamic, temporal side of reality. 
To be energetic is a trait of reality at every level, and a trait 
which is measurable. This trait seems to rest on a tension, 
or strain, of which systems are capable and which, perhaps, 
is inseparable from their organization. 

The analogy between energy and effort, or will, is close 
enough to exercise a fascination upon thinkers. It will be 
remembered that both Schopenhauer and Wundt regarded 
the will as ultimate reality. May there not be a will-atom 
which is the reality back of these atoms of action of which 
physies speaks? Unfortunately for this analogy when taken 
literally, will is an expression of a complex system in action, 
it is the personality on its functional side. We must take 


MATTER, ENERGY, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 253 


evolution with its novelties seriously. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be this amount of truth about the theory, that, if 
physical reality were not energetic, will and the functional 
characteristic of personality could not have arisen. Yet mind 
and will as categories must not be taken out of their evolu- 
tionary setting and level. It is really quite surprising how 
ready many contemporary scientists are to make these identi- 
fications of mind and will with energy. Once the scientist 
permits himself to philosophize, he outdoes the philosopher 
in the boldness of his speculations. Perhaps that is because 
the scientist is always a specialist and is not so aware as the 
philosopher is of the demands of other fields. 

Reflection Begins with Things—We have argued all along 
that philosophy is an attempt to understand knowledge and 
its categories and to lead it back to the data of experience. 
Now in ancient times with Democritus and in modern times 
from Galileo onward, philosophy has been engaged with the 
problem usually stated as the question of the reality of 
primary and secondary qualities. In the historical section of 
the book we examined the treatment of this problem by Locke 
and Berkeley. It is now our opportunity to analyze the 
question afresh in the light of epistemology and scientific 
facts. Here realism naturally clashes with idealism. At 
this point, then, we enter upon the typically philosophical 
mode of handling the question of matter, substance and 
properties. 

Perceptual knowledge does not begin with any subtle, 
elementary stuff called matter or electricity but with things. 
It is quite true that, as we have seen, science is convinced 
that things are organizations and aggregates of something 
more elemental and basic but our knowledge does not begun 
that way. It is reflection and experimentation which dis- 
closes the structure and composition of things. Our adjust- 
ments and thoughts are ordinarily directed to complex things 
as such. Let us begin at this level of experience and work 

down with reflection. 


954 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


We shall, then, study the physical world as a perceived 
and known plurality of things which are objects of our 
attention and action. These things have magnitude, shape 
and properties, or qualities, of various kinds. At any one 
time, their relative position can be known, roughly by per- 
ception, and more precisely by measurement in relation to 
a frame of reference. Some of these things are inorganic 
and others are organic. We are concerned at present with 
the common characters of all such things. In the next chap- 
ter we shall examine living things as such to see wherein they 
differ from inorganic things. 

The Generic Traits of Thinghood.—It would seem that 
the individual does not have a clear perception of the external 
world until he has developed and used in a referring way 
certain characters such as color, smoothness, roughness, shape, 
size, odor, position. These characters are often called sensa- 
tions. They are also called sense-data. In perception, these 
characters are used to interpret the object of perception. 
In this sense, as we have constantly pointed out, perception 
is more than sensation. It is a higher level for which inter- 
pretation of objects is significant. 

The essential meanings, or traits, which qualify and sur- 
round the things of common-sense perception are as follows: 
(a) co-reality with ‘the percipient, (b) independence, (c) 
spatial magnitude and massiveness, (d) high degree of per- 
manence and (e) possession of dynamic capacities. All these 
characteristics must hold of an object before it is duly con- 
sidered a physical thing. 

We can take up the first two meanings together. It is 
clear that they are the meanings emphasized by all forms of 


F 


realism. I recognize myself to be just one among many ~ 


things using them and responding to them. The sense of my 
bodily self—and the self always retains something of this 
setting—grows up step by step with my sense of other 
things. Resistance, motor activity, the appreciation of atten- 
tion, the recognition of colored patterns, all these experiences 


MATTER, ENERGY, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 255 


enter into this perception of an external world of things. 
Thus I take a rabbit out of its hutch. It struggles for a while 
and then becomes quiet. I put it down and then watch it 
move around and eat clover. To catch it again, I walk towards 
this colored moving shape. Again I pick it up, and again 
it resists. Experiences such as these develop the sense of 
thinghood. The instinets of fear and love with their cor- 
related emotions deepen this sense of relations with other 
things. There is, also, the contrast with images which have 
not the vividness of perceptual experiences and which cannot 
be correlated in the same way with tactual experiences and 
with bodily attitudes. It is for the psychologist to investi- 
gate this sense of reality which finds expression in the judg- 
ment of existence. We are all aware, however, of the fact 
that we can control that complex called our body in a way 
that we cannot control complexes outside it. Independence 
of will and independence of awareness are closely correlated. 
It is undeniable, then, that we have all developed this per- 
ception of common, independent, co-real things. Our world 
falls into a flexible plurality of things which are spatially 
related and influence each other. These things are distin- 
guishable and numerable. 

That things have shape, size and solidity is admitted by all. 
Shape and size are determined by both visual and tactual 
data while the muscular sense adds the meaning of massive- 
ness and solidity to things. These characteristics are made 
more definite by measurement in terms of accepted units. 
Again, things are relatively permanent and do not fade away 
but are to be depended upon as existing through fairly long 
periods of time. They are continuants. Finally, our experi- 
ence with these things shows us that they have the capacity 
to affect us or other things in specific ways. Both everyday 
experience and science are engaged in finding out what 
things are good for, what they are composed of, how they 
will act in various combinations and under various circum- 
stances. We are interrogating and judging them by means of 


256 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


the data we can secure which seem to us relevant to, and 
significant for them. 

Primary versus Secondary Properties.—One of the stones 
of stumbling in the eyes of philosophers when they thought 
of physical realism was the technical difficulty they had when 
they tried to relate discriminated characters to objects. 
It seems absolutely -necessary to get clear ideas on this 
subject. 

Hume, it will be remembered, admitted the force of Berke- 
ley’s attack upon Locke. Strip the substantial object of all 
qualities given to sense and you are left with a mere 2, a 
nothing which it is not worth while to affirm or to deny. The 
difficulty is stated by Fullerton in his A System of Meta- 
physics: ‘‘And every modern Lockian, whether scientifie or 
non-scientific, sticks in the same difficulty. If the sounds and 
colors that I perceive do not exist in a world beyond us, but 
come into being in me when my body is acted upon in certain 
ways, why may not the same be true of the resistance, the 
extension, the motion, that I seem to perceive in things? Can 
I perceive bodies to be resisting, extended, or in motion, un- 
less they act upon my body? May not the resulting com- 
plex of sensations in this case, too, be wholly different from 
the external cause? Perhaps the real world is not, then, the 
extended and imaginable thing that I have thought it. Per- 
haps it is only a name for the unknown, a somebheng that I 
eannot more clearly define.’’ + 

In order to understand the problems in the philosophy of 
nature we must linger upon this crucial point. We have 
tried to show that perception and knowledge are complex acts, 
of the kind usually called mental, directed towards things 
as their objects. Though these acts have their external 
causal conditions, we must not substitute these causal condi- 
tions for the act of perception, or else we have the old formu- 
lation so well expressed in the above quotation. In short, 
perception is an interpretation of an object. We interpret 

1Fullerton, A System of Metaphysics, p. 147. 


MATTER, ENERGY, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 257 


objects by means of data, or predicates, which we are able 
to discriminate. 

But reflection has soon distinguished between what may 
be ealled sense-qualities, on the one hand, and such factors 
as pattern, quantity, relations, and powers, on the other 
hand. Color, sound, taste, odor are sense-qualities, while size, 
shape, position, behavior, structure, effects on other things, 
are not qualitative in the same sense. Spatial and temporal 
order and comparative estimations of things stand out in 
these factors. Here we have the experiential basis of the 
historical distinction between primary and secondary quali- 
ties. As a matter of fact, the so-called primary qualities are 
not qualities in the sensory sense. They are assertions of the 
structures, relations and quantities of things. 

It is a matter of historical fact that the English empirical 
movement never did justice to the element of form and order 
in experience. Kant tried to, but he was dominated by in- 
natist and rationalistie notions. It is only gradually of late 
that this subject is being better understood. The perception 
or discrimination of form or relations undoubtedly has an 
hereditary basis but it is strengthened by muscular activities 
and adjustments. We work out a pattern actively in percep- 
tion. 

It is, again, undeniable that science has found itself forced 
to work along these lines and to supplement them by exact 
measurement. The result has been the belief that color and 
sound are to be correlated with wave-movements in ether and 
air, while perceived form and relations can be correlated with 
the measured form and relations of things. But note the 
difference. In the first case, there is no hkeness or corre- 
spondence between the two terms, between that which is out 
there and that which is discriminated in perception; in the 
second case, there is a correspondence. Is there any reason 
for this divergence? It seems clear to me that the reason 
lies in the nature of the terms. 

In order to bring out more clearly the significance of this 


258 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


direction which intensive knowledge of the physical world 
always takes, let us distinguish between correspondence and 
qualitatwe hkeness. We shall say that the knowledge which 
physical science achieves and which is prefigured in percep- 
tion is based on the assumption of the correspondence of the 
order and quantity which we decipher in perception and in 
measurement with the order and quantity of things. We just 
find that things are ordered and quantitative and have a tex- 
ture or pattern. And we find no reason to doubt this belief 
which appears at the level of perception and is confirmed by 
additional knowledge. On the other hand, we do find reason 
to doubt that things are actually colored. Color seems to 
depend so much upon physiological factors. But, you may 
reply, is not the perception of order just as dependent upon 
physiological factors? Assuredly. But here is the difference. 
Color cannot be discovered to be a cause of its own perception. 
It is, as Berkeley saw, passive. It is essentially a qualitative 
event in the organism. Order, on the other hand, can be 
thought as an essential characteristic of the outer cause, 
@ characteristic which the cause must have to control the 
perception of order. In brief, there is no intellectual or 
logical difficulty in this case as there is for the so-called sec- 
ondary qualities or predicates. Taking its departure from 
perception, the human mind has made this discrimination 
and found it workable. 

There is nothing mysterious about the reproduction of 
order. The order of a landscape can be reproduced in the 
order of a sketch. The order of a person’s features can be 
reproduced in a photograph. Order is clearly the most repro- 
ducible of characteristics. And quantities can be known in 
terms of comparison or numerical ratios, as is actually done 
in science. We may say, then, that order and quantity ap- 
pear in experience. Or we can say that order and quantity 
as determined in experience correspond to the order and 
quantity of things. We have categories here back of which 
we cannot go. They are empirically forced upon us and, 


MATTER, ENERGY, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 259 


fortunately, can be developed by our thought in all sorts of 
logical and mathematical ways. It is because of them largely 
that we find our world to be rational. If there were no 
quantity and order about our world how different our think- 
ing—if it were still possible—would be! 

The order of our perceptual content is filled in with sense- 
qualities. We naturally assign them to objects. But 
reflection has suggested the view that these qualities are 
intra-organic and are causally conditioned by events in the 
object of perception. And, as we have seen, while there is 
very good reason to hold to a correspondence of order and 
quantity, there seems very little justification for the belief 
that these sense-qualities are like qualities somehow possessed 
by the thing perceived. 

Another point. Science always attempts to express things 
in their relations to one another rather than in relation to 
the knowing organism. The human organism is a constant 
condition of perception and of knowledge which, as constant, 
is eliminated. Even at the level of perception, we can see 
this tendency at work. We interpret things comparatively 
by means of their perceived sizes. Since two things are per- 
ceived by the same percipient, this relation can be neglected 
as the same for both things. Examine the content of the 
exact sciences from this point of view. It consists of such 
terms as mass, size, position, acceleration, energy. In every 
ease, these terms are delivered as ratios. The technique of 
such information has been briefly referred to in the section 
on measurement. The manipulation of things and the use of 
instruments are basic. Observation gives only readings in- 
terpretative of this technique. But this technique merely 
develops more perfectly what the percipient is trying to do 
in perception and perceptual judgment. It is the form, order, 
structure, behavior, relations of things which the human 
reason seeks to grasp. 

Does This View Split Nature in Two?—We are now at 
the very heart of some recent controversies in philosophy. 


260 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Idealists have always clung to Berkeley’s identification of 
things with ideas and to his denial that we can make a mean- 
ingful discrimination between primary and secondary char- 
acters. The neo-realist, also, did not have the courage to 
break with this tradition. Nor has the pragmatist with his 
experience-philosophy. And yet we must be just to both of 
these movements. They prepared the way for a better under- 
standing of the implications of the scientific view of the 
world. On the whole, the neo-realist did better work in 
mathematics and in an appreciation of the physical sciences, — 
while the pragmatist was more at home in the biological and ~ 
social fields. Neverthless, neither grappled very successfully 
with this age-old problem nor, as we shall see, with the mind- 
body problem. 

We have said that controversy is still rife over the problem 
we have just analyzed. An able English mathematician, 
A. N. Whitehead, has attempted to carry the experientialist 
tradition into physics and to hold that the data of sense or 
sense-objects, as he calls them, are literally parts of external 
nature. They are the phenomena which give the physicist 
his evidence for the existence and character of scientific ob- 
jects like atoms and electrons. He argues that the traditional 
position of the physicist to which we ourselves have adhered 
leads to a splitting of nature into two realms, one mental 
and subjective and the other physical, and that between these 
two a gulf exists. To overcome this gulf, he proposes that — 
the data of sense be regarded as literally a part of nature, 
something which the physicist must fit into his field of objects. 

On the face of it, this is a return to some form of naive 
realism. Unfortunately it is not clear (1) as fo exactly what 
he means by mind, and (2) what the exact relation is be- 
tween sense-objects and scientific objects. Yet the anti- 
Lockian tradition has welcomed with enthusiasm this effort 
on the part of a very able mathematician. We shall make 
a few comments here, while pointing out that his analysis 
of space and time is excellent and quite in harmony with our 


MATTER, ENERGY, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 261 


own view. We do this particularly because an idealist of 
standing like Hoernlé has weleomed Whitehead’s stand as 
a revolt against ‘‘matter.’’ } 

In the first place, it is perfectly true that the Cartesian 
dualism, which was continued by Locke, split nature in two. 
Mind was non-natural and outside of nature. But it 1s 
obvious that the point of attack upon this position should be 
an attack upon this conception of mind. Now it is unlikely 
that a physicist can tell us very much about mind and it is 
certainly true that it is not his province to deal with either 
mind or consciousness. His accepted task is to tell us about 
the general structures and relations characteristic of physi- 
eal things, particularly of inorganic things. In the second 
place, it is the mind that judges and which uses evidence 
which it regards as significant and revelatory about nature. 
Now all our position maintains is that the data of perception 
are intra-organiec and, like mind, bound up with the organism 
of the percipient and thinker. Being naturalists and not 
Cartesian dualists, we have regarded the organism and all 
its functions as a part of nature, continuous with the outside 
world which the physicist 1s studying. In this sense, both 

mind and the data of sense are a part of nature but I do not 
think that they come within the field of physics as a special 
science for all that. It is true that the physicist cannot in- 
vestigate his objects and processes without using perceptual 
data as a basis for description and inferential construction, 
but this simply means that he could not think and know his 
world without data which reveal it. It does not mean that 
these data are his objects or literally a part of them. White- 
head does not recognize sufficiently that knowledge involves 
transcendence. It is a transcendence, however, which in- 
volves natural existential conditions in the nature of the 
percipient organism and its relation to stimulating objects. 
But we must not confuse the conditions of knowledge with 
the nature of knowledge. 

2 Hoernlé, Matter, Life, Mind, and God, Lecture 2. 


262 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Critical realism does not involve any Cartesian ‘bifurcation 
of nature’? but a proper understanding of the locus of the act 
of knowledge and its nature. The locus is the organism. 
Hence we must protest against the bias of Hoernlé who con- 
cludes that we must choose between the outlook which accepts 
matter and ‘‘the new philosophy of Nature which proceeds on 
the principle that, from the first moment of perception to the 
latest hypotheses of scientific speculation, there is a continu- 
ously growing knowledge of Nature—a knowledge for which, 
as Whitehead says, ‘everything perceived is in Nature’ and 
the main task is to follow up ‘the coherence of things per- 
ceptively known.’ ”’ 

Surely this last conclusion is the very one which we have 
ourselves reached in our epistemology while accepting the 
external and psychological conditions of knowledge. The 
critical realist holds that we must begin with knowledge from 
the start and then extend and develop it. It is really a ques- 
tion of whether one is going to be a naive realist or a critical 
realist, whether the content of perception is existentially the 
object of perception. The content of perception is for us 


revelatory of the object but, if the question of existence is © 
raised, we must assign it to the complex act of perception. — 


How Shall We Think Things?—In the preceding sections 
we have tried to show why we accept physical realism and 
why we think the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities is justified. No student can work through a prob- 
lem of this sort without philosophizing. That is one of its 
values. Let us now examine the equally interesting question 
of the distinction between things and their properties. 


It will be recalled that Berkeley riddled Locke’s formula- — 


tion of this distinction. Locke had asserted that an unknow- 


able something had the primary qualities inhering in it. © 


Berkeley argued that it was not worth while to speak of un- 

knowables and that, moreover, this talk of inherence was a 

mere metaphor, that, in short, Locke was unwittingly feeding 
1 Whitehead’s phrase. 


reg [Sy 


MATTER, ENERGY, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 263 


himself with words. What does our own interpretation 
suggest as an intelligible way of thinking things? 

It has gradually been realized that the schema of a sub- 
stance possessing qualities, or of qualities inhering in a 
substance, is a reflection into the world of the form of judg- 
ment with its subject and its predicate. ‘‘This book is ob- 
long’’ is taken as the assignment of a quality to a thing. 
How, then, does the thing possess it? We cannot go into the 
history of the formulation of this problem from Aristotle’s 
time to Locke’s. It was concluded that the objective reality 
of properties meant that a substance somehow possessed 
them. 

Let us make a fresh start. The obvious way to think about 
things is in terms of our knowledge of them. That is all the 
assigning of predicates means. It means that we are thinking 
things, as we believe correctly, in terms of certain predicates. 
Things are clearly spatio-temporal systems which are quanti- 
tative, have definite structures, behave in certain describable 
ways, and affect other things in describable ways. To the 
knowledge falling under these headings, or categories, all 
relevant data are instrumental. Thus color helps in the dis- 
eovery of the kind of event which takes place in a physical 
thing when light strikes its surface. Measurement gives the 
mass of an object, or its comparative size. In short, we must 
think the thing in terms of our knowledge of tt. It is quite 
sufficient to state that a physical thing is extended, struc- 
tured, massive, the seat of events, the cause of changes in 
things around, ete. These are characteristics of the thing. 
But they should not be thought of in a scholastic way as 
qualities inhering in some mysterious way in a substance. 
We are here confronted by something ultimate for human 
thought. We know that things are extended, structured, 
complex, ete., because we know them that way. That is the 
way we must think things. But it does not help in the least 
to change this way of thinking things into a relation between 
a substance and its qualities. 


264 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Perhaps the situation can be made clearer by another ap- 
proach. We seem forced to assert that things have a nature 
or characteristics. But is this not another way of admitting 
that we do know things and that our knowledge falls into 
definite headings like those indicated above? In short, knowl- 
edge implies that there is an object to know and something 
to know about the object. Thus we always work within 
knowledge as an accepted fact. Things must have a nature 
or they could not be known. They are known; therefore, 
they must have a nature. But this nature we should think 
of as intrinsic to the thing and having no concern with our 
knowing as an act or claim. The thing is asit is. It is not 
a complex of substance and qualities. But we cannot 
intellectually get nearer to this thing than the elements of 


our knowledge. Because of this situation, we can at one and 


the same time say that the predicates in terms of which we 
think things are cases of knowledge and comprehensions of 
the determinate nature of the things. 

The realization of our epistemological situation enables us 
to avoid all sorts of false problems. Thus we can recognize 
the very human form of the content of knowledge with its 
arbitrary units and mathematical symbols and its approxi- 
mations. From this angle, properties are propositions formu- 
lated in a human way and referred to things as bits of 
knowledge of them. Our minds demand that these proposi- 
tions harmonize and present us with an intelligible result. 
But there is no need to assume a substance as that which 
somehow unifies inherent qualities. We simply think physical 
objects in terms of definite ideas; and, in so doing, we 
categorize our world. Our world is ordered, extensive, quan- 
titative, changing, energetic, etc. The basic implication of 
knowledge is this cognitional identity of the categories of our 
thought with the characteristics of things. Things are re- 
vealed in their characteristics. 

We have been led to contrast the pattern and quantities, 
which critical thought stresses, with sense-qualities such as 


MATTER, ENERGY, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 265 


color, taste and sound. These data are subjective or private, 
and investigation shows that they are correlated with cortical 
events. It is highly probable that they are part of the nature 
of these events. But while sense-qualities are subjective or 
private they are cues which the mind uses in perception and 
indicate external events which must then be studied—if our 
purpose is knowledge—in terms of the categories and 
methods of physical science. These sense-qualities are 
often very useful and are excellent clues to differen- 
tial events. Without them, we could never carry on 
many of our investigations. But their relation with 
external events is one of causal correlation rather than 
likeness. 

The reason why it has taken philosophy so long to appre- 
ciate the actual situation is because perception masks the 
nature of knowledge. Sense-qualities and comparative appre- 
ciation of order and quantity are equally assigned to the 
object of attention because they are equally valuable for 
practical purposes. Reflective knowledge is a higher level 
than perception, and, for it, distinctions must be made which 
are not remarked at the lower level. 

Are Things Substances?—The dominant usage to-day is 
to speak of physical and chemical substances. Chemical sub- 
stances are either elements or compounds of elements. The 
elements seldom occur in a pure or unalloyed state. Most 
physical things are, therefore, minerals or compound chemical 
substances. In regard to these minerals or compounds, 
science seeks to discover such characteristics as composition, 
weight and reactive physical and chemical properties. If they 
can be considered compounds of simpler chemical compounds, 
these also are intensively studied to get all sorts of informa- 
tion about them. 

Surrounding all this information is the conviction and 
judgment that we have to do with physical systems which 
exist, that is, which exist as much as we do and are out 
there affecting us, or capable of affecting us, and in relations 


266 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


with other physical things. In short, chemical substances 
are surrounded with what I called realistic meanings. To say 


that an object is substantial or a substance means that we are © 


ready to apply to it definite attitudes and thoughts of the 
sort we have concerned ourselves with in this chapter. 

One of the striking things which epistemology recognizes is, 
that we apply to physical objects qualifications or predicates 
which we are not willing to apply to our thoughts of them. 
This is the basic paradox or problem of the situation. I say 
that this box weighs five pounds, has a cubic content of so 
many feet, is made of wood; but I do not say that my thought 
of the box weighs five pounds, has a cubic contents of so many 
feet, ete. In short, I interpret my object by means of my 
thoughts but my thoughts are not my object. They may later 
become my object, and then I try to discover how I can think 
these meanings or predicates. It is this that logie and psy- 
chology have been trying to do for a very long time. Had 
they been more successful, epistemology would not so long 
have wandered in the wilderness. 

We can say, then, that things are substances, not in the 
sense that we intuit any mysterious stuff or that we grasp a 
transparent essence which exhaustively informs us all about 
things or that there is something in which qualities inhere, 
but in the sense that they are realities to be contrasted with 
our thoughts of them and known in terms of definite predi- 
cates. Cognitively, we can get no nearer to these physical 
things than that which our thoughts grasp. The physical 
thing, itself, cannot be given in our consciousness as naive 
realism supposes. Knowledge is as near any physical object 
other than our own organism as we can get. This one quali- 
fication we shall find important when we come to consider 
the mind-body problem. 

Constant Characteristics, Events, Relations and Proper- 
ties.—The detailed knowledge which science has achieved 
enables us to add to the earlier distinctions which philosophic 
reflection made. 


MATTER, ENERGY, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 267 


The macroscopic things to which we, as organisms, ordi- 
narily respond and which we perceive are composed of micro- 
scopic things organized in specific ways. The discovery of 
these microscopic components has been one of the striking 
achievements of science. To admit them is not to assert that 
molar, or macroscopic, things are illusions. Quite the con- 
trary. The reality of the one class is bound up with the 
reality of the other. Microscopic things are usually component 
parts of macroscopic things. 

There are certain characteristics in terms of which we 
_ always think bodies. A body always has some size or shape, 
and it always has some volume. Weight and mass, structure 
and composition, are other characteristics. Let us call these 
constant characteristics. These constant characteristics are 
essential marks of physical things. To be a physical thing 
is to have these characteristics at least. Whether micro- 
scopic things have these constant characteristics in the same 
degree as macroscopic things is a question. But they must 
at least be such that, in combination, they account for these 
characteristics. 

Events are situated in both macroscopic and microscopic 
things, in organisms, for example, and in atoms. The par- 
ticular shape, or volume, of a body can change. One of the 
features of recent formulations is the inseparability of events 
and characteristics. Thus the structure of an atom involves a 
dynamic curve of events. The time dimension must be added 
to the space dimension before an adequate idea of structure 
is obtained. As we shall see in the next chapter, dynamic 
structure is analogous to metabolism in organisms. Form 1s 
sustained by events. 

It is generally acknowledged now that early reflection did 
not grasp the importance of relations, or connections, in 
nature. Causal, spatial and genetic relations are stressed by 
modern science as revealing the order or structure of the 
world. Causal laws, spatial distributions, numerical laws, 
genetic laws stand out as significant information about our 


268 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


world. In the language of logic, this means that relational 
propositions are as important as atiributwe propositoons. 
Ours is a world with a spatio-temporal pattern. 

Finally, we come to the scientific idea of property. Besides 
constant characteristics there are properties which are state- 
ments, as it were, of what a substance or thing will do under 
definite conditions. We have the melting point of a substance, 
its freezing point, its combining capacities with other sub- 
stances under specific conditions. These properties state the 
behavior of microscopic and of macroscopic, or compound, 
things. 

Concluding Remarks.—This has unavoidably been a long 
chapter for it has necessarily contained our explicit justifica- — 
tion of physical realism. We have tried to bring out the 
various meanings which ‘matter’ has had in the past and the 
dominant meaning at present. At the same time, we have 
attempted to show that the scholastic schema of a substance 
in which properties inhere in some mysterious fashion is no 
longer necessary. Things have certain characteristics, rela- 
tions, and powers; and these can be known in a sufficient 
way by means of the data which they control in us. We 
have, also, tried to show the factual and logical justification 
of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 
Order is reproducible in a way that passive qualities are 
not. The mechanism of perception is such that, even if things 
had color in their own right, we could never know it. We 
should also note that physics seeks to penetrate to the micro- 
scopic, or ultra-microscopic, parts of the large bodies with 
which our perception ordinarily deals. It has discovered 
that things are composed of atoms and molecules, and that 
insight into nature involves a study of the structure, 
behavior and relations of these elements. But these elements 
are no more and no less real than the huge bodies which they 
compose. The knowledge we have of one must be capable 
of harmonization with our knowledge of the other. 


MATTER, ENERGY, THINGS, AND PROPERTIES 269 


REFERENCES 


AMES, The Constitution of Matter. 

LockE, Essay on the Human Understanding, bk. 2, chap. 23. 
Miuus, The Realities of Modern Science. 

RUSSELL, The A BC of Atoms. 

SELLARS, Evolutionary Naturalism, chaps. 5 and 6. 

Soppy, Radioactivity. 

Braae, Concerning the Nature of Things, chap, 1. 


CHAPTER XIX 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LIFE 


The Evolutionary Approach.—If we really wish to gain 
insight into basie problems, we should use the best knowledge 
of the day. Though this knowledge is by no means infallible 
and may need considerable correction and supplementation 
as research continues, it is at any one time our best guide. 
Now the sincere use of this knowledge means that we are 
ready to criticize, and even relinquish, those ideas which ex- 
press the more superficial knowledge of past generations and 
to construct our outlook afresh. In other words, we must be 
prepared to move beyond the flat contrasts and oppositions 
of tradition to new ground and there work out the possibilities 
and suggestions which flow from the facts. Those who adopt 
this standpoint will hold it wrong to decide in an a prori 
fashion just what is possible in nature, just what can occur 
and what cannot occur. We must, as it were, wait upon — 
nature herself to answer our questions. 

These remarks have, I think, point as an introduction to 
a study of the nature and origin of life. It is so easy to 
fall back upon a sharp separation between the organic and 
the inorganic which makes the gulf between them unbridge- 
able. The result is apt to be a dialectical controversy expres- 
sive of fixed concepts. How can the living come from the 
lifeless? Living and lifeless are contradictories and exclude 
one another. But is this not to confuse the tools of thinking 
with the real world which we desire to know by means of 
them? It may easily be that there are levels in nature to 
which we could hardly apply either of these sharp concepts. 
Concepts constantly need reformation and deepening. What 

270 


THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LIFE 271 


exactly is it to be living? And what exactly is it to be lifeless? 
Are these conditions abruptly divided in nature, or does the 
one seem to arise upon the other? It would appear that, in 
the long run, our concepts are determined by the facts. It 
is this long-time dependence of concepts upon our experience 
which should warn us against merely dialectical ways of 
handling our problems. To put our suggestion in logical lan- 
guage, it may be that living and lifeless, organic and inor- 
ganic, are more of the nature of contraries than of contradic- 
tories. They may be characteristic stages in a process of 
evolution. 

The more the contemporary thinker studies the question of 
the nature and the origin of life, the more he is convinced 
that the principle of evolution has a crucial significance for it. 
And when the principle of evolution is referred to to-day in 
science and philosophy, something far more wide-reaching 
than organic evolution is meant. It is the principle of change 
which is intended, change in the stars, change in the elements, 
change in the conditions on this earth, change in chemical 
combinations, change in organisms, change in human life, 
change in society. The principle of evolution means, in the 
first place, the reality of basic alterations all through the 
universe. It stands for the acceptance of process in place 
of fixed and static things. It holds that the world is not a 
frozen scheme so much as a growth. Now the fault with much 
of past thinking lay in its assumption that our concepts should 
correspond to rigid and changeless divisions in the nature of 
things. The supposed rigidity of the world crept into our 
ideas and led to what I called dialectical controversy. If we 
accept the principle of evolution we free ourselves from all 
this, rather barren, way of thinking. 

Of course, as we shall shortly see, the principle of evolu- 
tion stood for something more than the reality of change. 
It stressed what may be called cumulative change. While we 
must avoid using the terms, higher and lower, in a valuative 
way, we can still assert that evolution is taken to involve 


272 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


stages in complexity of organization. Simpler things precede 
complex things and make them possible. The very nature 
of growth or becoming, seems to involve this direction 
of change. We may speak of this as the sole essential in 
the continuity of change. It would certainly be a very differ- 
ent kind of a world than the one we are in which permitted 
leaps from the ameba to man without intermediaries. Thus 
we may say that organic evolution involves a certain genetic 
order in change which suggests cumulation. How crucial and 
abrupt changes may be cannot be determined beforehand. 

Biologists developed the idea of organic evolution at a time 
when the material world was regarded as a realm of merely 
mechanical events. So little was known in detail of physical 
things and relations that a broad scheme which had been 
found useful in mechanics was extended imaginatively to all 
physical events. This scheme has guided experiment and re- | 
search and is justly associated with the conquest of nature. 
Opposed to it was only the rather mystical and barren appeal 
to final causes and purposes in nature, an appeal that was 
associated with theology and theological types of explanation. 
In the previous chapter we penetrated deeply enough into the 
nature of scientific knowledge to realize that it is an attempt 
to grasp order and relations in nature. It was this that theol- 
ogy never tried to do, and it was this that mechanics was at 
least trying to do. Is it any wonder, then, the terms, mechan- 
ics and mechanistic, became associated almost inseparably in 
the mind of the scientist with his cause and his methods? In 
the present chapter, we shall see the continued influence of 
this association when the need for it has practically dis- 
appeared. Often the mechanistic view of life means nothing 
more than a naturalistic view of life. 

On the whole, Darwinism made as little break with the 
scientific ideas of its period as possible. It did not challenge 
the categories and perspective of the physical sciences. What 
it did challenge was the traditions of a special creation and 
of fixed species. By means of the twin theories of slight varia- 


THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LIFE 273 


tions in the germ-plasm and of the survival of those better 
adjusted to their environment, Darwin succeeded in suggest- 
ing a natural explanation of the origin of species. He thus 
began a genuinely scientific interpretation of biological 
phenomena. Let us linger upon this point for a moment 
since it will give us our clue for the oppositions which once 
ruled biology but which are now largely memories or should 
be. 

The design, or teleological, view of the world had placed 
stress upon a designing mind which had the power to create 
and arrange in accordance with its ideas. In physics, this 
outlook was still present in Newton’s mind, but, by the time 
of La Place, it had practically vanished from physics and 
astronomy. The order, or pattern, of the universe was now 
regarded as the natural expression of the materials and forces 
involved. But, in biology, the outlook still reigned. We may 
eall this explanation by design external teleology. It was 
the common faith that animals and plants were made for 
man’s sustenance and that the human organism could not be 
accounted for in all its marvelous intricacy apart from the 
agency of some supreme intelligence. Note the setting. The 
inorganic realm was now regarded as a region of mere unco- 
ordinated and unintegrated movements, a complicated turmoil 
of atoms. That an organism could have come out of such a 
realm by some happy combination of atomic collocations 
seemed to the majority unbelievable. Such a happy combina- 
tion would be mere chance, and would be extremely improb- 
able. The sole alternative was held to be design. Darwin’s 
contribution was the idea of natural selection, a mechanism, 
so to speak, which permits us to think of nature as uncon- 
sciously selective and directive from behind. The concept of 
growth was entering into men’s minds. 

No complete theory of organic evolution is possible apart 
from an adequate idea of what an organism is. We should 
not, therefore, expect Darwinism to be the last word on the 
method of evolution. That will come in time as research 


274 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


continues. We must gain insight into organic processes. The 
whole setting of physical theory is changing under our eyes. 
System and pattern in nature is taking the place of the mere 
turmoil of unsociable parts. It seems likely that we must 
equally reject chance and design and substitute causally 
conditioned growth. Ours is a world in which systems are 
formed and cumulative growth occurs. 

The Material World a Domain of Organization.—In order 
to get the proper perspective in regard to life, we must have 
adequate ideas in regard to nature at large. We have already 
seen that the principle of evolution has now a practically uni- 
versal application. It apples to suns and solar systems, to 
the chemical elements, to cultures, to nations. But there is 
another principle which goes with it and which it in a manner 
presupposes, the principle of organization. 

Let us now recall some of the facts bearing upon organiza- 
tion which the new physics has brought to the front. Research 
of a remarkably delicate kind in the field of the minute was 
initiated by the discovery of the X-ray and radioactivity. 
Speculation of a blind sort in regard to matter was replaced 
by concrete analysis aided by a technique which dealt with 
atoms and their parts. I know of few things in the world 
of knowledge more startling and fascinating than these ex- 
plorations by J. J. Thomson, Rutherford, Millikan, and the 
Braggs. And a host of workers in Germany, France and 
the United States did their share, The significant point for 
us is that this work has revolutionized the notion of matter. 
The atom is an organized electrical system varying in com- 
plexity from hydrogen to the unwieldy systems which are 
radio-active. Where is the old, inert atom? Gone into the 
discard. And this change must affect to its very foundation 
our notion of the inorganic. 

This intensive study of atoms has revealed the fact that 
each kind of atom 1s a system with definite properties corre- 
lated with its organzation. Thus fluorine, which has two 
electrons in the first group and seven in the second, has prop- 


THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LIFE 275 


erties very similar to those of chlorine, which has two in the 
first, eight in the second, and seven in the third. In both 
eases, the outside group of electrons is an arrangement of 
seven. All the properties of carbon depend on its possessing 
a six-electron group. A ‘‘seven’’ or a ‘‘nine’’ gives totally 
different properties and makes a new substance. It has been 
determined that certain atoms are satisfied and unsociable, 
and that this characteristic expresses in each case the particu- 
lar atomic structure. These unsocial atoms constitute nearly 
perfect gases because their movement easily overcomes the 
slight attraction which they exert upon one another. On the 
other hand, the more sociable atoms attract one another and 
tend to form systems of a molecular type. It has been found 
that the forces exerted by one atom on another are very 
complicated in character and are naturally imperfectly under- 
stood as yet. It has been suggested that these attractions de- 
pend on the way in which atoms are brought together or 
presented to each other. Thus atoms are not inert, and they 
do attach themselves to one another to form systems or organ- 
izations. 

In chemistry, also, organization is a basic characteristic. 
The chemist deals with complex molecules rather than with 
atoms. It is interesting to note that the chemist distinguishes 
three sets of data in regard to chemical structure. These are 
(1) the empirical chemical composition of the molecule, that is, 
the chemical elements and their number in a substance; (2) 
the constitution or manner in which the atoms are linked to- 
gether; and (3) the configuration of the molecule or the ar- 
rangement of the atoms in space. Thus three sets of properties 
may be looked for, depending upon composition, constitution 
and configuration. We have quite a range of variables for 
permutation and combination. In this still more complex do- 
main, then, properties are correlated with organization. 

The significance of this fact for life was at once grasped and 
in part misinterpreted by Professor L. J. Henderson.t He saw 

*L. J. Henderson, The Order of Nature, passim. 


276 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


that nature is not a realm in which organization is an accident. 
But he did not know how to express this except in terms of 
the old controversy betwen chance and teleology. He pointed 
out the dependence of life upon the properties of hydrogen, 
oxygen, carbon and nitrogen and upon their wide distribution, 
which is quite true. And then he went on to state that this 
distribution and ensemble of elements and properties is in- 
finitely impossible as the result of mere chance, and must 
therefore be regarded as a sort of teleological preparation for 
life. 

Logicians point out that chance is a term relative to human 
calculations. Events in nature have their conditions and are 
determined by them. In this domain, then, we should speak 
neither of chance nor of teleology. We must simply recognize 
that life is dependent upon certain favorable conditions which 
arose in nature and which thus prepared the way for a higher 
level of evolution. As against the old mechanical view, we 
must recognize that nature is a realm of systems and that, 
therefore, growth and evolution are natural to it. But we 
should try to avoid using such an ambiguous term as tele- 
ology in this connection. There is no reason to assume any- 
thing which is of the nature of ends, or purposes, as causally 
operative to bring about systems in nature. We are, instead, 
just learning better what nature is and what it can do. Or- 
ganization appears to be intrinsic and native to physical 
Systems. 

Would it be surprising to find that this correlation of organ- 
ization and properties extended upward to the realm of living 
bodies? It is certainly true that organization is a fundamental 
eategory of biology. Function and structure go together. 
And this way of approach suggests that the organic and the 
inorganic are not so alien to each other as was at one time 
supposed. The more we know about the inorganic to-day, 
the less we despise it and the less we underestimate its pos- 
sibilities. Tyndall, were he living to-day, would find no 
reason in recent results to revise his dictum that matter con- 


THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LIFE 277 


tains the promise and potency of life. It is this clue that 
we shall follow in this chapter. 

Living and Lifeless Things.—Perhaps it is less easy to dis- 
tinguish living from lifeless things than is generally supposed. 
But if we leave border-line cases and examine plants and 
animals, it is metabolism which soon strikes our attention 
as differential. Living things are constantly changing in 
a sort of internally determined way. They grow and assimilate 
food and, on the other hand, use up material already assimil- 
ated. There is something of relative autonomy in the be- 
havior of an animal, for instance. It seems to go on a path 
of its own which is not completely determined by outside 
influences, to have spontaneity. living substances act as 
though they carried a goal in themselves. 

A lifeless thing does not develop a differentiated, internal 
form, and it does not contain processes of metabolism. In 
animals we note response to stimuli, and such response is not 
a mere effect of an obviously mechanical sort. The internal 
nature of the organism is a very important determinant of 
the response. 

It would take too long to enter into all the details of this 
contrast between the living and the lifeless, We could point 
out, for example, that certain complex substances are found 
only in living bodies. It does not follow of course, that these 
substances can never be made by man in the laboratory. 
But it is, nevertheless, significant that they occur naturally 
only in connection with life. 

Living substance is usually called protoplasm. It has no 
element peculiar to it. Proteid, which consists of carbon, 
hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, and sulphur, is present in all 
protoplasm, is the most complex of all chemical substances, 
and, so far, is known only from organic bodies. Undoubtedly, 
proteid has peculiar properties which express its composition, 
constitution and configuration. And protoplasm is a com- 
pleated mixture of proteid matter and other material. 
This complex whole has an organization which must be con- 


278 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


sidered an historical growth. This type of substance is col- 
loidal in character and is not to be compared with substances 
which erystallize. To employ the terminology of the bio- 
chemist, the life of the cell is the expression of a particular 
dynamic equilibrium which obtains in the polyphasic system. 
It is a property of the cell as a whole because it depends upon 
the organization of processes, upon the equilibrium displayed 
by the totality of the co-existing phases.1 The organism is a 
complex system of energies. 

The labile character of protoplasm early attracted atten- 
tion, and chemists have offered various explanations of it. 
Some have stressed the presence of cyanide, others the 
presence of oxygen. Probably both these factors are im- 
portant, yet they must be seen in relation to the colloidal 
structure of protoplasm. When we remember that living sub- 
stance is a complex historical growth we need not be sur- 
prised that science finds it hard to determine the factors 
which give it this labile character. Are catalyzers at work? 
Is there a structure which assists the balance of anabolism 
and katabolism? It seems plausible to assume that lability 
depends not only upon characteristics of chemical parts but 
also upon their organization into a new type of whole. Such 
a suggestion but carries out the conclusions drawn for simpler 
levels of nature; for we saw that the properties of the atom 
depend upon its organization and that the properties of 
chemical substances are likewise expressive of their organ- 
ization. 

We have tried to bring out the physical difference between 
lifeless and living bodies by stressing the characteristies of 
living bodies. It would seem that living bodies contain the 
materials of lifeless bodies but possess a constitution and 
exhibit processes of a more complex type. It is as though a 
line of development opened up and was followed from level to 
level, the result in the end being the achievement of bodies 
with quite novel properties. 

2Cf. Hopkins, Nature, Vol. 92. 


THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LIFE 279 


The Origin of Life——For a very long time, the origin of 
life did not impress men as a serious and almost insoluble prob- 
lem. Aristotle accepted abiogenesis, that is, the rise of organ- 
isms from lifeless matter. He held it to be proved that some 
animals spring from putrid matter. Lucretius in his great 
poem De Rerum Natura asserts similar phenomena of spon- 
taneous generation. A passage will illustrate at once the 
naturalism of his outlook and his unhesitating acceptance of 
the rough-and-ready observation of his time in these matters: 
‘To come to another point, whatever things we perceive to 
have sense, you must yet admit to be composed of senseless 
first-beginnings: manifest tokens which are open to all to 
apprehend, so far from refuting or contradicting this, do 
rather themselves take us by the hand and constrain us to 
believe that, as I say, living things are begotten from sense- 
less things. We may see in fact living worms spring out of 
stinking dung, when the soaked earth has gotten putridity 
after excessive rains; and all things besides change in the 
same way: rivers, leaves, and glad pastures change their sub- 
stance into our bodies, and often out of these the powers of 
wild beasts and the bodies of the strong of wing are increased. 
Therefore nature changes all foods into living bodies and 
engenders out of them all the senses of living creatures, much 
in the same way as she dissolves dry woods into flames and 
converts all things into fires.”’ 

This belief in spontaneous generation continued to be held 
until very recent times although skeptics now and then arose. 
Thus we have the emphatic reply of one, Alexander Ross, 
to the doubts of Sir Thomas Browne: ‘‘So may he doubt 
whether in cheese and timber worms are generated; or if 
beetles and wasps in cow’s dung; or if butterflies, locusts, 
grasshoppers, shell-fish, snails, eels, and such like, be pro- 
created of putrified matter, which is apt to receive the form 
of that creature to which it is by formative power disposed. 
To question this is to question reason, sense and experience.’’ 
The Aristotelian idea of formative forms which direct and 


280 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


control matter should be noted. We shall note its presence 
in modern vitalism. 

In 1668, an Italian, Redi by name, proved that no maggots 
are bred in meat on which flies are prevented by wire screens 
from laying their eggs. Experimentation of this sort was 
extended into the microscopic world by Leeuwenhoek. The 
culmination of the disproof of spontaneous generation was 
reached in the work of Pasteur and Tyndall. The technique 
of sterilization was developed and applied with the result that 
it could no longer be doubted that actual living organisms 
always arise from living things by means of some process of 
reproduction. The well-known formula, omne vivum ex vivo, 
expressed this conclusion. 

The more we know about the complex structure of even 
unicellular organisms the more such a principle seems to us 
almost a priort evident. But the limits of this disproof of 
spontaneous generation should be carefully kept in mind. 
It has not been shown that living matter may not have arisen 
through a series of stages from material which could be char- 
acterized as non-living. Benjamin Moore, a bio-chemist, has 
argued that colloidal chemistry has made the conception of 
spontaneous generation, or abiogenesis, less repugnant be- 
cause it implies a different kind. ‘‘The territory of this 
spontaneous production of life lies not at the level of bacteria, 
or animalculae springing forth into life in dead organic 
matter, but at a level of life lying deeper than anything the 
microscope can reveal, and possessing a lower unit than the 
living cell, as we form our concept of it from the tissues of 
higher animals and plants.’’* In his article on Abiogenesis 
in the Encyclopedia Britannica, Chalmers Mitchell develops 
essentially the same position: ‘‘The refutation of abiogenesis 
has no further bearing on this possibility than to make it 
probable that if protoplasm ultimately be formed in the 
laboratory, it will be by a series of stages, the earlier steps 
being the formation of some substance or substances, now 

*Moore, The Origin and Nature of Life, p. 189, 


THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LIFE 281 


unknown, which are not protoplasm. Such intermediate 
stages may have existed in the past, and the modern refutation 
of abiogenesis has no application to the possibility of these 
having been formed from inorganic matter at some time in the 
past. Perhaps the words archebiosis, or archegenesis, should 
be preserved for the theory that protoplasm in the remote 
past has been developed from non-living matter by a series of 
steps, and many of those, notably T. H. Huxley, who took a 
large share in the process of refuting contemporary abiogen- 
esis, have stated their belief in a primordial archebiosis.”’ 

Seience and philosophy are naturally led to favor the 
strongest hypothesis, that 1s, the one which seems to have 
the highest probability. Now there are only three important 
candidates: (1) the theory of the cosmic transport of germs, 
(2) the theory of special creation by a Divine Will, and 
(3) archebiosis. 

The hypothesis that the germs of life have been transported 
to our earth through space has been supported by scientists 
of the standing of Helmholtz, Kelvin and Arrhenius. One 
form of this suggestion was that living germs could be driven 
from planet to planet by radiation. Another form was that 
_ life could be hidden in meteorites and so transported. The 
first suggestion is far-fetched and has to meet the objection 
that conditions in interstellar space are undoubtedly very 
unfavorable to life. And meteorites are seemingly igneous 
products which have long circled in the heavens. But the 
chief objection to these theories is that they are not really 
attempts to solve the problem of the origin of life. They 
accept the break between the living and the lifeless and 
assume a sort of cosmic continuity for life. Life is a con- 
stant feature of the universe and cannot be said to have 
an origin. 

The theory that life was created by a divine fiat at some 
moment in the past accords with traditional religious beliefs. 
But it is clearly an appeal to supernatural agency and can- 
not expect to meet with a sympathetic response from science, 


282 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Science stresses spatial and temporal continuity and looks 
upon all events as conditioned by their relevant natural ante- 
cedents. This theory would be a theological explanation of 
life rather than a scientific one. For science, it would be the 
relinquishment of any attempt to explain the origin of life 
instead of an explanation. We can also point out that this 
theory implies vitalism or a life-force. 

We seem left, then, with archebiosis as the most probable 
hypothesis. And a survey of recent biological literature shows 
that interest in this way of approach to the problem is in- 
creasing. The recent advances in photo-chemistry showing, 
as they do, that energy changes of a high potential are made 
possible by light—especially the ultra-violet ray—have opened 
possibilities hardly understood before. Ultra-violet rays 
change stable material systems into unstable systems with a 
far higher potential. Recently chemists have been able by 
their means to transform formaldehyde into sugars. In an 
article entitled ‘‘The Origin and the Maintenance of Life,’’ 
Duclaux of the Pasteur Institute argues that all the condi- 
tions for the origin of life may have been present in the 
past. ‘‘It would suffice that the quantity of water and car- 
bonie acid in the atmosphere be augmented and the amount 
of oxygen be diminished. An elevation of the temperature 
of the ocean, in augmenting the dissociation of bicarbonate 
of lime and the tension of water vapor would produce an 
enrichment in the direction wished.’’ His conclusion is that 
life is probably due to a complex combination of circum- 
stances and that, once formed, it developed mechanisms of 
protection and survival. Chlorophyll is one example of this, 
as is also the property called autocatalysis. Under favorable 
conditions, life can multiply itself enormously. It seems to 
have chemical properties which enable it to use all the free 
energy around it for synthetic purposes. This point is im- 
portant, for it is related to the question of entropy. The 
majority of inorganic processes are entropic, that is, they lead 
to a loss of free energy. But anabolic processes are ektropic 


THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LIFE 283 


and involve a ‘stepping up’ of potential energy. It is this 
kind of chemical process which is so characteristic of living 
things. But, of course, there is in this no creation of energy. 
And so it is absurd to regard this ektropic feature of living 
things as unnatural. Radiant energy is of a very high level. 
What we have in life is seemingly a cumulative concentration 
and storing of energy in connection with chemical substances, 
their phasic organization, and their differentiated, spatial con- 
struction into bodies. Moore’s Law of Complexity, that mat- 
ter, so far as its energy environment will permit, tends to 
assume more and more complex forms in labile equilibrium, 
is a protest against the old simplicist mechanicalism which 
did not recognize organization as a significant and important 
characteristic of the physical world. I would suggest, again, 
that molar mechanics which concerns the rather external 
relations of physical aggregates has dominated thought 
excessively, 

When we realize the complexity of living things, we, at the 
same time, recognize that such complexity is a cumulative 
product requiring a very long series of changes. Increased 
differentiation and integration is a step-by-step process, each 
succeeding step made possible only by what has gone before. 
Such a development implies long lapses of time. And it is this 
demand that geology meets and which the laboratory cannot 
meet. There is, however, no reason that I can see why the 
laboratory may not in time, as knowledge and technique 
develop, see the production of at least the first hesitating 
stages of life. As science knows more about the details of 
nature, it is coming to recognize the constant occurrence of 
creative synthesis, that is, the reality of organization in nature 
as an intrinsic and characteristic feature of its process. 
Nature seems to have directions and novelties. 

Mechanism versus Vitalism in Biology.—Science is no 
more free from basic disputes than is philosophy. The reason 
for this situation should be obvious to us by now. The basic 
disputes of science concern its philosophy, that is, the funda- 


284 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


mental principles and concepts with which it works. All that 
philosophy is is just a systematic and patient reflection upon 
such basic principles and concepts. And for any particular 
field in which he is an expert the scientist can undertake this 
task of persistent reflection upon the basal concepts and 
categories involved. The professional philosopher and the 
reflective scientist can meet and cooperate. In the following 
discussion of mechanism and vitalism in biology we can make 
use of this overlapping of philosophy and science. The con- 
troversy has been going on for centuries. It is only com- 
paratively recently, however, that a novel point of view has 
been developing which bids fair to bring order and agree- 
ment into the field. | 

Let us begin our examination of this controversy by seeing 
what each position is and what it has to say for itself. We 
shall, then, criticize both strict mechanism and vitahsm and 
point out a third possibility which a larger survey of the 
world suggests. 

Mechanism in biology has meant, rather vaguely, certain 
things. It has stood for dependence upon, and continuity with, 
physics and chemistry. It has held that no new factor of a 
non-physical kind has entered into nature at the level of 
organic life. In this sense, it has championed what one writer 
has called experrmental determinism. The factors science 
ordinarily deals with—namely, energy and matter—are the 
sole conditions and antecedents of changes in the organism. 
But there has usually been something more to the mechanistic 
view of life than this assertion of continuity and dependence 
and this rejection of any new factor coming in from outside 
and operating in a controlling way upon physico-chemical pro- 
cesses In the organism. Mechanism has been not only monistie, 
or anti-dualistic, in its dislike for a life-force or entelechy of 
an immaterial sort, but it has been inclined to adopt the past 
outlook and categories of physics and chemistry without a 
critical enough consideration of their adequacy for biology. 
In short, the mechanist has been inclined to carry over tradi- 


THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LIFE 285 


tional ideas from a less evolved realm to a more evolved realm 
and has avoided asking himself what the facts of biology can 
tell us about nature. There was in biology too great a 
tendency to abdicate to physics and chemistry. It was taken 
for granted that a physical system could be nothing but a 
aggregate, or complex, of material particles, and that every 
change was simply a mechanical resultant of the energies and 
motions of the parts taken as essentially self-sufficient. It was 
this bias of mechanism which led it to be called by its oppon- 
euts the machine-theory of life. 

In this exposition of mechanism in biology, we have tried 
to be fair to both the good and the bad sides of the position. 
Its good side is its denial that life is occult and mysterious and 
its determination to push analysis to the utmost. In our dis- 
cussion of the origin of life, we saw adequate reason to believe 
that life is but a term for certain kinds of processes and be- 
haviors. It does not seem to be something, distinct from 
physico-chemical processes, which can take its departure like 
a bird from its nest. We must not think mythologically about 
life. Again, advance has been made only by means of patient 
analysis. The structure of the organism must be made out. 
_ The inter-relations of the organs must be determined. It 
must be shown that organic compounds can be made in the 
laboratory. In short, the grip of scientific technique and 
method must be completely laid upon this terribly complex 
set of processes. The bad side of mechanism was its lack of 
analysis of biological categories. It lived on tradition in these 
important matters. It was so interested in excluding mind, 
purpose, and life-forece that it forgot to ponder on its own 
data in a synthetic and interpretative way. This was a very 
natural stage. 

Vitalism is best represented by such men as Driesch, Berg- 
son, and McDougall. We shall see that it, too, has both its 
good and its bad side. 

There are two features of the vitalist’s position. He as- 
sumes that these two features go inevitably together, though, 


286 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


as we shall see, it is questionable whether they do. The first 
feature is the eriticism of the adequacy of the mechanistic 
explanation of life. Clearly this feature is quite relative to 
what mechanism is supposed to be, and, as I have pointed out, 
the mechanist has paid so little attention to the positive side 
of his teaching that it is really hard to say what the categories 
of biological mechanism are. To the vitalist, biological 
mechanism means a machine-theory of life. The second fea- 
ture of vitalism is the assumption that, in order to explain 
living processes, there is need to postulate a vital force or 
entelechy, an agent of an immaterial kind which ean control 
and direct physico-chemical processes to results which they 
by themselves could never achieve. Let us look at this double 
argument. of vitalism. 3 

I presume that it would be generally admitted that Hans 
Driesch, a German biologist and philosopher, is the ablest 
representative of modern vitalism just as Jacques Loeb would 
be given the title of the most determined champion of mechan- 
ism. A quotation from Driesch’s The Science and Philosophy 
of the Organism will furnish a good introduction to the posi- 
tion. He writes: ‘‘No kind of causality based upon the 
constellations of single physical and chemical acts can acecunt 
for organic individual development; this development is not 
to be explained by any hypothesis about configurations of 
physical and chemical agents. . . . Life, at least morphogene- 
sis, is not a specialized arrangement of inorganic events; 
biology, therefore, is not applied physics and chemistry ; life is 
something apart, and biology is an independent science.’’* In 
a recent article, Driesch has defined for us what he means by 
mechanism, ‘‘The processes which take place in a material 
system will be mechanical for us when the phenomena which 
occur there can be deduced without a remainder from the 
knowledge of the positions, the velocity, and the force of the 
material elements of the system.’’ Assuming that all chemical 
processes are of this sort if left to themselves, he proceeds 

1Driesch, The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 142. 


THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LIFE 287 


to show that the development of organisms from eggs cannot 
be explained mechanically. 

Thus when we come to examine vitalism, we find that it 
consists on the negative side in first taking traditional atomic 
mechanicalism as literally valid for the physical world and 
showing that such atomic, or discontinuous, mechanicalism 
cannot account for what takes place in a developing egg. 
Driesch argues, if certain living processes cannot be explained 
mechanically, we must assume non-mechamcal agents. To 
these he gives the Aristotelian name entelechy. Another of 
his terms is psychoid. In an organism, then, we have the 
directing operations of an agency which has the power to 
suspend chemical changes at the right time and thus to guide 
the construction and activity of an organism. This agent is 
not spatial but acts into space. Here we have a frank dualism. 

Driesch tries to be true to biological characteristics and does 
not wish to speak of teleology in the sense of conscious adjust- 
ment of means to end ina plan. Instead, he wishes to employ 
the expression ‘relative to a totality.’ Somehow, the egg 
develops as though a sense of the whole system were operating 
to control the parts. 

What shall be our final comment upon this whole con- 
troversy? The briefest way to describe it is to say that it is 
the continuation into our day of the ideas and formulations 
of Cartesian dualism. The vitalist is clearly a dualist who 
feels that there is a breach between inorganic and organic 
nature which can be accounted for only by some élan vital 
or vital urge (Bergson) or by a guiding, immaterial agent. 
The mechanist accepts the vague categories of traditional 
mechanism and disputes the assertions of the vitalist. In the 
meantime, thinkers of a more original and creative type of 
mind have begun to take evolution seriously and to view 
nature as a process from level to level, each level characterized 
by organization and new properties. The categories of biology 
lie midway between those of chemistry and those of psy- 
chology. Knowledge of our world is displacing the blanket- 


288 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


contrasts which relative ignorance and the dualisms of 
traditional thought induced. 

There are many questions about organic evolution which 
we have not touched in the present chapter, preferring to 
stress, as we do, certain essential points. We have attempted 
to show that neither vitalism nor traditional mechanism are 
adequate views. Integration, configuration and wholeness are 
more significant for nature than science was ready to admit. 
Nature seems able to form systems which have a measure of 
internal unity and are not mere collocations of self-sufficient 
units. To apply this notion to life involves the admission of 
something which may well be ealled organicism. A living 
system differs in many basic ways from an inorganic system 
and yet the ground pattern, the fact of organization, is already 
present in the more primitive and extensive field. It is really 
quite surprising to note how many scientists are thinking in 
this revolutionary way which leads, not to vitalism, but a 
more adequate conception of the physical world in general. 

Let us now turn to a study of the mind-body problem, a 
problem which seems crucial for our interpretation of nature 
in nearly every regard. Perhaps no scientific and philoso- 
phical problem can vie with this one in importance both 
because of its natural interest for us human beings and 
because of its far-reaching implications. 


REFERENCES 


HOERNLE, Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics. 

JOHNSTONE, The Philosophy of Biology. 

Lozs, ‘‘The Mechanistic Conception of Life,’’ Popular Science Monthly, 
1912, 

Lovesoy, ‘‘The Meaning of Vitalism,’’ Science, 1911. 

Moore, The Origin and Nature of Life, chaps. 1, 7, and 8. 

OsporNn, The Origin and Evolution of Life. 

SELLARS, Evolutionary Naturalism, chap. 15. 

Luoyp Morgan, Life, Mind and Spirit, chap. 3. 


CHAPTER XX 
SOUL, MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS: 
AN HISTORICAL SURVEY 


The Nature of Mind a Problem.—In the preceding chap- 
ter, we noted the empirical and undeniable differences between 
living and lifeless things. We then sought to understand the 
possibility of the origin of the one from the other by an 
appreciation of the ‘preparation’ of the conditions upon which 
life depends. We saw that life is more of a chemical than 
of a strictly mechanical affair and that metabolism with a 
double direction, a certain autonomy of form and action, and 
capacities for reproduction and adjustment are its chief, gen- 
eral characteristics. The suggestion which we advanced is 


one which is becoming fairly common now among biologists 


and philosophers, viz.,—that a living thing is a systematically 


_ organized whole with new properties expressive of this organ- 


ization. Life did not spring full-born from nature; rather 
must there have been intermediate, hesitating phases of inte- 
eration and disintegration. The tendency to complex organ- 
ization under favoring conditions must have been there to 
push nature’s experiments and growths. And so, after count- 
less efforts, life was formed and pushed blindly upward. We 
all know to-day what strange creatures were thus called into 
being to flourish for a time and then to die out. Of all this 
the rocks have kept a record of a partial and tantalizing sort. 

We also tried to show that the old contrasts between mechan- 
ism and vitalism are pretty outworn to-day. It was our sug- 
gestion that biology had not taken evolution seriously because 
it was still fighting its historic battle against design. It had 
not, in short, explored the new possibilities which had opened 

289 


290 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


up. After criticizing both mechanism and vitalism as these 
have usually been formulated, we sought to indicate a new 
perspective which might introduce biology to a truer idea of 
its field. In its essentials it was this: biology, also, must 
have its empirically discovered categories without which it 
cannot interpret its data. These categories will correspond 
to such characteristics as structure, function, interdependence, 
plasticity, relative autonomy. The genetic question is, then, 
simply this: Can we think of these characteristics as having 
grown, or developed, out of the simpler conditions which pre- 
ceded them? Our answer was in the affirmative. 

It is obvious that, by this answer, we have cast away the 
neat and unreal contrasts of Cartesian dualism. Nature has 
now become for us a realm of growth and activity whose 
limits eannot be set a priort. We no longer have a nature 
robbed of capacity for growth and creation, a merely repetitive 
domain with no energies and unrehearsed possibilities. It is 
for us now something which possesses dim analogies with our- 
selves. It is the kind of stuff out of which we have arisen. 
Leibniz, it will be remembered, saw this, but scarcely in an 
evolutionary way. 

The categories of biology—if evolution is to be taken seri- 
ously—should not be reducible to those of physics and chem- 
istry as though what is peculiar to biological facts is an 
illusion due to complexity and shortsightedness. That was 
the old view which it has been so hard for the human mind 
to overcome. Nonetheless, the categories of biology must fit 
into the outlines of the categories of physics and chemistry. 
Here, also, we must have structure, relations, events, and 
energies. A living thing must be a spatio-temporal system. 
But it is this fact that biology proclaims. It is a structure of 
structures, a relation of relations, a system of events and 
energies. The elements are caught up into a form which they 
sustain and which yet has properties and characteristics ex- 
pressive, not of themselves taken separately, but of their 
integration. A living body is literally a new kind of reality. 


SOUL, MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS 291 


If this view is correct, life is an open line of cumulative 
change. And even along this open line the humble beginnings 
have disappeared so that the monumental heights reached 
stand out above the inorganic plain. Those who have no 
historical, genetic imagination can well be forgiven if they 
feel that the chasm between the living and the lifeless cannot 
be bridged. Because of their devotion to the Hebraic story 
of creation, many sincere souls are convinced that the gulf 
between homo sapiens and the beasts of the field had no 
genetic bridge. We have been giving reasons for another 
perspective. The details must be left by philosophy to the 
relevant sciences. 

But life rises to mind, and the reality of mind and con- 
sciousness presents us with still another apparent gap, or 
break, in nature. Plants are living things with all the prop- 
erties of living things. They have in the words of Aristotle 
a nutritive soul. But the higher animals, at least, and man in 
all certainty, have capacities and modes of selective response 
which we speak of as mental. And this mentality has degrees 
in its range and power. Now because in the development of 
this term man has been acquainted with himself at first hand 
and is aware of certain of the characteristics and processes 
involved, mind has seemed to him something unique and even 
less related to the inorganic world than life itself. It has 
seemed to him something having its roots in vital processes 
and yet reaching far beyond them. That man can know 
himself, can become self-conscious, full of plans and pur- 
poses, is surely marvelous. And it has often seemed to 
him that that which in its full development can become the 
spectator of all time and existence escapes from nature and 
differs from it even more definitely than does life. If living 
things tower qualitatively above inorganic things, does not 
man’s mind as greatly tower above things which merely have 
life? But may we not have here another open line of 
cumulative change? 

Our thoughts are full of old traditions in regard to the 


292 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


soul, mind and consciousness, These ideas get in our way 
when we try to think freshly about these things. They make 
a fog, as it were, which prevents us from seeing sharp out- 
lines. We cannot repress them by an act of will, but must 
try to rob them of their power by bringing them to self-con- 
sciousness and analyzing them. 

Now that we have analyzed space, time, matter, and life, 
we should not be surprised to find that familiar terms do not 
necessarily have any precise or exact meaning for us. They 
are vaguely suggestive and indicate what the logicians call a 
‘‘universe of discourse.’’ An adequate, comprehensive mean- 
ing fitting into the total demands of a whole complex of ques- 
tions and problems is something to be achieved by patient 
effort rather than something we start out with. Let us begin 
this effort by finding out what mind and soul and consciousness 
meant in the past. Perhaps, there has been a development, 
or a critical deepening, of these terms which will put us on 
the right track for our own systematic reflection. 

Primitive Notions of Mind.—How does primitive man 
think of himself? The answer seems to be that he thinks of 
himself as a body and a spirit. A spirit is a kind of tenuous © 
being different from tangible things. In his book on Primi- 
twe Religion, Lowie describes the views of a Shoshoni Indian. 
Red-shirt Jim had become sick from breaking a food taboo. 
This was his experience: ‘‘I was still breathing. I thought 
of seeing my dead father and mother, brother and relatives. 
I wished to die immediately. For three days and four nights 
IT lay in my tent. At last on the fourth day my soul (mtgua) 
came out of my thigh, made a step forward and glanced back 
at my body. The mtgua was about as large as this (ten 
inches). My body was not yet lifeless. When the migua 
had made three steps forward, my body dropped, cold and 
dead. I looked at it for some time; it made no movement at 
all.’?+ This soul goes to another region and sees the Father 
who is a handsome Indian. Here it is washed. Now, as Lowie 

* Lowie, Primitive Religion, p. 101. 


SOUL, MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS 293 


points out, a soul that is washed and is ten inches tall does not 
correspond to our notion of spirituality, yet this soul is sup- 
posed to be distinct from, and to consist of a finer essence 
than, the human body. 

There is general agreement among anthropologists and 
psychologists with regard to this early outlook which, follow- 
ing Tylor, is called animism. There seems to have been two 
motives at work. Primitive man notes the difference between 
a living man and the same man when dead and concludes that 
there must be something in him when alive that is absent 
when he is dead. And, in the second place, the savage sees in 
dreams and visionary experiences human shapes which are 
yet different from those he perceives in waking life. Tylor 
was convinced that ‘‘nothing but dreams or visions could have 
ever put into men’s minds such an idea as that of souls being 
ethereal images of bodies.’’ In this fashion, the idea of some- 
thing vital to the living man is combined with the idea of a 
phantom double to form the notion of a ghost-soul. 

This conception has been so influential and so persistent 
that it is well to get it clearly before our minds. The follow- 
ing quotation from McDougall may assist us: ‘‘The belief 
most widely current among the peoples of lower culture is 
that each man consists, not only of the body which is con- 
stantly present among his fellows, but also of a shadowy 
vapour-like duplicate of his body; this shadow-like image, 
the animating principle of the living organism, is thought to 
be capable of leaving the body, of transporting itself rapidly, 
if not instantaneously, from place to place, and of manifesting 
in those places all or most of the powers that it exerts in the 
body during waking life. Sleep is regarded as due to its 
temporary withdrawal from the body; trance, coma, and 
other serious illness, as due to longer absence; and death is 
thought to imply its final departure to some distant place.’’ ? 
It appears, then, that the ghost-soul was a theory suggested to 
the mind of primitive man to explain a great many phenomena 

4McDougall, Body and Mind, p. 1. 


294 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


in which he was passionately interested. The imaginal basis 
of such a theory manifests itself in such terms as manes, 
shade, spirit, ruach, amma, pneuma. I well remember that 
an old Norwegian woman once told me, when I was a boy, 
that the soul is the breath, and her reason was just this one, 
which primitive man was influenced by, that the breath leaves 
the body when an individual dies. 

This semi-material spirit, which was conceived as the source 
of life and of feeling, thinking and acting, was thus modelled 
upon the shadow, the breath, and the experiences had in 
dreams. We must remember that early man had no scientifie 
explanations of these phenomena as we have them to-day. 
He did not know that shadow is due to the interception of 
light, that breath is air and water-vapour, that dreams are 
centrally-aroused experiences. He thought that the dead 
actually spoke to the living in dreams and that, in sleep, this 
ghost-soul travelled away from the body. Those who remem- 
ber their Iliad and the Bible will recall how Patroclus ap- 
pears to Achilles in his sleep and how Samuel is called out 
of Sheol to speak to Saul. It is obvious that modern spiritism 
is not far removed from this primitive outlook. Do we not 
hear of people photographing spirits? Do not spirits rap 
upon the walls of houses and upon tables and take up their 
residence in the bodies of mediums? Much of what we eall 
superstition is the survival of this primitive theory. 


The Mind-Soul in Ancient Philosophy.—Thus far we have 
used the terms mind and soul almost interchangeably. Our 
excuse must be the historical one that for centuries they were 
so used. Even the Greek and Roman philosophers hardly 
distinguish between the two. More than this, they did not at 
first distinguish very sharply between matter and spirit. The 
matter by means of which the early physicists undertook to 
explain nature was something vital and active, something with 
many potencies. It was not until Plato that the dualism 
between matter and spirit with which tradition has made us 
all so familiar began to take shape. In the sixth century, 


SOUL, MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS 295 


Anaximines of Miletus taught that ‘‘our soul, which is air, 
rules us.’’ Heracleitus of Ephesus, the philosopher of be- 
eoming, looked upon the world-soul as a sort of fire and held 
that it is the fire in us that is our life and our reason, a view 
which appears again among the Stoics. Anaxagoras, to whom 
Socrates and Plato referred as one who almost anticipated 
their teaching, believed that mind ordered the elements. But 
this mind turns out to be only a very fine kind of matter 
which acts in a vital, physical way. In our discussion of 
materialism, we have already examined the teaching of Demo- 
eritus. For him, we saw, the soul consists of the smooth, 
subtle fire-atoms which penetrate the body. These fire-atoms 
give us different experiences in different parts of the body. 
In the brain, they give us thought, in the heart, anger, in the 
liver, desire. Death is the cessation of this differentiated play 
of fire-atoms. 

But it was not these early thinkers, only, who thought of 
the mind-soul as material, even though of fine stuff. The 
Epicureans and Stoics, very influential schools of the Hellen- 
istic period, were just as materialistic in their thinking. The 
Epicureans followed Democritus and believed that the soul 
when unprotected by the body would soon blow to pieces and 
vanish. It was too fragile a thing to last alone. This school 
was outspoken in its disbelief in immortality. We find such 
epitaphs as ‘‘ We are mortal; we are not immortal.’’ ‘‘I was 
not, I was; I am not; I do not care.’’ The Stoics followed 
Heracleitus and taught that the soul is a bit of the world-fire 
or world-reason which is God. We can speak of them as 
energists and pantheists. They were inclined to take the 
possibility of immortality seriously, though, as we find in 
Marcus Aurelius, they felt no dogmatic certainty. 

But it is Plato who is responsible for the development of 
the immaterialistic conception of the mind-soul. Undoubtedly, 
his point of departure is animism—perhaps the animism of the 
Orphics with their belief in transmigration of souls. But this 
animism was interpreted in the light of his rationalistic 


296 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


metaphysics. The mind beholds ideas, or forms, which are 
eternal and immutable. And the mind which beholds these 
supersensible realities is in a measure like them. The soul 
belongs to the unseen, and the body to the seen. The 
Phaedo is one of the great documents of this direction of 
thought. Socrates, who is in prison, discusses the nature of 
the soul and the possibility of immortality with his disciples. 
The whole Dialogue should, of course, be read at some time, 
but a brief excerpt must serve our present purpose. ‘* When 
the soul and the body are united, then nature orders the soul 
to rule and govern, and the body to obey and serve. Now 
which of these two functions is akin to the divine and which to 
the mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be that 
which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal that which is 
subject and servant? True. And which does the soul re- 
semble? The soul resembles the divine, and the body the 
mortal—there can be no doubt of that, Socrates.’’ Taking 
the soul as divine, Plato argues for its pre-existence and 
distinctness from the body. It is simple, unitary and 
indecomposable. 

But we must not neglect another aspect of the question. 
Plato was a keen psychologist and was quite aware of the © 
complexity and variety of our experiences. Following this 
direction, he taught a tripartite division of the soul as im- 
mersed in the body. There is the appetitive part connected 
with the belly, and to this is to be assigned all our gross desires 
and appetites; there is the will, or spirited part, which listens 
to reason, and this is to be correlated with the breast and 
heart; and, finally, there is the rational part connected with 
the head. It is this last part, alone, which is really divine 
and unchangeable. 

Aristotle was in all essentials a Platonist, and yet he wished 
to avoid the sharp dualisms which Plato gloried in. Thus he 
wanted to bring body and soul closer together. The soul is 
the organizing form of the body. We can distinguish, he 
thinks, three levels or elements in the soul, the nutritive soul, 


SOUL, MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS 297 


the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. The nutritive soul 
is the vital principle which organizes matter and forms the 
body. All living things have this kind of a soul. Animals 
have, further, the sensitive soul which enables them to sense 
their environment and respond to it. But man has a rational 
soul which consists of two parts, passive reason and active 
reason. The passive reason corresponds more to what we 
would call association and imagination. The active reason is 
creative and directive. It is the truly divine part in us, that 
part which may be immortal. 

It must be admitted that Aristotle left certain aspects of 
this view of the mind-body problem indefinite. Does the soul 
stand to the body in the same relation as a sailor to his boat, 
as he somewhere suggests? Or is the relation of form and 
matter more intimate? Some of his peripatetic (the name of 
his school as the Academy was the name of Plato’s) successors 
dropped back into naturalism and denied that there is any 
dualism. The Christian Church in the period of scholasticism 
adopted Aristotelianism as its philosophy but gave emphasis 
to the dualistic, Platonic trend. At the time of the Renais- 
sance, this traditional interpretation was challenged and 
mortality deduced as a consequence. 

Under the influence of mystical, religious motives the soul 
gradually becomes increasingly non-spatial and _ ethereal. 
The terms used are dominantly negative. In Plotinus we have 
the culmination of this movement which is rightly called Neo- 
Platonism. Its effects continue to this day and appear in 
some measure in the teaching of Bergson. Thought breaks 
through the laws and methods of logic. The soul is said to 
be present in all the parts of the body and yet entirely in all 
parts and in the whole. There is interpenetration of some 
immaterial kind. The soul can laugh at the nature of space. 
Fullerton’s comment is worth quoting: ‘‘ What he tried to do 
is clear, and it seems equally clear that he had good reason for 
trying to doit. But it appears to us now that what he actually 
did was to make of the mind or soul a something very like an 


298 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


inconsistent bit of matter, that is, something in space, and yet 
not exactly in space, a something that can be in two places at 
once, a logical monstrosity. That his doctrine did not meet 
with instant rejection was due to the fact, already alluded to, 
that our experience of the mind is something rather dim and 
elusive, It is not easy for a man to say what it is, and, hence, 
it is not easy for a man to say what it is not.’’} 

As we have already pointed out, the Platonic-Aristotelian 
view of the mind-soul as an immaterial substance temporarily 
allocated to the body and accounting for its life and the 
individual’s experiences dominated the Middle-Ages. These © 
were the centuries of faith and of easily accepted tradition. 
With the rise of science and the re-birth of analytic enquiry, 
the theory of the mind-soul passed to another stage. 

Mind in Modern Philosophy.—It is generally admitted 
that a new era in the envisagement of the mind-body relation 
dawned with Descartes. It was not that the traditional 
dualism was challenged, for it was not; it was rather in the 
new interpretation of the body that the novelty lay. The 
body was conceived by Descartes as a complicated machine. 
Animals, he held, are purely machines, while man is a machine 
with a soul which guides it. But he did not leave the matter 
there. He went on to suggest a principle of explanation. 
The behavior of animals can be regarded as the resultant of 
reflexes. A reflex is a mechanical response to a stimulus, and 
is exemplified in the knee-jerk and in the swift closing of the 
eyes at the approach of an object. An animal is, of course, 
a very complicated machine but complication does not alter 
the scheme of construction. Why assume, then, that animals 
are conscious? Consciousness is a function of the soul and 
not of the body. And there is no good reason of a theological 
sort to suggest that animals have souls. In fact, the assump- 
tion would lead to all kinds of theological difficulties, for souls 
are naturally immortal. We may say, then, that Descartes 
solved the traditional mind-body problem for animals by 

4Fullerton, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 104, 


SOUL, MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS 299 


simply deciding that there is no such problem. The body 
is the sole reality in this case, and it is a mechanical system. 
We shall see that many modern psychologists desire to solve 
the problem in the same way for man. 

But a human being is a soul as well as a body. It will be 
remembered that Descartes postulated two kinds of substances, 
extended substance and thinking substance. The essence of 
the human mind-soul is thinking, and it is immaterial and 
unextended. Less mystical than Plotinus, Descartes bravely 
located this immaterial soul in the pineal gland of the brain. 
There it was supposed to sit and control the movements of the 
animal spirits of the brain, or, as we would say, the nervous 
currents. This position is technically called interactionism. 
The modern interactionist, as we shall see, is vaguer in his 
theories as to how these two realities, which are by theory 
alien to each other, secure effective contact, but the gist of the 
position is contained in Descartes. And here we must make 
another comment. The Cartesian position differs from the 
traditional animistic position, which goes back to primitive 
times and from the great classic tradition, which we found 
characteristic of Plato and Aristotle, chiefly in the new theory 

of the body. 

The historians of philosophy and psychology are very well 
agreed that two parallel and, in a way, supplementary de- 
velopments now took place. On the one hand, the mechanical 
conception of the body became dominant, and, on the other 
hand, the mind-soul was replaced by consciousness, conceived 
as a stream of ideas. <A very brief description of these develop- 
ments will be sufficient for our purpose. 

We have already studied the larger aspects of the mechan- 
istic conception of organisms in the preceding chapter. Our 
conclusions were, in essentials, the following: The mechanistic 
outlook grew up in the service of experimental demands and 
as the expression in the biological field of the idea of cause- 
and-effect nexus. It was opposed to vitalistic and animistic 
dualism with its assumption that nature was not a closed 


300 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


system but, instead, a system which was constantly being 
interfered with from outside in incalculable ways. Internally, 
the mechanistic view was naive and incredibly simple-minded. 
It undertook to carry the current views of physics over into 
biology without any essential modification. We must re- 
member that these were pre-evolutionary days and that even 
physics was largely a matter of molar mechanics because so 
little was known of the details of physical changes, What 
must we say of this movement? I think that we must say that 
it was the sole fruitful direction for science to take. What it 
needed was an internal correction in the direction of a de- 
velopment of its categories; and it is this correction which, as 
we have seen, is taking place to-day. We have suggested that 
the idea of levels of causality, expressive of levels of organiza- 
tion, offers this correction. The essential feature of the 
mechanistic view still remains, viz..—its denial of a non- 
physical principle. 

The second development was the substitution of a stream of 
econs*iousness for the substantial mind-soul of the classic 
animistic tradition. Locke began this development by his 
genial skepticism. He even admitted the possibility of a 
peculiar sort of materialism. He writes: ‘‘It is not much 
more remote from our comprehension to conceive this (that 
God should give matter the power to think) than to conceive 
that God should superadd to matter another substance with a 
faculty of thinking ; since we know not in what thinking con- 
sists nor to what sort of substances the first eternal thinking 
Being has been pleased to give that power.’’ I cannot forbear 
quoting another passage from Locke which shows both his 
vigorous common sense and his bewilderment: ‘‘Every one 
finds in himself, that his soul can think, will, and operate on 
his body, in the place where that is; but cannot operate on a 
body, or in a place an hundred miles distant from it. Nobody 
can imagine that his soul can think or move a body at Oxford, 
whilst he is at London; and cannot but know that, being 
united to his body, it constantly changes place all the whole — 


SOUL, MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS 301 


journey between Oxford and London, as the coach or horse 
does that carries him.’’? 

The steps by which consciousness came to replace the mind- 
soul of tradition are extremely interesting. The student will 
recall the rise of empiricism as represented by Locke, Berkeley 
and Hume. It will be remembered how Hume denied that 
he could find in his experience anything corresponding to the 
soul of tradition. Every idea must spring from some 1m- 
pression or more immediate experience. But there is no im- 
pression to which this notion of a spiritual substance cor- 
responds. It is, therefore, quite an illusion, or fiction, to 
which it is more than doubtful whether any clear idea cor- 
responds. As a challenge to rationalism, this introspective 
analysis of Hume’s appears quite valid and it has, in fact, 
been carried farther by modern psychology. Is it not, how- 
ever, too phenomenalistic? And, of course, it neglects the 
historical development of the idea of a ghost-soul. It is this 
which anthropology has enabled us to comprehend. The 
eighteenth century was not given to the historical interpre- 
tation of ideas. 

But it is the positive side of this empirical movement in 
which we are at present chiefly interested. It would seem that 
both philosophy and psychology fell into the mistake of con- 
sidering consciousness as a mosaic of elements called ‘‘ideas.”’ 
These ideas are bound together by association much as phy- 
sical things are supposed to be bound together by gravity. 
The work of the mental sciences was, then, to analyze these 
ideas and correlate them with nervous processes. The tradi- 
tion on both sides was to neglect organization and to empha- 
size supposed units. We shall have more to say about this 
outlook and its weaknesses in the next chapter. Suffice it to 
point out here, that the Cartesian dualism was replaced by a 
eonsciousness-body dualism, both sides of this more empirical 
dualism being analyzed into as simple elements as possible. 
The logical result of this dualism was epiphenomenalism, the 

1Locke, Hssay, bk. 2, chap. 23, sec. 20. 


302 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


view that the stream of ideas which accompanies changes in 
the brain is merely a shadowy dupleation. And this epiphe- 
nomenalism was naturally continually on the point of lapsing 
into extreme materialism. 

Unsatisfactory as this outlook appears to us now, it seemed 
for a long time the best that philosophy and psychology could 
accomplish. The result was a psychology without a soul. 
The hypothesis of a soul did not seem to be of any interpre- 
tative value. William James put this in his inimitable way, 
and I eannot do better than quote from his Hibbert Lectures: 
‘‘Yet it is not for idle or fantastical reasons that the notion 
of the substantial soul, so freely used by common men and the 
more popular philosophies, has fallen upon such evil days, 
and has no prestige in the eyes of critical thinkers. It only 
shares the fate of other unrepresentable substances and prin- 
ciples. They are without exception all so barren that to 
sincere inquirers they appear as little more than names 
masqueradine—Wo die begriffe fehlen da stellt ein wort zur 
rechten zeit sich ein. You see no deeper into the fact that a 
hundred sensations get compounded or known together by 
thinking that a ‘soul’ does the compounding than you see 
into a man’s living eighty years by thinking of him as an 
octogenarian, or into our having five fingers by calling us 
pentadactyls. Souls have worn out both themselves and their 
welcome, that is the plain truth.’ + 

The Kantian-Idealistic Tradition—In our sketch of the 
changing attitude toward the mind-soul, we have stressed the 
development among empiricist, scientific circles of the so-called 
‘psychology without a soul.’’ Certainly, the soul-substances 
of scholastic traditions fell upon evil days. Associational 
psychology came to the front, and these principles of associa- 
tion were given a neurological foundation, largely in terms of 
contiguity, recency and frequency. It increasingly seemed as 
though the organism were the primary unit and the flow of 
consciousness but a reflection of blind nervous events. In the 

+ James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 209-10. 


SOUL, MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS 303 


next chapter, we shall examine the later developments of this 
trend and point out the differences between structural psy- 
chology, functional psychology, behaviorism and Freudian- 
ism. We shall see that a spirit of deeper questioning fell upon 
psychology. I do not think it is misleading to say that psy- 
chology and biology have come ever closer together. The 
feeling is that a dualism is impossible. But, as yet, no con- 
sensus of opinion has been reached on how to restate and 
relate mind, consciousness and the organism. 

But it would hardly be justifiable in this semi-historical 
survey of the theories of mind in modern philosophy to omit 
completely the perspective characteristic of the Kantian- 
Idealistic tradition. Fortunately, our introductory survey has 
made us fairly familiar with this tradition. All that we need 
to do is to point out its disagreement with the empiricist 
standpoint. The empiricism of Hume and his successors 
looked upon the mind as a bundle, or constellation, of ideas or 
perceptions. Kant, on the contrary, stressed the reality and 
significance of relations. Such relations presuppose, he be- 
lieved, an active agent which introduces order into the mani- 
fold of sensations. It is this active agent which Kant called 
the a priort wuty of apperception, From this centre as a 
source radiate order and complication in the field of experi- 
ence. Kant was led to distinguish between the subject and 
the empirical self, which is but another object along with 
other phenomena. To make a long story short, this idea of a 
basic subject to which all experience is relative became a tradi- 
tion in much of modern philosophy. It is said that the subject 
is active and synthetic and is not for a moment to be com- 
pared with the spiritual soul-substance of tradition. All 
psychology implies a self which is not merely an idea or 
presentation but something more basic which has the idea or 
presentation. 

Though critical toward many of Kant’s assumptions, many 
contemporary psychologists and philosophers are yet con- 
vineced that psychology cannot leave a basic self out of its 


304 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


data and resolve consciousness into a mosaic of mental ele- 
ments called ideas and feelings. For them, the ultimate units 
of psychology are ‘I feel something,’ ‘I know something,’ 
and ‘I will something.’ James Ward, Mary W. Calkins and 
McDougall are representatives of this outlook. It may be 
called a self-psychology. In fact, that is how Miss Calkins 
defines psychology ; it.is the science of the self as conscious. 

But what is the self? For Kant, the self was an unknow- 
able source of syntheses. Let us remember that many of these 
writers are idealists in their philosophy or else frank dualists 
who regard the material world as a mechanism capable only 
of automatic action. The situation is a fascinating one, and 
we shall examine it in some detail in the next chapter. I shall 
make the suggestion that we are to-day the witnesses of the 
rise of a functional view of mind and that the self-psychol- 
ogists, like the animists of biology, are critics of the atomic, 
sensationalistic views of traditional empiricism but critics 
who lean on the past. Like the vitalists, they do not take 
evolution seriously. The result is the tendency to think of 
the self, not as a functional growth which lifts life to a higher 
level, but as an entity attached to the body. 

The New Currents in Psychology.—We hear to-day very 
frequently of the ‘‘new psychology’’ just as we hear of the 
‘‘new physies.’’ Things are moving very rapidly, indeed, in 
this field, and, as a consequence, there is much bewilderment. 
Let us not forget that the theoretical problems involved in 
psychology are tremendous in their scope. To determine what 
consciousness and mind are and to locate them in nature is no 
easy task. Nothing less is involved than a new philosophy 
of nature. The psychologist must understand his data and his 
categories and yet relate them to the data and categories of 
biology and of chemistry. We have seen how difficult the 
biologist found a similar task. And I do think that it is 
undeniable that the problem of naturalizing mind and con- 
sciousness, of fitting them into the outline which the inorganic 
sciences sketched, is still more difficult. I would say that, on 


SOUL, MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS 305 


the whole, the philosophy of the past has not been of much 
assistance. And yet I do not see how psychology could answer 
these questions apart from philosophy. The psychologist who 
has an answer for them zs a philosopher. But if this is the 
demand upon the theoretical psychologist, we must admit that 
the situation in psychology has not, on the face of it at least, 
been of much assistance. Psychology has been split up into 
groups. There are the animal psychologists, the medical psy- 
chologists or psychiatrists, the industrial psychologists and the 
usual academic group carrying on the tradition of normal, 
human psychology. This diversity has brought specialization 
of interest and of terms. And yet out of this very diversity 
it would seem that a larger view-point with more adequate 
ideas of mind and of consciousness is slowly arising. I shall 
argue that a functional view of mind and consciousness is 
taking shape which, when clarified, will completely replace the 
traditional dualism formulated by Descartes which reached its 
logical expression in epiphenomenalism, that is, the thesis that 
mind has no efficacy in nature. The re-interpretation involved 
will be profound and will demand an evolutionary placement 
and definition of mind. 

It is wrong to exaggerate the new currents which have given 
_ renewed life to psychology ; yet Freudianism and animal psy- 
chology have been undeniably effective in determining a larger 
perspective. To Freudianism we owe, perhaps, an increased 
interest in the dynamic and complex character of mind. In 
spite of the exaggerations of which it has been guilty, it has 
called attention to the desires and tendencies which are strug- 
eling for control of the organism. It has in this way re- 
enforced, and made more specific, the tradition of voluntarism. 
To animal psychology we owe that outlook which we call 
behaviorism. Behaviorism has stood for the continuity of 
man with the animals and for the objective study of mind. 
By so doing, it has realized the total setting of mind in the 
organism and the part played in it by instinct and habit. 
Even the glands have come in for their share of recognition in 


306 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


the total economy of the organism. All this leads to a concrete 
idea of mind. Mind as a static substance is in these days 
scarcely conceivable. 

So much for our historical survey of soul, mind and con- 
sciousness. Let us now interrogate contemporary psychology 
with the aim of eliciting its categories and interpreting them 
in the light of the view of nature which we have been 
constructing. 

REFERENCES 


HumMeE, Treatise of Human Nature, part 4. 

JAMES, A Pluralistic Universe, lect. 5. 
McDoucGa.u, Body and Mind, chaps. 1, 2, and 3. 
RUSSELL, Analysis of Mind. 

Hout, The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics. 
FrEeuD, The Interpretation of Dreams. 

Tytor, Primitive Culture. 

PATRICK, Introduction to Philosophy, chap. 17. 


CHAPTER XXI 
PSYCHOLOGY AS A NATURAL SCIENCE 


The Situation in Psychology.—Just as we turned to biol- 
ogy for specialized knowledge of living things, so we now 
turn to psychology for a similar knowledge of intelligent, 
living things. There can be no doubt that psychology by 
reason of its years of persistent and patient investigation has 
obtained a rich store of knowledge in regard to human and 
animal behavior and in regard to what we ordinarily eall 
mental processes such as perceiving, remembering, reasoning, 
etc. This information has led to the development of theories 
and to the rise of analyzed concepts. The psychologist has a 
better sense of what goes on when a person perceives, acts, 
reasons, remembers, wishes, than has the individual who has 
merely perceived or remembered without trying to study 


_ these activities. 


In spite of this knowledge, present-day psychology is a 
little non-plussed about its subject-matter. Violent disputes 
have broken out, and belligerent schools have been formed. 
We hear of structuralists and functionalists, mechanistic psy- 
chology and purposive psychology, introspectionists and be- 
haviorists. And even these schools have their subdivisions. 
This situation is not to be deplored but welcomed, for it means 
that psychology has reached the stage of self-consciousness and 
that it is no longer willing to live on inherited concepts. 
What, after all, is consciousness? What are mental states? 
What should we mean by the subjective? Is science limited 
to external observation? Or is psychology the only science 
which can use introspection because of its subject-matter? 
In philosophy there has been in the New Realism a distinct 

307 


308 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


dislike of the subjective. It is not surprising that the same 
dislike has spread to psychology. The following excerpt from 
an article in the Psychological Review by an author who leans 
towards behaviorism expresses the situation as it still holds: 
‘There is evidence at present of a pronounced disposition to 
pause for a consideration of fundamentals. What is psy- 
chology anyway,—what is its subject-matter and what are its 
methods? The stock definition that it is concerned with ‘the 
description and explanation of states of consciousness as such,’ 
states of consciousness being something which everybody 
knows and nobody can define, has fallen or is falling into 
disrepute.’’* Objective psychology or psychology as a natural 
science, it is said, studies behavior, and behavior is something 
observable. The reactions of the white rat which learns a 
specially prepared labyrinth give data which are open to all in 
exactly the same way that the reactions of chemicals in a test- 
tube are. Is not this, and this alone, science? The older 
psychology was less concerned with behavior and more with 
the characteristics of mental processes and their conditions as 
determined by introspection. The demand facing the modern 
psychology is to do justice to all the investigations which 
throw light upon intelligent behavior and to work out a point 
of view which harmonizes them. 

Let us recall that, as we passed from physics and chemistry 
to biology, we became aware of something novel about living 
things that only a new and specialized science could adequately 
deal with. We examined the controversy between mechanists 
and vitalists and suggested an outlook which, while nearer 
mechanism than vitalism, seemed to do justice to the empirical 
facts by enlarging the rather rigid, inherited categories of 
biology. Must not something of the same sort be done for 
psychology? In both cases, the scientists concerned have 
slowly been working out a more plastic outlook. In fact, 
it would make the philosopher hesitant if the ideas which came 


2 Bode, Psychology as a Science of Behavior, Psychological Review, 
1914. 


PSYCHOLOGY AS A NATURAL SCIENCE — 309 


to him as illuminative had not already begun to suggest them- 
selves to the investigators familiar with their fields and its 
demands. Now psychology appears to be in much the position 
that biology is in; only the difficulties are, if anything, greater 
for psychology. 

The Classic Tradition.—Let us begin our discussion with 
a few typical definitions of psychology expressive of the 
classic tradition. One from Titchener is as follows: ‘‘Psy- 
chology may be defined as the science of mental processes. 
Each of the three terms included in the definition requires a 
brief explanation. A process is any object of scientific knowl- 
edge which is not a ‘thing.’ A ‘thing’ is permanent, rela- 
tively unchanging, definitely marked off from other things. 
A process is, by etymology, a ‘moving forward.’ It is a 
becoming something,—a continuous operation, a progressive 
change, which the scientific observer can trace throughout its 
course. .. . A mental process is a process in the origination 
and continuance of which we are ourselves necessarily con- 
cerned,—a process the nature of which is determined by the 
constitution and functions of an organism, an organized 
individual.’’? Angell, who is generally regarded as one of 
the leaders of the functionalists, defined psychology in much 
the same way: ‘‘Mental facts, or facts of consciousness, con- 
stitute the field of psychology.’’? One of the latest writers 
on the subject continues this tradition and asserts that psy- 
chology is the science of the mind (consciousness, mental life, 
or other more or less equivalent expressions) and that some 
other term must be invented for the science of behavior.® 

It follows from these definitions that the facts of psychology 
concern the experience of individuals. The terms, mental and 
conscious, have taken on the meaning of that which is an 
element in the individual’s field of experience. Both of these 
terms are, perhaps, unfortunate because they so easily carry 


1Titchener, An Outline of Psychology, pp. 7-8. 

7 Angell, Psychology, p. 1 

*J. S. Moore, “Behavior vs. Introspective Psychology,” Psychological 
Review, 1923. 


310 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


with them old traditions of dualism. As a science, psychology 
makes no such assumption. It studies its own class of facts in 
accordance with the methods it has found useful. It may 
well leave it to philosophy or to the growth of science, itself, 
to determine whether any dualism is necessary. 

It would have been well if orthodox psychology had more 
generally adopted a more neutral terminology. On the whole, 
the definition of an English psychologist, Stout, seems to 
fulfil this demand better than the definitions already given. 
He writes: ‘‘ Psychology is the science of the processes whereby 
an individual becomes aware of a world of objects and ad- 
justs his actions accordingly.’’ This definition stresses those 
processes which constitute awareness and behavioristie ad- 
justment. What these processes are is a matter for specific 
investigation. 

So pervasive has been the dualistic tradition that the author 
of this very satisfactory definition proceeds to assert that 
psychology does not aim at increasing our knowledge of the 
material world, an assertion which assumes that the individual 
is not a part of the material world, for are not these processes, 
studied by psychology, said to be processes of an individual? 


On the face of it, psychology would seem to deal with all the — 


processes constitutive of awareness and response on the part 
of individual organisms. There would seem to be no need to 
divide the organism into two kinds of things, mind and body 
respectively, unless such a division is absolutely forced upon 
the science by the facts. 

The Method of Introspection.—The chief method of classic 
psychology was introspection, And I do think that it is 
undeniable that much was accomplished by means of the 
method. It was first used in an individual and uncontrolled 
way by the early empiricists and was later connected with 
experimental technique by men like Fechner and Wundt. 
Introspection is simply self-observation, the noting of relevant 
data in his experience by the subject of an experiment. It is 
contrasted with usual scientific observation which deals with 


PSYCHOLOGY AS A NATURAL SCIENCE © 311 


things external to the individual observing and employs the 
sense-organs of external perception. 

The unfortunate thing was that introspection was often 
considered a sort of intuition which could not go astray. 
When it did go astray and led to distinctions and beliefs 
which had later to be given up as untenable, it was hastily 
condemned by certain groups. As a matter of fact, intro- 
_ spection is just as complex a process as external perception. 
It requires training. Not every one is a good introspectionist. 
Moreover, covert, or subjective processes, are very complex 
and variable. A bit of experimental work should be done over 
and over again and with different subjects; and there should 
be no suggestion as to what the subject ought to find. If, 
under these conditions, there is a fair amount of agreement, 
something has been accomplished. It should also be remem- 
bered that individuals do actually differ. 

But because of the dualistic tradition in psychology the 
limitations of introspection were not fully recognized. It was 
often supposed that, since consciousness was a sort of separate 
stuff, it could be studied completely and, as it were, in isola- 
tion by this method and that this was the only method which 
could get in contact with it. But this view of consciousness 
has been going by the board and is clearly a dogma rather 
than something inevitable. In short, psychology has no need 
to begin with such an assumption. It is studying all the 
processes constitutive of awareness and behavior; and 
it may easily be that awareness is inseparable from a kind of 
behavior. 

It is probable, then, that psychology will come to the con- 
clusion that introspection is a valuable method which enables 
us to study the incipient stages of behavior, those covert proc- 
esses which have developed between stimulus and response. 
The ultimate fact seems to be that the subject of an experi- 
ment is in his consciousness on the inside of these processes 
and that he can observe them in a way that the observer 
cannot, On the other hand, the observer can note facts of 


312 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


overt behavior and gather significant data—often of a quan- 
titative sort—which supplement the data of introspection. 

It would seem, then, that psychology must simply rid itself 
of the fear that consciousness is something subjective in a 
dualistic and mysterious sense. Consciousness is, on the 
face of it, merely intra-organic and intrinsic to the activities 
and responses of a person. Back of all this dislike of con- 
sciousness and introspection is a naive epistemology which is 
not aware that all science is a product of mental operations of 
observation and reasoning. The difference between introspec- 
tion and extrospection is one of direction. In extrospection 
we are dealing with things and using our sense-organs and 
hands. Furthermore, we can develop methods of manipula- 
tive measurement. In introspection, we are cut off from these 
methods and we can employ no sense-organs. All we can do 
is to attend to processes as these develop in us. But, in both 
eases, the individual must be active and gather data. In 
short, the growth of neo-realism and pragmatism has given 
psychology a wrong idea of what science is. The bias of 
physical science has also operated. Critical realism is able to 
give a better perspective. 

The Method of External Observation.—By quite general 
consent, Watson is regarded as the leader in this country of 
extreme behaviorism. The psychologists of other countries 
have hardly ever gone to the extreme position advocated by 
him and those who have allied themselves with him. There is 
gvood reason for believing that Watson went to this extreme 
under the mistaken idea that consciousness necessarily in- 
volved dualism and the entering wedge of supernaturalism. 
Also, we must remember that Watson began his career as a 
worker in the field of animal psychology and, as is obvious, 
introspection is not available as a method in that field. 

But we are concerned for the moment with the method of 
external observation. The basic query is this: What is it 


that the psychologist can observe in a genuinely scientific © 


dee) 


way? The answer is, ‘‘Behavior.’’ Even language is a kind 


PSYCHOLOGY AS A NATURAL SCIENCE — 3213 


of behavior of a specialized type. To be scientific, we must 
have a science of the other-one; we must get beyond auto- 
biography. Watson classifies behavior under four headings: 
(1) explicit habit-responses, (2) implicit habit-responses, 
(3) explicit hereditary responses, and (4) implicit hereditary 
responses. Methods have been developed for studying condi- 
tioned secretion reflexes and conditioned motor reflexes, also, 
for studying verbal responses. Into the detail of this work 
it is not our task to go. Suffice it to say that good results 
have been obtained which give insight into the functioning of 
man and other animals. Of the value of this work there can 
be no doubt. It is thoroughly scientific.* 

A Combination of Methods.—The majority of psycholo- 
gists are ready to use both of these methods, which, it is 
thought, should supplement one another. One point is some- 
times obscured. It is this, that all scientific observation rests 
ultimately upon external observation and agreements due to 
this external observation. This agreement comes through 
language, which is a verbal affair which supplements the less 
delicate means of communication. But while language is 
used in physics, chemistry and biology solely as a means of 
communication and statement of external observations and 
their logical interpretation, in psychology it is used as a 
method of communicating by the subject to the experimenter 
the experiences which the subject has had, experiences which 
are supposedly personal to the subject, though of general im- 
port. These experiences are also supposedly relevant to the 
problem under investigation and supplementary to the ob- 
servation of the subject’s muscular behavior. That language- 
behavior is expressive of processes taking place in the higher 
nervous centers, processes which are in part conscious, is 
the assumption underlying this combination of methods. 

It has been well pointed out that we combine these methods 
in everyday life to give an adequate meaning to such terms 


The student should look over the introductory chapters of Watson’s 
Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. 


314 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY | 


as playing, hating, attending. I am glad to be able in this 
connection to quote with approval from a writer with whose 
general philosophical position I disagree. ‘‘The concept of 
behavior, so we would deliberately and emphatically suggest,”’ 
writes Hoernlé, ‘‘has precisely the great merit that it permits 
us to use the terms of ordinary life, the total meaning of 
which combines within itself the experience of the observer 
describing others and the experience of the subject expressing 
his feelings and thoughts. The meaning, e.g., of ‘playing’ 
is derived hardly less from seeing others play than from 
playing oneself. Neither way of experience by itself is ade- 
quate or sufficing. One has to do or suffer a thing, in 
order to ‘know what it feels like,’ to realize it in terms of one’s 
own sensations of movement with their attendant pleasure 
orpalne? 

All but the extreme behaviorists recognize that the situa- 
tion is of this sort. What they are opposed to is mentalism 
in a dualistic sense. Often, however, the swing of the pendu- 
lum is extreme before the adequate perspective is gained. We 
shall try to show that psychology has been brought face to face 
in an unprepared state with the problems of epistemology 
and with the question of evolution. I have tried to show 
that I appreciate how great these difficulties are. It would 
surprise me greatly if psychology got its point of view worked 
out quickly. If it did, that point of view would be of tre- 
mendous interest to philosophy. 

Different Kinds of Behaviorism.—Many of the younger 
psychologists are favorable to the general idea of behaviorism 
because they recognize that it suggests a more comprehensive 
perspective than was associated with traditional psychology. 
It stresses the organism as the unit of reference and implies 
the categories of organic response and process. Consciousness 
and mind are a suffering and a doing of the organism. The 
traditional perspective of psychology was too dualistic. It 
suggested mind as a separate kind of stuff and was, on the 

*Hoernlé, Matter, Life, Mind and God, p. 156, 


PSYCHOLOGY AS A NATURAL SCIENCE = 315 


whole, friendly to epiphenomenalism, It is felt to-day that 
a deeper analysis of the whole situation is necessary. The 
very notion of mind must be revised in the light of the idea 
of function, or process, and consciousness must be thought of 
as of the nature of a patterned event connected with organic 
functions. 

Clearly, the term behaviorism is as yet equivocal. Only as 
the mind-body problem reaches a generally accepted solution 
will the significance of the term be agreed upon. In the 
meantime, four types of behaviorism are distinguishable. 
Their formulations are as follows: 

(1) Facts of conscious experience exist and are capable of 
treatment, as distinct from behavior. The behaviorist is not 
interested in them, since they are irrelevant to his problems. 
-This is merely psycho-physical parallelism with emphasis on 
the physical. <A scientist who works from this standpoint 
accepts the traditional dualism of mind and body. It may 
be said to carry out Cartesian dualism. The categories of 
psychology are not re-analyzed in the hght of an originative 
evolution. 

(2) Facts of conscious experience exist but are unsuited to 
any form of scientific treatment. This is the common formula- 
tion of the behaviorist’s position. Weiss, Watson in his earlier 
writings, and Yerkes favor this attitude. It may be called 
methodological behaviorism. We have here merely a matter 
of emphasis upon a new set of studies and a refusal to do 
justice to what the older psychology accomplished. Animal 
psychology is to the forefront. 

(3) The supposedly unique facts of consciousness do not 
exist. An account of the behavior of the organism leaves no 
residue of pure psychics. Mind is behavior and nothing else. 
This is Watson’s present position. It may be called radical 
behaviorism. 

(4) Mind is a term for a certain level of organic responses 
and processes centering in the nervous system and finding 
expression in muscular activities. The total response can be 


316 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


called behavior. This position can be called synthetic behav- 
corism. It is clear that, for this position, mind and conscious- 
ness are categories which psychology must add to ordinary 
biology to deepen and enrich it. Ordinary self-consciousness 
and introspection give data to psychology concerning the 
nature of mental responses. This is a monistic, evolutionary 
position.t It is to such a position as this that our own thought 
has been tending. | 

When one glances over the discussions by psychologists of 
the situation in their field, one is immediately impressed by 
the variety of positions taken. There is, first, the compromise 
position. Pillsbury represents this attitude very well. He 
writes: “‘These differences of opinion on theoretical points 
may very well be neglected in the development of a description 
of the mental life. After facts have been collected and laws 
formulated, the fundamental problems may be attacked in the 
light of these results.’’? From the point of view of science 
much can be said for this position. Things will clear up as 
more is known. There is, second, the view that there are 
two kinds of psychology which should have different names. 
The one might well be called behaviorism and the other 
psychology. It is even suggested that a more inclusive science 
to be called psycho-biology might be developed to bring to- 
gether the results of the first two kinds, And there is, third, 
the position that psychological categories must be thoroughly 
explored and revised. It is, of course, to this third position 
that philosophy is attracted. By its very nature, philosophy 
is exploratory and interested in categories. In the next chap- 
ter, we shall examine the traditional mind-body problem, 
stating the usual positions taken and suggesting the proper 
perspective. At present, it is of interest to note that the 
drift in psychology is towards a denial of the validity of the 
traditional dualism. Of course, psychologists are prone to 


*Part of this summary is taken from Lashley’s articles entitled “Be- 
haviorism and Consciousness” in the Psychological Review, 1923. 
? Pillsbury, Fundamentals of Psychology, p. 7. 


PSYCHOLOGY AS A NATURAL SCIENCE 317 


eastigate philosophy as the cause of psychology’s ills. Par- 
ticularly to American scientists who know little about philoso- 
phy does this alibi appeal. The simple truth of the matter is 
that the problem psychology is here confronting is so basic 
that they should not be ashamed of being puzzled by it. But 
some pretty bold and basic suggestions are being made which 
should help philosophy in working out a theory of mind and 
consciousness. Let us always bear in mind that intelligence is 
a higher level than mere life. Should we not expect novel 
properties and characteristics? Psychology must work out its 
own salvation; but there is no reason why philosophy may 
not help it to find itself. A clear-cut epistemology and an 
evolutionary cosmology should be of considerable assistance to 
psychology. 

A Current Paradox.—The epistemological standpoint at 
which we have arrived should aid in bringing order into the 
psychologist’s outlook. It should help to determine what 
science should mean by such terms as ‘subjective’ and ‘objec- 
‘tive.’ Neo-realists, pragmatists and behaviorists have been 
very much afraid of the subjective. It has meant to them a 
survival of the ghost-soul of traditional dualism. But surely 
there is a perfectly legitimate use of the term as meaning 
that which is bound up with the individual experiencer. It 
is a term which indicates the locus of certain events in which 
the psychologist is interested. Existentially, nothing is either 
objective or subjective; it just is. 

From both the logical and the scientific standpoint it would 
be best to throw overboard this term, subjective, as misleading 
and ambiguous and to employ the term consciousness. Con- 
sciousness is real and must be given a locus in reality. Also, 
it must be the object of careful study. The only healthy thing 
to do, then, is to forget the traditional dualism of substances 
and start afresh from the facts. May not consciousness be a 
complex of qualitative events in the brain rather than a 
unique kind of self-sufficient stuff? If so, these events can be 
introspectively studied and correlated also with the behavior 


318 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


of the organism, that is, its functioning, as this is externally 
studied through sense-perception? It is highly probable that 
psychology will work thus from both directions. 

It is suggested that psychology has been the victim of three 
ills: (1) a bad epistemology or none at all; (2) the dualistic 
tradition; and (3) the atomic, mechanical view of both the 
brain and consciousness. It is in the throes of freeing itself. 

Critical realism can, I think, solve a paradox which has 
troubled the psychologist. The paradox arose in connection 
with this question, What is the peculiar subject-matter of 
psychology? We find Titchener writing as follows: ‘‘It is 
the same experience all through; physies and psychology deal 
with the same stuff, the same material; the sciences are Sep- 
arated simply—and sufficiently—by their point of view.’’ 2 
But is this clear? It would appear that an idealistic type of 
epistemology is at work in this statement. As a matter of 
fact, physics and botany try to gain knowledge about physical 
processes and plants by means of data of observation in experi- 
ence and reflection upon those data. The physicist is not 
trying to know about experience as a kind of stuff. But he 
must use data in experience and mental processes in order 
to achieve knowledge about things. What, then, does psychol- 
ogy study? What is its object? Surely the process of indi- 
vidual experience with all that it implies. And this flow of 
experience is always bound up with an individual organism. 
It follows that psychology does have a distinctive subject- 
matter. Now the striking feature of the situation is that this 
distinctive subject-matter can be studied by means of intro- 
spection, which is a sort of self-observation. 

James Ward views the situation in the same way that Titch- 
ener does and, probably, for the same reason. His episte- 
mology has caused the difficulty. ‘‘Paradoxical though it 
may be,’’ writes Ward, ‘‘we must then conclude that psychol- 
ogy cannot be defined by reference to a special subject-matter 
as such concrete sciences, for example, as mineralogy and 

* Titchener, A Text Book of Psychology, chap. 1. (Italics mine.) 


PSYCHOLOGY AS A NATURAL SCIENCE © 319 


botany can be; and, since it deals in some sort with the whole 
of experience, it is obviously not an abstract science in any 
ordinary sense of that term. ... It is by way of expressing 
this that widely different schools of psychology define it as 
subjective, all other positive sciences being distinguished as 
objective.’’ 4 

But if the standpoint we have developed in this text is 
correct, psychology is no more subjective than any other 
science. It is really no wonder that the psychologists who 
think of their science as linked with biology object to such a 
eontrast. The simple and ultimate fact is that all knowledge - 
involves the activity of an observing and reflective organism 
which has experiences. And we must distinguish between 
the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself. All knowl- 
edge, 1.e., data, laws and theories, is within experience as a 
part of its content, when it is not latent. Now the distinguish- 
ing feature of traditional psychology was that this content and 
flow of experience in individuals was itself the object of knowl- 
edge. The only sense in which this object was subjective 
was that it was linked up with subjects or persons. It is not 
subjective in any metaphysical sense or in any logical sense. 
This kind of object, as real, must be linked up with the other 
kinds of objects which the other sciences deal with. And psy- 
chology as a natural science will tend to take a monistie, 
naturalistic position. It will want to fight free from such 
paradoxes as Titchener and Ward set up. And critical realism 
will maintain that it can do so. But, before it can do so, it 
must recognize all the facts. It must realize that man is a 
knower and that knowing is a concrete process taking place in 
imndwidual, intelligent organisms and that all the sciences up 
to psychology can turn away from this fact whereas psychol- 
ogy cannot but must face wp to it. And that is why psychol- 
ogy cannot merely take refuge in biology as the behaviorist 
wants it to do. It has new facts and new categories, 

Another way of putting this same conclusion is to contrast 

*Ward, Art. on Psychology, Ency. Brit. 


320 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


it with Whitehead’s view of Nature. It will be remembered 
that Whitehead feared that the assignment of sense-data to 
mind involved the ‘bifurcation’ of Nature. It does so if mind 
is something outside of Nature. And it is for the physicist, 
but only in the sense that the field of the physicist neglects 
those levels and characteristics of Nature which we have 
ealled biological and psychological. Nature is limited or 
taken selectively. But neither the philosopher nor the psy- 
chologist can admit for a moment that this selection is any- 
thing more than a division of labor. To the physicist, then, 
mind is outside of Nature; to the psychologist, it is not. 
Mind is a term, we have maintained, for individual, organic 
minds, an evolutionary level and product of nature, of which 
the physicist ’s mind is typical. To assign sense-data to such a 
biological mind is not to bifurecate Nature in any Cartesian 
sense but to locate mind in Nature. 

In this discussion it should be clear how critical realism 
and evolutionary naturalism support and confirm one another. 
This coherence is in favor of both. 

An Inclusive Definition of Psychology.—Let us now en- 
deavor to interpret the task and outlook of psychology. It is 
continuous with biology but, while the biological sciences have 
used only extrospective methods, human psychology can add 
introspection or self-observation. In this way, it involves a 
supplementation of biology. 

One of the interesting points in behaviorism has been its 
distinction between behaviorism and physiology. It is now 
pretty well agreed that behaviorism differs from physiology 
in stressing the response of the organism as a whole, or func- 
tioning, system. Watson has brought out this point very 


conclusively. ‘‘Physiology,’’ he says, ‘‘tells us nothing of 


man’s capacity to form and retain habits, nor of the com- 

plexity of man’s habit organization.’’+ Pillsbury puts it 

this way: ‘‘When behavior is modified, not merely by the 

physical stimulus and chance chemical conditions of the 
*Watson, Psychology, p. 21. 


PSYCHOLOGY AS A NATURAL SCIENCE — 321 


organism, but also by the results of earlier behavior, we have 
the first beginnings of intelligence, and the organism offers 
material for psychology.’’? 

We may define psychology, then, as the science of the con- 
scious and unconscious processes essential to intelligent be- 
havior. 

The older associational psychology thought of mind too 
thinly as a series of mental states or a mosaic of ‘ideas.’ The 
spread of a biological perspective plus the suggestions of 
Freudian psycho-analysis has made mind and personality 
something more permanent, more of the nature of a complex 
of systems. It is only in terms of the organism and its capa- 
cities that actual personality can be understood. It is the 
unity of the organism which must be the point of departure 
for interpretation. 

We must, apparently, start with instincts or tendencies in 
the organism tuned to stimuli or situations in the environment 
and ripening with the growth of the organism. The dynamic 
character of such instincts may be ealled conation. Thus 
conation is the functional expression of those large, hereditary 
organizations which we call instincts. These instincts may 
conflict and seek, each in its own way, to dominate the organ- 
ism. Thus conflict is characteristic of organic life. It is 
probable that, at a low level, such conflicts are felt and not 
raised to reflective consciousness. Certain tendencies are 
repressed because they are not victorious in the struggle to 
eapture the control of the organism. But, gradually, impulses 
acquire meaning, and these meanings are raised to the level of 
conscious awareness. It is only at this plane that we have 
consciousness proper, the awareness of a field of experience. 
It is the level of reflection, of deliberation, of choice. 

This way of approach to personality promises to throw a 
flood of light upon it. Personality is a growth, a complex 
organization of dispositions and tendencies, a moving equilib- 
rium like life itself. We have habits, methods, repressions, 

1 Pillsbury, The Fundamentals of Psychology, p. 7. 


322 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


inhibitions, facilitations, integrations. Personality rises and 
falls, integrates and disintegrates. There are those who can- 
not face reality and live in a dream-life. We have here what 
Freud calls ‘‘regression into the infantile.’’ Others are brave 
and face life. These organize their tendencies and habits, 
deliberately repressing that which will not fit in and, per- 
haps, sublimating it by drafting its energy. 

But how about mind and consciousness? These have been 
the supreme categories of past psychology. It is clear that, 
if the position I have been outlining as fairly characteristic 
of recent psychology holds, mind and consciousness as sub- 
stances disappear. Mind must be thought of as a term for 
systematic tendencies and operations which have slowly come 
to pass in the organic world. It is a term covering memory, 
habit, association, reasoning, attention. It is a term for func- 
tions. We have here something which has developed with 
the needs and structure of the organism. It stands for motor- 
sets and action-patterns, for cumulation and organization, for 
instinct and for learning by experience. 

But what about consciousness? We come to the deepest of 
all questions in cosmology. In the next chapter, we shall try 
to offer some suggestions which seem to be along the right 
lines. We must bring consciousness under the category of 
event. We shall suggest that what we call consciousness is a 
patterned complex of events intrinsic to the functioning 
of the brain-mind. In consciousness we are on the inside 
of these events; we are the events. It is not that we have 
knowledge of the time-order of these events from the outside as 
in science. Here, alone, we are on the inside of reality. And it 
should not surprise us to find that in itself reality is capable 
of quality. The colorless, logical pattern which science dis- 
cerns in its necessary stress upon the order and quantity of 
things makes us too easily forget that this is but a translation 
of the form of reality. Reality has a content as well as a 
form. And it is this content at the evolutionary level of mind 
which emerges as guales with which we are acquainted be- 


PSYCHOLOGY AS A NATURAL SCIENCE = 323 


cause, as conscious beings, they constitute that field of aware- 
ness which we are. 

In these matters we are at the heart of cosmology. We 
shall now examine the traditional views of the mind-body 
relation and conclude with an attempt to make clear the situa- 
tion in which we human beings are. 


REFERENCES 


ANGELL, Psychology, chap. 1. 

Bove, Psychological Review, 1914. 

HosuovuseE, Mind In Evolution. 

LASHLEY, ‘Behaviorism and Consciousness,” Psychological Review, 19238. 
PILLSBURY, Fundamentals of Psychology, chap. 1. 

Ward, Psychological Principles, chap. 1. 

Watson, Behavior, chap. 1. 

WARREN, Human Psychology. 

KOHLER, The Mentality of Apes. 


CHAPTER XXII 
THE RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND ORGANISM 


The Mind-Body Problem.—The last two chapters have 
raised problems of intrinsic philosophical significance, but 
they have also been of the nature of a preparation for a 
penetrative discussion of the traditional mind-body problem. 
The first chapter sketched the history of this age-old distine- 
tion and showed the transformations it has undergone and is 
in process of undergoing at the present. The second chapter 
aimed to introduce us to the concepts and perspective of con- 
temporary psychology. The reason for this preparation is 
surely clear. Philosophy does not work in a vacuum nor, like 
the monks of Athos, does it contemplate its own navel in hope 
of illumination. It must immerse itself in the general facts 
and concepts of the sciences and, from that vantage-point, 
press on to an understanding of the categories of the sciences 
as these unfold. And this preparation has suggested to us 
that we are dealing with a high level of evolution in which 
organisms have developed methods, organs and functions of 
adjustment to, and control of, their environment. 

This last way of putting it seems very simple, and behavior- 
ists are quite convinced that the traditional mind-body prob- 
lem is a pseudo-problem, that is, a problem due to a false 
way of looking at the facts. And it is quite apparent that 
there is a good deal of truth in this way of looking at it. Yet 
there is decidedly more to be said about the problem than this. 
In the first place, the behaviorist must explain what he means 
by mind and show that these complex integrations of condi- 
tioned reflexes of which he speaks accurately account for the 


operations of choice and reasoning that the human organism 
324 


RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND ORGANISM 325 


performs. Is there not a system-formation and a process of 
selection which is hardly done justice to by the concept of con- 
ditioned reflexes? In other words, do we not again meet with 
the problem of levels in nature? Is not the mind an organiza- 
tion upon an organization? 

But we have also seen reason to take the category of con- 
sciousness seriously and to accept the view that each of us 
has a private stream of experience in which we are on the in- 
side of nature in a way to need explanation. The delicate 
question is to show how these changing contents are integral 
ingredients of mind and brain. Physical science has so accus- 
tomed us to think of physical systems in terms merely of quan- 
tities and relations that we are almost shocked at the sug- 
gestion that a physical system may contain a qualitative 
eontent. Let us remember that physical science can never 
offer us a glimpse of the stuff of the physical world, but can 
only work out structures, quantities and relations. In our 
consciousness we are a pulse of reality at this high level of 
organization and activity. But just how we are to perceive 
this, just how we are to harmonize consciousness and its char- 
acteristics with the characteristics of neural response remains 
_ a basie question. Unless this can be done, dualism will remain 
a living alternative. We shall find questions a-plenty here 
and of the most subtle and tantalizing sort. 

Finally, let us recall that we have found much of radical 
behaviorism to be motivated by a dislike for traditional psy- 
cho-physical dualism. It would seem that such thinkers do 
not so much object to consciousness and introspection as to 
the view that consciousness is mysterious and apart from nerv- 
ous processes. But many champions of introspection have 
much the same perspective. For them, also, the organism 
is the unit. 

The traditional set of assumptions may be summed up in 
the term Cartesianism. It was supposed that the physical 
world consisted of something clearly alien to consciousness 
and entirely mechanical in its operations. By very definition, 


326 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


there was a dualism between mind and body. It must be 
remembered that, for a long time—in fact, until recently— 
science took the general Cartesian view of the world in a 
fairly orthodox fashion. It did not admit the significance 
of organization, and it did not see that its type of knowledge 
had lmitations. The mind-body problem was accordingly 
left by it to metaphysics with an inner conviction that meta- 
physics could oecupy itself with it until doomsday without 
results. We have been suggesting that this outlook has been 
disintegrating through the very growth of science, on one 
hand, and the keener analysis of philosophy, on the other hand. 
Solutions Offered.mWe can readily divide theories of the 
mind-body relation into two classes, viz.,—dualistic and mon- 
istic. Dualistic theories accept the distinction between the 
material and the immaterial as corresponding to an existen- 
tial division in reality itself. Our historical approach has 
given the setting of this outlook. Monistic theories represent 
endeavors to avoid this dualism. There are the older monistic 
theories and the newer ones. The older theories were either 
dialectical or else the expression of extremes, such as idealism 
and materialism. The newer type of monistic theory is de- 
veloping rather gradually by making the notion of mind more 
concrete and organic and by taking a more evolutionary view 
of physical realities. The whole situation is being more care- 
fully studied. Illuminating principles and categories are be- 
ing achieved by reflection upon the facts instead of being 
assumed in ana priori way. The solution which we will favor 
will express this method of approach. Now that we have a 
clear-cut theory of knowledge and an appreciation of the 
fact of novelty in a physical world, a satisfactory monistic 
view should not be so hard to attain. 
Dualistic Theories.——Dualistic theories divide around the 
question whether or not a causal relation exists between mind 
and body. There are two main dualistic theories, although 
there are varieties of these two. Since our purpose is to gain 
a clear idea of the mind-body problem in its fundamental 


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RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND ORGANISM 327 


aspects we shall not consider mere variations on minor points. 
These often have only historical interest. 

The older and more popular of the two dualistic theories is 
mteractionsm. Interactionism holds that mind and the phys- 
ical world interact causally. Thus it accepts two distinct 
realities and. declares that experience indicates a causal rela- 
tion between them. The advocates of this position always main- 
tain that it covers the facts more naturally than any other 
dualistic position. In sensation, we clearly have the external 
world affecting the body and, through it, the mind; while, in 
volition, the reverse is just as obviously the case. A pin-prick 
gives me a sharp pain and makes me feel uncomfortable. 
Here the body and its happenings affect the mind. My plan 
to read up upon the latest theories in physics causes me to 
drive down to the library to get out a technical magazine. 
Here my conscious purpose controls my body and brings 
about changes in its behavior. And if my consciousness is 
distinct from my body such expressions seem quite justifiable. 
The traditional outlook very naturally took on an interaction- 
istic form. 

Parallelism is the denial of interactionism. The parallelist 
refuses to regard physical and mental events as parts of one 
cause-and-effect order. So impressed is he with the differ- 
ence between the mental and the physical that he finds it 
impossible to admit that there is causal interaction between 
them. He is led to hold that each order is self-sufficient 
and independent, even though they accompany each other 
so assiduously. Parallelism grants a temporal correlation of 
mental events and neural events but denies any more intimate 
relation. 

Let us now examine these two dualistic views a little more 
in detail, considering what can be said in favor of them and 
what against. Suppose that we begin with interactionism. 

Interactionism.— While the acceptance of a causal rela- 
tion between mind and body is the defining characteristic of 
interactionism, we must not ignore the fact that some inter- 


328 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


actionists conceive of the mind and of this relation more 


! 


erudely than do others. We have seen that the mind was 


first looked upon as a ghost-soul of a fairly material texture. 
Probably the relation between soul and body was conceived 


vaguely in a sort of magical way. The soul had mana to do 


things to the body. Again, when the mind was later thought 
of as a complex of fire-atoms, no great theoretical difficulty 
was felt. It was a case of one kind of physical thing affecting 
another. But as the mind was more and more de-materialized 
and extruded from space, difficulties multiplied. How can 
that which is not in space influence and be influenced by that 
which is in space? Does interaction involve a meeting or 
coming together? 

Let us examine a contemporary exposition of interactionism 
which is subtle enough to avoid all the grosser errors of 
earlier expositions. We can easily note its kinship with vital- 
ism. Dr. McDougall writes as follows: ‘‘In a similar way 
we may describe a soul as a swum of enduring capacities for 
thoughts, feelings and efforts of determinate kinds. Since the 
word substance retains the flavour of so many controversial 
doctrines, we shall do well to avoid it as the name for any 
such sum of enduring capacities, and to use instead the word 
thing or being. We may then describe a soul as a being 
that possesses, or is, the sum of definite capacities for psychical 
activity and psycho-physical interaction, of which the most 
fundamental are (1) the capacity of producing, in response to 
certain physical stimuli (the sensory processes of the brain), 
the whole range of sensation qualities in their whole range 
of intensities; (2) the capacity of responding to these sensa- 
tion-complexes with the production of meanings, as, for ex- 
ample, spatial meanings; (3) the capacity of responding to 
these sensations and these meanings with feeling and cona- 
tion or effort, under the spur of which further meanings may 
be brought to consciousness in accordance with the laws of 
reproduction of similars and of reasoning; (4) the capacity 
of reacting upon the brain-processes to modify their course 


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RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND ORGANISM 329 


in a way which we cannot clearly define, but which we may 
provisionally conceive as a process of guidance by which 
streams of nervous energy may be concentrated in a way 
that antagonizes the tendency of all physical energy to dissi- 
pation and degradation.’’ 7 

It seems to me that we must admit these capacities which 
Dr. McDougall enunciates but the basic query is this: Can 
they not be regarded as capacities—partly innate, partly de- 
veloped—of the nervous system? It is, again, the problem of 
levels in nature with new capacities as against the old dead- 
level mechanicalism. But let us consider the objections which 
seem very pertinent to interactionism. 

The objection which science has usually advanced concerns 
the conservation of energy. For modern science, energy is 
neither lost nor gained but merely transformed. Yet here is 
the hypothesis: the brain-event acts upon the soul and so 
energy disappears from the physical world into an immaterial 
world. And, in volition, just the reverse happens. But such 
an open boundary of a physical system is quite opposed to 
the ideas of science. The quantitative form of the principle 
of causality is the energy equivalence of cause and effect, that 
is, the amount of energy, free and potential, in a physical 
system. We must admit, however, that we are dealing here 
with a basic generalization of science and not with an a priort 
truth—it is probable that there are no a priort truths. As a 
matter of fact, this influx of energy has never been detected 
by objective methods; and it is quite obvious to us that mental 
work requires physical energy gained by eating and drinking 
and breathing. 

Another objection calls attention to the implications of this 
relation between soul and body. Each soul must be adjusted 
to its own kind of body, for the soul of a dog is surely not 
like the soul of a man. Whence come these souls? Why is it 
that they are influenced by brain-events? Do they remain 
latent when they do not have a brain to stimulate them? Do 

+ McDougall, Body and Mind, p. 365, first edition, 


330 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


souls evolve step by step with the brain in the animal series? 
Descartes got out of these questions nicely because he did | 
not admit that animals have souls. But the bio-psychologist 
of to-day could hardly take this position. 

Another objection is usually formulated under the heading 
of inconceivability. It is difficult for us to get these two 
kinds of things in juxtaposition, as it were. And yet some- 
thing like juxtaposition seems to be implied by causality. We 
seem to ourselves to have gained some measure of insight into 
physical processes, but we are non-plussed in any attempt 
to understand how a soul can regulate physical processes from 
outside. The contact of the two is like the thought of a round 
square. The idea, itself, is not self-contradictory; it is just 
vague and puzzling. Perhaps this fact means that our idea 
of causality has developed in connection with our interest in 
things so that the category of space is knit with it. Clifford’s 
sallies express this outlook or, if you will, prejudice so well 
that one of them should be quoted. ‘‘ When, therefore, we 
ask: ‘what is the physical link between the ingoing message 
from chilled skin and the outgoing message which moves 
the leg?’ and the answer is, ‘A man’s will,’ we have as much 
right to be amused as if we had asked our friend with the 
picture what pigment was used in painting the cannon in 
the foreground and received the answer ‘wrought iron.’ ’’ 
It is clear that Clifford thinks that the brain is a continuum 
of physical events. 

Finally, interactionism, like vitalism, must postulate an 
agency peculiarly well informed about the brain and its paths. 
This agency must know what nerve to quiet and what nerve to 
excite. It must be like a pilot or a pianist in this respect. The 
empirical self does not have this knowledge. It must be given 
to something transcendental about which, by hypothesis, we 
know only that it has capacities to respond in certain ways. 

We have raised the customary objection to interactionism. 
Let us now point out its assets. It has always been a protest 
against automatism and crude materialism. It has stood for 


RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND ORGANISM 331 


the efficacy of consciousness and the significance of delibera- 
tion and choice. Historically, this is to say much in its 
favor. It was not so long ago that both philosophy and 
science thought of nature as a one-level mechanical process in 
which vis a tergo, or external push, determined all that oe- 
eurred. Mind and consciousness were classed together as an 
epiphenomenon, something which accompanied these pushings 
and shovings of particles but had no say in what took place. 
Consciousness was like a man carried on the back of a runaway 
horse. Taken in its historical setting, much can be said in 
favor of interactionism. We must do justice to many of its 
motives—though not, perhaps, to all—in any acceptable solu- 
tion of the mind-body problem. This motivation of inter- 
actionism is frankly acknowledged by McDougall: ‘‘ And it is 
just because we have found that mental and vital processes 
eannot be completely described and explained in terms of 
mechanism that we are compelled to believe in the cooperation 
of some non-mechanical, teleological factor, and to adopt the 
hypothesis of the soul.’’?? Our comment must be this, Is there 
not a third possibility? Must we not analyze all our terms 
more carefully? 

Parallelism.—Parallelism is the denial of a causal relation 
between mind and body. And it accompanies this denial with 
the acceptance of dualism. 

There may be said to be two current forms of parallelism, 
the one methodological and the other metaphysical. Moderate 
behaviorism is an expression of methodological parallelism. 
It simply does not concern itself with consciousness or pure 
psychics, though it admits the reality of such events. Phys- 
lology tends to approach the mind-body problem from the 
same angle. It does not see how consciousness can be effective 
and assumes that consciousness is somehow distinct from the 
organism. Metaphysical dualism is the explicit erection of 
this separation into a philosophical theory. It is this theory 
which we shall now examine. 

+McDougall, Body and Mind, p. 364. 


332 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


The purest form of parallelism is found in Occasionalism. 
The Occasionalists, who were influenced by Cartesianism, saw 
the difficulties confronting interactionism and were led to 
deny that mind and body could directly affect one another. 
To account for a certain harmony, or correspondence, between 
conscious purposes and actions, they resorted to a theological 
explanation. Spinoza and Leibniz sought to account for the 
facts by such metaphysical doctrines as ‘corresponding attri- 
butes of the one substance’ and ‘preestablished harmony.’ 
Spinoza’s position is best expressed in the Hthics and comes 
out in such statements as the following: ‘‘The order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of 
things’’ and ‘‘Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are 
arranged and associated in the mind, so are the modifications 
of body or the images of things precisely in the same way 
arranged and associated in the body.’’? It is a correspondence 
of order between the elements of two attributes. Leibniz 
saw the difficulties and fell back on a basic rapport without 
a causal relation. So much for the early development of the 
doctrine. Suggestive as these ideas were, they were too much 
bound up with particular systems of philosophy to be very 
significant for science. The empirical movement forced their 
reformulation. Why should we consider mind and body as 
two parallel attributes of one substance? Or why should we 
postulate a preestablished harmony between mind and body? 

Science and philosophy tended to leave these early formula- 
tions in the background and to think of consciousness and 
matter as two kinds of reality in which events occurred. These 
events were continuous in their own domain but never affected 
the other domain. This was a negative position. It restrained 
itself from speculative construction as much as possible, and 
tended to satisfy itself with the proclamation that, for every 
psychosis, there is a neurosis. Such concomitance is ultimate. 

There are two main objections to dualistic parallelism. The 
first is, that the constant concomitance of psychoses and neu- 

*Spinoza, Ethics, part 2, proposition 7 and part 5, proposition 1. 


RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND ORGANISM 3338 


roses is a mystery—and neither science nor philosophy likes 
mysteries. If there is no existential connection between them 
why should the one accompany the other? The mystery 
becomes still greater when we realize that there is a deeper 
relation than mere concomitance between them. The idea 
of moving my head actually precedes the movement of my 
head. The second objection to parallelism concerns the point 
in which interactionism is strongest. Can we understand 
human behavior in terms of purely blind physical processes? 
Let us note that parallelism has usually been content to think 
of the organism as a mechanism. Do not meanings and plans 
so pervade conduct that it is inexplicable without them? 

It is well to call attention to another point. Consciousness 
seems to come and go and to be unconserved. It has abrupt 
beginnings and endings. It does not seem, then, to be a 
self-sufficient system in the same way that the physical series 
is. If we try to supplement consciousness by a soul, there 
still remains the question why the soul emits consciousness in 
this intermittent way. Decidedly, parallelism is a position 
in unstable equilibrium and expresses puzzlement rather than 
insight. It is essentially the result of the traditional Cartesian 
extrusion of mind and consciousness from the physical world. 
Clearly we must challenge the whole set of assumptions which 
it reflects. 

Epiphenomenalism.—Parallelism readily lapses into epi- 
phenomenalism. Consciousness and mind are _ ineffective 
ghosts which accompany the changes of the organism. The 
body is an automaton, a machine which blindly passes from 
one condition to another. The chief article in the epiphe- 
nomenalist’s creed is that the physical world is a closed causal 
system. It is not interfered with from outside. 

Epiphenomenalism represents the outlook of the nineteenth 
century in science. It is a sort of hold-over from earlier specu- 
lation. Evolution was not as yet taken seriously for the 
physical world. The organism was held to be a mechanical 
system with no new capacities or modes of action. It was, 


334 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


also, alien to consciousness. Thus epiphenomenalism was an 
attempt at a compromise between parallelism and material- 
ism; and, as in all such verbal compromises, it is either paral- 
lelism or materialism according to the desire of the interpreter. 
The term, itself, is the expression of the philosophical eclect- 
icism of Huxley who really did not know whether he was an 
idealist or a realist. Consciousness is a sort of phenomenon 
upon a phenomenon and yet might ultimately be the only 
reality. 

Epiphenomenalism is often spoken of as involving a one- 
sided causal relation between consciousness and the brain. 
It is, then, not a form of parallelism but a form of materialism. 
As such, it is a witness to the truth of the assertion that paral- 
lelism is in a condition of unstable equilibrium and easily 
falls over to the materialistic side. Since we have already 
discussed materialism, we need not go over the ground 
again. 

To one who accepts a dead-level, merely atomistic view 
of nature, the difference between the brain and other physical 
things is only one of complexity. Hence, unless some reason 
can be given why consciousness should be correlated with the 
brain rather than with, for example, the fall of water, the 
correlation is merely a brute fact which is irrational and 
puzzling. And the intellect with this outlook can see no inner 
connection between complexity and consciousness. For the 
nineteenth century, as for the eighteenth, complexity did not 
mean organization and novelty but mere numerical complica- 
tion. The only difference between fifty molecules and one 
thousand was nine hundred and fifty molecules. Now in a 
gas, that is about the only difference; in a chemical sub- 
stance, it is not. New combinations bring new properties. 

Our conclusion is, that none of the dualistic theories are 
satisfactory. Each tries to express a truth but, in so doing, 
meets a counter-truth which it cannot do justice to. Both 
philosophy and science are working at present away from 
dualism to some form of monism. Mind and body must be 


RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND ORGANISM 335 


integrated in our thought just as they obviously are in actu- 
ality. 

Monistic Theories—We saw that dualistic theories postu- 
lated the existential distinctness of mind and body and dif- 
fered among themselves on the question of a causal relation 
between these distinct realities. Monistic theories agree on 
the thesis that mind and body are not distinct realities, but 
differ in their interpretation of these terms. We shall dis- 
cuss three types of monistic theory. All three are bound up 
with epistemology and with ultimate questions as to the 
complete nature of the organism. We shall call the first theory 
psychical monism, the second, the double-aspect theory, and 
the third, the double-knowledge theory. 

Psychical Monism.—Psychical monism is a deduction from 
spiritualism, which, it will be remembered, is itself a deduc- 
tion from idealism. If all reality is spiritual or mental, the 
reality of the body must conform to this one universal kind of 
reality. The spiritualist asserts that what the dualist calls the 
body and regards as distinct from mind is only a perceptual 
or conceptual symbol or appearance of something which is in 
itself mental. Changes in the physical world are phenomenal 
changes which indicate changes in this basic reality. There 
is no mind-body problem because there is only mind. 

Panpsychism offers the simplest form of psychical monism. 
The brain is the symbol of consciousness. If personal con- 
sciousness is not enough, the panpsychist simply postulates 
more consciousness, unconscious consciousness, mind-stuff. 
Only in feeling are, we in touch with reality itself. In fact, it 
is a fair sample of reality. 

Now there may be a good deal of truth in this, and yet 
not the whole truth. Feeling is, undoubtedly, a feature of 
reality; but is it the whole of reality? Consciousness is so 
evanescent, seemingly so little conserved, that it scarcely 
strikes our reflection as being the foundation of the gigantic 
processes of the physical world. Prevent oxygen from being 
conveyed to the brain, and we faint and lose consciousness. 


3836 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


It is something unsubstantial, something qualitative rather 
than quantitative. It would appear that only the exigencies 
of a theory would lead thinkers to resort to the view that 
consciousness is the only reality. 

On the face of it, consciousness is a changing unity of 
qualitative processes which we have good reason to believe 
expresses the temporary condition of the organism. It is 
not made up of unit-atoms called ideas, or mind-stuff, but is 
rather a functional field which reflects the organization of 
something which has grown up and developed in time and 
which we commonly eall either mind or brain—though just 
what the relation of the mind to the brain is perplexes us. It 
would seem, then, that psychical monism plays fast and loose 
with consciousness and with scientific knowledge, and is rather 
the expression of an idealistic epistemology than of the actual 
terms of the mind-body problem. If we take consciousness 
at its face value, it does not seem to be a stuff nor made up 
of elements which have permanence. It is more of the nature 
of a qualitative flux. And this qualitative flux seems to be 
intrinsic to, and express, systems and dispositions which life 
has evolved." 

Panpsychism, we may say, was a position characteristic of 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. It expressed the 
influence of an agnostic realism, that is, a realism which was 
convinced that we know only phenomena and that we can 
penetrate to reality only by analogy. There is a nature of 
which we are parts. But, at this time, nature was not thought 
of in terms of a genuinely evolutionary view. The result was 
the translation of consciousness into mechanical terms, into 
mind-stuff. Make realism gnostic, as eritical realism does, 
and take evolution seriously, and we obtain the view which 
seems to us the most probable answer to the old riddle. But 
more of this later. 


4There is a full statement, and criticism of the older panpsychism in 
McDougall’s Body and Mind, p. 160. For newer formulations, more in 
line with critical realism, see Strong, U'he Origin of Consciousness, and 
Drake, Mind and its Place in Nature. 


RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND ORGANISM 337 


The Double-Aspect Theory.—There have been many for- 
mulations of the double-aspect theory. The chief objection 
to most of them is their vagueness. They seem to swing 
between a position like Spinoza’s and panpsychism. Mind 
and body are said to be like the two sides of a shield or to 
constitute one single process observable in two ways. The 
epistemology of all this is not very clear. As a monistic 
position which tries to do justice to both physical science 
and introspective psychology, its heart is in the right place. 
It faces up to the difficulties more than does psychical monism. 
But it has not got quite the right clue. 

We shall begin with a statement by Hoffding which swings 
between panpsychism and the double-aspect theory. ‘‘If 
it is contrary to the doctrine of the persistence of physical 
energy to suppose a transition from the one province to the 
other, and if, nevertheless, the two provinces exist in our 
experience as distinct, then the two sets of phenomena must 
be unfolded simultaneously, each according to its laws, so 
that for every phenomenon in the world of consciousness there 
is a corresponding phenomenon in the world of matter, and 
conversely (so far as there is reason to suppose that conscious 
life is correlated with material phenomena). The parallels 
already drawn point directly to such a relation; it would be 
an amazing accident, if, while the characteristic marks re- 
peated themselves in this way, there was not at the foundation 
an inner connection. Both the parallelism and the propor- 
tionality between the activity of consciousness and cerebral 
activity point to an identity at bottom. The difference which 
remains in spite of the point of agreement compels us to 
suppose that one and the same principle has found its expres- 
sion in a double form.’’* This quotation shows that Hoffding 
has completely sensed the problem. But the solution is very 
vague. What does he mean by one and the same principle 
in a double form? The influence of Spinoza is apparent. 

Recently a psychologist has attempted to offer an empirical 

1 Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 64-5. 


338 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


analogy for the double-aspect view. The outer aspect, the 
brain, is to the inner aspect, consciousness, as surface is to 
mass. ‘‘In the surface-mass relation one aspect of the change 
is perceived by the eye, the other aspect by the muscle sense. 
Similarly, in the neuroconscious relation one aspect is objec- 
tive—it is perceived from without; the other aspect is sub- 
jective—it is the conscious experience of the living organism 
itself. . . . Changes of surface and changes of mass do not 
influence one another, neither are they independent. Just so 
the monodualist (the holder of the double-aspect theory) re- 
gards the activity of consciousness and the activity of the 
nervous system as neither causally related nor parallel. They © 
constitute one single process, observable in two ways.’’? 

The problem left with us is two-fold: How can we regard 
consciousness and the nervous system as constituting a single 
process? How is it that this process is observable in two 
different ways? It is to the answer of these two questions 
that the double-knowledge theory addresses itself. 

The Double-Knowledge Theory.—The solution of the mind- 
body problem is being made possible by four things: (1) the 
recognition that mind is a developed system of dispositions 
and operations; (2) the clearer idea of the nature of knowl- 
edge; (3) the admission that there are evolutionary levels in 
nature; and (4) the recognition that consciousness is an ever- 
changing field of contents intrinsic to processes. 

The view that mind is a developed system of dispositions | 
and capacities came to the fore in the preparatory chapters. 
We saw that behavioristic psychology gains knowledge of that 
which controls and conditions the overt behavior of the or- 
ganism. This control is mind. So defined, mind is the 
relatively permanent organization of habits and tendencies 
which enables the animal to act as a whole to stimuli and to 
adjust itself intelligently. In this sense, mind is a category 
which evolutionary physical science must recognize. But we 
saw that orthodox psychology teaches much the same thing. 

4Warren, Psychological Review, 1914. 


RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND ORGANISM 339 


It points out that past experience somehow modifies the 
individual and determines what he perceives and does. It 
lays stress upon the instinctive foundation of the individual 
and looks upon the mind as something which grows and de- 
velops with the organism. The psychologist cannot under- 
stand what is given in consciousness at various times without 
assuming that dispositions and capacities exist which condi- 
tion consciousness and are in turn modified by it. This 
evolving background is the mind. Thus the conclusion to 
which psychologists are coming is that mind is more than 
consciousness. We have seen that McDougall maintained 
such a view, but that he was led to call mind a soul because 
of his belief in animism and vitalism. This view of mind as 
a complex, or organized, system of dispositions, habits and 
capacities is quite separable from his dualism. Let me quote 
from another thinker. ‘‘Consciousness, as appears from our 
previous account, is a name for a state, an act, or a condition, 
in short for something temporary. . .. It will suffice us for 
the moment that we give the name of Mind to the permanent 
unity of which we conceive any given act of consciousness 
to be the temporary condition, act or state. . . . Conscious 
and unconscious operations then may be legitimately grouped 
together, and without prejudgment as to their ultimate nature 
the sum of them may be called mind. Mind then appears as 
that which has consciousness in the foreground while in the 
background it is the theatre of energies, of interactions, of 
stresses and strains, the play of which goes to determine the 
character of the scene by which the foreground is filled.’’ ? 

Let us try to get our concepts of consciousness and mind as 
distinct as possible. Consciousness is a stream. It is con- 
tinually changing. It is a function of attention, stimuli and 
associations. It is a more or less patterned complex of con- 
tents containing awareness. It is intermittent, for in deep 
sleep or a swoon it is practically non-existent. There seem to 
be in it levels which reflect levels of mental activity. There is 

1 Hobhouse, Development and Purpose, pp. 20-1. 


340 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


no good reason to believe that these contents are entities which 
exist when they pass from the field of consciousness. Let us, 
therefore, call consciousness a variant. This means that it ds 
essentially a qualitative event rather than a stuff. But con- 
sciousness is indirectly conserved. The student gains by his 
reflections and observations. Knowledge is a growth, and we 
always know more than we are aware of at any one time. A 
well-stored mind is no empty metaphor. Consciousness seems 
to sink back into the mind and leave a deposit. And if con- 
sciousness is a process this fact is not surprising. Each pulse 
of consciousness may be likened to a coral insect which, dying, 
enlarges the rock upon which it has lived. Memory and reten- 
tion are, of course, the most overt indications of this positive 
modification of the individual’s mind. It is obvious that we 
must not have a negative conception of the mind, as simply an 
abstract system of naked potentialities. The mind is com- 
plex and concrete, a growth of habits, adjustments, associa- 
tions, tendencies. It is that which flowers into consciousness 
and is, as it were, fertilized by it. 

Let us now bring to bear upon this conception of mind the 
definite view of knowledge which critical realism made pos- 
sible. Knowledge by means of the data of external percep- 
tion, that is, by use of the sense-organs and the methods of 
science, consists of a comprehension of the quantity, structure, 
relations and behavior of things. It can never be an intuition 
of the thing itself. Now it is this kind of knowledge that 
objective psychology gives of the mind. It is a study of 
action-patterns as these develop from an hereditary founda- 
tion. It is unfortunate that many people think of the brain 
as a mere complex of cells and do not appreciate its func- 
tional organization, the processes which are its functional 
side. But valid as this kind of knowledge is, it has inherent 
limitations. It can never afford a literal glimpse of the 
content of being. It can, therefore, never attain consciousness 
which is clearly a part of the content of the brain for each 
one of us. In consciousness, we must hold—and in conscious- 


RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND ORGANISM 341 


ness alone—we participate in the content of being, here the 
content of the brain as it functions. Those who have followed 
the argument of the book should not find it difficult to appre- 
ciate the situation in which man finds himself, nor should he 
find it surprising that man has been puzzled by it. 

Our minds are directed most naturally upon outside things, 
and the categories of our knowledge are molded by that inter- 
est and direction. It is not strange, therefore, that we find 
it difficult to think consciousness correctly and to put it in 
its proper context and relations. Let us keep in mind the 
thought that consciousness is a structured event and not a 
separate thing or stuff. Perhaps we can convey this distine- 
tion best by ealling it a qualitative dimension of a functioning 
system. And it is a qualitative dimension which apparently 
emerges with the type of organization and activity which we 
eall mental. How far back something lke mere sentiency 
goes we cannot tell. And did not this qualitative dimension 
with its subject-object structure arise, we could neither know 
things nor become aware of our own life. In our conscious- 
ness we are immersed in being at a particular place and 
time. This is the reason for the privacy of consciousness to 
_ which the neo-realists so much object. But privacy does not 
preclude the sort of knowledge which communication and 
analogical inference mediate. All that privacy precludes is 
sharing. I cannot possess your emotion or thought though I 
may have good reason to believe that I know what it is. 

To call consciousness a qualitative dimension of the fune- 
tioning brain-mind seems a good way of keeping before us 
that intrinsicality of consciousness to the brain-mind upon 
which our theory puts so much stress. The situation is so 
ultimate in these matters that we can but resort to metaphors. 
Were we to use Hume’s metaphor of the stage, we must say 
that, by the very nature of the situation consciousness is the 
only element of the stage which is gwen because it is what 
we are as conscious. Of all else, we can only have knowledge 
by means of the characters in our consciousness. We cannot 


349 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


look over our shoulder, as it were, and sense the existential 
bond of union of consciousness and brain-mind. 

So much for the general standpoint of what we have called 
the double-knowledge theory of the mind-body relation. Its 
implications will become clearer when we examine the ques- 
tion of purposive action. And in that connection I shall study 
the question of the nature of the efficacy of consciousness. 
Let us remember that, if this theory is true, we must hence- 
forth think of the brain in terms of all of our knowledge of it. 
We must not think of mind and consciousness as budding out 
of the brain like an ethereal story, an emanation or ectoplasm. 
It is the physical system, itself, which has evolved to a higher 
level and become deepened and enriched with its manifold 
integrations. | 

In the meantime, we must continue our investigation of 
originative and cumulative evolution by studying the social 
process. It is in the social process that homo sapiens has 
become a person and has developed all sorts of values and 
activities which indicate another open line of advance. 


REFERENCES 


Bereson, Matter and Memory. 

HOFFDING, Outlines of Psychology. 

McDoucatu, Body and Mind, chaps. 12 and 26. 
Strona, Why the Mind Has a Body. 

SELLARS, Evolutionary Naturalism, chap. XIV. 
Luoyp MorGan, Emergent Evolution, chap. 2. 
Pratt, Matter and Spirit. 


! 


CHAPTER XXITIT 
SOCIETY AND PERSONS 


Society and Culture Emerge.—Strange as it may seem, it 
has taken mankind a very long time to realize the naturalness 
of society. Consequently, there is yeoman’s work yet for 
philosophy at this growing point of science. In this chapter, 
we shall try to show that society is an integration of human 
beings which lifts these human beings to a higher level. 
Many questions will confront us, and we shall be led to make 
analyses of social categories in order to remove vagueness 
and obscurity. For instance, we shall try to understand the 
relation between the individual and the group, one example 
of the relation of the one and the many. What is the group? 
In what way is it more than a collection of individuals? Has 
it a mind and will of its own? 

In all this, we shall seek to continue our evolutionary way 
of approach. Let it be noted that we shall be cooperating 
now with sociology just as in the previous chapters we co- 
operated with physics, chemistry, biology and psychology. 
We are nearing the apex of evolution as we know it, for we 
are now to study that Leviathan or mortal god, of whom old 
Thomas Hobbes wrote, the society in which we live and move 
and have our being. 

When we remember how difficult it was for science to fit 
together lifeless and living things, we are not surprised that 
the social sciences have come to their own very slowly. The 
compromise adopted was for each domain to develop its own 
data, methods and concepts in the hope that sometime, after 
enough knowledge had been gained, these systems would link 
up. This was a wise course and the only one to adopt. Let 

343 


344 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


us recall those breaks which separated society and the physical 
world. 

There was, first, the difficulty of understanding the origin 
and nature of life. If the physical is irremediably mechani- 
eal, must not life be a mechanical thing? And yet organisms 
do act in a novel way. There is metabolism, reproduction, 
selective behavior, adjustment. To meet this problem, we 
suggested that life represents an open line of advance in 
which creative organization brings forth new properties and 
possibilities. In place of abrupt contrast we introduced the 
idea of genetic continuity with the birth of novelties. We 
appealed to the category of time in order to bring together 
differences which seemed appalling in their greatness. And 
in our everyday experience we have good analogies for this 
appeal. Remark the difference between this boy just learning 
the keyboard and this gifted pianist who uses his instru- 
ment to bring out melodies which enthrall us. But we need 
not repeat our arguments for a perspective which mediated 
between mechanism and vitalism. Thus was one chasm 
bridged. 

And then we came to the problem of mind. How can we 
conceive mind and consciousness as natural? By means of 
basic analyses, we gained a more adequate idea of these terms 
which led in the direction of their integration with the living 
organism. Epistemology helped us here as well as the idea 
of evolutionary novelty. We realized that in conciousness 
we were on the inside of a highly organized and functioning 
bit of reality. We now saw that things with minds are native 
to the physical world under favoring conditions. When such 
highly endowed organisms reach the level of human beings, 
they secure and deserve the name of persons. Thus another 
chasm was passed. 

But how can we make society out of persons? Is society an 
organization of persons? It is clear that something of this 
sort is the case. It is obvious that another step in evolution- 
ary novelty is before us, and a most interesting step at that. 


SOCIETY AND PERSONS 345 


Society emerges with persons. It looks as though evolu- 
tionary naturalism could be guided by its principles into this 
domain also and justify them by the comprehensiveness of 
their sweep. Sociology, which has been developing its con- 
cepts and methods for over a half century, if we date its be- 
ginning from Comte, can proclaim itself a natural science able 
to adjust its categories with those of the other natural 
sciences. In the present chapter, we shall try to carry 
through for sociology much the same sort of thing that we 
have done for the sciences dealing with the broad, lower 
levels of nature. We 
shall try to appreciate 
what is unique about it 
and, at the same time, 
see this uniqueness in its 
genetic relation to what 
preceded it. The fol- 
lowing diagram may 
make the situation 
clearer: 

The base of the pyra- 
mid stands for inorganic 

nature in its full scope; 
the next level for living 
things of all grades and kinds; the next, for mind or intelli- 
gence; and, finally, we come to social processes, to human 
beings in their social relations, to civilization. Nature diversi- 
fies itself. The higher must have the broad foundation of 
the lower on which to rest. By now the student should have 
developed a genetic imagination which ean enrich this plain 
diagram by projecting into it the upward thrust of life. 

The Primitive Group.—It is a familiar principle that 
thought moves most securely from the simple to the complex. 
While, in both psychology and sociology, there is another 
principle of equal standing which must also be heeded, v2z.,— 
that we should pass from the best known to the less known, 


Society, Persons, Civilization 







Animate Nature 


Inanimate Nature 





Organization — 


346 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


it still remains true that a genetic approach from the simple 
to the complex helps our understanding of a field immensely. 
Now primitive groups are much simpler than the complex, 
social groups of civilization and, in connection with them, 
we can gain insight into the nature of social organization. 

It is clear that the individual and the group are relative 
to each other. We may put.it this way: the group selects the 
individual, and the individuals compose the group. The 
social group and the human individual grow up together. 
The human individual is impossible without the group, and 
the group is the cooperative expression of the individuals who 
compose it. In this way there is a reciprocal dependence be- 
tween the social group and its members. It is the character 
of this relationship which we need to study and understand. 

Let us note some of the characteristics of the primitive 
group. First of all, the members of the group are usually 
kinsmen. They belong to one race which has developed in a 
locality or migrated together. In early times the sense of 
kinship was very strong. The alien was seldom assimilated. 
If permitted to live in the community, he was nearly always 
a slave and not a free man. Adoption was allowed under 
certain conditions, but it involved some rite by which the 
adopted alien became a blood-brother or son. All this strikes 
us even to-day as natural and inevitable. Something very like 
it expresses itself in nationalism. In the second place, the 
members of the group felt themselves to be inseparable from 
the group. Its life was their life; its fate was their fate. 
There was, as yet, no sense of independent individuality and 
no desire for it. Man was through and through a social 
animal. His interests and habits were social. It is probably 
not going too far to speak of him as endowed with social 
instincts. 

Of recent years there has been intensive study of various 
aspects of group life of. a primitive sort. The religion, the 
magic, the customs, the technical achievements of this stage 
of development have been examined and theorized over. In 


SOCIETY AND PERSONS 347 


connection with the history of ideas about the mind, we 
pointed out the nature of animism. Workers in comparative 
religion, comparative ethics, anthropology, and psychology 
have gathered data and interpreted them. It seems pretty 
elear that early man felt more than he reasoned, developed 
customs, or folkways, in a communal fashion, and had a strong 
sense for the group. Groups, again, were suspicious of one 
another and even hostile. 

The Human Organism and the Group.—It follows from all 
this that the group was not the result of any conscious plan. 
Tt was a growth due to the factors which had been working all 
along in the biological realm. We know so little of man’s 
actual origins that we cannot trace the stages of his develop- 
ment. Undoubtedly, however, he was social from the begin- 
ning and belonged to a gregarious type of animal stock. And 
we mean by gregarious that the individuals of this stock 
enjoyed living together and added to this enjoyment some 
measure of cooperation. These organisms were attuned and 
sensitive to each other. It is probable that variations of a 
more savage and unsocial sort were eliminated because they 
were less likely to survive. Let us remember that the group 
is always stronger than the individual, and those who par- 
ticipate in it participate in its strength. We can safely con- 
elude that the human organism became more and more inter- 
ested in group-activities and in persons, and more and more 
sensitive to them. The stimuli to which it responded were 
increasingly of this sort. The individual was able to appre- 
ciate emotions, demands, group-actions, and almost spon- 
taneously responded to what was being done around him. His 
habits were in large measure common habits. 

In this account of the group, I wish to stress the part 
played by unconscious adjustment, by constant interaction 
in the face of situations and needs. The group is, in short, 
a growth after its own kind, an organization of a new sort, 
made possible by the capacities of the human organism, capaci- 
ties which were themselves refined and emphasized by itself. I 


348 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


suppose that one of the most striking witnesses to this de- 
velopment and interaction is language or communication. It 
is not too much to say that the group made language possible 
and that language lifted the group to a higher level. 

The tremendous influence of language and communication 
is realized by recent thinkers. Thus Dewey sings almost a 
pean in its praise.. ‘‘Of all affairs communication is the 
most wonderful. That things should be able to pass from 
the plane of external pushing and pulling to that of revealing 
themselves to man, and thereby to themselves; and that the 
fruit of communication should be participation, sharing, is 
a wonder by the side of which transubstantiation pales. . . 
Events turn into objects, things with a meaning. They may 
be referred to when they do not exist, and thus be operative 
among things distant in space and time, through vicarious 
presence in a new medium. . . . Upon the whole, professed 
transcendentalists have been more aware than have professed 
empiricists of the fact that language makes the difference 
between brute and man.* 

By means of language there can be conscious adjustment, 
education, the handing down of traditions, the spread of new 
ideas. The group would be impossible without it. Culture 
depends upon it. 

The group is a new type of organization which appeared 
with the gregarious animals and awaited man for its full 
exploitation. We must not forget, however, that nature tried 
this method among the ants and bees with signal success. 
The query remains: What kind of communication do these 
more lowly groups employ? That is a question which the 
philosopher must leave to the comparative psychologist. 

In the human group, held together by mutual needs and — 
affections and capable of communication, we have the slow 
rise of culture. Do we not have here a new open line of 
development reared on the open line represented by life? 
To appreciate its character and possibilities is to realize the 

1Dewey, Experience and Nature, ch. 5, passim. 


| 
| 


|— 
| 





| 


SOCIETY AND PERSONS 349 


naturalness of society. The basic processes underlying this 
social development are increase of population, discovery, 
culture-contacts and division of labor. Fortunately, we have 
ample historical material to illuminate the general features 
of this social growth. The advance to what we eall civilization 
was very slow at first, millenniums being taken for a single 
step ahead. And then gradually in certain favorable regions 
like the great river valleys consolidation began and nations 
arose. Writing, art, temple-worship, administration, com- 
merce, social classes, appear aS complications and achieve- 
ments. It is the group which advances and retreats, adjusts 
itself to conditions and explores their possibilities, wars with 
other groups, succumbs or conquers or makes commercial 
treaties. History has dawned.' 

What is the Group?—Philosophy deals primarily with the 
basic concepts and principles of a field rather than with the 
concrete details. We must, therefore, leave to social 
psychology, sociology and history the study of actual groups 
in all their immense diversity. Few fields are more interest- 
ing to the human mind than this survey of the characteristics 
and eventful career of human groups. Man is fascinated by 
man. Who does not like to read of Egyptian pharaoh, 
Chaldean priest, Assyrian conqueror, Greek explorer, Roman 
administrator, Tartar, saint, monk, scientist, inventor, lover, 
poet? But this immense wealth of human life, which fills 
the ages, raises certain basic problems upon which we must 
now focus our attention. What kind of an entity is the 
eroup? How is the individual person related to it? We must 
see them in their relations. 

We often hear it said that society is an organism. Is this 
true? Or does it simply express our paucity of language? 

The problem here is to realize the likenesses and differences 
between a literal organism and a society. An organism is a 
bio-chemical organization which has a definite size and con- 


‘The intimate relation between history and geography is being increas- 
ingly realized. See, for example, Newbigin, The Mediterranean Lands. 


3850 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


sists of differentiated tissues and organs integrated in a 
specific, and individual, economy. It is a physical thing of this 
evolved kind. It grows, it adjusts itself to its environment, 
its parts are interdependent. What is a society or group? 
It is an integration of gregarious animals of high mental 
capacity in terms of their reciprocal responses. Clearly, a 
society ts not a physical thing, but a peculiar grouping of 
physical things. It is this peculiar grouping which we must 
understand in its nature and effects. 

Perhaps an analogy will make the situation clearer. We 
saw that mind is not so much a thing as a process. Or, to 
put it still more exactly, mind is a level of action of a highly 
organized thing. In like manner, we can speak of society 
as a level of action of gregarious, intelligent things, a level 
of action which develops in time. It is this level of action, 
which involves large numbers of intelligent organisms in 
reciprocal response, which the sociologist seeks to understand. 
Another way of putting it is this, that the grouping of indi- 
viduals in a society is a function of their nature and inter- 
actions and that both their nature and their interactions are 
in part an effect of the group. The group is, then, something 
which can be understood fully only historically, or genetically, 
just as we have seen is the case with an organism. And what 
we call human personality is, itself, relative to the group; 
it is fostered by it, made possible by it. In short, society 
is an organization of persons but is not, itself, an organism. 
And this simply means that society is a kind of organization 
which presupposes intelligent organisms, a level made possible 
by the nature of its constituents which yet carries these 
constituents themselves to a higher level. Should we not 
expect novel properties at this new evolutionary level as we 
have found them arising at each level below? As a matter 
of fact, such novel properties are undeniable. We find them, 
and the new categories they involve, in plenty. The number 
of them is tremendous—government, religion, wealth, justice, 
art, etc. The general characteristics of these we must also 


SOCIETY AND PERSONS 351 


study in later chapters in order to appreciate the distinctly 
human level of reality. 

To conclude, a society, or group, is not a physical thing, 
but a new kind of organization depending upon, and expressive 
of, the capacity of the human organism. We may eall this 
eapacity the social nature and intelligence of the human 
organism. Another way of putting it is this, that a society 
is a new kind of thing. This is no longer a physical integra- 
tion in the mode of life, but a mental integration in the way 
of intelligent response and modifiability. A society is, in 
other words, a complex of modes of behavior on the part of 
human beings due to the way in which these individuals have 
affected one another. These modes of behavior are adjust- 
ments and inventions which are the expression of what may 
be called group response. Thus society is a mentally mediated 
and historically developed integration of human beings which 
finds expression in cooperative, or joint, behavior and in 
personality. To make this concrete, translate it into political 
activities, economic activities, religious activities, social 
activities. Human organisms are, as it were, caught up into 
a complex of activities which are a function of needs, interests, 

intelligence, and numbers. It is for this reason that a society 
is externally, or numerically, a sum of individuals, while it 
is actually a web of reciprocally determined behaviors which 
ean be understood only in terms of what the sociologist calls 
institutions. It is this, I think, that the abler psychologists 


mean to-day when they eall society a psychological, rather 


than a biological, phenomenon. 

Has Society a Mind?—We have decided that society is not 
an organism but an historically developed, and mentally 
mediated, organization of human beings. Have we a right 
to say that this group-organization, which we eall society, 
has a mind? It is clear, I take it, that we can say at once 
that it does not have a mind in the same sense that an indi- 
vidual human organism has a mind. Society is mental in that 
it depends upon minds and is an expression of minds, but 


352 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


it does not have a mind as a human body has a mind. Actual 
thinking is done by the individuals who compose the group, 
but this thinking is stimulated by a realization of how others 
are thinking and acting and by knowledge of the character 
of group-actions. Persons affect one another in the most 
complheated ways; and we react to groups as well as to indi- 
viduals. Jt 1s this quivering interaction according to defimte 
methods of communication and behavior which we must 
appreciate. 

Another way of putting our conclusion is to say that society 
contains cooperative thinking which is necessarily more than 
the thinking of any one individual or the thinking of any 
number of individuals in isolation. The citizen participates 
in the thinking that goes on in society. <A political campaign 
offers a good instance of such participative thinking. Man- 
agers present the issues, newspapers laud the one party and 
heap criticism upon the other, individuals argue, a few think 
seriously about the whole situation. Social thinking is, then, 
a complex of interacting thinking. 

There are two kinds of social units which we should con- 
trast. The one we can call a mob; the other, a deliberative 
body. In a mob, suggestion and sentiment predominate in 
social interaction. People feel together. In a deliberative 
body, individuals try to assist one another to think clearly 
about questions. Here we have cooperative thinking at its 
best. And the sense in which society has a mind is evident. 
It does not have a mind, above and beyond the minds of its 
members, which is just one more individual mind; rather 
its mind is the interaction of individual minds and depends 
upon their quality. This view fits in with our conclusion 
as to the actual nature of a group. There is a new kind of 
organization which leaves the units, human beings, a relative 
autonomy. It is a mental organization rather than a physical 
organization. 

The topic we have been discussing has often been broached 
in the form, Is there a social consciousness? Does it not seem 


SOCIETY AND PERSONS 303 


quite obvious that there is no social consciousness if we mean 
a field of consciousness with definite contents and perspective 
attached to a thing called society? Society is not a thing in 
this sense nor does it have a sort of super-consciousness. We 
have seen that contents of consciousness are correlated with 
mind-brain processes; and where is the mind-brain of 
society? And it is because we think that consciousness and 
a mind-brain are inseparably correlated that we tend to refuse 
a mind to society. Where there is a mind, we feel, there 
must be consciousness. And where there is no consciousness, 
there cannot be a mind. 

We are thus brought back to our previous conclusion that 
a society is a new kind of thing with novel properties and 
characteristics. It is a cooperative thing rather than a 
physically unified thing. Thinking runs through society 
because of the capacity of its members and this think- 
ing is conditioned by society. Social thinking is joint 
thinking. 

The Relation between the Group and the Individual.— 
Just because it is difficult to grasp clearly what a society is, 
there has often been much misunderstanding in regard to 
_ the relation between the individual and the group. In our 
own day, the doctrine that society is a mere collection of 
individuals has not been entirely absent. The other extreme 
position is that the individual is nothing apart from the 
group, that he is essentially an organ of the group. Let us 
try to work out the implications of the position at which we 
have arrived and compare these implications with the facts 
of social life. We will, I think, soon realize that the first 
extreme has not realized what society is and that the second 
extreme has thought too much in terms of biology and has 
not done justice to the actual character of a society. 

To view society as a mere collection of individuals is to 
take a purely numerical position. It would be like counting 
the cells in the brain and saying that the brain is a collection 
of cells. Both mistakes would be due to a disregard of the 


354 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


fact and significance of organization. To number things 
is to take them as units for the purpose of counting, even 
though they are actually related in intimate ways. To 
take this external view as adequate would be to turn our 
backs upon the whole basis and meaning of evolution. Clearly 
society is not a mere collection of individuals, for it is these 
individuals in interaction according to historically deter- 
mined methods and patterns. , 

On the other hand, to assert that the individual is a 
subordinate part of society having its specialized role to 
play in the economy of the state is to carry over into society 
the structure of an organism. It is to forget that we have 
in society a new kind of thing expressive of the mental 
capacities of its members. Only if it can be proved that 
rigid control and subordination are for the best can we 
rightfully advocate this type of organization in society. The 
point is this, that the peculiar structure of a society as 
against the general nature of society is a matter of social 
growth and choice. In itself, society does not involve any 
mimicing of the type of organization which we find in the 
organism. A society can be very loosely organized and very 
little differentiated. 

The actual relations between individuals in a social group 
are determined by the historical development of that group. 
Investigation has shown that primitive groups are closely 
knit together but that there is little social differentiation as 
yet. Group solidarity and collective responsibility are 
features of this stage. The individuals seemingly feel and 
think much alike and hold themselves to be of one blood. 
There are traditions, beliefs, rituals and practical technique. 
The point to bear in mind is, that none of these things are 
thinkable apart from the common life of the group. They 
are group products. They are inseparably connected with 
that new thing which the group is. It is in the new setting 
and situation produced by these things that the individual 
lives and moves and has his being. The individual as a 


SOCIETY AND PERSONS 395 


member of the group is, himself, a social product. He knows 
and feels this. 

And, as time passes and the group develops along many 
lines under the spur of increase of population, invention, 
intellectual growth, war, contact with other cultures, etc., 
there arise classes and occupations which, once more, dif- 
ferentiate the individual. The social function, or place, in 
which the individual finds himself controls his concrete and 
specific relations to other members of society and his activi- 
ties. The growth in complexity of society means a corre- 
sponding growth in variety of human life. Now the modern 
mind with its sense of history is very well aware of this 
expansion and differentiation of society. We read of the 
various medieval types, monk, priest, peasant, noble, clerk, 
townsman; of the life of the time of the Renaissance in Italy; 
of the sailors, factory-workers, miners, artists, business-men, 
politicians, etc., of the present. All these types in their 
individual exemplars are creations of the historically 
developed group. The incentives and knowledge and needs 
which have impressed them, or attracted them, are resident in 
society. 

There are many tendencies or forces at work in society. 

First of all, of course, it must adjust itself to its environ- 
ment. And it does this both actively and passively. This is 
a secular process always at work. Then there are the 
influences exerted by the institutions which have slowly estab- 
lished themselves. Finally, there is the pressure constantly 
springing from personality. Human organisms have the 
capacity to achieve personality under the education and con- 
stant suggestion exercised by the life of the group. In a’ 
rich society—I mean a society rich in knowledge, art and 
social sagacity—the individual becomes rich in content and 
activity. And this richness of life makes him, in turn, a 
center of initiative and creation. He becomes an individ- 

—uality, something dynamic and influential. 

It is the task of political science and sociology to study 


386 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


various phases of human, social development. In this field, 
also, they have found to the full the working of evolutionary 
processes. Language, government, industry, religion, art, 
science, all these are wmpersonal growths whose life exhibits 
the nature of the social process. The time-dimension is all 
important. Familes, nations, races are products of the 
cumulative effect of incessant changes and adjustments. 
Heine is a product of Jewish race, German tradition and 
French suggestion. Milton is a poet of aristocratic puri- 
tanism. Lincoln is a product of the meeting of American 
pioneer life with culture. These are the processes and 
conditions in terms of which, alone, we can under- 
stand human life. It is clear that we have here a super- 
biological level. 

In What Sense is Personality a Social Product?—We can- 
not hope to draw a hard-and-fast line between what a 
human being is by nature and what he is by culture. The 
biologist is inclined to stress ‘nature’ in his estimation of 
human life, while the sociologist points out the significance of 
‘nurture.’ That each individual has biological endowments, 
or possibilities, seems to me undeniable. In a general way, 
the limits of his activities are set by his organic texture. But 
the particular character and level of his personality is a 
function of his history, that is, of the actual way in which 
he has lived. And the way in which he has lived is pro- 
foundly affected by the social stimuli which have come to him. 
It is to social situations and demands that he adjusts him- 
self from day to day and from year to year. There is inter- 
action, suggestion, new ideas, new activities. In short, per- 
sonality is a complex growth which reflects the social setting 
of the individual. Only in this way can we understand the 
differences between the adult Englishman and the adult 
American, the adult Frenchman and the adult Greek or 
Roman of the past. Civilization and culture are social cate- 
gories, not biological ones. This new level of evolution is 
conditioned, and made possible by, the bio-psychologieal level, 


SOCIETY AND PERSONS 357 


but is not simply reducible to it. We have here a new com- 
plex of processes which brings new realities to birth. 

But the best way for any one to realize his indebtedness 
to that historically developed complex which we call society 
is to trace the influence upon his own life of his social sur- 
roundings. Parents have, perhaps, come first. To these he 
adds the type of life lived in the village or city in which he 
was brought up. Some striking personality may have called 
out reactions of an intenser kind, may have aroused interests, 
given a new bent to his life. And then there are the adjust- 
ments to others constantly going on. Bit by bit, character 
develops, ideals and ambitions appear as controlling forces. 
And if his life has gone higher in a cultural way, think of 
the tremendous effect which great writers, great artists and 
great thinkers have had upon him. The stuff of his life 
is there in an organic way, but it is canalized, refined, dif- 
ferentiated by this continuous process which is life in 
society. 

There is one mistake which we must not make in all this. 
We must not think of the development of personality as a 
passive thing. It is not the stimuli by themselves which 
mould us but our responses to the stimuli. To respond many 
times in one way is to become a certain kind of person. 
And there are many social stimuli which large numbers 
ignore and which do not, therefore, enter into their lives. 
I presume that we can express this selective relation between 
individuals and social stimuli by opportumty and interest. 
To some, the opportunity of responding intensely and long 
to certain kinds of things and activities is denied. Not every 
boy with an artistic temperament can go to an art-school 
or travel abroad. He may not even have the time to try out 
his own impulses in a systematic way. Again, interest is 
often lacking. These things may not appeal to him. We 
know that many students, so-called, can be exposed to intense 
thought and be unaffected by it. They are not attuned for 
some reason. Was there something lacking in home in- 


358 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


fluences, in social conditions of the general type which we 
call the social atmosphere, or in innate temperament and 
trend? We must hold fast to the idea of process, of inter- 
action. Individuals cooperate with social influences and 
what we call personality is the result. We may, I think, 
rightly say that, in this sense, personality is relative to the 
social group. A wild man would not be a human being in any 
other than a biological sense. It has taken untold generations 
to make what we are accustomed to call a gentleman. I do 
not mean this in any class sense but in an ethical and 
sesthetic sense. 

Human Consciousness a Socially Conditioned Conscious- 
ness.—Now that we have fully appreciated that personality 
is unthinkable apart from the setting of society, we are ready 
to understand that an individual’s consciousness is condi- 
tioned by its relations. Human psychology is, in a very real 
sense, always a social psychology. Yet there are distinctions 
to be made if we are to avoid confusion. 

It will be remembered that we decided that society could 
not rightly be said to have a personal mind although it was 
a mental kind of thing. Society, we saw, is an historically 
developed organization of persons. But it is not, itself, a 
person because it is not a physically integrated thing with a 
unified mind. It does not have a will which moves individ- 
uals as my volition moves my arm. We decided that we have 
in society a new kind of organization of a looser sort which 
depends upon the development in its members of a social 
sense expressed in awareness of the group and in sympathetie 
cooperation. Granted this development, we can understand 
the secular growth of societies which outlive this individual 
and that and contain generations and their products. This 
ever-flowing tide of socialized life into which the individual 
is born and by which he is profoundly affected is an organi- 
zation which does not depend for its existence upon him. 
Before I was, it was. After me, it will go on much as before. 
We all learn to realize how small and temporary a part we 


SOCIETY AND PERSONS 399 


are of this system. But we are also aware that this system 
could not exist apart from its members and their capacities. 

Just as our personality is conditioned by society, so is our 
consciousness. The ideas I have in mind at present could 
not have arisen had I not been trained as a member of society. 
I could probably have seen as well, and heard as well, all 
the sights and sounds of inanimate nature, but I would not 
be thinking of patriotism, science, internationalism and re- 
ligion had it not been for the actions and suggestions of 
the group. The contents of my consciousness are socially 
controlled. It is for this reason that I think of literary 
movements and of economic conditions, of pragmatism and 
of community funds. Communication by language is an 
essential agency here. The objects of my thought are social 
objects, persons acting together, institutions, schools. 

But the mistake has sometimes been made of believing that, 
because I think of social objects and because the contents 
of my thought are socially conditioned, my consciousness can- 
not be my consciousness but must be socially owned. Surely 
this conclusion does not at all follow. My consciousness is 
the expression of my personality, that is, my developed, 
trained and functioning organism; and it is existentially as 
integral to that organism as is my eye or my hand. My 
consciousness is social only in the sense that its contents are 
conditioned by, and reflect, the situation in which I live 
and move. The new level cannot so basically contradict the 
facts of the level which conditions it. 

Finally, it is essential that we realize that self-consciousness 
is a mental level which is made possible only by social inter- 
actions. ‘The individual becomes conscious of himself as he 
becomes conscious of other people. He interprets himself 
in much the same terms as he interprets others. The whole 
range of mental development of the individual which lifts 
him above the brute in range of thought and interest is, as 
we have seen, socially conditioned. In a very real sense, 
we are what we are interested in. The range of our mind 


360 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


is an essential characteristic of it. Psychologists have become 
quite aware of this fact, and it is now a commonplace of 
philosophy, psychology and sociology that we become aware 
of ourselves as we become aware of our interests, relations 
and ideals. Bit by bit, by trial and error, we also become 
aware of our capacities and.their limits. The self is a center 
of actions and relations as well as of knowledge and of feeling. 

It is through such activities as these which we have 
sketched above, in primary groups of the playground and 
later in the more complex relations of love, sex, business, art 
and contemplation, that personality is both achieved and made 
the object of consciousness. At the period of adolescence 
this awareness of the self deepens. We brood, compare our- 
selves with others, set up individuals as heroes and ideals. We 
seek to know this personality which has been growing up in 
this organism of ours. It is a difficult and lifelong task. In 
this old civilization of ours we are guided by the models 
which others have set for us. Art, as the field of self- 
expression, is peculiarly enlightening. It may be that Rem- 
brandt has aided us, or Rousseau, or Heine, or Matthew 
Arnold, or Whitman, or Browning. To explore ourselves and 
the world, to realize curious possibilities and push back 
horizons, it is in such endeavors that personality grows. 
Habit, alone, or concentration on mere living or making 
money leaves sealed this more delicate and spiritual play and 
growth of the personality. The people of an old race bear 
on their very faces the imprint of these more subtle 
endeavors and experiences. 

Conclusion.—We have tried to show that, when properly 
understood, it is quite devoid of paradox to hold that society 
is natural. Society is a term for persons in developed and 
differentiated relations which are either temporary and in- 
formal or fixed and formal. Fixed and formal relations are 
usually called institutions, and the history of these can be in 
large measure traced. In these relations, persons are called 
members of society. It is clear that a society does not depend 


SOCIETY AND PERSONS 361 


upon any one individual, though it does depend upon indi- 
viduals taken collectively. The level which society has at- 
tained in complicated and differentiated states we call 
civilization. These civilizations differ markedly from epoch 
to epoch and from region to region. Few things are more 
fascinating than to study and compare them. While recog- 
nizing the relativity of personality to society, we hold that 
growth and summation must focus in the human organism. 
Mediocre individuals can never sustain a great society. More- 
over mere numbers must not impress us. Vast oriental 
empires could exist at a social level far below that of little 
Athens. And a commercial and industrial civilization may 
easily crush to death that finer flower of expression and 
contemplation which struggles into life here and there 
within it. We saw, finally, that there is no adequate reason 
to assign a personal mind and will to a society. A society 
is clearly not just one more person to be added to its mem- 
bers. And yet to each individual who must adjust himself 
to groups, these groups take on the semblance almost of 
super-individuals. Their behavior is merged and their mem- 
bers easily become anonymous. It is this merging and har- 
mony of action in terms of groups which stands back of 
such terms as public opinion and the social will. To think 
delicately here is to realize the mental texture of society 
without giving a society either a mind or a consciousness. 


REFERENCES 


CooLry, Social Organization, parts 1 and 4. 

WALLAS, The Great Society. 

Fouuett, The New State. 

OcBuRN, Social Change. 

Topp, Theories of Social Progress. 

GinspurG, The Psychology of Society. 

Peterson, J., ‘‘The Functioning of Ideas in Social Groups,’’ Psycho- 
logical Review, 1918. 

DennEs, ‘‘The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology,’’ Cal, 
Pub., vol. 6. 

LIPPMANN, The Phantom Public, 


CHAPTER XXIV 


THE THEORY OF LEVELS AND BASIC POINTS IN 
COSMOLOGY 


A Crucial Point in Cosmology.—We have been advancing 
from level to level in nature with what has appeared to us a 
large measure of success. While we have encountered serious 
problems, we have yet seemed to gain insight and to achieve 
a point of view which raised us above the very vague con- 
troversies which have been traditional in these fields. Our 
outlook has, on the whole, been empirical. Ours is a very 
complex world whose constitution and inner variety must be 
worked out piecemeal. It is this that the sciences have 
‘ actually been doing in the measure of their ability. It 
follows that our concepts and principles are things achieved 
rather than things to start with. Just what does life turn 
out to be? What is matter? What exactly is mind? How 
should we think of society? The answers to these questions 
come only at the end after a comprehensive survey has been 
completed and some fairly intensive thinking has been done. 
The best we can do in all these matters is to make the most 
satisfactory hypothesis we can, the hypothesis which seems 
to comprehend the facts and to introduce harmony into the 
largest number of principles. The hypothesis which has 
appeared to us most illuminating is that of evolution. It is 
the assumption that there is novelty or origination in the 
world, that there has often been something new under the 
sun, including—if I may use an Irish type of witticism—the 
sun itself. This thesis has been given various names of much 
the same import: creative evolution, emergent evolution, 
epigenetic evolution, originative evolution. Lloyd Morgan’s 

362 


THEORY OF LEVELS AND BASIC POINTS 3638 


formulation of the thesis is typical: ‘‘The orderly sequence of 
natural events, historically viewed, appears to present, from 
time to time, something genuinely new. Under what I eall 
emergent evolution stress is laid on this incoming of the 
new. Salient examples are afforded in the advent of life, in 
the advent of mind, and in the advent of reflective thought 
. . . But if nothing new emerge—if there be only regrouping 
of pre-existing elements and nothing more—then there is no 
emergent evolution.’’? 

And here we have the crucial point. For many generations 
the scientific ideal was the so-called mechanical view of the 
world, what I have called a dead-level view of the world. 
To-day the struggle is on between these two sets of assump- 
tions. What does each imply? Which seems best to accord 
with the facts? Let us contrast the two positions. 

We have hitherto dealt with emergent evolution in the 
concrete. We are concerned more now with its logical struc- 
ture, but I do not think it will be amiss to summarize the 
historical perspective it opens before us. 

The general plan of nature which presented itself to us 
with this perspective we likened to a pyramid of a tier-like 
construction. A process of creative organization led at each 
stage to the advent of gradients or levels above. Hach new 
level depended upon the energies and conditions of the lower 
level and was adjusted to its wide-spreading foundation. 
Matter, itself, was evolved. Then came the earth with its 
waters, its salts and fertile earth and, giving it radiant 
energy, the sun. Then little by little came life reaching 
upward to more complex forms. The story is a long one, 
not completely deciphered, for whole chapters are missing 
in the records. Slowly life lifted to mind, the human mind 
being the latest and highest to appear. Pre-history gave way 
to human history and society with its fruit, civilization, 
began to dominate the surface of the earth. Something of 
this sort seems to be the unavoidable reading of the facts 

4Lloyd Morgan, Hmergent Evolution, pp. 1-2, abridged. 


364 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


which science has collected. And the advantage of it is that it 
explains the co-existence in nature to-day of things so dif- 
ferent aS minerals and government, the stormy ocean and 
the human mind which contemplates it and sees in it beauty 
and destruction. The old persists while the new develops 
with effort within it. In this regard, evolution offers us the 
spectacle of the differentiation of nature through its 
temporal dimension. And this temporal differentiation is 
spread out in space in the variety of co-existing kinds of 
realities. 

But what is the logical structure of such a view? It 
clearly involves a hierarchy of behaviors reaching from the 
simple and more general to the complex and more special- 
ized. Chemical laws cannot be regarded as deducible from 
the general laws of motion, for we have entering here the 
new factor of the actual structure and constitution of the 
various compounds. And in biology we have organisms which 
are constituted by the organization of chemical systems into 
systems of a higher order. The laws of biology cannot, 
therefore, be deduced from the laws of chemistry. For each 
level, laws must be discovered rather than deduced. The task 
of science is, for this outlook, the discovery and arrange- 
ment of the laws of nature in an ordered hierarchy. Let us 
remember that scientific laws are our human formulation of 
invariable correlations between events or between quantities 
obtained by measurement. They give us knowledge of the 
processes and relations of things. The evolutionary thesis 
would hold that things of different orders behave differently 
and that the laws which formulate this behavior are not 
deducible from one another. This conclusion is frequently 
expressed by saying that the laws of nature form a hierarchy 
wm which the different levels are discontinuous. This logical, 
or deductive, discontinuity, does not at all conflict with the 
genetic continuity of orders of things in nature. But it 
does mean that there are ‘junctures’ in nature at which 
critical arrangements occur with the origination of novel 


THEORY OF LEVELS AND BASIC POINTS 3865 


properties. Genetic continuity is not smooth but mutative, 
as it were. What nature does we must accept. Knowledge 
is an affair of discovery. For this attitude, S. Alexander and 
Lloyd Morgan, two very able English thinkers, have an 
attractive phrase. We must, they say, accept these mutative 
junctures with ‘‘natural piety.’’ So much for the logical 
structure of the evolutionary view. 

But it is time that we examined the classic view of nature 
which has tacitly ruled the sciences until recently. It is 
really impossible to appreciate the strength of this classic 
view apart from some knowledge of its rise in the seventeenth 
century and an appreciation of the outlook to which it was 
then opposed. In the chapter dealing with the nature and 
origin of life, we indicated the general character of this early 
conflict and pointed out how distinctly emotional it made 
the controversy between mechanism and vitalism in biology. 
There is really very striking agreement among philosophers 
who have given their attention to this controversy on one 
point, the vagueness of the use of the term mechamsm. It 
will be remembered that we criticized Professor Pratt’s 
defense of metaphysical dualism on this very point. It is 
too easy to oppose mechanism to teleology in a sort of blanket 
way. 

Broad, one of the ablest of the younger English philoso- 
phers, has undertaken to analyze the meaning of mechanical 
explanation. He points out that there are two distinct ques- 
tions involved in the mechanism-vitalism controversy: ‘‘ (1) 
What precisely do we mean by a mechanical explanation and 
how do we suppose it to differ from any alternative kind of 
explanation? and (2) Can the phenomena dealt with by 
biologists be fully accounted for mechanically in the sense 
defined?’’1 Now it is clear that the first question is the 
prior one, and one which demands more than biological train- 
ing. And it is unfortunate that the controversialists have 


8Broad, Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1918-1919. Mechanical Ex- 
planation and its Alternatives, p. 86. 


366 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


seldom undertaken the task of telling us what they meant by 
mechanism. Driesch, we saw, was an exception. 

Now precisely the same problem of the satisfactoriness of 
mechanical explanation and its meaning breaks out in chem- 
istry, as we have seen. The laws of chemistry are not those 
of pure mechanics, that is, laws of motion. The actual situa- 
tion is rather of this kind: scientific explanation tends to 
substitute for macroscopic phenomena, that is, for the things 
we see, microscopic phenomena like atoms and ions. And 
then the theory is easily made that these particles behave 
in accordance with rigid mechanical laws. As a matter of 
fact, they do not. Certainly, it has never been proved 
that they do. The laws of chemistry are empirically dis- 
covered, and they are not deducible from the laws of motion. 
Pure mechanism assumes qualitative homogeneity and simple 
geometrical relations. It is an abstract construction rather 
than something discovered. To assert that all physical proc- 
esses are in themselves merely mechanical re-arrangements 
of microscopic particles is a bit of pure dogmatism. As 
Broad puts it, ‘‘We perhaps pay Nature too high a compli- 
ment by assuming it must be as logically beautiful as we can 
imagine it might be. We may admit with Mr. Dombey that 
‘Nature is a highly respectable institution,’ but we need 
not stake our faith in science as its being so terribly re- 
spectable as that mathematical Mrs. Grundy—pure mech- 
anism—demands.’’ ? 

A. E. Whitehead has put the logical situation of science 
very aptly in the phrase: ‘‘Seek simplicity, and distrust it.’’ 
Why should nature be simple? Professor Lovejoy speaks of 
science’s millennial dream of unification and reduction of all 
special laws to a few, general ones and its disappointments. 
‘“To the philosophic looker-on,’’ he writes, ‘‘these disappoint- 
ments are not surprising; for he remains mindful that a 
belief in the ultimate unifiability of natural laws has no 
cogent logical grounds. ‘Seek simplicity’ is a maxim born 

1 Broad, ibid., p. 109. 


THEORY OF LEVELS AND BASIC POINTS 367 


primarily of our needs and ambitions—and most of all of the 
need for intellectual economy characteristic of such limited 
and short-lived creatures as we are.’’? 

Mechanism versus Design.—Let us now try to apply this 
analysis of the character of natural processes to the old con- 
troversies which still puzzle popular thought. Surely, this 
is one of the duties of philosophy. We have endeavored to 
view nature as a hierarchy established by creative evolution 
and to maintain that such an outlook fits in more harmon- 
iously with the facts than the rather a priory view so long 
held as the scientific ideal. Does this position enable us to 
interpret, and deal justly by, the traditional opposition 
between mechanism and design, or external teleology, in 
nature? 

We shall find it very interesting to note that this oppo- 
sition was at first of a dominantly theological type. Design 
and teleology stood for creation and providence, while mech- 
anism stood for a sort of atomic naturalism. Here we have 
another instance of those sharp and harsh antitheses which 
have ruled and, at the same time, puzzled and bewildered 
the human mind. It is probable that problems set in this 
way, that is, falsely, have done more to east discredit upon 


~ human reason and upon philosophy than has any other 


cause. We shall meet with others, such as freedom versus 
determinism in conduct. Only by degrees has the human 
mind been able to achieve an adequate perspective and to 
pass beyond vicious and unreal problems. And yet all these 
problems were in a sense real. They represented difficulties. 
One extreme protested against another extreme. 

The brute fact of the situation is this: Man arrived and 
erept around in this world for many thousands of years 
with no one to tell him about himself or about the world 
in which he found himself. Inevitably he began with myths 
and passed bit by bit to a well-constructed religious view of 


1 Lovejoy, Hssays in Metaphysics, University of California Pub. No. 5, 
p. 197. 


368 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


the world. His imagination was social and anthropomorphice. 
The gods did these things. The gods made the earth and 
created all creatures. The gods plan things and can be 
propitiated. It is with the categories so established that 
theology with all its refinements still works. Design and 
teleology are categories based on an extension of mam’s 
own agency to the world concentrated in a mystical and 
magical way in the thought of a god or gods. In this way 
was developed what I earlier called the great hypothesis of 
religion. 

But the human reason in Greece began another type of 
interpretation of things and events. The form which we 
recognize as scientific reached its first clear expression in 
the work of Democritus. We may call it atomic mechan- 
icalism. Undeniably, it is naturalistic in its intent and outlook. 
We need not examine it here because it has already been 
discussed. 

This first form of atomic naturalism was challenged by 
Plato. His challenge was an event of tremendous historical 
importance for, right or wrong, it forced to the front another 
type of explanation, more akin to the religious view. Western 
thought has been divided between these two types. We shall 
try later to show that the perspective opened up by the idea 
of evolution offers a type of explanation which will do justice 
to what is valid in both of these positions. 

Plato opposed to atomic naturalism a teleology based on his 
own spiritualistic metaphysics. For him, the world is con- 
trolled by ideas, or forms, of an eternal sort, assignable ulti- 
mately to God who is the seat of eternal truth, beauty and 
goodness. We must remember that, by ideas, Plato meant 
ideal forms which are dynamic realities quite independent of 
the human mind. These ideas operate upon the world after 
the manner of ends, values or final causes. This outlook was 
developed more concretely by Aristotle who peopled the 
world with active forms united with a passive matter. These 
forms exerted their influence, not as efficient causes in a 


THEORY OF LEVELS AND BASIC POINTS 369 


time process, but as ends. United with forms, the material 
world is swayed by its yearning after the perfection which 
forms hold before it. God, the Unmoved Mover, is the 
highest point and summit of this hierarchy of forms. Those 
who would realize the meaning of all this must think how 
love for a beloved person may control our actions. Ideals, 
or values, for Platonism are given a cosmological status. 

During the Middle Ages, this Platonic-Aristotelian view 
held sway, and it was not until the rise of astronomy, mathe- 
matics and physics in the seventeenth century that the prin- 
eiple of efficient causality of a mechanical type again came 
to the front. 

Nearly every one has heard of the position taken by La 
Place. He believed that a divine mathematician who knew 
the configuration of the bodies which constitute the physical 
universe and also knew their accelerations could predict 
all their future configurations. This ideal quite dazzled the 
scientific mind. Philosophers were puzzled, but escaped its 
import by dualism or by holding that the physical world is 
merely an appearance of something more ultimate. Let us 
be certain that we get the problem clearly before our minds. 
It was assumed that matter is inert, that we have to do only 
with accelerations among particles. Such a system is purely 
mathematical and permits prediction. There 1s nowhere con- 
trol, purpose or spontanerty. 

But organisms do exist. How could they have arisen? 
The traditional hypothesis was creation according to a design. 
And with such a background this hypothesis continued to 
seem the natural one. Mere chance, it was felt, could not 
account for these complicated structures and functional 
harmonies. Writers like Paley never tired of pointing out 
evidences of design. Unfortunately they forgot disharmonies 
or dysteleologies, as they are called; and they exaggerated 
the perfection of the human body. Nonetheless, they had 
their justification in the background of atomic mechan- 
icalism. 


870 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


If we ask ourselves very frankly what design can mean, 
we quickly see that it is a category taken over from human 
work. The inventor designs a machine; the artist designs 
a building. Here we have mind and body working together. 
Take the idea from such a setting and it becomes forced and 
unreal. Is God an artisan? In the eighteenth century, Hume 
pointed out the logical difficulties confronting the argument 
from design or external teleology. What do we know about 
such a designer? We can argue from a watch to a watch- 
maker because we have met watchmakers. 

We saw how Darwin helped to break this deadlock by sug- 
gesting a natural process which might partly explain the 
rise of organisms. But, as we pointed out, he did not 
challenge the mechanistic outlook which dominated all lines 
of science. Is it surprising, then, that there has been dis- 
satisfaction with Darwinism as too mechanistic? No experts 
would deny the value of his achievement nor belittle the 
stimulus which he gave to biological studies. He gave the 
death-blow to design in biology, and yet we are to-day 
convinced that the whole outlook of science needs re- 
construction. It was to this problem that we devoted the 
first section of this chapter. We must deepen our thought 
of nature. We must get beyond the ancient contrast of mech- 
anism and design. Nature is insurgent, creative, a domain 
of synthesis and origination. 

The Need for New Categories.—Philosophy had not been 
sterile all these years, though science was too busy with its 
details to note what philosophy was thinking. 

One of the striking attacks against traditional mechanism 
was led by Charles Peirce and continued by William James 
and James Ward. We may call this a shifting of interest 
from the mechanical schema to the nature of the stuff of the 
world. As Morris Cohen puts it, there was much ‘mythology’ 
in the tidy world of science ‘‘according to which all the atoms 
in the universe are to-day precisely in the same condition 
in which they were on the day of creation, a mythology which 


THEORY OF LEVELS AND BASIC POINTS 3871 


is forced to regard all the empirical facts of spontaneity and 
novelty as illusory, or devoid of substantial truth.’ Experi- 
mental science has confirmed this attack. We have here a 
movement in the direction of what has been called by the 
French scientific pluralism. Let me quote a passage from a 
French philosopher expressive of this outlook: ‘‘In all units, 
however small, of the physical universe, in all its agerega- 
tions, however vast, there is always heterogeneity, complexity ; 
an intelligent and immortal being, possessing means of infor- 
mation endlessly perfectible, capable of progressing without 
obstacle towards the infinitely little and towards the infinitely 
great, would always find himself confronted with new dif- 
ferences, new multiplicities.’’ 2 

The thesis of Peirce and Ward is that law springs from the 
spontaneity of matter. And this spontaneity of matter they 
call chance. Thus chance is more ultimate than law. Novelty 
is natural to the world, and law is the result of habit. Matter 
develops habits and tends to settle down into regular ways of 
acting. Spontaneity, or impulsiveness, comes first in order 
and gives way in a measure to routine. 

What shall be our reaction to this very striking hypothesis 
which challenges the inertness of matter as conceived in 
traditional atomic mechanicalism? First, one of admiration, 
and then one of qualification. It is clear that we are searching 
for new categories. We feel that the action of things must 
be the expression of their nature and that we must not con- 
ceive of laws as external rulers. Very true; laws are our 
formulations, and they are never exact andi are largely 
statistical. But do we need to assume anything more 
than genuine variety and self-expression on the part of the 
realities which make up the world? And it seems to me very 
likely that, the farther down we go into inorganic nature, the 
farther we are from psychological categories. I would suggest 


*Morris Cohen, Introduction to his edition of Peirce’s Chance, Love 
and Logic, p. XIII. 
7 J. Sageret, Revue Philosophique (1923), p. 222; quoted from Lovejoy. 


372 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


that there are degrees of freedom in nature, and that the 
higher up we go in the scale of evolution the more freedom 
there is because the greater is the internal organization and 
plasticity of realities. 

I would suggest, therefore, that regularity in nature is the 
expression of absence of change. Even human beings act 
again and again in the same way if they have not changed 
and the situation has remained the same. We should expect, 
then, that at certain levels of nature there is little alteration 
and hence great uniformity of behavior. Such changes as 
there are are secular and evolutionary. In short, I doubt 
whether chance is a good term for what is valuable in this 
protest against classic atomism. What is essential in the 
standpoint is a shift in emphasis from laws to the self- 
expression of the nature of things however far back we go. 
Laws are descriptions of the behavior of things, often 
descriptions of mass-behaviors. To postulate mind, habit 
and impulse at the inorganic level seems to me unjustified 
and to belittle the novelty which these thinkers wish to pro- 
tect. I would suggest for chance and spontaneity a more 
neutral term like activity or functioning. Even behavior 
might be satisfactory. 

One of the great difficulties confronting biology has been 
the achievement of satisfactory categories. There are those 
who wish to read into its data the categories of psychology ; 
and there are those who will use none but the categories of 
physics. Now if the thesis of evolutionary naturalism is 
correct, each level in nature would have its own laws and 
categories. Organization is cumulative. We may put this 
metaphorically by saying that time packs space. At the level 
of biology, this cumulative organization is so internally sig- 
nificant that we have a system which is organic. Interde- 
pendence and cooperation are the characteristics of biological 
systems. Where there is interdependence and cooperation in 
a physical system we have always used the term organic, 
and it seems quite justifiable to employ the term organicism, 


THEORY OF LEVELS AND BASIC POINTS 373 


as advocated by G. H. Parker and by J. S. Haldane, or 
organismal as advocated by W. E. Ritter. The organic would 
be a level of organization. 

The solution of the mind-body problem which we advanced 
enables us to affirm the actual reality of a high level of effi- 
cient causality in which internally developing systems control 
human behavior and, through it, bring about changes in the 
earth’s surface. Agency in this sense there is; but it is 
localized agency just as for Einstein time is always local. 
Personality is a system founded on hereditary capacities and 
ripened by education and experience. If, as we have taught, 
psychology gives genuine knowledge about nature, it indi- 
cates in no uncertain manner the reality of creative synthesis, 
or cumulative growth, and the rise and functioning in nature 
of gradients, or levels, of efficient causality. The human mind 
surveys and correlates. 

Push, Pull, or Internal Teleology?—We have our material 
in hand for re-stating one of the historical oppositions. It 
will be remembered that Plato challenged the adequacy of 
the mechanical type of explanation. One of the classical 
passages is from the Phaedo. The problem is the explana- 
tion of Socrates’ conduct in staying in the prison when he 
might easily escape. ‘‘ As I proceeded,’’ said Socrates, ‘‘I found 
my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other prin- 
cuple of order but having recourse to air, and ether, and 
water, and other eccentricities; I might compare him to a 
person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the 
cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavored 
to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went 
on to show that I sit here because my body is made of bones 
and muscle. . . But to say that I do as I do because of them 
and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from 
the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of 
speaking.’’ Here we have the historically significant con- 
trast between mechanical, physical processes and human pur- 
pose in which valuations play their part. Has our investiga- 


3874 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


tion enabled us to mediate between these extremes and 
naturalize purpose? 

The old perspective took the form of a sharp opposition 
between push and pull. Thus we may speak of the dead-level, 
mechanical view of tradition as stressing push. Every change 
is the resultant of many distinct pushes. An atomic system 
of this type is an aggregate. Pull, on the other hand, was 
the control exerted from outside by final causes or values 
or ideals. Pulling was often given a temporal interpretation. 
Thus it was supposed that the future, that which 1s to be, 
exerted this pull on the lagging and reluctant present. 

In philosophy, we must always keep our categories in mind 
or else we get confused. It will be remembered that the 
distinctions between the past, the present and the future are 
distinctions before the human mind. The future means both 
that which is to come and that which we want to come about, 
and the future is thought of by means of a present idea 
in my mind. It is my plan for the future which is my 
present purpose. Pull must have a localized fulerum. Clearly 
the great difficulty confronting all theories of pull or finalism, 
as it is sometimes called, is that it spatializes time and thinks 
of the future as somehow real now and operative upon the 
present. It makes the future co-existent with the present, 
which it cannot be. 

The great systems of spiritualism have always tended to 
envisage the universe in terms of pull rather than in terms 
of push. They have given a cosmological significance to 
values and to ends. Usually this has been in a singularistic, 
or monistic, way. They have postulated a world-mind 
dominated by values, a normative sun which attracts and 
upholds what is ideal in our world. We have already noted 
that this is the assumption in Plato and Aristotle. Those 
who have read Dante will recall how completely his cosmology 
is dominated by the same thought. 

But the physical realist is practically compelled by his 
logic to deepen and develop efficient causality and to reject 


THEORY OF LEVELS AND BASIC POINTS 375 


finalistic causality. Along what lines, then, can we advance 
to pass beyond the purely ‘push’ interpretation of causality? 
The crucial objection to it is that it assumes that all causal 
activity is merely an external shove. The imagery which 
dominates it is the imagery of baseball and billiards. One 
body hits another body. Now while we would not deny the 
existence of this sort of efficient causality, we must regard 
it a mistake to assert that it is the only type of event which 
occurs in nature. When bodies are highly organized they 
are capable of responses to stimuli, responses which are by 
no means adequately accounted for by the external stimulus 
or shove. The push becomes essentially an occasion which 
must unite with the capacities of the thing pushed in order 
to account for the resultant action. And, as we go up the 
seale of organization, the importance in causality of that 
which is pushed becomes ever greater. The living body 
adapts itself to the environment and even modifies the en- 
vironment. Its response is differential. Take the level of 
mind. Attention is controlled by internal systems of interest 
and knowledge as much as it is by the intensity of the 
stimulus. If, then, we are to accept the push theory, we 
must disconnect it from mechanical atomism of the tradi- 
tional sort and admit the significance of system and organ- 
ization. We rightly feel that in most of our actions we are 
not pushed around from outside. There is choice, adjust- 
ment, response to these external demands upon us. It is 
because of this that relative autonomy is a feature of the 
world. Things are not passive and inert. Their nature and 
properties determine results as truly as the forces external 
to them which impinge upon them. Under the same condi- 
tions, one plant will die while another plant will flourish. 

It is this growth of relative autonomy or self-rule which 
distinguishes the position which we have taken from the 
traditional contrast and by means of which we can escape 
from the old dilemma. It will mean that there are degrees 
of freedom in nature itself, degrees expressive of the prop- 


376 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


erties of the things around us. A human being has a high 
degree of freedom because he has powers of interpretative 
adjustment to his environment. He is not a mere creature 
of circumstances but a person whose activity is determined by 
very highly developed powers. 

Our suggestion amounts to this, that an organism is a 
thickened system with definite trends. Its organic structure 
points it towards the future. It has needs and ways of doing 
things. It has what might be called an organic momentum 
which uses and bends to itself those factors in the environ- 
ment which are significant for it. Such a trait seems to me 
inseparable from an organic system. It is, for example, im- 
possible to understand embryology apart from it. I doubt — 
that it is possible to understand organic evolution without 
the concept of organic momentum. In our own conscious 
lives, the principle comes quickly to the front. Our present 
activities are conditioned by our past activities in the sense 
that our interests urge us on. Our goal is selected by our 
self, and this means that trends, tendencies and purposes 
grow up within us. Traditional finalism is just a misunder- 
standing of this immanent, or internally developed, teleology 
or directedness. Organization can never be passive or neu- 
tral; it must involve an urge or trends. The mistake which 
we must be on guard against is to reify these trends and make 
them external, attractive ends which exercise a spell over the 
organism. ‘To do so would be merely to project a vicious 
analysis of human purpose into organic systems. It is this, 
we said, that traditional finalism did. If we speak of ends 
as governing organisms, as biologists constantly do, we must 
think of these ends as incarnated in the structure and in- 
ternal relations of the organism. That which has a specified 
structure cannot be neutral; it must have a set, a charac- 
teristic way of functioning. In this sense, and in this sense — 
only, ends are natural to the physical world; but they are 
local and intrinsic to particular thickened systems. With 
these qualifications in mind, we can speak of biology as need- 


THEORY OF LEVELS AND BASIC POINTS 377 


ing teleological categories. Organisms have designed them- 
selves because design is natural to the physical world. But 
such design is a growth-design and not a planned design. 
It is only machines which are planned designs. 

Does Internal Teleology in Nature Imply Mind?—We 
have argued that teleology is an expression of organization. 
It follows that it has degrees, and that we must not interpret 
the higher levels in the same way that we do the lower 
levels. Now many thinkers have suggested that we must 
hold Mind to be a universal driving force in nature and in 
all evolutionary change. A very able and well-informed 
English thinker who has done much work in genetic 
psychology, L. T. Hobhouse, asserts that he has been led to 
‘‘raise the question whether mind (in the infinitely varied 
form of its activity, from the groping of unconscious effort 
to the full clearness of conscious purpose) may not be the 
essential driving force in all evolutionary change.’’ And 
Lloyd Morgan, with whose standpoint we have expressed gen- 
eral agreement and sympathy, goes farther in a theistic diree- 
tion and speaks of an Activity which is the nisus beneath 
the process of evolution. He even ealls this Activity God 
and indicates his belief that it exerts a pull from above upon 
evolving nature, an essentially Aristotelian idea. To quote 
an important passage: ‘‘ Within us, if anywhere, we must feel 
the urge, or however it be named, which shall afford the basis 
upon which acknowledgment of Activity is founded. What 
then does it feel like? Each must answer for himself, fully 
realizing that he may misinterpret the evidence. Without 
denying a felt push from the lower levels of one’s being— 
a so-called driving force welling up from below—to me it 
feels like a drawing upwards through Activity existent at a 
higher level than that to which I have attained.’’* Anal- 
ogous, at least, to these suggestions is the hypothesis of Berg- 
son, who sees something of the nature of consciousness as the 
activity which creates, while matter is the slackening, or 

1ZLloyd Morgan, Hmergent Evolution, p. 208. 


378 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


decrease of tension, of this life-energy. What shall we say 
to these suggestions that mind is central in nature and in 
evolution ? 

In the case of Bergson we have a form of vitalism with a 
peculiar metaphysical background with which physical 
realism can have little in common. Have we any good em- 
pirical reason to regard matter as a deposit of life-energy? 
Frankly, I do not see that we have. Suppose we raise the very 
interesting problem: How far down in nature does mind 
extend? If we take mind as a term for a more or less 
sentient type of behavior, surely we have no good reason to 
extend it below organic life. It is very doubtful whether 
we should assign it to stationary things like plants. On the 
face of it, mind appears to be a novelty emerging with 
locomotion and the positive and negative responses which 
go with it. And yet we have here no absolute break with 
what goes before but rather a specialization in functioning, 
a new level which has its gradations, as animal psychology, © 
and even human psychology, well shows. 

The objections confronting the assumption of an Activity — 
or a Guiding Principle or a Creative Will working in nature ~ 
are the objections against vitalism and all other forms of 
dualism. Such an assumption refuses to admit that a physical 
system contains its own trends. It demands something — 
immaterial to do the organizing and arranging. We can quite - 
understand this demand as a counterpoise to the traditional — 
mechanical view of nature; but has it a similar justification | 
for the theory of originative evolution? Personally, I can-— 
not convince myself that it does and that is why I call my 
own position evolutionary naturalism. Here the student has — 
one of those basic decisions to make with respect to which 
he should be in no haste. 

The objection to an Activity which pulls life upward seems 
to me very similar. Ultimately, I suppose, it rests upon the 
thesis that we know nothing of a discarnate mind. Where — 
does this Activity reside? Is it outside space and time, that is, 


THEORY OF LEVELS AND BASIC POINTS 379 


outside the physical world? Since we know nothing empi- 
rically of a discarnate mind such an assignment would seem 
to be a form of words rather than a thought. That, at least, 
is my difficulty. And, again, it postulates a directing force 
which is external to the system directed. But we shall have 
more to say on this whole question in the third part of the 
book where we treat of values and a philosophy of hfe. 

All such questions as these have their metaphysical bear- 
ings and implications. The perspective to which I ineline 
is, as I have often indicated, pluralistic. The universe is a 
spatio-temporal complex containing immense, internal variety. 
Life and mind have their locus and their conditions. Both 
are natural to the universe, but are not natural to every 
part of the universe. Life and mind are the high levels 
of cumulative organization, levels which are attained seldom 
and in few places in the tremendous sea of suns and planets. 
Probably only single suns have planets, and that excludes 
many stellar systems as loci of life. And on the planets 
conditions must be favorable for life. It is very improbable, 
for instance, that life of any high animal type exists on any 
other planet of our solar system. As for the planets of other 
suns, what do we know? What shall we know? All this raises 

questions of significance. Clearly, it becomes harder to sup- 

pose that the stellar universe exhibits the marks of inventive 
design aiming at values similar to those we know. Other- 
wise, what a waste of material! Relinquish the hypothesis 
of design and creation, and our puzzles, at least, become 
fewer. We then simply seek to discover what kind of a 
world we are in. This much scientific cosmology seems to 
indicate to philosophy. 

Purpose and the Efficacy of Consciousness.— We are now 
ready to attack the most delicate of the problems which con- 
front cosmology, viz.,—the nature of the efficacy of conscious- 
ness. We postponed this problem from the chapter dealing 
with the relation between mind and body because the ground 
had not at that stage been sufficiently prepared. It is obvious, 


380 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


for instance, that the rejection of mechanism as an adequate 
account of biological processes gives us new hope of natural- 
izing mental processes and localizing them in nature. If an 
organic system is thickened and has an internal teleology and 
trends, conscious processes begin immediately to seem more 
native and less alien to the inner adjustments of such a 
system. Recall the famous simile of Clifford to which the 
older view gave point. How could consciousness bind together 
molecules any more than the sentiments of amity between 
the stoker and the guard could lnk carriage and engine? 
Or, as James put it, ‘‘we can form no positive image of the 
modus operandi of a volition or other thought affecting the 
cerebral molecules.’’ But we have seen good reason to 
believe that molecules form an integrated, organic system, 
historically developed and differentiated, which acts some- 
what as a whole. The molecules are already bound together. 
The mind-brain is a moving complex of systems. The per- 
spective has decidedly altered from the Huxley-Clifford days. 
But there is the other important point. The older view 
was dualistic. It pictured the brain as a turmoil of atoms 
and then asked how another substance, called indiscriminately — 
mind or consciousness, could act upon it from outside and yet 
not be quasi-physical. It is this sort of situation which James 
had in mind in the above quotation. But think for a 
moment how our epistemology and cosmology have altered 
the whole approach. Consciousness, we said, is an event in 
the qualitative dimension of a functioning mind-brain sys- 
tem; it is an event with which we are acquainted from the 
inside because it is what we as conscious creatures are. Here 
we have a monistic, instead of a dualistic, perspective. Con- 
sciousness is an event whose unity reflects the unity of the 
mind-brain as it functions. If it is efficacious, it is efficacious, 
not from the outside, but from the inside of the system. 
Have we not gained a great deal from this re-formulation 
of the problem? Consciousness need no longer be thought 
of as hammering upon the brain from outside in some mys- 


THEORY OF LEVELS AND BASIC POINTS 381 





_ terious fashion for which we have no positive image. I am 
quite aware that, until people live into the double-knowledge 
| approach to the problem, they will continue to try to do just 
that sort of a thing and feel baffled. For them, consciousness 
will continue to be—as it is for George Santayana—a lyric 
ery in the midst of business, a belief in its efficacy ‘‘a super- 
stition clung to by the unreconciled childishness of man.’’ 
Clearly, the prime question is to know our terms. Conceive 
them falsely, and we beget an insoluble problem. It is pre- 
cisely this that the human mind has in general done, and 
why it is so usual to turn away from the mind-body problem 
as an ultimate mystery. 
_ There are two principles which seem to me relevant to the 
question of the efficacy of consciousness. And these prin- 
_ ciples are based upon the solution of the mind-body problem 
~which I have called the ‘‘double-knowledge view.’’ The first 
principle is this, that the brain must not be thought of as a 
mechamcal system but as a developed organization of ten- 
dencies, a system which has the eapacity to function in an 
intelligent manner and which modifies its functioning in a 
cumulative and interpretative way. In other words, the brain 
is a mind. The second principle is this, that the efficacy of 
consciousness must correspond to rts nature. It was to this 
second principle that dualism could not be true in its theory 
of interaction. Because consciousness was assumed to be 
external to the brain, to be efficacious it must move it from 
outside, a causal operation which remained mysterious and 
magical just because consciousness was thought of as an 
external stuff. But let us, instead, think of a conscious 
process as a complex event in the brain-mind. What kind 
of event is it? An event at the moment the brain-mind is 
seeking to adjust itself, to solve a problem which involves 
analysis and synthesis and some sort of survey. Is it not 
this survey which consciousness gives to the brain-mind? We 
attend, relate, compare by means of these contents which are 
elements of consciousness. In short, the function of con- 








382 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


sclousness would seem to be guidance. Introspection con- 
firms this suggestion, though it cannot reveal to us the 
deeper play of the system of tendencies which constitute 
mind. We foresee the consequences of our possible actions, 
and we react as we respond to those envisaged possibilities. 
To me, only one who dogmatically limits his thought of cere- 
bral action to the usual scientific schemata can deny the 
feasibility of this view of the efficacy of consciousness. It 
seems to me when I introspect that I can detect by data in my 
consciousness forces and tendencies which are pressing into 
action and of which these data are expressions. It is in this 
fashion that a vague impulse becomes a desire which knows 
its goal. In short, make consciousness intrinsic to the brain- 
event, and its efficacy cannot conflict with the facts of physi- 
ology and behaviorism. 

The self is a very complex kind of reality. It is an organ- 
ized system of habits, information, aims and sentiments. We 
must take a very realistic view of the self and not merely 
identify it with the pulse of consciousness which is its 
temporary illumination. And we must not think of con- 
sciousness as a stuff having a distinct existence; instead, to 
put it another way, it is a qualitative dimension of the opera- 
tions which we as conscious beings are. What puzzles us is 
our tendency to think of the brain-mind in terms merely of 
our knowledge about it and forget that it has a content of its 
own which we cannot get at in that fashion. Our episte- 
mology should make all this much clearer. The point is that 
the content of consciousness is a phase of the content of the 
brain-mind. Here, and here alone, are we on the inside of 
a highly developed part of reality. In planning and thinking 
we are ourselves seeking to make adjustments. And we 
realize that this sort of work cannot be done blindly. There 
must be discrimination. 

Physiologist and behaviorist study the organism externally. 
They are, moreover, still dominated by dead-level mech- 
anical ideas of physical action, and do not allow for pattern 


_—— = 


THEORY OF LEVELS AND BASIC POINTS 383 


and levels of causality. But even here there are many indi- 
eations that a more flexible outlook is developing. The 
tendency to think of nature as a rigid machine with one or 
two degrees of freedom is passing. Instead, there is coming 
a recognition of the remarkable adaptive capacity of physical 
systems. Let this outlook be united with an adequate episte- 
mology, and a clearer vision of the locus and nature of con- 
sciousness will arise. 

Concluding Remarks.—This chapter has involved the 
study of some very basic categories. The questions we have 
studied are undeniably difficult, and it cannot be said that 
philosophy and science are as yet accomplishing much more 
than the getting of a more fruitful perspective than Cartesian 
dualism offered. The admission of integrative patterns in 
nature along with the recognition of evolutionary gradients 
lifts us above the sharp antitheses which so long controlled 
and frustrated thought. We see the futility and anthromo- 
morphism of the choice between machine-hke mechanism and 
design, and gain a more sympathetic insight into the move- 
ment of nature. At first, this movement is unconscious. We 
must then depend upon the descriptive knowledge we achieve 
by means of our intelligence looking into these systems 
through the key-hole of sense-data. We have scarcely an 
internal analogon on which to work. But gradually, as 
nature presses onward and upward, it attains a level which 
demands a tremendously complex and shifting adjustment. 
An organism is a physical system which maintains itself 
and even carries on a life of desire and craving. In this 
respect it has both relative autonomy and relative spontaneity. 
It is at this stage, apparently, that the pattern of life begins 
to glow and become conscious. And with man there arrives 
a social creature which by education and mutual stimulation 
becomes self-conscious. What a dramatic fact! It is 
man’s drama, the drama of a creature which looks around 
upon the world at first with uninformed eyes and only 
slowly finds out about both himself and his world that we 


384 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


shall now begin to study as objectively and sympathetically 
as possible. 


REFERENCES 


BERGSON, Creative Evolution. 

DriEscH, Science and Philosophy of the Organism. 

HOERNLE, Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, chaps. 6 and 7. 
HENDERSON, The Fitness of the Environment, and The Order of Nature. 
Ward, ‘‘ Purpose and Mechanism,’’ Aristotelian Soc., 1911-12. 
LuoyD Morgan, Emergent Evolution. 





PART THREE 
HUMAN LIFE AND VALUES 





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CHAPTER XXV 
HUMAN LIVING AND ITS PROBLEMS 


Human Living from the Inside.—In the first division of 
our work we examined the claim of human knowledge to 
reveal an external world. We there devoted ourselves to the 
history of philosophy, so far as it bore upon this problem, and 
to the controversy between idealism and realism. While try- 
ing to do justice to both sides of this persistent debate, we 
decided that, on the whole, the realistic position seemed best 
in accordance with the structure of experience and the claim 
of knowledge. In the second division, we explored the struc- 
ture of the world at large in the light of modern science and 
came to the decision that the categories of space and time 
apply significantly to it. This decision led us to take 
naturalism seriously and to ask ourselves whether a frank 
pluralism of an evolutionary type did not better accord with 
our knowledge than a singularism of a spiritualistic flavor. 
Working along these lines, it appeared possible to regard 
human life as a level in nature made possible by environ- 
mental conditions and the very capacity of creative synthesis 
intrinsic to the world. We were aided, moreover, in our 
treatment of the age-old mind-body problem by the episte- 
mology we had already worked out and by a subtler concep- 
tion of consciousness as not a distinct substance so much as a 
stream of qualitative events in a highly integrated system. 
And now in this third and last division of our survey, we wish 
to look at actual human living from the inside, to see its 
specific problems and intrinsic categories. We now enter 
upon that division of philosophy, technically called axiology, 


which concerns itself with human valuations and demands. 
387 


388 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


We move inward upon human life itself. We are ready to 
leave this contemplative survey of being and to concentrate 
upon the characteristics of actual human living with its joys 
and sorrows, its failures and achievements, its purposes, 


“Si 


efforts and valuations. Are not we human beings participants © 


in the movement of reality, living agents located on the sur- 


face of this earth and leading dramatic lives of feeling, voli- 


tion and thought? 
Individuals are confronted by situations. For them, the 


world divides itself crosswise into self and others, man and " 


nature. Thus the reader is a person with plans and con- 


fronted by problems. He must adjust himself to external — 


physical and social conditions. And yet his hopes go beyond 
mere adjustment to achievement. He would be a lawyer 
or a doctor or a business-man or a teacher; he would have a 
mate and children; he would have avocations and hobbies; he 
would live, intensely enjoying the genuinely good things of 
life. In short, he would be an active, selective personality 
looking fearlessly out upon the world. 

When we Americans wish to feel this sense of personality, 
of creative agency in the world, we may well go to Emerson. 
‘*T do not wish:to expiate,’’ he writes, ‘‘but to live. My life 
is not an apology, but a life. It is for itself and not a spec- 
tacle. I much prefer that it should be of a lower strain, so 
it be genuine and equal, than that it should be glittering and 
unsteady.’’ Such statements as these carry us back into 
life. Duties, needs, desires, aims, dreams, these are the active 
stuff of human living. 

It is the task of philosophy at this level to seek to under- 
stand the texture of human living. Here, again, we meet 
with an old field rich in human thought. For centuries, man 
has reflected upon his characteristic experiences. Thus we 
have the social and political sciences dealing with institu- 
tions and methods of a political and industrial kind. What is 
the nature of the state? What is the relation of the indi- 
vidual to it? What is wealth? What are the laws of its 


ae SS eee ee eee ee tamed 





HUMAN LIVING AND ITS PROBLEMS 389 


distribution in the societies of to-day? Society is a very 
complex kind of thing having within it the momentum of 
human living and an historically evolved structure. And 
it 1s in it, even more than in inorganic nature, that the 
individual lives and moves and has his conscious being. 
Qualitatively it has tremendous significance and, of course, 
paramount value for individuals, for it is upon it that their 
interests and happiness depend. Let us think of the plastic 
arts, of literature, of industry, of politics, of religion, of 
friendship. 

And, as I have already said, philosophy has not been re- 
miss. Ethics, esthetics, political philosophy, philosophy of 
religion, are all old subjects in which much good work has 
been done. And it is to these that we now turn. But here, 
again, an introduction does not permit of the detailed investi- 
gation which the subjects demand and lead on to. We must 
satisfy ourselves with a survey of the general nature of hu- 
man living, hoping that the interest of the student will lead 
him on to take further work in these special subjects. 

Has Human Life Intrinsic Value?—The category which 
the human sciences tend to bring to the front is that of value. 
_We speak of moral values, esthetic values, educational values, 
religious values. To understand what value is will be a large 
part of our present enterprise. 

Man values as well as knows. In fact, he often knows be- 
cause he values. He reacts to things, persons and situations 
in an emotional and volitional way, saying that they are 
good or bad, beautiful or ugly, evil or beneficent. This new 
kind of judgment which we did not examine in epistemology 
and cosmology will furnish us the clue with which to explore 
human life. Evidently, this characteristic element in human 
living raises questions of wide import which cannot be taken 
up in a Satisfactory way by a narrow and specialized disci- 
pline. Just as the physical sciences do not investigate knowl- 
edge as such, so the social and human sciences do not seek to 
understand the precise nature of value and valuation. The 


390 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


consequence is, that philosophy is obliged to analyze this 
new claim and activity and to bring it into harmony—if 
possible—with the results of epistemology and ontology. Are 
the values we give to things actually in them? Or are values 
meaningless apart from the constitution and purposes of 
human beings or beings like them? Is the world beautiful 
and good in itself? Or only in the eyes of conscious creatures 
who react within it emotionally because their weal and woe 
is bound up with objects and situations? 

There are two questions in regard to values which are 
sometimes confused. The one concerns itself with the nature 
and kinds of human valuations and values and the other with 
the fate of values in the cosmos. We shall postpone the con- 
sideration of the second question to the last chapter in which 
we Shall deal with first and last things, in other words, with 
the problems usually taken up in philosophy of religion. In 
the first chapters of this section, we shall devote ourselves 
chiefly to analytic questions concerning value and to an ex- 
amination of moral and aesthetic values as particularly well- 
known and basie. 

But in this introductory chapter it may be well to point 


out the crucial character of the problem of value. Why has — 
it come to the front of recent years to such an unexampled — 


degree so that it stands co-equal with epistemology and cos- 
mology ? 


The truth of the matter seems to be that man is being © 


called upon by his increase of knowledge about himself and 
the world to make a reflective readjustment in his perspective 
of an almost unparalleled sort. In the old days in spite of 


plagues and famine, the world was looked upon as a small, © 


cosy and not unfriendly place. An excellent way to bring out 
the contrast between the older view and the modern is to 
compare Dante’s cosmology with that of the astronomer of 
to-day. 

‘‘The scheme of the created Universe,’’ writes Norton, 
‘held by the Christians of the Middle Ages was compara- 


| 


| 


HUMAN LIVING AND ITS PROBLEMS 391 


tively simple, and so definite that Dante, in accepting it in 
its main features without modification, was provided with the 
limited stage requisite for his design ... The Harth was 
supposed to be the centre of the Universe, and its northern 
hemisphere was the abode of man. At the middle point of 
the hemisphere stood Jerusalem, equidistant from the Pillars 
of Hercules on the West and the Ganges on the east. Within 
the body of this hemisphere was Hell, shaped as a vast, hol- 
low cone, of which the apex was the centre of the globe; 
and here, according to Dante, was the seat of Lucifer... 
Immediately surrounding the atmosphere of the Earth was 
the sphere of elemental fire. Around this was the Heaven of 
the Moon, and encircling this, in succession, were the Heavens 
of Mercury, Venus, the Sun, Mars, Jove, Saturn, the Fixed 
Stars, and the Crystalline or First Moving Heavens.’’ ? 

The subject of the Divine Comedy is—I use the words of 
Dante in a letter to Can Grande—‘‘the state of the soul after 
death, simply considered. But, allegorically taken, its subject 
is man, according as by his good or ill deserts he renders him- 
self liable to the reward or punishment of Justice.’’ And 
Justice is something which governs the universe in a per- 
sonal way. 

Let us contrast with this conception a recent eloquent, 
though exaggerated, description of man’s place in the world 
according to science: 

‘‘Man, so far as natural science by itself is able to teach 
us, is no longer the final cause of the universe, the Heaiven- 
descended heir of all the ages. His very existence is an 
accident, his story a brief and transitory episode in the life 
of one of the meanest of the planets. Of the combination of 
causes which first converted a dead organic compound into 
the living progenitors of humanity, science, indeed, as yet 
knows nothing. It is enough that from such beginnings 
famine, disease, and mutual slaughter, fit nurses of the future 
lords of creation have gradually evolved, after infinite travail, 
- @Norton, The Divine Comedy of Dante, Introduction, p. 13. 


392 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


a race with conscience enough to feel that it is vile, and intel- 
ligence enough to know that it is insignificant. We survey 
the past, and see that its history is of blood and tears, of 
helpless blundering, of wild revolt, of stupid acquiescence, 
of empty aspirations. We sound the future, and learn that 
after a period, long compared with the individual life, but 
short indeed compared with the divisions of time open to 
our investigation, the energies of our system will decay, the 
glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and 
inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment 
disturbed its solitude. Man will go down to the pit, and all 
his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness, which in 
this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contented 
silence of the universe will be at rest. Matter will know 


itself no longer. ‘Imperishable monuments’ and ‘immortal 


deeds,’ death itself, and love stronger than death, will be as 
though they had never been. Nor will anything that is be 
better or be worse for all that the labour, genius, devotion, 
and suffering of man have striven through countless ages to 
effect.’’ ? 

This passage—and there are many of like tenor to be 
found—presents us with a problem: the locus and nature of 
human value. Has human life value even though it does not 
last forever and even though it cannot control the structure 
and course of the sidereal universe? It is clear that it 
is the question of the fate of human values which 


occupies Mr. Balfour’s attention but the prior question — 


is that of the nature of values. Does nature actually 


assist in the rise of human values and does nature support — 


them ? 
We must guard ourselves against the emotional effects of 


the pathetic fallacy. In what sense is this planet mean? © 
This, itself, is a value term. While not very large, this planet — 
is very favored as regards temperature and atmosphere. In — 
the second place, famine, disease and mutual slaughter played — 


1 Balfour, Foundations of Belief, pp. 29-31, 





HUMAN LIVING AND ITS PROBLEMS 393 


only a subordinate part in human evolution. It was endur- 
ance and ability which played the more positive role. And 
does man regard himself as vile? What would be the stand- 
ard consideration of which would thus overwhelm man in 
his own sight? Where is the pure and sinless perfection be- 
fore which man must cast himself down in self-disgust? Such 
phraseology reflects asceticism of a morbid kind. And in 
what sense is man insignificant? Is a creature that can 
create science and art insignificant before mere cosmic size? 
Surely, this is the old mistake of confusing the qualitative 
and the quantitative. And suppose that it is true that life 
will disappear in the far distant future from this planet, 
does this fact rob human living of its intrinsic values? Is 
cosmic permanence the sole criterion of worth? Is a picture 
any the less beautiful to those who enjoy it because it will 
not last forever? Is it not in creation even more than in 
possession that value consists? Time cannot wipe out the 
past, and love and joy and production were to the full even 
if they could not last. 

I have made these several comments upon this rather 
typical passage because I do think that mere conservation as 
against actual living has been too much stressed. Is it not 
‘possible that value exists in the throb of intelligent emotion 
as human beings adjust themselves to their world and bring 
out its possibilities? Perhaps, nature is a cooperative con- 
dition of all the values we know rather than their enemy? 
Can health, love and beauty be separated from sky and air 
and landscape? 

And, finally, it is the wiser part of philosophy, as of 
science, to recognize the kind of a world we live in and not 
to build up romantic expectations which will crumble around 
it. While illusion may have a justified place in life, it can 
surely not have a major place. Courage remains one of the 
chief virtues. So much for suggestions in regard to a prob- 
lem we shall examine later, that of man’s fate and the sup- 
posed dilemma between optimism and pessimism, In the 


394 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY ~ 


meantime, we shall proceed to consider the basic question — 


of value in the world. Moral values will furnish a good 
introduction. 


REFERENCES 


Brownina, Men and Women. A group of poems interpretative of human — 


life. 
EMERSON, Essays. 
The Little Flowers of St. Francis. 
FRANCE, The Garden of Epicurus. 
Marcus AvrRELIusS, Thoughts. 
MAETERLINCK, The Measure of the Hours. 
PLATO, Apology. 
NIETZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil. 
RuSSELL, Philosophical Essays, chap. 2. 
SANTAYANA, Dialogues in Limbo. 
SELLARS, The Next Step in Religion. 


CHAPTER XXVI 
MORALITY AND ETHICAL THEORY 


The Field of Ethics.—The philosophical science which 
studies human conduct and its standards is called Ethics. 
Ethies is a very old science and has had a varied and a 
distinctly controversial career very much as have episte- 
mology and metaphysics. That should not be surprising 
because both man’s view of himself and his view of the world 
have altered from age to age. Whence do moral standards 
come? What sanctions them? Are they fixed or changing? 
What kind of life should we seek to realize? Questions such 
as these arose as soon as moral reflection developed. Moral 
values are never indifferent to beliefs and to social conditions. 
Looked at in this way, it is not strange that man has only 
slowly gained insight into the nature of morality. We may 
_ say that moral theory has gained in adequacy with increased 
knowledge of human nature and with clearer realization of 
the whole process of human living. 

In the present chapter we shall give some attention to the 
theories which have ruled ethical discussion in the past, but 
our main interest will be constructive and directed to the 
achievement of a definite view of the general nature and 
foundations of moral values. In other words, we shall attempt 
to show how morality functions in human life and how it ex- 
presses the values of both the individual and the group. Inci- 
dentally, this will necessitate distinguishing between intelli- 
gent and unintelligent morality. Such an approach is the 
more valuable in a survey like the present because one of the 
popular traditions is that morality does not have natural 


causes and sanctions but needs the support of supernatural 
395 


396 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


- causes and authorities. For such a tradition, morality is 
considered adventitious to human life and pressed upon it 
from outside. From such a view, modern theory differs in 
toto; and we shall endeavor to show that goodness is the in- 
telligent living of social creatures constructed as we are. 

The field of ethics is, then, morality in the hight of what 
we know about ourselves and the world. It is a patient 
examination of moral facts to discover their meaning and 
foundation. | 

Everyone knows in a general way what morality is. The 
term arouses in us thoughts of customs, rules, duties, ideals, 
virtues. We say to a person that this kind of action is the 
eustom here, that truthfulness is a virtue, that the wise and 
patient care of children is a moral obligation, that ideals are 
projected improvements upon customary modes of life. In 
this connection, we employ such terms as right and wrong, 
good and bad, duty and conscience, responsibility and moral 
freedom, moral principles and methods. We may speak of 
such terms as the moral categories for they are fundamental 
concepts without which we cannot understand and interpret 
our human life. 

We have given reason to believe that these moral categories 
are not universal in the same way that space, time and caus- 
ality are. Rather are they intrinsic to, and characteristic of, 
a certain kind of living. Thus it is fairly obvious that such 
value terms as good and bad, right and wrong, are expres- 
sions of approval and disapproval on the part of conscious 
beings. When I say that this act is wrong, it is clear that I 
disapprove of it. And one can quickly realize that these 
predicates are correctly applied only to acts of a certain 
character by agents of a certain type. This means that moral 
categories have a limited area of application. They apply 
primarily to human beings since these, alone, seem capable 
of judging the value of their acts. Morality and personality 
go together. 

There are many indications that man did not at first realize 


MORALITY AND ETHICAL THEORY 397 


this limitation of morality to himself. Even inanimate things 
which injured human beings were at first condemned as 
guilty of doing that which they should not have done. Un- 
doubtedly, there was in this procedure a trace of that animism 
which was so definite a feature of man’s early outlook upon 
the world before he had learned to recognize the difference 
between the animate and the inanimate, the conscious and the 
unconscious. Kinds of existences were not differentiated as 
yet but rather merged vaguely together. Probably it took 
even longer for man to realize how different he was from 
other animals. It is true that he got bravely over that and 
went to the other extreme, as the struggle over evolution 
shows. But it is not difficult to find early laws which involve 
the trial and punishment of animals which have killed or 
hurt human beings. 

It is to-day frankly recognized that developed human be- 
ines endowed with certain psychological powers or abilities are 
alone fit subjects of moral judgment. And, of their actions, 
it is voluntary actions that are regarded as the suitable ma- 
terial for moral approval or disapproval. We do not judge 
children in quite the same way that we judge adults. Do we 
not feel that in voluntary action intelligent adults can foresee 
'the consequences of their action and thus know pretty well 
what they are about? We hold them responsible, that is, 
answerable. 

To determine just what we should mean by responsibility 
will be one of our tasks. It presupposes certain things which 
are not always understood. Why are not the insane held 
responsible? What they do is as injurious as what criminals 
of the supposedly responsible type do. 

Ethies discovers that there are very many interesting ques- 
tions which arise during an examination of its field, the 
voluntary actions of human beings. Thus many of our 
voluntary actions are generally regarded as morally indiffer- 
ent. Shall I play golf this afternoon or go for a walk? Shall 
I read a new book on philosophy this evening, or shall I re- 


398 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


read Butler’s The Way of All Flesh? A voluntary action 
implies a certain measure of choice or selection between pos- 
sible lines of action. Why are some choices regarded as mor- 
ally unimportant and others morally important? This prob- 
lem has led to the attempt to define what is meant by a moral 
situation. We can say in general that a moral situation is 
one in which the feeling of duty enters. But what is this feel- 
ing of duty and by what is it conditioned? May it be that* 
important values or interests are felt to be at stake? 

But we have said enough to indicate the specificity of the 
field of ethics. Human living is a specific kind of living 
which involves the valuation of actions as good or bad, right 
or wrong. Moral questions are recognized and standards 
set up and applied. All this is empirical matter which we 
all know about in a general way but do not usually under- 
stand to the full. Since the early days of Greek philosophy, 
reflection has been directed to these characteristics of human 
life, sometimes in an analytic way, sometimes in a directive 
way. The prime task of ethics is, however, to understand 
morality. If it can add positive suggestions as to lines of 
conduct, that will be so much to the good. But it must never 
neglect for this the work of analytic interpretation of moral 
conduct. 

Methods of Study.—Morality is a wide field which can 
be approached in different ways and from different angles. 
Any one who wishes to go into the subject thoroughly should 
employ all relevant ways of approach. In this brief survey 
we cannot do more than indicate them. 

The older tradition in ethics was analytic and speculative. 
It sought to determine the meaning of the essential terms and 
to set up a standard of the good, based upon a theory of man 
and the universe, which would give the proper sanctions 
to a reflective morality. Ethics arose, in short, in an attempt 
to meet moral skepticism. The breakdown of rigid, customary 
morality and the rise of individualism with its accompanying 
eritical attitude led to what appeared to many to be moral 


MORALITY AND ETHICAL THEORY 399 


anarchy. There have been many such periods of conscious 
transition and questioning, and we are enough in one at 
present to appreciate their nature. 

Moral skepticism led to what is called indifferently ethical 
relativism and ethical subjectivism. These terms are used to 
signify that what seems right to the individual is right. Ac- 
companying this principle is, usually, the idea that what 
seems right to the individual is his personal advantage. 
Personal advantage is set over against custom and law in a 
rebellious sort of way. There is a refusal to admit that 
custom and law are right, and just, simply since they are 
eustom and law. Something more basic is sought; and the 
idea naturally occurs that pleasure and personal success are 
being ignored too much for the sake of rather ignorant 
convention. 

Out of this situation arose the ethical theories of Socrates, 
Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus and Zeno. These thinkers sought 
to define the good at which man should aim, tried to find a 
rational criterion for conduct. Their analytic reflections es- 
tablished the problems and the general direction of philosophi- 
cal ethics. In a way, we are seeking to clarify the problems 

_they discussed, in the light of our larger range of experience 
and fuller insight into human nature and its cosmic status. 
With these qualifications it would almost be true to say that 
we are revising Aristotle’s ethics, a book which is an excellent 
point of departure for the student who wishes to look at con- 
duct objectively and dispassionately. 

A supplementary method of study of morality has bulked 
larger and larger of recent years. Sometimes it has been 
regarded by its champions as practically supplanting the older 
tradition. The keener thinkers have, of course, retained their 
perspective while pointing out the merits in this new method. 

Ethics as an empirical science is for this new movement 
a eareful study of human morality in an historical and so- 
ciological way. There are moral facts, and these can be 
gathered, related to the social conditions of their time, and 


400 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


compared. We may call this the objective study of morality, 
using the term objective in much the sense employed by be- 
haviorism in psychology. The morality of the various social 
groups existing now and in the past is scrupulously examined. 
Thus the various codes of conduct in regard to sex, property, 
children, war, personal relations are tabulated and correlated 
with stage of civilization, food-supply, religious views, institu- 
tions, ete. : 

There can be no doubt that this careful study of morality 
through the ages gives a broader outlook and indicates the 
presence of certain objective laws or correlations. It be- 
comes clear that morality is not a merely haphazard affair, © 
a matter of personal whim. The foundation of moral custom 
is the folk-ways, and this is a complex in which conditions, be- 
liefs and accident have all played their part. Moreover, this 
historical and comparative study of morality tends to rid 
those who come in contact with it of provincialism and the 
belief that morality is something stationary and uniform. In 
this way, it is an antidote against intuitionalism, traditional- 
ism and dogmatism in these matters. It gives, in short, a 
broad foundation in the subject-matter of ethics for reflection. 

I do not think that it is too much to say that ethics is 
feeling the effect of the meeting of these two broad currents 
of study. The advance in philosophy and psychology—of 
which we should now be well aware—enables the present-day 
thinker to raise the analytic questions of the nature of moral 
judgment, duty, responsibility, the good, with deeper insight 
and within the larger setting which social history unfolds. 
The categories of ethics are distinguishable from the concrete 
content of morality and, at the same time, principles are sug- 
gested which may guide us in our experimentation with life. 

Theories of Ethical Knowledge.—It should not surprise 
the student to find that ethical theory was affected by the 
theories of knowledge which arose during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries and which we have already considered 
in connection with the controversy between idealism and real- 


MORALITY AND ETHICAL THEORY 401 


ism. Rationalism was easily led to maintain that ethical 
knowledge is an affair of the reason, while empiricism was 
equally convinced that it is an affair of experience. We shall 
suggest, of course, that we can no longer hold that any ideas 
are given by any fixed faculty, call it reason or sense, but 
that ideas are growths within experience resting upon all 
sorts of human activities and relations. 

Ethics must free itself from mythology, much as physical 
science has had to do. Religious tradition has favored the 
notion that conscience is an innate faculty which is, as it 
were, a representative of deity. It is the voice of God speak- 
ing to the human soul and telling it what is right and what is 
wrong. This good genius may be hearkened to, and then all 
is well. But there is a tempter who whispers us to do other 
things contrary to conscience, and, if we listen to it and 
disobey our conscience, then we are doing evil. 

This hypostatization of our moral feeling and judgment, 
this explanation of it in terms of a spirit or entity at work 
within us, still lingers among people who have not given the 
subject much thought. It will be our endeavor to show that 
moral feeling and judgment is explicable in terms of human 
nature in its social development. It is fundamentally a matter 
of comparative valuations characteristic of our human, selec- 
tive living. 

Since philosophy could not accept the crude, mythological 
interpretation of conscience, it is not surprising to find that, 
in the days in which theology still dominated thought on 
these matters, the mythical view of conscience was refined and 
translated in various ways into an innate faculty. We can 
even trace the transition from the cruder to the more critical 
view. Thus early Christian thought was influenced by both 
Greek rationalism and theological prepossessions. ‘‘How,”’ 
asks Chrysostom, ‘‘did your lawgivers happen to give so many 
laws on murder, marriage, wills, etc? The later ones have 
perhaps been taught by their predecessors, but how did these 
learn of them? How else than through conscience, the law 


402 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


which God originally implanted in human nature?’’ Medie- 
val thinkers puzzled much over the difficulty that conscience 
seems to make mistakes and the suggestion was put forward 
that there are two faculties, one at a higher level than the 
other. My conscience deals with particular acts and may 
err in its pronouncements but there is another faculty, called 
the synderesis which tells me in general that evil must be 
avoided. , 

So long as reason was thought of as a faculty which has 
the power to produce valid ideas—a view which we saw 
Descartes entertained—it is not surprising that ethicists ap- 
pealed to it. They reflected here the general tradition. Rea- 
son reveals moral truths as well as mathematical ones. This 
view is well exemplified by the English Platonist, Cudworth, 
and the American may well remember that Emerson’s teach- 
ings are in line with this tradition. 

The greatest ethical rationalist of modern times is un- 
doubtedly Kant. In this field, also, he opposed extreme em- 
piricism by an attempted blending of sense and reason, reason 
giving the form or law. Kant took his departure from the 
ethical category of duty. There is, he maintained, an im- 
perative of a moral type within us which cannot be reduced 
to calculations of pleasure and pain. It is anti-sensuous and 
unconditional. He postulated, accordingly, a practical reason 
which gives moral laws much as the theoretical reason, it 
will be remembered, gives order in perception and thought. 
Unfortunately, this conception implied formalism of a rather 
empty sort. Kant believed that he could discover certain 
general precepts or laws of the practical reason which would 
furnish guidance in conduct. Thinkers are, however, very 
skeptical whether these laws are innate; rather do they seem 
to be the sort of ethical maxims which the Christian, rigoristic 
tradition would suggest. Take, for instance, this law which 
Kant asserts the categorical imperative enjoins: ‘‘Act so 
that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold 
good as a principle of universal legislation.’’ It is clearly 


MORALITY AND ETHICAL THEORY 403 


formal, and it is really doubtful whether it does justice to the 
specificity of ethical situations. What is the right thing to do 
in one case may not be exactly the right thing to do in another 
ease. And we must also note that this principle does not show 
us what the maxim of our will is as regards its concrete con- 
tent. Would bandits be willing to let everyone steal? If so, 
they would be applying Kant’s principle. 

Ethical empiricism arose as a protest against ethical ra- 
tionalism of the innatist type. It, also, had a varying career 
into which it would scarcely pay us to go at present. The 
movement which had the greatest influence, perhaps, was 
hedomsm. 

Hedonism arose in the classic world under the inspiration 
of Aristippus, the Cyrenaic, and Epicurus. In general, we 
may regard it as an attempt to explain morality in terms of 
pleasure and pain. The prime psychological fact for hedonism 
is that we seek pleasure and avoid pain. Pleasure is, there- 
fore, a good, and pain is an evil. Because pleasures and pains 
are mixed and pain is sometimes a condition of a greater 
pleasure, many distinctions must be made. Nevertheless, this 
basie psychological situation must be the guide of ethics. 

The thinker of to-day usually feels toward traditional he- 


~ donism much as he does toward traditional materialism. Both 


traditions have been technically inadequate while being nearer 
to the reality of things than supernaturalistice spiritualism or 
abstract, ethical rationalism. Hedonism has stood for experi- 
mentation in ethics and for the drift of concrete experience. 

It is through the conflict between divergent traditions that 
progress is usually made in a field like philosophy. We must 
add that the growth of knowledge in regard to ourselves and 
the world has likewise greatly aided and has worked as a fer- 
ment in the above conflict. As a consequence hedonism has 
been greatly modified. We shall have more to say of the 
shortcomings of traditional hedonism and the direction which 
ethical thought is taking at present after we have examined 
the question of the good. 


404 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


To summarize the conclusions which we have stressed in 
regard to theory of knowledge in the field of ethics: beginning 
with a rather mythological view of the source and nature of 
conscience, modern ethics passed to rationalism. Reason was 
supposed to be a faculty capable of producing sanctioned 
ideas of right and wrong. As for the criterion of these ideas, 
it was logical to appeal to clarity and self-evidence as rational- 
ism did in science. But just as rationalism was challenged 
in theory of knowledge so it was condemned in ethics. Em- 
piricism undertook to account for the origin and development 
of our ideas of right and wrong. It was quickly seen that 
feelings and emotions had much to do with moral approvals 
and disapprovals. The first stage of ethical empiricism is 
usually hedonism. It was so in the Ancient world, and it 
should not surprise us to find that Hobbes, Hume, Mill and 
Spencer—not to mention many others—were hedonists. Since 
their day, a better idea of the springs of conduct, the nature of 
standards, and the criteria ordinarily employed in ethical 
valuations has been slowly acquired. 

Temperamental Attitudes in Morality.—Temperamental 
attitudes have had much to do with the actual content of 
morality and even with ethical theory. These attitudes are 
partly individual and partly a matter of social conditions. 
Thus we know that some individuals are more serious about 
life than others are, are more inclined to look forward and to 
plan for the future. These are admirable traits in themselves, 
but they are often accompanied by a certain rigidity and 
solemnness which leads these individuals to condemn relaxa- 
tion and to misunderstand the value of play and art. Now 
the unfortunate part is that this temperament has been af- 
fected and misled by historical movements of tremendous 
power which, however valuable and—what shall I say?— 
justified as protests, were scarcely temperate and balanced. 
I refer, of course, to such movements as asceticism and puri- 
tanism. The consequence of this mingling of large social and 
religious movements with temperamental differences has been 


MORALITY AND ETHICAL THEORY 405 


the presence in society of opposed attitudes towards hfe. The 
puritan has the tradition of rather belittling, if not com- 
pletely. condemning, the play aspect and even the artistic 
element of life, while the cavalier, artistic, humanistic tra- 
dition regards the puritan outlook as narrow and unimagina- 
tive. In America, the conflict between these two moral 
perspectives is very marked. The literature on the subject 
is voluminous and is both instructive and amusing. 

It is impossible to understand asceticism apart from a 
close study of such supplementary factors as (1) a dual- 
istic, religious philosophy of life, (2) reactions against ten- 
dencies to sensualism, and (3) repressions in the personality of 
the individual. It is undeniable that historical Christianity 
contained from the first an ascetic strain which set flesh and 
Spirit in a sort of metaphysical opposition to each other. Man 
was supposed to be of a dual nature. And then there was the 
dislike of the extremes of sensualism to which groups in the 
pagan world were prone. And, finally, the individual was 
often unable to work out a moral perspective for himself of 
a healthy and intelligent sort. The result was tensions and 
repressions and instability, a psychological situation inciting 
to refuge in some extreme like asceticism. And the un- 
fortunate fact was that the better the instincts of the indi- 
vidual, the more apt he was to become an ascetic under these 
general circumstances. 

It would take us too far to study the rise of puritanism 
and to point out its good and bad features. That there are 
both is undeniable. Something of the dualistic philosophy of 
asceticism was in it; something of a protest against mere 
pleasure-seeking; something of lack of culture and imagina- 
tion in its more sectarian and philistine aspects. 

When we remember how little man has known of himself 
and his place in the universe and how easy it was for all 
sorts of beliefs to flow into this vacuum, it should not surprise 
us that he has found it difficult to work out an intelligent 
mode of conduct expressive of his actual nature and situation. 


406 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


We have the same chaotic state of affairs in morals that we 
have in his economic and his political life. Order of a well- 
gsrounded sort in all these fields will come only with time 
and better knowledge. 

From the standpoint of ethical theory it is interesting to 
note that the ascetic, puritan, rigoristic tradition in morality 
has always opposed itself to hedonism. Such an opposition 
was so logical and inevitable that it needs scarcely more than 
mention. But the rigoristic tradition cannot be said to have 
had a clear theory to put in the place of hedonism. ‘‘To do 
right for right’s sake’’ is admirable as an expression in con- 
demnation of mere selfishness or looking for the main chance 
without regard to larger relations and consequences, but it 
does not tell us what the right is nor what our criteria should 
be. And religious puritanism has usually appealed to revela- 
tion or authority of some kind or has lapsed into super- 
naturalistic hedonism which gives up this world and its 
pleasures for bliss in the next. 

The Nature and Conditions of Human Good.—We have 
said enough about ethics already to make the student realize 
that it is both an interesting and a complex subject. Many 
questions have arisen in it for discussion and possible solution. 
Thus the controversy as to the respective merits of altruism 
and enlightened self-regard has aroused much interest and 
has actually led to increased insight into morality. Again, 
there has been much examination of the idea of duty and of 
the meaning of right. But perhaps the drift of ethical opinion 
has been in the direction of determining what is the nature 
of human good and what are its chief conditions. In this 
respect we may be said to have returned to the Aristotelian 
tradition with, however, differences in our view of human 
nature and of the way in which the good is to be worked out. 
We are more experimental in these matters and allow for more 
variety in human nature. 

What, then, is the Aristotelian tradition in ethics? It is 
a stress upon the attempt to discover what the nature of human 


MORALITY AND ETHICAL THEORY 407 


good is. Aristotle held that there is a supreme end for which 
everything else ought to be chosen. It is something desired 
for its own sake and not as a means. Thus we choose money 
chiefly as a means and it cannot be the supreme good. What, 
then, is it that would satisfy us and make us feel that we are 
achieving the natural goal of our activity? At this stage, 
Aristotle appeals in an inductive way to general opinion and 
is convinced that the term happiness or well-being (eudae- 
monia) expresses this highest good which gives meaning to 
life. But he recognized that while this term is satisfactory, 
people assign different contents to it. To some it means 
pleasure, to others fame, to others wealth, to still others power, 
and so on. 

In an endeavor to determine with greater precision what 
constitutes happiness, Aristotle is led to investigate the nature 
of man, what it is he is best fitted to do. Man’s good is the 
expression of the highest part of him, the reason. And we 
must distinguish between the impulsive part of our nature and 
the strictly rational part. The first can be brought more or 
less under the control of reason while the latter only needs 
instruction. Morality as ordinarily understood is an affair 
of controlled and guided desire. ‘‘The moral virtues come 
neither by nature nor against nature, but nature gives the 
eapacity for acquiring them, and this is developed by 
training.’’ * 

Let us neglect those phases of Aristotle’s teaching which 
reflect the Platonic view of the soul with its sharp division be- 
tween reason and desire, and ask ourselves what the good 
which we tend to set before ourselves consists of. 

Very briefly, we may say that the good is the mode of life 
and its achievements which brings with it a fair amount of 
active satisfaction. The basic fact to grasp is that we are 
persons of certain capacities, tendencies and temperament 
trained by the culture of an historically developed group and 
more or less adjusted to a particular social situation. In 

* Nicomachean Hthics, bk. 2, see, 1, 


408 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


other words, we have habits, desires, needs and a situation to 
meet. These factors determine our valuations; and what we 
more or less systemically seek to do is to attain and maintain 
the kind of living which appeals to us most under the con- 
ditions which we must reckon with. In other words, we be- 
come a certain kind of self with the desires and valuations 
and opportunities of that kind of a self in its social medium. 
Our desires must be. examined in the light of their conse- 
quences and their relations to one another. This will involve 
redirection and modification. And with wider experience new 
desires appear. The practical reason would seem to be the 
survey which guides these adjustments and interpretations in- 
trinsic to human living. It is a valuational reason, that is, a 
reason which listens to and assists valuations. 

Underlying the choices of the good are the characteristic 
instincts and’ tendencies of human nature as these have de- 
veloped in the medium of social conditions and opportunities. 
There are controls and demands which the group always 
stresses, such as consideration of the common good and con- 
cern for what is generally regarded as admirable. But, when 
we come to describe the good we can never be formal. There 
is no one universal summum bonum or highest good. It is in 
biography and in the sympathetic delineations of human 
living by great literary artists that we obtain our best glimpses 
of the modes of life that in some measure satisfy. 

How We Value in Affairs of Conduct.—Human living is a 
process conducted in a social or cultural medium and resting 
upon the expression of a self with its tendencies, beliefs, 
valuations and opportunities. And we must always remember 
that this self is neither fixed nor a flux. Our desires and in- 
terests change in some degree with conditions and experience. 
How, then, are moral decisions made? 

Hedonism was one of the important, empirical theories of 
valuation. But it is generally admitted now that it was 
psychologically and logically inadequate. It oversimplified 
the moral situation and its methods and standards. I drew 


MORALITY AND ETHICAL THEORY 409 


the analogy between materialism and hedonism. Technically, 
both were almost completely inadequate because they did not 
analyze their terms. 

We must distinguish, in the first place, between psycho- 
logical hedonism and ethical hedonism. Though the distine- 
tion is not entirely clear-cut, it is a step in advance of mere 
vague hedonism. 

Psychological hedonism is a theory of the motivation of 
eonduct which affirms that we are always aiming at pleasure, 
that we have pleasure in mind as our constant goal and ob- 
jective of action. Ethical hedonism is the theory that pleas- 
ure in the thought of an object is the only significant criterion 
of valuation in reflection about conduct and thus in the deter- 
mination of what is desirable. 

Closer observation has so qualified psychological hedonism 
that it is quite fair to say that it is now rejected as invalid 
for our more serious conduct. The springs of action rest in 
our personality and consist of tendencies, habits, desires and 
ideals. This dynamic foundation of our life finds expressions 
in concrete aims which the actual situations suggest and 
warrant. We are hungry and desire food. We are lonely 
and desire companionship. We are intellectually curious and 
_ desire books and stimulating conversation. We are patriotic, 
and desire that our country show intelligence in its policies, 
ete. It is not psychologically true that we are primarily aim- 
ing at an object called pleasure in these instances. Even in 
moments of leisure and relaxation we select activities which 
we recognize as pleasant. In moments of pleasure-seeking, 
we are aiming at a certain kind of experience not connected 
with serious aims. 

In this criticism of psychological hedonism the philosopher 
and the psychologist are not at all biased by the tradition 
of rigorism or puritanism. Surely pleasure as an element of 
our experience is intrinsically a good thing. We must simply 
realize, however, that as agents adjusting ourselves to a social 
and physical environment and expressing our trained capa- 


410 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


cities we do and must aim at specific objectives. The prob- 
lem is, accordingly, how we evaluate these objectives which 
we desire and how we adjudge some of them not only desired 
but desirable. 

The older phase of ethical hedonism may be called the 
hedonistic calculus. It supposed that the only logical and 
intelligent thing to do—if we were not to be mere creatures of 
custom and habit—was to estimate the pleasures and pains 
probably in store for us in case we did this or did that. 
Jeremy Bentham, one of the founders of modern hedonism, 
went into this calculus in detail. 

Here, again, I would not go to the extreme to which some 
writers have gone and deny that we ever employ some ap- 
proach to this method. We interrogate ourselves to see what 
appeals to us and we look abroad to examine consequences 
and effects and the way in which they would impinge upon 
us. Nevertheless, it seems truer to hold that our valuations 
are not so much in terms of imaginable pains and pleasures 
as in the realized appeal which objectives and events have for 
us. Values are growths reflective of ourselves and the whole 
social situation with which we identify ourselves. They em- 
body expectations, opportunities, past satisfactions, social 
prestige. Thus they are expressions of the self with its habits, 
instincts, training, ambitions. We must not forget this realis- — 
tic foundation in the process and conditions of living. Never- 
theless, it is true that the appeal which a projected action has — 
to our personality reflects itself in our feelings in contempla- 
tion of it. The feeling is a sign of the appeal. It can, there-— 
fore, be used as a criterion in reflection. We feel that we 
would get more satisfaction out of this line of conduct than © 
out of that. As we often say, we may be foolish but that is — 
the kind of a person we are. 

The ethicist, in short, must arrive at a theory of how values 
are built up in the individual and in society at large. He — 
must also examine our reflection when we are trying to com- 
pare valued objectives and make a choice. The basis is 


MORALITY AND ETHICAL THEORY 411 


clearly human personality in its social setting of suggestion 
and opportunity. Reason plays its part in bringing before 
our mind results, relations and opportunities. And we find 
that we respond to the objectives, thus envisaged in their 
objective setting, with degrees of satisfaction. 

Once we have understood the conditions and nature of com- 
parative valuation, we have done justice to all that ethical 
hedonism should rightly stand for. And the term hedonism 
has been so closely associated with psychological hedonism 
that it is doubtful whether it will not always be a misleading 
term. In this field, as in so many others, philosophy is gradu- 
ally gaining perspective and rising above the harsh and im- 
perfect oppositions of the past. What we should stress in 
the theory of ethics is the process and criteria of comparative 
valuation. Back of such intelligent valuation we must feel 
human nature, the world as it is and the urgency of living, 
itself, with its acceptances, its adjustments, and its more or 
less daring explorations. 

It is unfortunate that we have no descriptive name for this 
outlook to which reflection is leading thought. To eall it 
utilitarianism does not seem quite right, though it has the 
same empirical belief in concrete testing that utilitarianism 
~had, for utility is too limited a term for the range of human 
interests, and the logic and psychology of valuation held by 
utilitarianism was too hedonistic. To speak of it as self- 
realization does not quite satisfy either, for. there is no fixed 
self to realize. It is in the interplay of the self and the world 
that living consists. Why not call the position ethical human- 
ism and recognize the part played by both reason and feeling? 

Having achieved a standpoint in ethical theory, let us now 
apply it to the ethical categories and seek to answer those 
basic questions about the objective validity of morality which 
trouble those who have been accustomed to depend upon some 
supernatural sanction. How does morality justify itself be- 
fore human reason and experience? What should we mean 
by duty and responsibility ? 


412 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


REFERENCES 


L. T. Hosyouss, Morals in Evolution. 

EDWARD WESTERMARCK, The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas. 
G. E. Moors, Ethics. 

A. K. Rogers, The Theory of Ethics, chap. 1. 

Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct. 

DRAKE, Problems of Conduct, chap. 1. 

Fire, Moral Philosophy, chap. iy 


i ie: 


CHAPTER XXVII 
THE SANCTIONS AND CRITERIA OF MORALITY 


What Is Conscience?—Because words are definite, it does 
not follow that what they indicate is also definite. Popular 
literature and speech have developed the notion that there is 
in us a power or faculty concerned with our actions and 
informing us what is right and what is wrong. We are 
encouraged to listen to conscience. It is declared to be a 
monitor or guide implanted in our bosoms for our moral 
ruidance. 

But either an objective study of moral conduct or an 
introspective examination of our own moral experiences 
quickly dispels these mythical notions. Conscientious people, 
that is, people who want to do the right thing, differ markedly 
in their estimation of conduct; and we do not even need to 

-go from one civilization to another to discover this variability 
of the dictates of conscience. The conscience of some indi- 
viduals rebels against what seem to others to be harmless 
amusements. And when we seek to discover what goes on in 
ourselves when conscience is troubling us we find feelings of 
anxiety and distrust, regret that we have done what we have, 
suggestions to the effect that we cannot harmonize what we 
have done with other modes of conduct, wonderment as to 
what other people may say. In short, we have within us a 
complex of ideas and feelings marked by a measure of fear 
and conflict. 

Conscience would seem, then, to be a term marking feelings, 
attitudes and beliefs whose origin and basis it should not be 
difficult to explain. Thus we are aware that deeds which 

413 


414 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


tempt us often have undesirable consequences. If we give 
way to an impulse of the moment we may regret it. We 
soon build up inhibitions against hasty actions and develop 
an attitude of hesitation and resistance to suggestions. When 
we remember that man is a social animal trained in the group, 
it is not surprising that types of conduct awaken disapproval 
in him. The child, for instance, is taught to think of certain 
actions as those which he must not do. This meaning may 
have been caused by punishment or it may be due merely to 
what the parents or companions have said or the way they 
have acted. We are all sensitive to the views of others, es- 
pecially when these views are accompanied by signs of deep 
feeling. This control of our own estimation of an action by 
the current attitudes of our fellows is so direct and important 
that many ethicists have spoken of conscience as the reflection 
of the tribal self. This means that we consciously and un- 
consciously pick up and adopt the standards and views of 
those around us, Again, we tend to apply to ourselves our 
own passionate approvals and condemnations of the conduct 
of others. We don’t like injustice and therefore we do not 
want to be unjust. We admire generosity and kindness and, 
accordingly, we can’t approve of ourselves when we are selfish 
or harsh. 

The student of morality finds it, then, rather easy to ex- 
plain the phenomena of conscience. The variation in the 
eontent of conscience from age to age and from nation to 
nation seems explicable only in a naturalistic, social way. The 
conditions under which these people have lived have been 
different ; their moral leaders have had different ideas partly 
as a consequence of this; even accident has played its part in 
this evolution and alteration. So much for the variability 
in the concrete content of morality. But the emotional flavor 
of conscience is much the same for all people because it ex- 
presses a common psychological texture, the existence of con- 
flict and inhibition, the sense of the opposition between a 
desire and conduct of a more accepted sort. 


THE SANCTIONS AND CRITERIA OF MORALITY 415 


We have taken conscience in its primitive, vaguer and 
more emotional aspects. I do not think that many entirely 
escape from this phase, or background, of moral judgment. 
It colors our sense of duty and qualifies our interpretation 
of acts. It is something residual and seldom fully analyzed. 
For instance, we may convince ourselves that an unconven- 
tional act is quite harmless and very enjoyable and yet not 
escape a certain emotional tension of an unpleasant sort. This 
may vanish after a time, or what may remain may be only 
a fear of public disapproval, of those subtle punishments 
which the group knows so well how to inflict. 

The more explicit and reflective level of moral judgment 
rests on this more emotional foundation. Just because of 
its explicitness and its critical character, it is usually given 
- another name, such as judgment, realization of duty, moral 
insight. Let us recognize its continuity with ‘‘feeling-mor- 
ality’’ and proceed to analyze it in the hope of better under- 
standing the nature and significance of the moral categories. 

Moral Judgment and the Nature of the Sense of Obliga- 
tion.— We can distinguish three levels of conduct. First 
comes the broad foundation in those activities which concern 
existence, the getting of food and shelter, defense from ene- 
mies and the satisfaction of sexual and parental instincts. 
Habits and folkways arise and determine the texture of con- 
duct at this level. As time passes, action becomes more intri- 
eate and explicit and even transforms itself into custom. At 
this level, morality consists almost entirely of conformity with 
the mode of life of the group. Customs are standards, that is, 
socially approved ways of action. Because life is not very 
complex as yet and because social agreement dominates con- 
duct, we may speak of this level as customary morality. There 
is a strong sense of the right way and the wrong way. The 
individual does not seek to decide for himself what is correct 
form in action but searcely with question proceeds to follow 
the appointed path. A third level of conduct appears when 
the individual becomes a centre of initiative and decision. 


416 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Bit by bit, flexibility and variability begin to manifest them- 
selves. The individual is both less supervised and more de- 
veloped in his capacities and range of activities. He is thrown 
back upon himself and must make choices. We may speak 
of this level as reflective morality. 

We must never acquire the notion that morality developed 
as the affair of an isolated individual. The context of conduct 
is always social in the sense that it is action into a civilized 
group and must involve some measure of adjustment to it. 
All actions have consequences, and these consequences are as 
causally conditioned as any others. The needs of an indi- 
vidual are real and imply relations with other real people in 
a type of society which is as real and objective as a physical 
thing because it is an organization of human beings who 
are conscious and intelligent physical things. The medium 
of all moral conduct is social. 

But we must be pluralists enough in these matters to realize 
that the texture of society changes from level to level. Au- 
thority and the cake of custom—to use Bagehot’s phrase *— 
dominate at first. Solidarity is the need, and, since life is 
simple, definite rules can control the individuals, There is 
undoubtedly loss—initiative and invention are excluded for 
example—but the group holds together and maintains itself. 
Human nature being what it is and social conditions and 
exigencies as they have been, it is quite a defensible thesis 
that custom and authority had to rule at first. We moderns 
would not like it and would feel stifled by it but we can under- 
stand how natural it is. In fact, we are beginning to be 
acutely aware that democracy at times runs the danger of 
reversion to this method and the consequent social texture. 
At any rate, pressure against inherited custom—even revolt 
against it—always arose as life became more complex and 
as individuals had to take and did take more initiative. New 
problems and situations caused reflection and experimenta- 
tion. Within the outlines of conventional morality arose 

1 Bagehot, Physics and Politics, passim. 


THE SANCTIONS AND CRITERIA OF MORALITY 417 


both a new spirit and considerable leeway for individual deci- 
sion. The consequence was that principles and methods had 
to take the place of what we may call moral red-tape. While 
played upon by all sorts of suggestions and while recognizing 
social facts, the individual had to think moral problems 
through for himself. Of course, the degree to which indi- 
viduals do this varies tremendously. 

It is with this level of human life at which the individual 
makes decisions on conduct of importance that we are con- 
eerned. What is the nature of moral judgment? And what 
is the character of the sense of duty or ‘‘ought’’ which is a 
usual accompaniment of it? 

A moral situation, we have already suggested, is one in 
which matters of importance as regards ourselves and others 
are up for decision. There is always the question of how an 
act will affect myself and other people. We have desires 
and we ask, Are they desirable? Is there any good reason 
why we should inhibit them or modify them? As a rule, a 
moral question does not arise over mere technical questions 
of the best means, from the standpoint of intelligence and 
efficiency, to accomplish a desired end, but about the human 
effects and relations of those means and ends. What we desire 
_is so far good; and that which is a necessary means is good 
in so far as we are willing to pay the price in effort. But 
Wwe are aware of consequences to ourselves and others which 
we do not like and which we are aware that public opinion in 
general condemns. What are we then to do? Well; it is 
obvious that we have a reflective moral situation and must 
think the possible acts through and evaluate them. If we 
evaluate them in one way, we say that, on the whole, the 
desire is desirable and should pass into its corresponding 
conduct. If we evaluate them in another way, we say that 
the desire will lead to what is undesirable and should be con- 
trolled. 

In a reflective moral situation, the individual does con- 
sciously and for himself what has already been done in some 


418 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


measure by others and is, as it were, socially recognized. We 
know that certain acts are publicly labelled good or bad. 
These values have become attached to them as a result of 
various events. Perhaps leaders have so designated them, per- 
haps, they obviously conflicted with established needs and 
institutions. But there is this difference that, in reflective 
morality, the individual tries to think the act through and 
evaluate it himself. We do not assert that he does this thor- 
oughly. That depends upon his knowledge and his ability to 
appreciate all the factors involved. 

It would seem that a moral judgment is directly connected 
with choice and possible action. It is not like a purely 
intellectual judgment in this respect; but is more like an 
act of volition in which the self enters as an essential in- 
eredient. Some very interesting psychological experiments 
have brought out this marked difference between a choice and 
an ordinary judgment. In ordinary judgment we are not 
emotionally aroused but are simply trying to get evidence 
for an interpretation of an object. In choice, on the other 
hand, what have been called “‘self-assertive’’ or ‘‘determin- 
ing’’ tendencies are at work. And these tendencies are a 
part of the self which, however, is larger and more inclusive 
than they, taken separately. The self, in short, is a highly 
integrated complex of tendencies, knowledge, standards, and 
methods of evaluation and interpretation. Of course, it is 
not a fixed and unchanging complex but varies within limits. 
At certain times some tendencies are more powerful in us 
than at others. We may be ambitious at one time and inclined 
to leisure and pleasure at another, sensitive to the presence of 
people of the other sex or for a time distinctly ascetic. But, 
at any moment of choice, the self is a fairly dynamic and 
selective centre of being. 

When we unite this analysis of the self in choice with what 
we have already discovered about the psychological nature of 
conscience we should not have much difficulty in realizing 
the precise character of the sense of duty or the ‘‘ought.”’ 


THE SANCTIONS AND CRITERIA OF MORALITY 419 


Let us remember that any desire is so far good taken in 
isolation and as merely expressing some phase of the self. 
The basis of duty is our dislike of certain desires because 
of our realization of their consequences and relations. Bit 
by bit we may have built up a dominant self which involves 
certain standards and relations to other people. Other per- 
sons expect certain things of us, and we expect similar things 
of ourselves. This organized, integrated, more or less social- 
ized self—while always more or less fluid—has a momentum 
and implications which our intelligence shows us is opposed 
to desires which spring up now and then. The sense of 
‘fought not’’ is the feeling which accompanies this conflict 
in which the organized self senses its incompatibility with a 
desire. It would seem, in fact, that this negative relation is 
the basic one, just as it is for conscience. 

In very simple cases, rejection of a desire as undesirable 
is all there is. Our action is one of omission. But the situa- 
tion is often more complicated and then we speak of our 
duty to do this and omit that. We compare two possible ac- 
tions, it may be, and decide that the self demands our doing 
something to which we do not at the time have a strong 
inclination but to the not doing of which we have a still 
- stronger dislike. It is not surprising that we compare lines 
of action in this way and speak of some acts as deeds which 
we should not do and others as deeds which we should do. 
Back of all this lies the kind of dynamic self I have tried to 
indicate with its accepted tendencies, admirations, implied 
relations and dislikes. To such a real self with choice and 
valuation intrinsic to its very nature, the moral categories 
are inevitable. There are incompatibilities of an empirical 
sort. We cannot admire bravery and cowardice at the same 
time; we cannot like justice and not dislike injustice. There 
are qualitative kinds of action and life which do not go 
together. And, in any one moral situation with its com- 
plexities, even deeds which are ordinarily harmless may need 
to be rejected as things we ought not to do. But in such 


420 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


cases, we do not have so strong a sense of duty and may even 
be almost undecided. 

Must Not vs. Ought Not.—We have sought to show that 
genuine morality is an affair of choices and that, in choice, 
the self is growing and determining its own growth in the 
situations to which it must adjust itself. Morality has, in 
short, to do with kinds of action and their foreseen conse- 
quences. These kinds of action are always connected with 
desires which may be of various degrees of strength. Our 
moral life consists, then, of choices which may be omissions, 
positive selections, novel solutions, and modifications. The 
basic point to get before us is that this kind of activity with 
its accompanying feelings is intrinsic to the kind of living 
human beings do. The lower animals do not possess moral 
categories just because they do not live at the level of 
action, sentiment and survey which is characteristic of human 
life. | 

To make this interpretation entirely clear, we must dis- 
tinguish between ‘‘must not’’ and ‘‘ought not.’’ While these 
two feelings are often intermingled at any one time, they are 
qualitatively distinguishable. I may feel that I ought not 
to do a certain act and be quite aware that I must do it un- 
less I am willing to suffer certain punishments. And it may 
happen that I feel no sense of wronegness about an act and yet 
know that I must not do it since it is not worth the price I 
would have to pay, society being as it is. 

Kant took his point of departure for ethical analysis from 
the fact of duty. He spoke of this as the categorical impera- 
twve and contrasted it with the hypothetical imperative in 
which the question is merely one of means and ends. Thus | 
in the one case you feel that one line of action is morally 
wrong and that you ought to do the other. In the other 
case, your outlook is one merely of expediency; you have 
chosen your end—perhaps financial success—and you east 
about for the proper means and methods. Hedonism, Kant 
supposed, set up the maximum of pleasure as the end and 


THE SANCTIONS AND CRITERIA OF MORALITY 421 


therefore degenerated into a calculus of expedient means. In 
opposition, he stressed duty as other than pleasures. 

In the preceding chapter we have argued that Kant’s 
formal rationalism gave no adequate foundation for the 
determination of the good. The good seemed to us to be a 
mode of life with its satisfactions which man works out crit- 
ically and experimentally and more or less adequately. And 
in this chapter we have tried to show that evaluative choice 
is intrinsic to the self as a centre of action. This means that 
duty is relative to our idea of the good and that no hypo- 
thetical, formal, practical reason can be regarded as its in- 
spiration and source. 

We must acknowledge that Kant had genuine moral in- 
sight. He sensed the significance of the ‘‘ought’’ for an 
understanding of morality and was assured that moral de- 
cision was other than a calculation of selfish and superficial 
expediency as to means. He knew that it concerned the mode 
of life and the kind of person one admired and wanted to 
be. But his insight was led astray by his rationalism, his 
rigorism, and his interpretation of ethics in terms of moral 
laws analogous to laws of nature. His position was of tre- 
mendous hortatory value, much as Carlyle’s was later, but 
he had not solved the problem. That will come, I believe, 
only with a naturalism which has a place for humanism and 
which understands and appreciates human personality and 
its situation. 

There was a tendency on the part of empiricism, a ten- 
deney reenforced by the historical study of morality, to ex- 
plain the ‘‘ought’’ purely in terms of the ‘‘must,’’ that is, 
in terms of the infiltration of the effects of punishment. The 
child is punished for certain things, and this punishment 
begets fear and dislike and anxiety. All through life there are 
punitive sanctions of this sort at work. Law and the police, 
public disapproval as expressed in whispers and coldness and 
ostracism, the hurt faces of friends, all these are punitive 
sanctions which guide the individual. And as if this were 


422 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


not enough in the way of punitive guidance, religion has 
linked itself with moral pressure and painted the rewards 
and punishments of another world. The texture of morality 
varies with the dominant sanctions. 

These approvals, disapprovals, and sanctions condition the 
outlook of the individual in two ways. He realizes what he 
will be punished for doing, and he assimilates and accepts the 
valuations and beliefs which are expressed in these social 
attitudes and actions. The conventional individual, that is, 
the one who accepts and adopts the mores of his group, de- 
velops a conscience, or sense of duty, quite in harmony with 
the current standards. He does not live a conventionally 
moral life because he is afraid but because he is that kind of 
a self. Perhaps we should not put it as strongly as this. 
Very few there are who never rebel against convention 
at some time or in some degree. At such times, the must 
and the ought tend to separate. To be more accurate, in 
really conventional people, that is, people who have not 
thought through questions for themselves, desire fights against 
a mixture of fear and conscience. Often this leads to reflection 
on moral matters. 

We can conclude that ‘‘ought’’ is not the same as ‘‘must.”’ 
A genuinely moral decision expresses the personality of the 
moral agent, his sense of values. It is undeniable, however, 
that pressures and sanctions must be reckoned with in any 
decision. 

The Weakness of Convention and the Dangers of Novelty. 
It should not surprise us to find that reflection has always 
found fault with convention. In truth, it was the break- 
down of hoary custom that led to the rise of ethics among 
the Greeks. Acquaintance with the lives of other people 
and a shifting of institutional arrangements led the more 
daring to challenge what the fathers believed in regard to 
both conduct and cosmology. As solidarity based on the old 
ties and attitudes weakened, self-assertion came to the front. 
Individuals wanted to live out their own lives as they saw fit; 


THE SANCTIONS AND CRITERIA OF MORALITY 423 


and often ruthless selfishness came to the front. Theory 
sought to find a new foundation for conduct . 

Let us see why conventional morality is weak. It is the 
resultant of many factors, some of which are valid moral 
foundations and some of which are not. Customary morality 
expresses a certain stage of culture with its beliefs and insti- 
tutions. It is a sort of working adjustment in human rela- 
tions. But any past stage of culture is inevitably imperfect 
because it is the expression of accident, ignorance, imperfect 
institutions and faulty beliefs as well as of experience, human 
adjustments, and ingenious adaptations. In short, a culture 
and its morality are growths which, at one and the same time, 
are praiseworthy and objects of criticism. The good is the 
enemy of the better. Moral progress means that something 
finer, more intelligent, better founded in human nature and 
the reality of things can be developed. The weakness of 
customary morality is its conservatism, its willingness to rest 
in the culture and sentiments of the past, its desire to make 
all individuals conform to the same mould and outlook. 

The clash between customary morality and critical, re- 
flective morality may focus on an individual or upon a class 
of individuals who exert pressure upon the more slowly mov- 
ing members of society. When change and the belief in 
progress are in the air, these clashes are less violent and 
toleration of differences in conduct appears. There are all 
degrees of this situation. 

We have tried to point out both the weakness and strength 
of customary morality. It is a cultural adjustment, but that 
eulture may be capable of improvement. Let us now glance 
at the strength and weakness of the novel in morality. 

The strength of the novel is that it may express new knowl- 
edge and a higher level of personality. A good illustration 
of this is the growth of feminism. The weakness of the novel 
is that it may express merely whim and selfishness and lack 
of awareness of the wider reverberations and consequences of 
conduct, How then is the decision to be made? It is ulti- 


424 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


mately made by the social group as a result of evaluations 
in terms of knowledge and basic satisfactions. In other 


j 


words, new cultural adjustments are achieved, supposedly 


expressing less accident, less superstition, and more knowl- 
edge and range of feeling. It seems to me that we can rightly 
think of human culture as a growth in which human nature 
expresses its possibilities in the kind of a world we are in. 
These are the two great axes of the curve of culture, but 


the particular curves are functions of innumerable ways in © 


which human nature and the world have impinged upon one 
another. 
Supernaturalism vs. Naturalism in Ethics.—It has taken 


human thought a very long time to get a proper perspective § 
in these matters. Why this has been it should not take us © 


long to see. 


Religion, which is in its essentials the belief in usually — 
invisible and yet very powerful beings who are interested in — 
the group and cooperate with it, in various ways, became very — 
early a part of the life of the group. Immemorial custom — 
was held to be sanctioned by these superhuman authorities as — 
well as by the group itself. The gods and humans formed — 
one polity as it were. Any violation of sacred things or — 
sacred customs would be punished by these divine beings, — 


and it was probable that they would visit their wrath upon 
the whole group and not merely upon the individual. We 


need not go into detail in regard to the character of primitive 
religion. The Hebrew religion, one of the great ethnic re- © 
ligions, will illustrate the close connection between morality — 
and religious beliefs. The Mosaic code, which includes the — 
‘‘ten commandments,’’ was believed to be at once a command ~ 


and a revelation. 


This interpretation of morality as a command by authori- 
ties was a natural occurrence but, nevertheless, an unfortunate — 
one. It is at the foundation of the belief that morality is © 


something imposed upon people from outside and not some- 


thing expressing their own life intelligently. Even the 3 





| 


THE SANCTIONS AND CRITERIA OF MORALITY 425 


phrase, moral law, was not a good one in pre-democratice days 
since so many laws were oppressive and connected with priv- 
ileges possessed by favored groups. The mass of the people 
have not been enthusiastic about laws. 

The sanctions of fear and punishment have likewise played 
a great part in the history of morality. Duty has been 
thought of as something which you had to do if you did not 
want to be out of favor with human and divine powers. Moral 
codes and legal codes were closely associated. 

This external interpretation of morality as something im- 
posed on people from outside in an authoritative way, some- 
thing which they would not do if they were not frightened 
into doing it, has tinged the common conception of morality. 
The ‘ought’ has been largely a ‘must.’ In short, people have 
not thought of morality as an intelligent way of living but 
as a series of commands. Hence the genuine functions and 
justification of morality have been misunderstood. Perhaps 
the fear of hell and the hope of heaven still keeps some im- 
pulsive and unsocialized individuals within conventional 
morality, but ethics cannot sanction such a method as ideal. 
And one unfortunate feature of it is that it continues this 
total misunderstanding of the nature and justification of 
morality. The ‘good life’ is not a negative life in which 
people give up the world but one in which they master the 
world and wring from it a full life. Probably ascetic tradi- 
tions have combined with the theological theory of morality 
to mislead and confuse people. 

Since the whole drift of modern science and philosophy 
is toward a humanistic naturalism, this criticism of an ex- 
ternal, supernaturalistic conception of morality is very essen- 
tial. The student who has not been taught otherwise is con- 
vineed that morality is bound up with certain very tenuous 
theological dogmas and that, if these are given up, he is 
quite justified in acting like a brute or a fool. Of course, all 
this is the height of nonsense. Morality of a rational sort is, 
as I have said so frequently, just intelligent living, the living 


426 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


which will give the kind of self you are the most lasting satis- 
faction in the kind of society you are in. Because of its own 
bias, the church has been guilty of believing, and encouraging 
others to believe, this imposition conception of morality. I 
don’t want to be hard on poor, valiant, old Luther because 
practically every one in his day had the same supernaturalis- 
tie view of the sanction of morality, but, I cannot forbear 
quoting him. He said: 

‘Tf you believe in no future life, I would not give a mush- 
room for your God. Do then as you like. For, if no God, 
then no devil, no hell. As a fallen tree, all is over when you 
die. Then plunge in lechery, rascality, robbery, and murder.”’ 
And Massilon, a French priest, wrote as follows: 

‘‘If we wholly perish with the body, the maxims of charity, 
patience and justice, honor, gratitude, and friendship are 
but empty words. Our passions shall decide our duty. If 
retribution terminate with the grave, morality is a mere 
chimera, a bugbear of human invention.”’ 

We understand morality better in these days. Morality is 
a growth within human culture, itself expressive of human 
nature and the relations of human beings to each other. It 
is not perfect and may be improved, but it is always a vast 
improvement upon mere impulse and inexperienced action. 

The gist, of our conclusion, then, is that morality and its 
categories are intrinsic to that level of nature which we call 
human living, The area of human living is small in the ocean 


of existence but that fact is quite irrelevant to the validity — 


of its categories in their field. Nothing can rob us of the 
fact that we are men and women or make it seem rational to 
us to act like unthinking brutes even were we able so to act. 

The Final Sanction of Morality —Each particular code of 
morality must be examined and must stand or fall on its 
own merits. Just because ignorance of conditions and his- 
torical accident have been at work in every such code, there 
are always features to be amended. Moral progress in the 
large means advance in knowledge of social conditions and 


THE SANCTIONS AND CRITERIA OF MORALITY 427 


methods and something of the nature of development in the 
range and delicacy of human living. When we once grasp 
this cultural view of morality, we realize that it is an intrin- 
sic part of man’s adjustment to his world and of his explora- 
tion of the possibilities contained in life. It is this relation- 
ship of morality that gives it its final sanction to intelligent 
enquiry. Any code of morality is sanctioned so far as it is 
the expression of human nature and social conditions and 
embodies genuine wisdom. And in its degree this is true of 
all codes. They are never purely arbitrary and irrational. 
On the other hand, critical thought can never sanction them 
in any dogmatic and finalistic way. To improve them must 
always remain an ideal. We must think of them as experi- 
ments rather than as revelations. 

When we look at the matter historically, we soon discern 
that moral skepticism arose inevitably as a revolt against 
tradition as such, which had no rational explanation of its 
content and its value. Why should we do things just because 
our fathers did? was the natural question which arose to the 
lips of a generation which was trying—however vaguely and 
erudely—to rationalize its life. The sanction of mere au- 
thority or of mere habit can never ultimately satisfy. The 
- awakened human mind wants a deeper and more intrinsic 
sanction. And back of this revolt against mere authority was 
the feeling that many elements in the accepted codes were 
wasteful of life and based upon views which could no longer 
be held. 

Ethical subjectivism, or skepticism, is, then, the manifesta- 
tion of an early stage of reflection in morality. It indicates 
the passage from the unconscious, from that which has grown 
in a secular fashion by slow accumulation and modification, 
to the self-conscious. Is it surprising that reflection should 
not, at first, realize the function of morality and think of it 
as something pressed upon man from outside, something 
which has only force and superstition for its backing? The 
common appeal to supernatural sanctions encourages this 


428 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


first, superficial interpretation; and the presence of injustice 
and unreason in actual codes suggests to many that those in 
power have too much to do with the molding of morality. 
The only way of escape from moral skepticism is to press 
onward. There is no possibility of return to mere unthink- 
ing acceptance, to feelings of mystical sacredness. In brief, 
morality must justify itself before the bar of human reason 


“a 


and experience. And we have argued that morality as such — 


has no difficulty in doing so, even though particular conven- — 
tions and beliefs cannot. The ultimate, rational sanction of — 


morality is the fact that it is grounded in the nature of man. 


He who is social and selective in his valuations is by that — 


very fact a moral agent. It springs out of, and cannot be 


removed from, intelligent living. Our conclusion is that 7 


moral skepticism as a theory represents an attack upon an 
interpretation of morality which makes it rest upon mystical 
or merely authoritative sanctions and is to that extent justi- 
fied. It can be overcome only by deeper reflection which 
gains insight into the actual function of morality in living 
as a control and intelligent directing of desire. Skepticism 
of particular codes is different from general moral skepticism 
and is often justified. One of the tasks of ethics is to dis- 
eover criteria for customs analogous to the eriteria used by 
science in its testing of beliefs. So far as one does this in his 
own life he replaces convention by moral insight. But this is 
not an easy thing to do, and there is danger of too great 
haste and self-confidence. He must be very sure of himself 
who departs very far from the prevailing code; and he 
must remember that society punishes its rebels so far as it 
is able. 

What Should We Mean by Moral Responsibility?—In 
early days, practically every one was held responsible for his 
actions. Not only so, but the group to which the individual 
belonged was assigned a joint responsibility. An action was 
a fact to which the group and other groups responded in a 
self-protective way. In these days of individualism and 


THE SANCTIONS AND CRITERIA OF MORALITY 429 


recognition of intention as morally basic, it is often a little 
difficult for us to appreciate this more primitive outlook. An 
example may assist. 

Those who are familiar with the Old Testament may re- 
member the case of Achan. It seems that Achan had wrong- 
fully taken possession of certain articles from the spoil of 
Jericho which had been devoted to Yahweh. Afterwards 
Israel suffered defeat and this sacrilegious theft was dis- 
eovered. It is written that ‘‘Joshua and all Israel with him 
took Ashan, the son of Zerah, and the mantle, and the wedge 
of gold, and his sons and his daughters, and his oxen, and his 
asses, and his sheep, and his tent, and all that he had. And 
all Israel stoned him with stones; and they burned them with 
fire and stoned them with stones.’’* This action was self- 
protective and reflected the fears and resentments felt by 
the group. : 

What, then, did responsibility mean at first? It meant 
that an individual or a group was the agent from which a 
deed of a harmful sort went forth. He, or it, was, therefore, 
answerable for it, could be called to account. Clearly, there 
is nothing puzzling about this meaning or about the situation - 
in which it holds. The social balance which has been chal- 
lenged and disturbed must be restored ; social danger must be 
met and removed by action. Somehow the deed must be ex- 
piated and purification achieved. 

At this stage, intention is lttle regarded. It is what is 
done that counts. The pressing need is to restore the proper 
relations and workings of visible and invisible agencies. 

With the advance of culture and the increase of reflection, 
responsibility is focused increasingly upon the individual. 
Especially is this the case within the group. And intention 
counts for more, while due allowance is made for accident 
and the unforeseen. The individual is now held to be re- 
sponsible for what he did intentionally. This policy expresses 
the necessary demand that society give the individual a cer- 

1 Joshua, VII: 24, 25. 


430 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


tain initiative but judge his action so far as it affects the 
rights of others. 

But it is gradually realized that not all individuals can be ~ 
treated in the same way. The freedom given to some cannot — 
be given to others. The child must be supervised and edu- ~ 
cated until he reaches a certain level of personality. He is © 
then given the mode of life of the adult and told that he — 
will now be held responsible for violations of the legal and 1 
moral codes. The assumption is that he now knows what he © 
is doing and, in general, will fit in. An insane person is not 
given this status because it is believed that the ordinary mo- 
tives and controls do not apply to him. He must be super- 
vised, and it is society’s mistake if he was not supervised and 
so committed a crime. A person is held to be responsible if he 
has the capacities and is controlled by the motives which are 
characteristic of society. It means that he is a certain kind 
of person, one fit to be a member of society, one who appre 
crates human relations. 

It is obvious that all this is rough-and-ready, a sort of 
pragmatic distinction. Individuals differ in their capacities. 
There are border-line cases. To-day society is becoming quite 
aware of this fact and is making efforts to meet it by psy- 
chiatric clinics and special courts. Js an individual able to 
size up a social situation, to foresee consequences and put a 
normal value upon them, to control and integrate his impulses 
and desires? If he can do all this, he can be left to himself 
with the expectation that all will be well. If he cannot, he 
must be supervised so far as this is practical. Obviously, there 
are all degrees of personal and social capacity. 

The kind df an individual who is held responsible to-day is 
one who is regarded as (1) controlled by social sanctions such 
as public opinion and fear of punishment and (2) has moral 
insight and makes personal choices in accordance with the 
welfare of himself and others. He, alone, is a genuine mem- 
ber of society. If his actions conflict with the judgment of 
society he will be punished. The assumption is made that in 





THE SANCTIONS AND CRITERIA OF MORALITY 431 


this conflict society is right and that the individual has 
dropped below the rational demands of society. Usually such 
is the case, but not always. Sometimes the individual acts 
at a higher level than society in the main can understand and 
will accept. It is scarcely deniable that some pacifists have 
been in this position. Did not the rulers blunder in a criminal 
fashion in the decades before the Great War? But critics of 
the government in war-time must know what they are up 
against. It is for them a moral choice which they must make 
with their eyes open. But those who punish them have 
also made a moral choice which expresses their personality. 
As we look back at it all, whom do we admire? It is through 
conflict and challenge that moral advance comes. 

It would seem necessary to say a word about punishment 
in connection with the idea of responsibility. We have already 
noticed how intimately the two are associated. 

Punishment was at first the almost automatic expression 
of the fears and resentments of the tribe toward the indi- 
vidual, or group, responsible for a deed outraging custom. 
It was a movement aimed at the protection and defense of 
institutions and standards. The guilt had to be expiated. 
This origin and atmosphere still lingers around the notion of 
punishment. Many writers speak of punishment as an expia- 
tion of the affront done to the majesty of the law. There is 
a feeling of social resentment which demands expression. 
The criminal becomes an alien or enemy. Human instincts 
are at the foundation of this attitude and procedure. 

But reason suggests other motives and purposes. The in- 
dividual can no longer be given the same freedom; confidence 
is lessened. He may hurt still others or again challenge the 
social fabric. The best thing to do is to imprison him if death 
is too severe a sentence. This action will at once keep him 
out of mischief for a time and intimidate others who might 
otherwise drift into the same anti-social conduct. 

Finally, there is the more constructive idea of re-education 
or reformation. Cannot the individual be redeemed and again 


4382 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


become a free member of society after the challenge to the 
social order has been reproved? It is this last idea which 
has gradually led to a closer study of the causes and condi- 
tions of crime and to an appreciation of the possibility of a — 
better control of this phase of social life. Are there criminal — 
types? Are some individuals unable to adjust themselves to 
our complex society? Have some individuals not had a fair ~ 
chance? Does punishment in prisons answer the more con- 
structive need now that we know that the social will to law 
and order is in no danger of overthrow? There are many 
searching questions which ethicists, sociologists and erimi- 
nologists are at present investigating. 

Free-Will and Responsibility.—Philosophy has inherited 
another problem—which, we shall seek to show, is largely a 
pseudo-problem—which puzzles people. Since ethics had in 
large measure a theological setting and supernatural sanc- 
tions, the question inevitably arose whether the individual, — 
who had not made himself, could be held responsible by his 
ereator and justly punished in another world. What is the 
source of human action? Is the individual ‘‘free’’ or ‘‘deter- 
mined’’ in his conduct? If he is determined, then what he 
does is a foregone conclusion for which the initiator of all 
things is alone responsible. How, then, can this initiator 
have the impertinence to punish? If his action is not de- 
termined completely in this fashion, then he may be in part 
an originator and can be properly punished. 

It is obvious, of course, that the primitive theory of pun- 
ishment dominated theology. Punishment was an expiation of 
a challenge to God’s laws and majesty. Such a great guilt 
deserved and demanded punishments that would make one 
shudder to think of. What should be done to one who 
affronted the King of the Universe? The setting of this out- 
look is evidently monarchical. It seems inevitable that the 
newer theories of punishment will undermine this whole 
theological approach. Shall man be ethically superior to God? 
And we must remember that in the old days men were fright- 





THE SANCTIONS AND CRITERIA OF MORALITY 433 


fully cruel to each other, quite capable of boiling thieves in 
oil or sawing them asunder. In our more humane days we 
will think of a god as humane. It was the old brutal atmos- 
phere which made it possible for the religion of Jesus to 
co-exist with the belief in a literal hell. But our traditional 
religions contained many things more or less jumbled together. 

In this brief section I have tried to indicate the setting 
which made the question of free-will so poignant. In the con- 
eluding chapter I shall examine the cosmological implications 
of moral choice and see whether it is possible to gain a ra- 
tional and satisfactory view of human life which neither 
blinks its tragic aspects nor denies the joy and adventure 
which it contains. 

REFERENCES 

ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics. 
DEWEY and TuFrts, Ethics. 
Everett, Moral Values. 


DRAKE, Problems of Conduct. 
Dr Laauna, Introduction to the Science of Ethics. 


CHAPTER XXVIII 
THE NATURE AND LOCUS OF VALUE 


Why Questions of Value Are Basic for Human Life.—The 
critical consideration of the nature and locus of values has 
come to the front to an astonishing degree during the last 
few decades. Ethics has become the study of moral values; 
esthetics, the study of esthetic values; philosophy of religion, 
the consideration of religious values; and sociology is moving 
in the direction of the study of social, or group, values. It 
would seem that, in this term, we have one of those unifying 
concepts for which philosophy has always been on the lookout. 
Those who reflect on human life will not be surprised at 
this fact. Is not behavior at this level dominated by kinds 
of value, by comparative ratings, by preferences? 

Philosophy was never unaware of this strategic significance 
of what is considered desirable. From the days of the Greek 


thinkers, we find references to the true, the good, and the © 
beautiful. These, in truth, constituted the Platonic trinity. — 


Nevertheless, there is a difference in the thought of to-day. 


In place of this abstract trinity we have a democratic variety — 


of values, all jostling each other for recognition. And we see 
every historical culture as dominated by its own scale and 
complex of values. 


That value is central to human living we soon realize when ~ 


we grasp the fact that values are objects valued. Anything 


which we desire, need, want, enjoy either for its own sake or — 


as a means is a value. Whatever attracts the individual or 
the group so that it is selected and plays a part in life is 


: 


a value. And this would seem to mean that valuation ex- — 


presses our linkage with things, our attitude toward them, 


our use of them, our living employment of them, In this 
434 


THE NATURE AND LOCUS OF VALUE 435 


sense, food is a value; and so are health, play, scientific 
methods, political institutions, education, pictures. In short, 
whatever functions in human life is 1pso facto a value. 

In the two preceding chapters we examined typical 
questions of morality both for their own sake and because 
they would furnish an excellent introduction to the more 
general study of the nature and locus of value. Thus the 
highest good of ethical systems has always represented the 
idea of a system of values including criteria for selection 
and rejection. In like manner, historical epochs have always 
had their scales of values with some group of activities at the 
top. In a religious age salvation was the dominant desire, 
while, in a secular and commercial age, wealth and economic 
enterprise may be near the top in the estimation of men. One 
of the curious features of a period may be its uncertainty as 
to its seale of values. There may be drift, accommodation, 
experiment, differences of opinion. Perhaps, that is our 
situation to-day. 

A very interesting contrast stands out in the domain of 
values. It may be indicated in the following fashion: in 
periods of authority, there are standard values which are 
accepted by nearly all and which are supposed to be absolute, 
‘fixed and accredited; while, in a revolutionary, quickly- 
changing era, nothing seems absolute and fixed. Now, for 
better or for worse, we are living in a period of the second 
type. Authority is limited and must justify itself. We are 
sophisticated and have a keen sense of the relativity and 
interconnection of values. And yet we are convinced that 
values are not purely arbitrary but express human nature and 
cultural conditions. It is suggested to us that values are at 
once objective and relative, that is, that they are grounded 
in life as an historical development and are part of a com- 
plex. How, then, can we evaluate? What shall our tests be? 
And, hovering before our minds, is the inevitable query, 
What is the relation of human values to the universe? Philos- 
ophy cannot avoid this final problem. 


436 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


It is not difficult to realize that, in this new field, a contro- 
versy quite analogous to that between spiritualism and na- 
turalism in cosmology is certain to appear. Recent writers 
have recognized this fact and speak of idealism in regard to 
the locus and nature of values and naturalism in regard to 
the same, A quotation from Professor N. K. Smith may make 
this contrast clearer: ‘‘The meanings attached to the term 
‘idealism’ are so numerous and so conflicting that I have 
found it convenient to use it in a.very wide sense, as cover- 
ing all those philosophies which agree in maintaining that 
spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering 
of the Universe. The alternative position, as represented by 
what is now most usually entitled ‘naturalism’ is that these 
values emerge, and begin to vindicate their reality only at 
some late stage in a process of evolution.’’? 

Perhaps the contrast between idealism and naturalism in 
this domain gives the most illuminating terminology. And 
yet other terms may assist us in grasping the contrast. We 
may speak of idealism in regard to values as transcendental- 
ism or the cosmic location of values, while the opposed view 


may be called humanism. We may say that, in transcenden- — 


talism, there is the inclination toward singularism or a mon- 
archical concentration and control of values, while humanism 
is pluralistic and dispersive. 


A few examples may make all this clearer. Suppose that 


we take Plato and Emerson as witnesses to the transcenden- 
talist position. It is undeniable that this has been an influen- 
tial doctrine in the past and that it is still the commonest, 
perhaps because it is the traditional view and harmonizes best 
with the customary perspective of both religion and polities. 

In the Republic we have the following passage: ‘‘ Now this 
power, which supplies the objects of real knowledge with the 
truth that is in them, and which renders to him who knows 


*N. K. Smith, Prolegomena to an Idealistic Theory of Knowledge, — 


p. 1. It may be noted that Professor Smith’s theory of knowledge, itself, 


is realistic. 


{ 


THE NATURE AND LOCUS OF VALUE 437 


them the faculty of knowing them, you must consider to be 
the essential Form of the Good, and you must consider it 
as the origin of science, and of truth, so far as the latter comes 
within the range of knowledge: and though knowledge and 
truth are both very beautiful things, you will be right in 
looking upon good as something distinct from them, and 


even more beautiful ... the good, far from being identical 
with real existence, actually transcends it in dignity and 
power.’’? 


And in Emerson we have a similar, exultant mysticism: 
‘Meantime within man is the soul of the whole; the wise 
silence ; the universal beauty, to which every part and particle 
is equally related; the eternal One. And this deep power in 
which we exist and whose beatitude is all accessible to us, is 
not only self-sufficing and perfect in every hour, but the act 
of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the 
subject and the object, are one.’’? It is well-known that 
Emerson was much influenced in his thinking by Plato. 

The humanistic, naturalistic position is a more recent one 
and does not have the august tradition back of it that trans- 
cendentalism has. Its great writers are still to come. Per- 
haps the following quotation from Maeterlinck expresses 


something of its spirit: ‘‘If all who may count themselves 


happy were to tell, very simply, what it was that brought 
happiness to them, the others would see that between sorrow 
and joy the difference is but as between a gladsome, enlight- 
ened acceptance of life and a hostile, gloomy submission, be: 
tween a large and harmonious conception of life and one 
that is stubborn and narrow. ‘Is that all?’ the unhappy would 
ery. ‘But we too have within us then, the elements of this 
happiness?’ Surely, you have them within you... . It is 
true that on certain external events our influence is of the 
feeblest, but we have all-powerful action on that which these 
events shall become in ourselves—in other words, on their 


2 Plato, The Republic, sec. 509, passim. 
7 Emerson, The Over-Soul. 


438 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


spiritual part, on what is radiant, undying within them.’’? 
Though less contemplative, pragmatism has much of this spirit 
of stress upon actual living and its intrinsic values. Perhaps 
a quotation from an address which I gave a year or so ago 
may not be out of place: ‘It would seem, then, that natural- 
ism is becoming the positive and reductive term for thought. 
But naturalism must be filled out by the inclusion of human 
life and thus rise to humanism. It has been the supposedly 


negative and forbidding atmosphere of naturalism which has, iy 


perhaps, rendered many people desperate adherents of super- 
naturalism. They have felt themselves hanging over an abyss 
of mechanical processes which had no relationship to value. 


And this was philosophy’s fault which it is only now begin- © 
ning to correct. Surely the world is beautiful as well as © 
ugly, satisfying as well as adverse. We can find means to © 
accomplish what we greatly desire; and this control and — 
direction of events depends largely on man’s intelligence. — 


Nature does not merely tolerate man for it has produced 
hime 

We shall have in mind, then, this contrast between trans- 
cendentalism and naturalistic humanism. To make any ad- 


vance we must analyze judgments of value and value-experi- 


ences. 


eall a personal interpretation of the object. The more we 
isolate pure cognition, that is, reflective cognition in which the 


aim is consciously to know the object, the more we become ~ 


aware by contrast of the nature of valuation. 


Only certain data are valuable for pure cognition, that is, — 
further our intent to grasp the nature and characteristic of — 


the object as it exists in its own right and in its actual rela- 


1 Wisdom and Destiny, pp. 8-9, 29. 
The Emergence of Naturalism, The International Journal of Ethics, 
July, 1924. 


Valuation versus Cognition.—The valuation of an object — 
is not identical with the cognition of it even though, at the — 
level of practice, the two are intermingled in what we may ~ 





THE NATURE AND LOCUS OF VALUE 439 


tions. In knowing, we seek to get at the object in an im- 
personal sort of way, to become spectators of the object. To 
accomplish this purpose is no easy thing, as the gradual de- 
velopment of scientific technique shows. And we must not 
confuse results with means. While it sounds very quietistic 
to speak of contemplating nature, actually it is not so. Man 
has served a very long apprenticeship in this art. And the 
apparent simplicity and clarity of scientific contemplation of 
the world is, like the simplicity of great plastic art, purchased 
at the price of effort. Knowledge is not an intuition but an 
achievement; yet, when it is achieved, it claims to present 
the actual characteristics of things as they are in their own 
domain of being. 

Now feelings, emotions and desires are not cognitional data 
for external objects. It is for this reason that we must call 
them data extrinsic to scientific cognition. But they are sig- 
nificant for the valuation of external things. Why? Because 
they indicate the bearing of these things upon ourselves as 
centres of desire. Valuation is centripetal to living centres 
that strive and feel and estimate. 

In cognition we hold ourselves aloof from objects and 
restrain and hold in abeyance those direct relations and in- 
terests which are characteristic of living. In short, in pure 
cognition we temporarily inhibit desires and activities which 
are directed toward objects in a concrete, participative sort 
of way and try to understand what they are, what their struc- 
ture and properties should be conceived as. On the con- 
trary, in the usual run of living we are agents adjusting our- 
selves to the things around us, using, avoiding and enjoying 
them. How shall I put it? In living, we have no sense of 
abrupt separation between ourselves and things. We coop- 
erate with other persons, we handle objects, we move them, 
alter them, enjoy them, fear them. We are with things. Ac- 
tion emphasizes our relations with the world while cognition 
emphasizes our distinctness so far as existence is concerned. 

Just because modern philosophy has been so closely linked 


440 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


up with the advance of the physical sciences, it has been dom- 
inated by the outlook of pure cognition. Man has tended 
under these influences to think of himself as a sort of disem- 
bodied mind peering at the world. And as the world was 
long thought of as a purely mechanical, dead-level system, it 
is not to be wondered at that man felt himself alienated from 
physical reality. The dualistic view of the mind-body rela- 


tion, which made the mind something entirely separate from — 
the body, would obviously fit in with this tendency to think ~ 


of mind as only spectator and not as participant. 


But one of the great discoveries of recent philosophy— — 
strange as it may seem—has been the realization that living, — 
and not knowing, is the primary fact and the proper point — 
of departure for a philosophy of values. In these matters — 
the proper perspective came but slowly. A glance at the © 


history of philosophy may help us. 


Kant separated very sharply the realm of knowledge from — 
the realm of will. The Critique of Pure Reason dealt with — 
nature and regarded it as a phenomenal construction dom- — 
inated by the category of causality. As a part of nature, © 
man was determined in all his actions. But in the second © 
Critique, that of the Practical Reason, man was regarded as — 
noumenal and free. The problem, inherited by Kant’s suc- — 
cessors, was to show how man could be free and determined ~ 
at the same time. Gradually there arose what may be called ~ 
a voluntaristic type of philosophy which laid stress upon the ~ 
will. It was natural for this movement to be idealistic in — 
its epistemology and to look upon nature as a realm of 


appearance. 


Along these lines there developed the romantic movement — 
in philosophy which culminated in the work of men like | 
Nietzsche, Bergson and Eucken. These thinkers stressed — 
the creative element in human life and called attention to — 
the important part played by will and feeling. In episte- — 
mology they swung rather vaguely between idealism and — 
realism, idealism, on the whole, predominating; and in cos- 4 





eo 


THE NATURE AND LOCUS OF VALUE 441 


mology, they alternated between spiritualism and dualism. 
Thus Nietzsche, on the whole, belonged to the voluntaristic 
movement inaugurated by Schopenhauer, while Bergson is a 
vitalist, that is, a believer in a life-force which molds the inor- 
ganic realm. Hucken falls more into line with Fichte and 
post-Kantian idealism, as he calls himself an activist. 

It was in America that pragmatism secured its chief devel- 
opment and strength. Having much in common with these 
voluntaristic movements, it yet differed from them in its 
emphasis upon a biological view of life and mind. In other 
words, it was more empirical and naturalistic than early 
voluntarism had been. It was also temporalistic and inclined 
to stress actual human living and human situations. 

It is not necessary for us to determine priority in these 
matters. Suffice it to point out that Nietzsche, Bergson, 
James, Schiller and Dewey all tend to regard: living as some- 
thing more comprehensive than knowing. Knowing is an in- 
strument of living rather than something separate. In this, I 
think that they were undoubtedly right although the thesis 
needs careful definition. Knowing is not something which 
goes on of itself. It must rest in, and spring from, the active 
curiosity and interest of a being who participates in nature. 
We strive, desire, love, hate, create, dream. Each of us is a 
centre of existence impinging upon others and in active rela- 
tions with an environment and, by that very fact, full of the 
warmth of feeling and directed interest. Knowing is, then, a 
differentiated activity grounded in the nature and setting of 
life and developed to a high level. It is always sustained by 
interest. 

The danger in this movement was to suppose that because 
living is the fundamental human category knowledge could 
not be knowledge. There was a tendency to deny the reality 
of cognitive contemplation and the interest in pure cogni- 
tion. It is probable that certain inadequacies in the epis- 
temology and cosmology of the time encouraged this hostility 
to knowledge. 


442 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


The point in all this for us is the realization that par- 
ticipative living is a basic feature of human life and that 
valuation is bound up with this characteristic. We desire 
things and situations; we build up ideals of conduct; we 
ereate in various sensuous media rhythmic forms which we 
enjoy ; we establish social institutions which further our ends. 
In short, we are agents actively expressing ourselves in rela- 
tion to a physical and social environment. We must give up, 
once for all, the shadowy conception of ourselves as disem- 
bodied minds merely contemplating the world. Contempla- 
tion is, itself, an activity of a highly differentiated sort sus- 
tained by the whole organism. 

Let me hint for a moment at the consequences of this out- 
look. First, the human organism is an agent in nature and, 
therefore, nature cannot be, as Kant supposed, a mere mech- 
anism. Our evolutionary view with its acceptance of levels 
helps us here. In the second place, valuation is a necessary 
ingredient in human living with its desires and sentiments. 
To value objects is in a sense more primary than knowing 
as such, because knowing js at first largely a means to action. 
Pure cognition and the valuation of it is an achievement. 
Let us come back to ordinary perception with this point in 
mind. 

It will, I hope, be remembered that we said that ordinary 
perception is practical and concerned with the adjustment of 
the organism to its situation. Objects are experienced in 
what we may eall an appreciative perception. They are suf- 
fused with value-meanings. An apple is something good to eat 
as well as something round and red. A person is some one to 
have affection for or to fear as well as an individual of a 
certain height and having black hair. We may say that 
primary interpretation is at one and the same time cogni- 
tional and valuational and that cognition guides valuation. 
In this sense, we may say that valuation involves the em- 
ployment of two sets of data, one cognitional and the other 
volitional and affective. The cognitional data are more of 





THE NATURE AND LOCUS OF VALUE 443 


the nature of sense-data and are stressed in differentiated, or 
pure, cognition as in science. We may eall pure cognition a 
specialization. More peculiarly valuational are such ele- 
ments as feelings and desires. These are extrinsic to the 
knowledge of an object but are essential to valuation. On 
the other hand, I think that it is undeniable that feeling and 
desire alone are not quite sufficient for the valuation of an 
object. These must be guided and directed by knowledge. 

We must, then, acknowledge that we value objects that we 
know by means of additional data irrelevant to knowledge as 
such. If this is true, valuation as an act is as objective in 
its direction as is cognition. When we say that an act is 
good or that a picture is beautiful, it is the act and the picture 
that we are valuing. It is not our feeling that is good or 
our experience that is beautiful. Our feelings, desires and in- 
terests are conditions of the assignment of value to an object 
but they are not themselves the objects of valuation in these 
eases. There is the same objective reference in valuation as in 
cognition, and, in both eases, it seems to me to rest upon our 
directed organic response to the things around us. And there 
is no conflict here as soon as we realize that cognition is not 
valuation and that valuation is not cognition. Intimately as 
they influence one another in the whole of life, they are 
qualitatively distinguishable. In pure cognition, we are seek- 
ing to grasp the characteristics of objects as these are in some 
sense intrinsic to them; in valuation, we are seeking to inter- 
pret objects as they enter our experience and connect up with 
our lives. But we begin with an interpretation of objects 
which represents a fusion of undeveloped cognition and un- 
developed valuation. 

While, in science, we pass to a methodical development of 
the possibilities of cognition and attain critical knowledge, 
we may be said in ethics and esthetics to seek to advance to 
a method for the development of a critical type of valuation. 
Reason and reflection have their part to play in the activities 
of valuation just as they have in the differentiated activity 


444 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


of pure cognition. Moral experience and reflection teach us 
to call acts bad which were formerly called good or indifferent. 
And the trained artist knows the sentimental and shoddy 
from that which is esthetically satisfying. There is critical 
growth in both sorts of activities. 

Contemporary Theories of Value.—Let us now examine 
some recent theories of value. We shall find that epistemo- 
logical theories have~played their part. And the clarifi- 
cation which critical realism has introduced into our think- 
ing will be of assistance here. At any rate, we shall find that 
we can regard valuations as objective in their reference even 
while we recognize that the data essential to valuation are 
essentially human and social. It is a curious fact that we 
shall find the neo-realists divided among themselves on the 
question of value. | 

Let us begin with idealism. The tendency to identify value 
and existence, or even to put value above existence, which we 
saw characteristic of the ethical metaphysics or transcenden- 
talism of Plato, has continued a feature of idealistic philos- 


ophy ever since. It underlies the ‘‘back to Plato’’ movement . 


of modern idealism under the stress of the growth of realistic 


epistemology. But the world of space and time cannot be — 


so easily discarded to-day as it was by Plato. Yet if you are, 


like the idealist, unable to believe in objects which transcend . 
the consciousness of individual minds, it is not unnatural to ~ 


say that existence has meaning, value or significance as an 
intrinsic part of it. In this you would be ealling attention 
to what I have called appreciative perception. 

In his Outspoken Essays, Dean Inge makes the following 


statement: ‘‘The ultimate identity of existence and value is — 


a venture of faith to which speculative idealism is committed.”’ 
To which Professor Muirhead, another speculative idealist, 


adds the comment: ‘‘He clearly means reality and not exist- — 


ence in time.’’ But is there any reality outside the space-time 


system? It is evident how quickly we get back to epistemology ~ 


and cosmology. 





THE NATURE AND LOCUS OF VALUE 445 


Professor Mackenzie is another writer upon values who 
faces the implications of the growth of realism. In a chapter 
entitled ‘‘Cosmism or Axiological Idealism”’ in a recent work 
on values,* he writes as follows: ‘‘ First of all it is very impor- 
tant to be clear that by Idealism we are not to understand a 
doctrine that denies the reality of the spatio-temporal system. 
.. . At any rate, most modern idealists do not maintain that 
all is mind or spirit, but only that all has to be interpreted 
in the light of a spiritual principle. And this can hardly mean 
anything else than that the principle of interpretation is to 
be sought in human values, rather than in material condi- 
tions.’’ Is there not danger of anthropomorphism in this 
contention ? 

Idealism has been such an important and vigorous move- 
ment that it would be unwise not to give other instances of 
the idealistic view of values. Sir Henry Jones in his recent 
Gifford Lectures, based largely on the teaching of Edward 
Caird, advocates a position very much like Mackenzie’s. It 
contains the conception of a Power that shapes the Universe 
in accordance with truth, goodness and beauty. But how can 
we pass from such a transcendent Power to our actual human 
values? Mackenzie admits the difficulty and, like Sir Henry 
- Jones, falls back on the poetic insights of Browning. 

The suspicion will not down that these writers bow to the 
space-time system, call it real—more real than Plato admitted 
—and then delve underneath it to a Power or Ground which 
is the real reality. Professor Sorley does very much the same 
thing that Mackenzie and Jones did. In his Moral Values and 
the Idea of God, he writes: ‘‘By ultimate reality is not meant 
material existents, or even the realm of persons, but that 
which is the grownd of everything that is real.’’* It is the 
same procedure. We saw in our cosmology that Lloyd Morgan 
argued in the same fashion. It is the assumption that physical 
systems are contingent and existentially secondary, that there 


2J.S. Mackenzie, Ultimate Values, p. 155. 
“Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, p. 509. 


446 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


is a sort of fourth dimension back of them in which the springs 
of change are to be located. In short, that changes are not 
expressions of the nature of the spatio-temporal system but 
of something more real underlying it. Let me frankly say 
that I cannot—with the best desire in the world—see adequate 
grounds for this assumption that physical systems are not 
self-sufficient. It is a basic question, however, and the student 
should think over both sides of the question very carefully. 

It is clear that cosmic idealism is closely akin to what we 
ealled transcendentalism and tends to have a singularistic, 
monarchical conception of the cosmic locus of values. 

Let us next examine neo-realism. Neo-realism is divided 
against itself on the question of values, some writers keeping 
close to Platonism, while others approach pragmatism in these 
matters. 

An instance of the facility with which neo-realism lends 
itself to Platonism is to be found in Spaulding’s The New 
Rationalism: ‘‘The answer to these inquiries is almost as old 
as man’s own philosophizing, and is one that unites modern 
Realism with ancient Idealism. It is, that ideals are real. 
Plato was and still remains the great spokesman. Eternal are 
justice and goodness and truth, not because they persist 
through all time, but ‘because in a heaven by themselves’ they 
partake neither of the nature of ‘things’ that are in space 
and time, nor, indeed of the nature of time and space them- 
selves.’?+ I would say in contrast that ideals are to me 
objectives of the human personality arising out of our 
living experience rather than timeless entities. To make an 
ideal into an entity seems to me to misunderstand the setting 
of constructive valuation. But more of that later. 

Much of neo-realism has, I think, confused cognition and 
valuation. I shall examine the work of Laird and G. HE. 
Moore, two English thinkers, from this angle. 

In his ‘‘A Study in Realism’’ Laird asserts that value be- 
longs to objects ‘‘in the same sense as redness belongs to a 

4 Spaulding, The New Rationalism, p. 498. 


THE NATURE AND LOCUS OF VALUE 447 


eherry.’’ I judge that this statement means that value is an 
intrinsic quality of an object which the adjusted mind will 
discern. 

At the level of practical, or appreciative, perception, this 
statement is essentially correct. The content of perception 
contains redness and is suffused with feelings and desires. 
At this level, the meanings of things are affective and voli- 
tional as well as cognitional. Interpretation is naturally as 
directly valuational as cognitional. But I am convineed that 
reflection forces us later to distinguish between value-mean- 
ings and the terms of a cognitional type by which we think 
the nature of the object. It is clear that this is the point of 
divergence between naive and critical realism. 

I shall now take up G. E. Moore’s position in detail because 
it will bring out by contrast the outlook which we are inclined 
to favor. Moreover, he has given naturalism a certain arbi- 
trary meaning which may mislead the student if his attention 
is not called to it. 

In his Principia Ethica, a very stimulating though neces- 
sarily technical book, Moore identifies naturalism with the 
view that the value ‘good’ is a natural property of things. He 
writes: ‘‘ Whether good is defined as yellow or green or blue, 
as loud or soft, as round or square, as sweet or bitter, as pro- 
ductive of life or productive of pleasure, as willed or desired 
or felt: whichever of these or of any other object in the world, 
good may be held to mean, the theory which holds it to mean 
them will be a naturalistic theory.’’ Thus Moore believes that 
the mistake—shall we say of past naturalism ?—is to identify 
value with a literal existent, or natural, property of things, 
like vitality, productivity, or pleasure. These may be goods, 
that is, good things, but they are not what we mean by good as 
a predicate as when we say that an act is good. 

This logical analysis, inaugurated by Moore, which led to 
the emphasis upon the distinction between goods, or things 
which are good, and good as a predicate has been of decided 
benefit to axiology or theory of value. In the assignment of 


448 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


value, we are not discovering some intrinsic quality. For in- 
stance, to say that pleasure is good under certain circumstances 
is not similar to saying that pleasure has a variable intensity. 
Nor does it seem possible to find any feature in objects 
which is always present when we assert that they are good. 
While I recognize that naive naturalism has at times been 
guilty of this fallacy, it is not essential to naturalism. Another 
quotation from Moore .will make this clear: ‘‘I have thus ap- 
propriated the name Naturalism to a particular method of 


approaching Ethics—a method which, strictly understood, is — 


inconsistent with the possibility of any Ethics whatsoever. 


This method consists in substituting for ‘good’ some one — 
property of a natural object or a collection of natural objects; _ 
and im thus replacing Ethics by some one of the natural — 


sctences.’’ + 


Very curiously, this sounds like a recognition of the distine- 
tion which I have made between cognition and valuation. The 
natural sciences stress cognitional judgments because their 
purpose is that of knowledge of things and events. But we 
saw that, in living as a whole, we are concerned more with 
valuation and action than with pure cognition. 

But Moore is so dominated by epistemology that he does not 
employ this distinction and regards ‘good’ as a ‘‘non-natural, 
indefinable, intrinsic property of certain natural objects.’ It 
is non-natural because it cannot exist by itself in time. Yet 
it is always bound up with an object. It is indefinable like the 
quality, yellow, because it cannot be analyzed. But does not 
this conclusion leave us with a mystery? If there is some 
unique quality which objects always possess, if they are good, 
how do we discover its presence? Can it be recognized without 
a sense-datum? Or is it a peculiar kind of sense-datum? The 
whole doctrine seems to me very puzzling. Would it not assist 
Moore’s intention to recognize predicates which are not in- 


trinsic to objects in a cognitional way and yet are interpreta- — 


tive of them as linked up with living centres. For us, also, 
*G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 40. 


THE NATURE AND LOCUS OF VALUE ~— 449 


‘good’ is a non-physical property because it is not there to be 
recognized by a cognitional process. Acts, for instance, are 
not good out of relation to human beings. 

Professor 8. Alexander, although a neo-realist, represents a 
- movement toward a recognition of the relational, experiential 
view of values which I have been advocating. I shall neglect 
technical differences between his formulations and my own 
and stress the agreement. Let me quote a passage to bring out 
this recognition of the prime importance of the relationship of 
objects to living centres if they are to have values. ‘‘Things 
are good only in so far as we extract their goodness by using 
them to our purposes. That physical things are beautiful 
only in relation to us is a proposition which may seem paradox- 
ical and even revolting, and it needs and shall receive its 
justification, when it will be seen that a landscape has beauty 
not in and by itself, but in the same way as a poem has beauty, 
which is made by a man and when it has been made is also a 
physical thing, outside the maker. That truth and reality are 
not the same thing, but that truth belongs to real proposi- 
tions only in their relation to mind, may seem to some obvious 
and to others false, but I shall maintain that, though not 
obvious it is true. . . . Values, then, are unlike the empirical 
qualities of external things, shape, or fragrance, or life; they 
imply the amalgamation of the object with the human appre- 
ciation of it.’’! In all this I heartily agree though I am a 
wee bit skeptical of this term amalgamation. If it means 
that we as living beings connect up with things and that we 
interpret them in relation to our lives through a union of 
cognitional data and value-data, I quite agree. 

There are many other interesting writers on the subject of 
values to-day. Among these I might mention John Dewey, 
R. B. Perry, David Prall, George Santayana, Picard, Bouglé. 
It is to be hoped that the student will have developed enough 
interest in the subject to go on and read further in it for 
himself. 

1S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, vol. 2, pp. 278-9. 


450 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


REFERENCES 


S. ALEXANDER, Space, Time and Deity, vol. 2. 

Bouvet, The Evolution of Values, chap. 1. 

DEWEY, Nature and Experience, chap. 10. 

Moors, Principia Ethica. 

PicarD, Values Immediate and Contributory. 

PRALL, ‘‘ Metaphysics and Value,’’ University of California Pub., vol. 5. 
Perry, The Present Conflict of Ideals, chap. 25. 

SANTAYANA, Winds of Doctrine. 

URBAN, Valuation, Its Nature and Laws. 


CHAPTER XXIX 
KINDS, CONDITIONS, AND CRITERIA OF VALUE 


Valuation an Intrinsic Aspect of Living.—Our investiga- 
tions into the general character of values have econvineed us 
that they are objective after their own kind. Perhaps this 
fact can be best brought out by saying that values are objects 
valued. These objects may be of very different kinds, such as 
physical things, technical methods, human aims, social or- 
ganizations, ideals. In every instance, individuals and groups 
envisage something perccivable or conceivable as an object 
and respond to it in the way of estimation or prizing. It would 
seem, then, that the value which any object has in our eyes is 
our interpretation of it in relation to the function it performs, 
or can perform, in our lives. Our knowledge enters in, but 
more than knowledge is involved. Our feelings, our desires, 
our habits, our expectations, our needs play their part in this 
vital interpretation of objects. 

Following this clue, we have tried to show that the categories 
of valuation have a quite different sort of setting than those of 
cognition. In cognition by itself, we locate things in space, 
indicate their internal structure and their causal capacities, 
perhaps trace their history and predict their future. All this 
comes out very clearly in the inorganic sciences. In valuation, 
on the other hand, we are estimating objects in relation to 
ourselves and to all that bears upon us. We are now, con- 
sciously or unconsciously, egocentric and sociocentric. In 
other words, in valuation we are living with things, taking up 
attitudes toward them, relating them to our desires and aims. 
We are expressing ourselves in them, connecting them with 

451 


452 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


our suffering and doing. It is this difference of perspective 
and purpose which, as we saw, distinguishes pure cognition 
from valuation. 

Perhaps an example or so may make all this clearer. Let us 
take, for instance, this description by Arthur Symons of the 
art of Guy de Maupassant: ‘‘ Every artist has his own vision 
of the world. Maupassant’s vision was of solid superficies, of 
texture which his hands could touch, of action which his mind 
could comprehend from the mere sight of its incidents. He 
saw the world as the Dutch painters saw it, and he was as 
great a master of form, of rich and sober colour, of the imita- 
tion of the outward gestures of life, and of the fashion of 
external things. He had the same view of humanity, and 
shows us, with the same indifference, the same violent ferment 
of life, the life of full-blooded people who have to elbow their 
way through the world. His sense of desire, of greed, of all 
the baser passions, was profound; he had the terrible logic of 
animalism. Love-making, drunkenness, cheating, quarreling, 
the mere idleness of sitting drowsily in a chair, the gross life 
of the farmyard and the fields, civic dissensions, the sordid 
provincial dance of the seven deadly sins, he saw in the same 
direct, unilluminating way as the Dutch painters; finding, 
indeed, no beauty in any of these things, but getting his beauty 
in the deft arangement of them, in the mere act of placing 
them in a picture.’?? We may say that the artist finds delight 
in significantly arranging material which consists of primary 
human values, such as affection, love of money, hate, jealousy. 
This is the raw stuff of literary art. 

In education, again, it is coming to be recognized that the 
primary question is one of objectives. What do we wish to 
achieve by our educational institutions? Are there relatively 
diverse aims? And can there be wise accommodations of 
these aims? Is it the aim of education to enable people to 
have insight into themselves and the world which surrounds 
them and to achieve a wise system of values? Or is it better 

1Symons, Studies in Prose and Verse, p. 97. 


KINDS, CONDITIONS, AND CRITERIA OF VALUE 453 


to demand that education be quickly subservient to the mak- 
ing of money? 

Again, any voluntary group has its values, the things it 
holds dear and aims to realize. Art clubs dedicate themselves 
to the artistic development of their members. Scientific asso- 
ciations have similar objectives with regard to the advance of 
scientific knowledge. And how many groups there are, each 
with its particular aim! So far as an individual is a member 
of such groups, he has a value in common with other mem- 
bers; he shares their values. 

Political groups are only partly voluntary because they are 
so basic. But we can note that, as Americans, we share certain 
valuations. We believe the method of counting votes to 
determine majorities superior to overt revolutions. We 
believe that free discussion is valuable if new situations are 
to be met and minds kept flexible. And so we value our tra- 
ditional institutions, although not blindly and unaware that 
new conditions may demand important modifications. 

Now, in all these instances, we can notice ends, or objectives, 
which are settled upon as desirable, and we can also note 
methods and institutions which are also regarded as desirable 
because they assist these ends or objectives. It is this sense 
of the relatively desirable, this ability to construct scales, or 
hierarchies, of objectives, which stands out in both personal 
and social living. Life reaches out, grows and creates. It isa 
centre of appropriation and expression. 

Value in Aesthetic Experience.—Since we have already 
discussed the general character of moral values, it way be well 
to linger for a moment upon another type, the kind of value- 
experience found in art and thence in nature as contemplated. 

Those who have devoted themselves to an analysis of the 
aesthetic experience emphasize its unhurried, contemplative 
character. He who enjoys a landscape, for instance, is ab- 
sorbed in the colored pattern which is spread before his eyes. 
He is not trying to do something practical, to estimate the 
quality of the soil, the geological character of the rocks, the 


454 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


distance from town. Rather is he aware of color harmonies 
and delightful blendings of perspectives which satisfy. 

‘‘TMhe simplest aesthetic experience,’’ writes Bosanquet, ‘‘is, 
to begin with, a pleasant feeling, or a feeling of something 
pleasant—when we attend to it, it begins to be the latter.’ 
He then proceeds to point out that there are at least three 
chief characteristics of this experience. It is a stable feeling; 
it is a relevant feeling; and it is a common feeling. All this 
means that it is well-organized, connected with objects having 
definite characteristics, say of form, and experienced by all 
those who have developed their capacity of vision, feeling and 
insight. Summing up his analysis, Bosanquet writes: ‘‘So far 
the aesthetic attitude seems to be something like this: pre- 
occupation with a pleasant feeling, embodied in an object 
which can be contemplated, and so obedient to the laws of an 
object; and by an object is meant an appearance presented to 
us through perception or imagination.’’ + 

It is upon this latter statement that we shall linger a mo- 
ment. In art, we are not trying to know nature as the scientist 
conceives it. We are concerned with the object as it appears 
in our experience as a sensuous presentation capable of evoking 
and absorbing certain elements in our nature. Aesthetic con- 
templation is not passive but creative. And in art we mould 
objects until they express as perfectly as possible what we 
demand in the way of form, order and harmony. Note well 
the difference. In scientific cognition we are dominated by the 
purpose to know what is out there. Our methods and tech- 
nique are set by this aim. In art, it is otherwise. The aim of 
art is not to copy what already exists but to create something 
delightful and expressive. Those who do not realize this fact 
are unable to appreciate much of the newer painting. They 
look for resemblance, for agreement with things as they re- 
member them, and they are shocked by the colored pattern 
which is offered to them. They seek to look through it at 
things and not to rest in the appearance by itself. 

*Bosanquet, Three Lectures on Aesthetics, lect. 1. 


KINDS, CONDITIONS, AND CRITERIA OF VALUE 455 


A quotation or two from recent works on aesthetics may 
bring out the specific aim of art more clearly. ‘‘Art in gen- 
eral,’’ writes Buermeyer, ‘‘is an expression of emotion, an 
expression which consists not, as with ordinary expressions in 
gestures, exclamations, or physically efficacious acts, but in an 
envisagement of the moving object in the terms or qualities 
that the emotion has seized upon and laid bare as significant. 
The object, so envisaged, is never identical with the object as 
it exists independently, either as a physical thing or as it 1s 
conventionally perceived. Rather, the aesthetic object is such 
a reorganization of conventional impressions, a reinterpreta- 
tion of familiar fact, as well reveal their distinctive significance 
for feeling or emotion.’’* In a similar vein, Parker writes as 
follows: ‘‘This same purpose of affording pleasure in sympa- 
thetic vision leads the artist not only to present the unity of 
life, but so to organize its material that it will be clear to the 
mind which perceives it. . .. Hence the artist infuses into 
the world which he creates a new and wholly subjective sim- 
plicity and unity, to which there is no parallel in nature.’’ ? 

Psychologist and aesthetician have devoted themselves to an 
analysis of the aesthetic experience. The student who finds 
the subject interesting will discover admirable material in 
the books just cited and in those of Vernon Lee, Croce, Val- 
entine, Bullough, Langfeld and Carritt. There are tendencies, 
feelings, patterns, emotional adjustments back of the experi- 
ence of beauty. No one who has studied to the full the artistic 
side of man’s nature can regard it as something artificial. Art 
springs out of human living and deepens it. It is, in short, a 
eultural emergence. Man is a child of nature to the full, 
while possessed of the capacity to create works of art which 
improve upon nature in their emotional appeal. 

Within experience or as experienced, then, the object has 
been transformed. Perhaps, it would be less misleading to say 
that the object has been reflected into the domain of the per- 


*Buermeyer, The Aesthetic Hxperience, chap. 1. 
* Parker, The Principles of Aesthetics, p. 83. 


456 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


cipient organism. And, as so reflected, the thing acquires 
qualities which it does not intrinsically possess, like color, 
perceptual size, perfume, etc. And it does not take us long 
to realize that the sensible thing of naive realism has fused 
with its sensory qualities other more emotional qualities like 
expressiveness, desirableness, peacefulness, usefulness, charm. 
This primitive realism is puzzling to the scientifically trained 
man because he is not philosopher enough to realize that he 
has been trying to penetrate beyond this complex of appear- 
ance and value to a critical knowledge of the thing in its own 
locus and domain. The idealist, on the other hand, looks upon 
this critical knowledge as an abstraction from concrete ex- 
perience and not as a purified cognition of an external order. 
Does not critical realism offer the best perspective? 

In valuation, then, we drop back into living. We are not 
indulging in knowing for its own sake; rather are we creators 
and doers. And it is in this relationship that the basic truth 
of pluralism comes home. We are located in the world and 
live in it as an environment. But the pluralism, thus sug- 
gested, is not a disjointed, atomic pluralism but one of inter- 
connection and the active, mutual adjustment of parts. If, in 
his analysis of cognition, the realist must stress the distinctness 
of object and knower, it does not follow that, as realities, the 
thing known and the thing knowing may not live together and 
affect one another. While we are cognizing we inhibit for the 
time being our practical relations with things. Even in the 
aesthetic attitude there is something of this withdrawal. It has 
been called psychical distance. It seems to me to come out 
clearly in the mood of Matthew Arnold’s poem, Resignation. 
He is describing the life of the poet. 


‘“He sees the gentle stir of birth 
When morning purifies the earth; 
He leans upon a gate and sees 
The pastures, and the quiet trees. 
Low, woody hill, with gracious bound 
Folds the still valley almost round; 
The cuckoo, loud on some high lawn, 
Is answer’d from the depths of dawn; 


d 


KINDS, CONDITIONS, AND CRITERIA OF VALUE 457 


In the hedge straggling to the stream, 
Pale, dew-drench’d, half-shut roses gleam; 
But, where the farther side slopes down, 
He sees the drowsy new-waked clown 

In his white, quaint-embroider’d frock 
Make, whistling, tow’rd his mist-wreathed flock— 
Slowly, behind his heavy tread, 

The wet, flowr’d grass heaves up its head. 
Lean’d on his gate, he gazes—tears 

Are in his eyes, and in his ears 

The murmur of a thousand years.’’ 


A General Survey of Values.—There have been many 
classifications of values. Since our present purpose is not an 
exhaustive analysis of the subject but, rather, an indication of 
the nature of the field, any one of these would serve. Let us 
bear in mind the fact that human interests, desires and feelings 
lie back of values and, in part, control them. 

We can begin with the values which we have in common with 
the brutes but which the development of culture has raised to 
a higher level involving refinement and greater complexity ; 
and we can then pass to values which depend upon distinctly 
human abilities and relations. It will be noted that the group 
as an historical growth comes more and more to the fore. The 
more specialized values come last in the list. 

Bodily values. 

Values of primary association. 
Economie values. 

Political values. 

Aesthetic values. 

Religious values. 


Moral values. 
Intellectual values. 


Oe a tena wre 


This list is, I think, suggestive; and yet we must carefully 
note certain supplementary uistinctions. In the first place, we 
must distinguish between individual and group values. Sec- 
ondly, we must contrast immediate with reflective values. And 
lastly we must put plus or positive values over against minus 
or negative values. These, and other necessary points, we 
shall take up later. 


458 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Bodily values are relatively immediate and, as we say, 
sensuous. We have here the bodily joys of life, tasty food, 


fresh air, the joy of exercise, the more elementary pleasures of — 
sex, pleasant sounds, alertness of life. We should not be-— 


little these primary sensuous values, which we experience as 
healthy, sensitive organisms moving about in our world. 
Thus bodily tone and enjoyment suffuses our life with well- 


being. Things take on a pleasant aspect as we respond to — 


them healthily and normally. We need but think of the first 
bland days of spring or of a well-earned vacation. Let me in 


this connection quote the paean of joy in life which came from 


the pen of one of our most intellectual poets: 


“‘Oh, the wild joys of living! the leaping from rock up to rock, 

The strong rending of boughs from the fir-tree, the cool, silver shock 
Of the plunge in a pool’s living water, the hunt of the bear, 

And the sultriness showing the lion is couched in his lair, 

And the meal, the rich dates yellowed over with gold-dust divine, 


a! a © eles eee. © 6) 6) 6 616 Je Ole @ Be Ce 6 6 816 Je .e e166: 14) Oe) ©) @ ce! 2 1e Cele, 6 68 6 wns] s1.e 10 


How good is man’s life, the mere living! ’’ 


It is a well-known adage, that of a sound mind in a sound ~ 


body. The foundation must not be belittled. 


The values of recreation go with the employment of body — 
and mind as in games and walking. These lead to the values — 


of association with affection, love, rivalry, discourse. 


But man must also work and plan, and society has gradually . 


developed various kinds of labor and various enterprises 


aimed at the satisfaction of man’s needs by means of effort 
and applied intelligence. Hence civic and economic values — 


emerge. 


And so we pass up the scale to highly developed art with © 


its craftsmanship and trained taste, to religious ceremonies 
and acts in which the individual supposedly enters into rela- 
tions of association with superhuman powers, to science and 


philosophy with their technique and ability to call out in ~ 


pleasant operation the intellectual powers, to morality with its 


attempt to avaluate and adjust to one another these manifold 


values and activities, 


| 
| 








KINDS, CONDITIONS, AND CRITERIA OF VALUE 459 


This brief indication of the presence in the field of values of 
the desires, activities and interests which appear as intrinsic 
to human life, may serve to direct the student to an empirical 
analysis of his own living. He will find it a complex whole 
shifting from hour to hour and from day to day and contain- 
ing in itself the enjoyments of food and drink, exercise, com- 
panionship, ambitions, work, the solution of moral problems, 
art, an imaginative sense of the world. And there are sor- 
rows as well as joys, lean stretches of life as well as fat, well- 
favored ones. And he will find that imagination, knowledge 
and insight pass downward to transform the more primary 
activities. It is in some measure the whole personality which 
expresses itself in all these values. 

There are various angles from which human values may be 
approached and various divisions which may be made. Thus 
we may speak of negative and of positive values. A moment 
of life or an act which is painful or harmful has negative 
value. We look back at it, perhaps, and say to ourselves that 
it was something we would be glad to forget or something we 
would like to rectify. And other activities are quite the re- 
verse ; we enjoy them and we also see that they have had re- 
sults of a favorable sort in our lives. Another division is that 
between intrinsic and extrinsic, or instrumental, values. An 
act or a moment of life has intrinsic value when it is felt to be 
satisfactory in itself. A walk on a bright day in fall, a bit of 
intellectual analysis, a talk with a charming friend, all these 
bits of living have intrinsic value. They may, of course, also 
have extrinsic value for the one does not exclude the other. 
But we think of extrinsic value chiefly when we regard things 
and actions as means to ends which satisfy us. Thus for a 
great many their work has too little intrinsic value. It is 
chiefly a method of obtaining the necessaries of life, And 
there is bound to be much of our living with this note of 
mere instrumentality in it. Fortunate is an individual in 
whose life instrumental value and intrinsic value merge, who 
loves his work and sees significance in what he does. 


460 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


We have thus far dealt with what may be called personal 
values. We have taken the educated member of society and 
asked ourselves what are some of the chief values in his life. 
But, besides private values, there are public, or group, values 
and the standards set up in connection with institutions. As 
a member of the teaching profession, I estimate certain activi- 
ties in definite ways. As an American, again, I am concerned 
with the social and political life of my country and agree with 
others on remedial measures. Again, institutions are repre- 
sented by officials who identify themselves with their history 
and purposes. For them, certain forms are the valid ones and 
deviation from them is to be condemned. We can note con- 
ventional institutional valuations in art, politics, the church, 
banks, literature. These institutions have a momentum of 
their own against which the individual reformer is largely 
helpless unless conditions are especially favorable to change. 

Let us pass now to a close study of the conditions of par- 
ticular valuations. We shall see that valuations have their 
definite conditions and are not whimsical and arbitrary. They 
are expressions of human living in the kind of a world we are 
in. 

Is it not true that I discover that I like certain things, actions 
and activities? Thus I enjoy the contemplation of certain 
arrangements and color combinations. Again, I may be 
moved by certain actions to keen enjoyment. For instance, 
I may like friends and find delight in good conversation. 
Individuals differ considerably in the kinds of activities 
they are attracted to. Some like to handle machines and do 
work out of doors; others prefer books. We have here per- 
sonal equations which are in some measure innate, although 
they are undoubtedly affected by subtle suggestions and even 
by accident. In valuation we have to do with responsive 
persons who come under all sorts of influences and yet are 
selective in accordance with natural talents. W. H. Hudson 
seems to us a naturalist born, and yet the early years spent in 
the plains of Argentina must have had much to do with the 


KINDS, CONDITIONS, AND CRITERIA OF VALUE 461 


development of these interests. Edison, again, strikes us as a 
predestined inventor, and yet, surely, the United States fur- 
nished an encouraging environment. Who, again, can read 
the life of Shelley without feeling that he was a poet by a 
biological predestination ? 

We must distinguish between the existential field of the 
organism and this external complex as it is perceived, inter- 
preted, reacted to selectively by a person. In this fashion is 
the existential situation transformed into an experienced 
situation. Only as so transformed or taken up are objects 
valued. And we should remember that the social environment 
is basic for the human individual. He always is a member of 
society with a given culture and institutions. <A striking 
instance of this fact is the value assigned to a flag as a 
symbol of a nation’s life. In itself, it is a bit of colored 
cloth. As a flag it means a vast historical unity of effort and 
expended energy. It arouses sentiments and memories. The 
individual life moves in the sea of social life. Important as 
the cosmic setting is, it but furnishes the margin or penumbra 
for the usual activities and enjoyments of the individual. 
Our field of participation is mainly social. Or, to put it more 
accurately, society adjusts itself to the earth and its resources 
and rears upon it, and in relation to it, activities of produc- 
tion, and distribution which again make possible the most 
varied interests and endeavors. Division of labor, the growth 
of culture and self-expression, experimentation, all play their 
part in the rise of systems of values. 

For analytic purposes we may divide the conditions of our 
human valuation into human nature, culture, and the physical 
environment. And we must see these factors in interaction 
and mutual determination. Were human nature different, our 
values would not be the same. Were we not gregarious ani- 
mals with social instincts and tendencies, were we insensitive 
to form and order, how different would our values be! Again, 
were we incapable of noting the consequences of actions and 
seeing the bearing of social cooperation upon our happiness, 


462 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


how different our values would be! And a culture is a slow 
growth in which human beings have responded to situations 
in specific and cumulative ways, forming customs, institutions, 
arts, languages, and accepted virtues. And to the scientific 
eye, neither human nature nor culture is thinkable apart from 
the vast setting which nature gives. Culture is not deducible 
from land and sea, yet it is correlative to it. Its texture knits 
up with the world. 

Our general conclusion is, that values arise in life through 
the linkage of selves with things and other selves. Such link- 
age takes time and is again variable because both self and 
situation alter. The more complex the value, the more the 
ramifications on which it depends and which it expresses. 
Only very simple, or primitive, values are close expressions 
of what we may call human nature. In the majority of cases, 
values are bound up with standards which are of slow growth 
and which are themselves valuations of a usually social kind. 
Trained taste, knowledge of relations and effects, developed 
sentiments play their part in sustaining values. And, ulti- 
mately, a lwing value is the expression of personality in con- 
tact with things. There is nothing in the external world to 
which it can be regarded as corresponding in any literal fash- 
ion. 

Valuations and Value-Judgments.—The human mind has 
been rather puzzled by the question of the status and claims 
of valuations and value-judgments. It was long supposed that, 
somewhere in existence, there are standard values by refer- 
ence to which our own could be corrected and evaluated as it 
were. Again, the analogy with truth and cognition was sup- 
posed to be close. We must ask ourselves the question, In 
what sense, if any, are value-judgments true? And we 
may add to this the query, By what right do we claim 
to correct our valuations? And what does such correction 
presuppose? 

First of all, what is a value-judgment? There has been 
much difference of opinion in regard to this point. Let me 


KINDS, CONDITIONS, AND CRITERIA OF VALUE 463 


quote from a passage by Professor Perry concerning a value- 
judgment. ‘‘An act of liking is often spoken of as the ‘judg- 
ment of value’... and it is commonly believed that we have 
to do here with a unique sort of judgment. But this belief 
is due to a lack of analysis. It is unique only in that it is 
complex. If I consciously like the Mona Lisa on the conscious 
supposition that it is the work of Leonardo, I may be said to 
judge twice. First, I judge that I like the picture. There is 
nothing peculiar about this judgment. It is like the judgment 
that I see stars . . . I can see good reasons for regarding that 
as a judgment of value, but none for regarding it as unique. 
Second, I judge that Leonardo painted the picture. There is 
nothing peculiar about this judgment . . . In addition to these 
two judgments my complex state of mind contains my liking 
of the picture.’’? 

Now I have argued that the value-quality which suffuses an 
object is a meaning in which the object is interpreted. Thus 
when I say that an object is beautiful, I am thinking of the 
picture as I experience it. It comes up to my expectations, it 
has nicety of design, harmony of coloring, expression. It is 
undeniable that I can shift back to my attitude and say that 
I like the picture. Nevertheless, I do think that my ordinary 
_ experience is one of immersion in the picture as an appearance, 
a pleased noting of its artistic features. An esthetic judg- 
ment of value seems, then, to me to be a translation and ren- 
dering explicit this living valuation of the object. And we 
do have the predicate, beautiful, to express this value-meaning 
which arises in us. And we should note that our experience 
is guided and illuminated by perceptual discriminations. We 
are living with the object and take it up into our experience. 
It is, I think, the unwillingness to realize the difference be- 
tween pure cognition and other more participative treatments 
of objects that causes the difficulty. Yet it is true that a value- 
judgment but expresses what we experience. It is of the 
nature of an intuition, like saying that I see this leaf as red. 

1Perry, Journal of Philosophy, vol. XI, p. 161. 


464 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


A judgment of value does not create; it translates. A picture 
is beautiful to you or it is not. 

But can we not correct our judgments of value? Only by 
changing our experience. Another person may point out 


certain things that we had not noticed. We may have a larger 


range of pictures to examine and compare. And so gradually 


our taste may be improved. After some time, then, we may — 
have so increased in discrimination and esthetic taste as to 
wonder at our former liking for the picture we first enjoyed. — 


The court of appeal will be the same, our response to the 


picture, but, in the meantime, we have changed and so our — 


response has altered. 


But does not this admission leave us in subjectivism? Shall — 
we not say that each one has his own taste? Nay, even that 
the taste of one year may not be precisely the same as that 


of another year? 
Are There Absolute Eternal Standards?—It is, I think, 


clear that for the position we have been developing there can 


be no absolute, eternal standards. And yet there is no reason 


to hold that valuations are not conditioned by human nature ~ 


and the actual situation in which it finds itself. It seems quite 
possible to avoid the dilemma of either eternal and external 
standards or mere whim and ecaprice. Let us roughly indicate 
our own view and then state and criticize a transcendentalist 
position. 


Personality and human nature play a justified role in value- 
experiences and value-judgments. Fortunately, these factors, | 
while they do have a range of variation, have much the same ~ 


basic pattern for all individuals. Do we not all sense a cumu- 
lative growth which convinces us that our later value-ex- 


periences are on the whole better grounded than our earlier 
ones? Again, experts usually reach broad general agreements. 
And should we desire stereotyped agreements? Is not a cer- 


tain spread of values quite desirable? 
Since value-judgments are not cognitional judgments, it 
seems scarcely right to use the term truth in their connection 





KINDS, CONDITIONS, AND CRITERIA OF VALUE 465 


without a recognition of this difference. We may speak of 
them as sincere, well-grounded, properly transcriptive of the 
personal value-experience. They are of the nature of in- 
tuitions in short, though of intuitions mediated by much 
besides knowledge. Yet, as expressive of the value-experience, 
they make a certain claim for the adequacy of this experience 
and all that it assumes. You say that this picture is more 
beautiful than that. This means that you claim that you are 
discriminating and have good taste in these matters. That 
may not be the ease. And one who has had good training and 
an educated taste has a perfect right to challenge your claim. 
There is such a thing as growth in these matters, a clarifica- 
tion of esthetic Judgment, a removal of alien factors like 
sentiment and mere association. Beyond this, I do not think 
that we have the right to go. Men of good taste differ in their 
valuations; and yet there will usually be certain basic agree- 
ments. 

Let us now examine a modern representative of the position 
that there are standard, eternal and necessary values somehow 
apart from human experience. We shall take Windelband’s 
argument as typical of this outlook. In contrast to it we shall 
put our own experimental, humanistic view. 

After examining what he calls the psychogenetic origin «of 
values, Windelband decides that such origin is irrelevant to 
the question of the vindication or rationality of values. In 
support of this decision, he appeals to the facts of disagree- 
ment or conflict between individuals. Values are relative to 
the individual. They are expressions of his nature and history. 
‘“We learn that what is good for one is injurious to others; 
and we later, as we get on in life, realize that even what we 
regard as good or evil, beautiful or ugly, is not judged by 
others in the same way. At first we are reconciled with this 
great diversity in ideas of value because in the circles to which 
we look there is, in spite of these individual variations, a cer- 
tain amount of a generally recognized standard of values, 
which we usually call morals . . . It is the voice of the general 


466 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


consciousness in the individual, and from it we derive the 
law of the subjection of the individual to it . . . The primary 
processes of the individual, cravings, feelings and volitions, 
each of which contains its own appreciation of an object, are 
themselves subject to a higher and more deliberate type of 
appreciation which approves one valuation as sound and con- 
demns another as unsound.’’ For the first level we have ac- 
cording to Windelband only psychological necessity. It is 


simply a fact that certain objects appeal to me as desirable or © 


pleasant or useful or beautiful. But he is convinced that these 
primary valuations are called in question by the general con- 
sciousness and its claim to set up a universal standard of 
value. 

Let me interpolate a query at this point. Does not the re- 
flective, individual mind—it may be with the assistance of 
other minds—criticize for concrete, experiential reasons its 
immediate valuations? It may have learned to discriminate 
better ; it may have become more sensitive; it may have gained 
new facts. Revaluation seems to me a constant feature within 
the individual’s consciousness, 

Assuming the authority of a general mind over the individ- 
wal mind, our writer goes on to point out that there are differ- 
ert general minds. ‘‘Hthical and aesthetic judgments display, 
to the mind of any unprejudiced observer, an extremely great 
diversity when one surveys the various peoples of the earth 
in suecession. Here, again, however, we try to set up a final 
standard of values; we speak of higher and lower stages of 
morality or of taste in different peoples and different ages. 
Where do we get the standard for this judgment? And where 
is the mind for which these ultimate criteria are the values? 
If it is quite inevitable to rise above the relativity in individ- 
ual appreciations and the morals of various peoples to some 
standard of absolute values, it seems necessary to pass beyond 
the historical manifestations of the entire human mind to some 
normal consciousness for which these values are values.’’? 

1 Windelband, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 214-6. 








KINDS, CONDITIONS, AND CRITERIA OF VALUE 467 


And now Windelband’s idealistic epistemology is brought 
in. He had argued earlier that truth implied a normal con- 
sciousness, something beyond the individual consciousness and 
its modes of testing. ‘‘In the same way,’’ he now writes, ‘‘our 
conviction that for human valuation there are absolute norms, 
beyond the empirical oceasions of their appearance, is based 
upon the assumption that here also we have the sovereignty 
of a transcendent, rational order. As long as we would con- 
ceive these orders as contents of an actual higher mind, on 
the analogy of the relation we experience of consciousness to 
its objects and values, they have to be considered contents of 
an absolute reason—that is to say, God.’’ Is there not here 
the tradition of authority? 

This argument is very interesting because it has much in 
common with Platonism and Anglo-American idealism, with 
what we earlier called transcendentalism. Let us see now 
whether much cannot be said for a purely humanistic view of 
values, 

Have we any empirical reason for setting a general mind 
over against the individual mind? In the chapter in which 
we examined this question in some detail we saw reason to 
deny a general, or social, mind. We must recognize—as Win- 
delband does not seem sufficiently to do—that the apprecia- 
tions of individuals are seldom blind and impulsive, but are 
rather the resultants of the application of relevant data. Very 
often, gifted individuals value things and acts differently from 
the way in which they were valued before, and others learn 
to note the new insight employed. 

The reflective individual thinks and feels things out for 
himself. It is as we know more about causes and effects, and 
as we become more sensitive to others and to our own needs 
that moral valuations become more adequate. Individuals in 
society assist each other in thinking and feeling things through. 
And, of course, cultural developments make cultivated and re- 
flective individuals possible. But I see no reason to assume 
transcendent, absolute values. Rather do we have the growth 


468 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


of a more adequate basis for a value-interpretation in the 
emergence of well-informed and sensitive persons. 

The analogy with cognition should cease. Values are ex- 
pressions of conditions and capacities in the individual and in 
the group rather than copies of realities external to the indi- 
vidual. As expressions, they function in the life of the indi- 
vidual, or of the group. There is accommodation, adjustment, | 
cooperation, clarification. Thus political methods are modified 
with more experience of their working and with a more 
critical sense of what can be achieved. In the same way, moral 
ideals are altered as individuals gain more freedom and as 
groups have greater flexibility. There is interplay, interde- 
pendence, cooperation, experiment, with, at the root of it all, 
those experiences which we eall satisfaction and dissatisfaction. 
In short, valuations can be made more adequate to the possi- 
bilities underlying life by knowledge of consequences, by 
experiment, and by a deepening of personality. It is all an 
immanent process in which human life must be taken in its 
physical and cultural setting. And, in spite of the changes in 
valuation which occur, there is an essential continuity and 
basic permanence. Bodily joys and the joys of association 
indicate what I mean. And artistic values will rest forever 
upon those capacities to sense appreciatively form and signifi- 
eance upon which the esthetician lays so much stress. Let us 
not forget that we still enjoy Homer and Theocritus and that 
the stories in the Bible retain their perennial appeal. 

It is well, I take it, to relinquish the belief in fixed, external 
norms to which we must bend our lives. To conceive values 
as critical expressions of our nature and situation at a certain 
cultural level is to give them naturalness and relevance. It is 
to make them tentative and responsible, something to be 
examined and, if possible, to be improved. 

Nor do I think it desirable that there should be a monotonous 
uniformity in the field of values. Individuals do differ both 
temperamentally and culturally. Complete uniformity would 
require regimented lives. I do not deny that human experience 


KINDS, CONDITIONS, AND CRITERIA OF VALUE 469 


shows the need of broad social control and the knowledge 
of certain essential consequences which it were foolish to 
ignore. But in all that les beyond this minimum, voluntary 
cooperation and individual choice should be permitted. In- 
telliigence and sincerity are the essential factors. I see no 
reason to suppose that the range of variation will be greater 
than it is to-day. And it may well be that a more settled 
society will bring in its wake more agreement. 

To conclude, unlike pure cognition, valuation does not have 
a merely external object and goal to which to correspond. It 
is an essential part of the process of weaving the web of life. 
It is expression and adjustment. Hence, value-experiences and 
value-judgments should be spoken of less as true than as more 
or less adequate and sincere expressions and formulations of 
the possibilities of human life and human living, 


REFERENCES 


BosaNnquEtT, Three Lectures on Aesthetics. 

BUERMEYER, The Aesthetic Experience. 

Cootey, The Social Process. 

ParkKER, The Principles of Aesthetics. 

Everett, Moral Values. 

Bouvet, The Evolution of Values. 

LANGFELD, The Aesthetic Attitude. 

PicarD, Values Immediate and Contributory. 

Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, chap. 14. 

PRALL, ‘‘The Present Status of the Theory of Value,’’ Cal. Pub. 
PEPPER, ‘‘The Equivocation of Values,’’ Cal. Pub. 
Santayana, Winds of Doctrine, p. 138 f. 

ScHILLER, ‘‘ Essay on Value,’’ Ency. of Religion and Ethics, 
WINDELBAND, Introduction to Philosophy. 


CHAPTER XXX 
FIRST AND LAST THINGS 


Queries and Suggestions.—It has been the purpose of the 
writer of this book to bring out the principles and problems, 
the structure and technique, of philosophy. Too often, it has 
seemed to him, has philosophy been permitted to appear a 
vague, inchoate, and even sentimental thing, a sort of rhapsody 
in prose form fitly symbolized by the picture of an old man 
with a long, white beard and high, wrinkled forehead. In- 
stead, it has appeared desirable to put stress upon both analy- 
sis and comprehensiveness. Philosophy is persistent search 
for the truth of things, a search whose results have been 
cumulative even though wrong paths were sometimes taken. 
And we have noted that philosophical search has gone hand 
in hand with the special sciences, though always the aim of 
the philosopher has been to take a synthetic, or synoptic, 
view. 

And now in this concluding chapter it would seem logical 
to gather our results together and to indicate how they bear 
upon first and last things. We shall do this in no spirit of 
dogmatism, for the philosopher is not a dogmatist. We shall 
merely indicate what seem to us implications and valuable 
suggestions. And, at the same time, we shall point out the 
positions taken by representatives of other philosophical 
schools. , 

The queries which inevitably arise at this stage in reflection 
are very similar to those dealt with in religion. We must re- 
member, however, that philosophy is laic and secular in these 
matters and argues only from the broad drift of experience 

470 


FIRST AND LAST THINGS 471 


and reason. We shall have in mind, then, questions concern- 
ing man’s life, his degree of freedom and responsibility, his 
fate, his possible immortality, and questions concerning the 
place of values in the universe, the degree and kind of unity 
the world has, its friendliness or alienness to man. 

The Status of the Belief in Immortality—An immense 
labor has been expended on the subject of immortality, but it 
is to be feared that most of the books and articles are mere 
repetitions of what has been said before on the subject. There 
is, of course, the type of enquiry called ‘‘ psychical research.’’ 
But the methods employed have, from the standpoint of criti- 
eal enquiry, been rather loose and the results scarcely con- 
vineing. Still we should keep an open mind in these matters 
and note what, if anything, has been accomplished. The en- 
thusiastic amateur is often irritated by the attitude of psy- 
chologists and philosophers, which they identify with dogmatic 
skepticism. I do not think that it is that. Is it not hard to 
eheck up on results attained outside the laboratory with its 
controls? And do amateurs have the equipment in scientific 
technique and knowledge of both normal and abnormal psy- 
chology? There is no need to challenge the integrity of all 
the mediums and their impresarios. The facts of multiple 
personality show us that there can be unconscious deception 
so far as the normal personality is concerned. And cannot 
all the well-established facts be explained in quite ordinary 
ways? But we have not the space to go very deeply into this 
field. 

An investigation carried on by Leuba, professor of psychol- 
ogy at Bryn Mawr, with regard to the prevalence of actual 
belief in immortality had interesting results. I quote from 
him: ‘‘ We are no longer in the dark concerning the preva- 
lence of the two main traditional religious beliefs among the 
intellectual leaders. A careful statistical investigation carried 
out in the United States, according to accepted statistical 
methods, has yielded the following percentages of believers: 


472 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


Believers in the God of Physical , . a 
the Christian Churches Scientists Biologists | Psychologists 
Lesser Men 49.7 39.1 32.1 
Greater Men 34.8 16.9 13.2 

Believers in Immortality 
‘Lesser Men S¥eh 45.1 26.9 
Greater Men 40.0 25.4 8.8 


These figures show that the belief in the God under dis- 
cussion (a personal deity) is still widely prevalent among in- 
tellectual leaders in the United States. Especially significant, 
however, is the discovery that unbelief is very much more 
frequent among the more than among the less distinguished, 
and that not only the degree of ability but also the kind of 
knowledge possessed is significantly related to the rejection of 
these beliefs.’’ ? 

It is undeniable that the spiritualistic tradition in philos- 
ophy and dualism are more favorable to the belief in survival 
than is physical realism and naturalism. It is easier for such 
positions to dispose of the organism. Thus a strict dualism 
permits the belief that the personality side is independent 
and can continue to exist for some time at least after death. 
In our own day, this outlook discloses itself in the philosophy 
of Bergson and partly accounts for its popular vogue. For 
him, mind is cumulative memory and is distinct from the brain, 
which is merely a complex of motor paths. 

It is evident from all this that the position one takes in re- 
gard to immortality expresses one’s total philosophy and one’s 
sense of the probabilities of the case. I have discussed my own 
attitude elsewhere and need, I think, here give only the refer- 
ence.” In these matters one grows into a position and the 
values associated with it. 

We were, it will be remembered, inclined to think of mind 
and consciousness as operations of, and events in, the living 


*Leuba, The Psychology of Religious Mysticism, p. 324. I have 
omitted part of the statistics for lack of room. 
4Sellars, The Next Step in Religion, chap. XI, 





FIRST AND LAST THINGS 473 


organism. These were emergent characteristics and yet en- 
tirely natural. If so, is it probable that they survive the life 
of the organism? It should, however, be noted that certain 
thinkers who have adopted this general outlook still hold 
that the higher levels secure a certain self-sufficiency and 
existential independence. Clearly, we have here something to 
think over. Is the mind independent of the brain? Does the 
mind emerge from the brain? Or is the mind the cumulative, 
functional organization of the brain? 

Many people love life very intensely and do not like to think 
of utter annihilation. I remember reading a great Spanish 
writer, Unamuno, who asserted that he would rather be a 
damned soul in hell than cease to exist. There can be little 
doubt that individuals and historical periods have taken dif- 
ferent attitudes toward a future life. Many races have 
scarcely had the idea. And epochs which are interesting in a 
human way are characterized by less dwelling on death. 

Life may well have its element of tragedy. The range of 
man’s thought and the depth of his self-consciousness make 
possible a kind of personality which we value highly and 
which we dislike to see perish. And yet the facts make it 
doubtful that man has outgrown the mortality of other earthly 
things. Even old age seems to be a sort of death. It has its 
joys and its leisures, but it does not have. the vigor and the 
urgent freshness of youth. 

Perhaps, if from the first we thought of ourselves as purely 
mortal, the thought of immortality would trouble us less. We 
would accept life as it is and seek to make the most of it in its 
various seasons. 

It is, I think, rather unfortunate that the Christian tradi- 
tion has sought to sanction morality in terms of future punish- 
ment and reward. This perspective led many to believe that 
morality does not have its natural sanctions, both social and 
individual. In the chapters on ethics, we tried to show that 
the good life is the intelligent life of an individual who has 
values and sympathies and is a member of a social group, 


474 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


The more this natural basis of morality is understood, the less 
the current weakening of the belief in immortality will affect 
actual human conduct. 

In these matters, differences of opinion are stimulating. Let 
me quote from the writings of a contemporary psychologist 
who defends dualistic animism. ‘‘A proof that our life does 
not end with death, even though we knew nothing of the nature 
of the life beyond the grave, would justify the belief that we 
have our share in a larger scheme of things than the universe 
described by physical science; and this conviction must add 
dignity, seriousness, and significance to our lives, and must 
thus throw a great weight into the scale against the dangers 
that threaten every advanced civilization.’’ 4 

Against this expression of opinion I would raise the question 
whether, in the past, a belief in immortality hag not called 
attention away from the possibilities in this life. Injustice 
and discomfort were belittled because only temporary. And 
the great ancient civilizations flourished at a time when 
personal survival, if admitted, was regarded as the survival 
of a shade and of little consequence. But I certainly have no 
objection to immortality if the facts permit us to believe in it. 
I do think, however, that human life can be lived gloriously 
without it. 


It would appear that the choice confronting the human mind 


to-day as knowledge of itself and the universe increases is that 
between an idealistic and a naturalistic interpretation. In the 
past, naturalism was regarded as a desperate and dishearten- 
ing alternative. But, of recent years, naturalism has shown 
itself to possess possibilities which were unsuspected. This 
alteration is due to two things at least: the growth of the 
social sciences including social psychology, and the rise of a 
naturalistic theory of values. To think of nature in terms of 
the inorganic sciences only is to sweep its evolutionary apex 
from nature. And we have tried to show that human values 
are intrinsic to human living, and that human living is bound 
* McDougall, Body and Mind, Introduction, p. XIV. 





FIRST AND LAST THINGS 475 


up with the kind of a world we are in. In short, naturalism 
and humanism are seen to be no longer antithetical. Let us 
linger for a while upon this point. 

The Old versus the New Naturalism.—The older natural- 
ism, which may well be called reductive materialism, linked 
its fortunes with extreme mechanicalism and sought to reduce 
man to a turmoil of blindly whirling atoms. It was a natural- 
ism which linked itself with epiphenomenalism and saw no 
place or function for human intelligence. That such a re- 
ductive naturalism has been overcome is cause for congratula- 
tion. If it turns out that the idealist must himself qualify his 
own extreme principles, he may rightly claim that his ancient 
enemy has also suffered a partial defeat. I do think that a 
naturalism which acknowledges man’s unique place in nature 
and the possibilities on the value-side of human life ean be 
regarded as a not unsatisfactory outcome of philosophic re- 
flection and scientific advance. 

When, then, an ethical, or a religious, writer speaks of 
spiritual forces in the world he can be interpreted by the 
humanistie naturalist as referring to human sympathy, intelli- 
gent purposes and ideals as effective in human relations. De- 
mocracy at its best, internationalism, humanitarianism, the 
love of beauty and of knowledge, these are spiritual forces 
which reside in the human beings of to-day. May their influ- 
ence ever be greater! 

The basic thesis of all naturalism is that man is a part of 
nature as an orderly and self-contained spatio-temporal sys- 
tem. But we now see that the great mistake of early natural- 
ism was to think reality in terms of the inorganic sciences and 
not to realize the tremendous importance of new levels of 
activity and capacity. This false perspective led to the result 
that the internal variety and differentiation of things was 
ignored. Moreover, the whole question of values was disre- 
garded. The tremendous importance of the qualitative was 
forgotten. The inevitable result was that size was insidiously 
suggested as the measure of value. Because stupendous spaces 


476 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


stretched around man and his little planet, it was implied that 
man’s life had little meaning. It will be remembered how 
Balfour makes this implication. 

But we are now critical enough to see that this term, meaning, 
requires analysis; and our study of value should help us here. 

Can we not contrast intrinsic meaning in the sense of satis- 
factory objectives with meaning in the sense of a plan? May 
not our lives have meaning for us in the first sense even 
though they do not have meaning in the second sense? It is 
becoming rather hard to believe that there was a definite, 
well-thought-out plan back of human history. It all seems so 
much a process of trial-and-error. But if I enjoy activities 
and approach the warm realization of my desires, my life does 
contain intrinsic meaning. Objectives and goals give signifi- | 
cance to individual lives. The value of the goal casts back 
value upon the person who has been furthering it. Even the 
humble worker in a cause feels his life absorb the meaning of 
the cause itself. One of the greatest, and yet popularly least 
appreciated, of English poets, Arnold, has well expressed this 
idea of the intrinsic meaning of life: 

‘*Ts it so small a thing 

To have enjoy ’d the sun, 
To have lived light in the spring, 


To have loved, to have thought, to have done; 
To have advanced true friends, and beat down baffling foes—’’ 


In our treatment of ethics we tried to show that human good 
is the aim of an intelligent morality. 

Why Man’s Realization of his Cosmic Position Has Been 
a Shock.—It is not difficult to understand why man’s grad- — 
ual realization of his cosmic position has been a shock. First 
came the Copernican revolution and then last century came 
the Darwinian revolution, one which is obviously still with us. 
What do these mean? Can man square old, authoritative 
beliefs with them? 

Philosophy is, as we have said, a laic movement and makes 
no appeal to revelation. It is a movement of the human — 





FIRST AND LAST THINGS AT7 


reason, old by twenty-five centuries, and stands proudly beside 
the oldest Christian ecclesiastical organizations as older than 
they. Its task from the beginning has been to replace 
mythology by something more rational in texture. The 
present situation is one which it has confronted before. Let 
us examine the factors which demand analysis. 

The facts seem to be of the following sort. Man awoke to 
himself and the world much as a child does but without the 
assistance which the child gets from parents and school. It 
was inevitable that dramatic myths about the causes of things 
should arise. Many of these are fascinating. Anthropologists 
and students of comparative religion have been tracing the 
origin and development of all sorts of pre-scientific beliefs. 

It is no part of the task of the philosopher to go into concrete 
detail in regard to the development of human cultures. He 
must presuppose that the educated man has to-day some sense 
of the stages and the factors of this evolution. 

The gist of the matter is, that early man socialized and 
anthropomorphized his world. The natural centre of man’s 
interest was his own welfare. The group came to believe that 
it was surrounded by, and immersed in, powers of all sorts 
upon which its welfare depended. Dreams, trance phenomena, 
inability to think of complete extinction, memory, a sense of 
the group-life, striking natural phenomena, all these worked 
together to produce a belief in invisible agencies of super- 
human power which, if placated, would cooperate with the 
group and even with the individual. And it was in terms of 
the powers of such superhuman agencies that man began to 
explain the world. The gods were the chiefs and kings of the 
earth. And the belief in magic, in vague and terrific powers 
which must be accepted and could not be understood in any 
other sense, made this outlook natural. 

The belief that the world is governed by powers of a social 
nature is basic to the supernatural view of the world. It is 
not at all difficult for us to explain the origin of this belief 
nor its power over the human mind. If human kings had 


478 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


reverence and sanctity in the eyes of their subjects, how much 
more would not these dread powers? And to think of them 
as kindly disposed to those who approached them in the right 
manner would bring delight and gratitude. Undoubtedly 
these powers had their plans and dispensations, their laws and 
their favorites. 

It is a well-established fact of comparative religion that 
man’s conception of the status and nature of his gods de- 
veloped step by step with his own social and intellectual 
growth. There is an evolution of spirits to deities and of 
deities to a pantheon having a political and moral grouping. 
What more natural than that the arrangements in the spiritual 
world should reflect both accidental associations and the 
various political and social relations developed in the nation! 
Zeus, the king of the Greek gods, has his consort and his 
courtiers. Yahweh, the national god of the Hebrews, is a king 
who reigns in the sky. He is the Lord of Hosts. 

Out of this interpretation of things with its belief in disem- 
bodied spirits and its faith in gods came the emphasis upon 
prayer and worship. Lifted to a higher level, it produced, 
logically enough, the notion of a plan or providence having 
a world sweep. Social relations were thus extended to take in 
the unseen, but powerful, agencies which dominated the world 
and held man’s fate in their grasp. The ablest of the human 
minds of that day worked on these suggestions and implica- 
tions and, with passionate faith, saw in the heavens the decrees 
which determined the course of events here below. The wide 
range and variety of all this, the infinite forms and gradations 
which these ideas took, can be appreciated only by the student 
of comparative religions. And yet there are common notes 
and recurrent motives. Man’s needs and hopes were enough 
alike the world over to weave a similar pattern. 

We who belong to the Hebrew-Greek tradition in these mat- 
ters are well aware that our monotheism has reflected the 
political organization of its cultural development. To use 
Well’s expression, God is the Heavenly King. Yahweh had 


FIRST AND LAST THINGS 479 


dominion and yet, thanks to the historical development of 
Israel and to the moral genius of the greater prophets, his 
dominion was thought of as moral. With Hosea came in the 
kindlier human note, which was to lead by degrees into the 
Christian proclamation that God pitieth man as a father 
pitieth his children. 

This is a striking conception of the universe, and it appeals 
to all of us. There is the child in each of us, and the world 
appears at times so hostile and unfriendly. Is this imper- 
sonality of the universe an illusion? Is it governed in the 
lght of values? 

Is the Universe Friendly?—Let us remember that the phil- 
osopher is trying to understand his world in the light of all 
the knowledge and possibilities relevant to it. Is there good 
reason to believe that the universe has a unity akin to mind 
-and purpose? Or is it a vast and loose system of the kind 
that astronomy describes? It is obvious that the question is 
a very serious and important one. 

Historically, the roots of the idea of a superhuman power 
20 deep down into the subsoil of early human attitudes and 
assumptions. Religion had its humble origin in fear, need, 
love, wonder, imagination. There was the sacred, the mysteri- 
ous. Bit by bit, the gods arose as worshipped powers. Social 
eroup and individual adjusted their lives to these powers. 
Ritual and reflection interacted, and the centuries saw tribal 
religions become national and even ethnic. Like language and 
literature, religion is one of the great social developments. 
Few, if any, subjects are more interesting than the history of 
the various religions which have appeared in the world, in 
India, Arabia, Palestine, Greece. 

The assumption back of our Western religions is in sub- 
stance that the universe has a unity analogous to that of per- 
sonality and that this unifying Centre and Soul of the uni- 
verse is mindful of us who are His children. Clearly, this is a 
magnificent hypothesis. What evidence is there for it? 

Skepticism in these matters reared its head with the in- 


480 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


crease of knowledge and of reflection upon it. It must be 
admitted, however, that doubt was directed chiefly against the 
magical and the miraculous. Slowly the abler human minds 
began to conceive of the universe as one of order and law. 
In this fashion, the problem shifted. Once the divine meant 
the supernatural, the unusual, the desired and visible answer 
to petition, the abundant harvest or the victory in war. Now 
for more critical minds it meant a divine plan, something 
at the heart of the world making for righteousness. 

Let us remember that the traditional religions have their 
revelations as sources of their faith that this idea is not a 
mere hypothesis. Philosophy has the secular and laic prob- 
lem of reflecting on this religious view of the world in the 
light of the structure and nature of the world as revealed in 
the sciences. For it, the existence of a God must be looked 
upon as an hypothesis which deserves the utmost consideration. 

To meet rising doubt philosophy and theology developed 
certain arguments which were designed to demonstrate the 
existence of a deity. These arguments were finally attacked 
by such men as Kant and Hume and are no longer regarded 
as cogent. It is worth our while to state them and to point 
out what objections to them have generally been accepted. 
We shall then show that the only vital question is this, What 
kind of a universe are we in? Is some Power working in it? 

The first traditional argument appealed to in these matters 
was the cosmological argument. It argues from the need of 
a first cause of the physical universe and of human beings 
to a God as the only possible First Cause. The second argu- 
ment was the teleological proof. It argues from design and 
order in the world to a superhuman designer. The third 
appeal is to the ontological argument. It will be remembered 
that Descartes rested his system upon this proof. It is the 
deduction of God’s existence from the idea of God as a 
perfect being. 

The first two arguments must be brought into relation with 
cosmology. Thus the cosmological proof assumes that the 


FIRST AND LAST THINGS 481 


universe is contingent, that is, that it is not self-sufficient 
existentially and must have a ground or cause. It is evident 
that this argument rests upon the belief that the world had to 
be created. But, in our examination of the category of time, 
we Saw reason to discard this tradition. There is no obvious 
reason why we should hold that the universe did not always 
exist. Time, we said, is in the world as an order of events, 
and not the world in time. So far as we can see there is 
nothing contingent about energy. It seems to exist in its 
own right. Our task is to understand the structure of this 
spatio-temporal system of which we are a part rather than 
to think mythologically about a hypothetical origin. And 
we know too much about the history of Hebrew cosmogony to 
take it as other than Semitic mythology. 

The argument from design had more logical force in the 
days before Newton, La Place and Darwin. These and those 
who have come after them have succeeded in showing that 
a certain measure of order and organization is intrinsic to 
nature. Why should it not be? But we must not exaggerate 
the amount of order in the world. There is devolution as 
well as evolution. The essential point is that we now think 
of order in nature as a growth and an adjustment rather 
than as something made on purpose as a@ machine is made 
by an artisan. The older tradition seems to us very anthro- 
pomorphie. 

There remains the ontological argument. This has been, 
when all is said, the favorite argument of apologetics. It 
cannot be understood apart from Platonic realism which 
thinks of ideas ag eternal realities above the world of appear- 
ance and illusion. In essentials the argument is this: The 
idea of God is the idea of a perfect being. But a non-existent 
being cannot be perfect to the degree that an existent being 
is since it lacks the attribute of being. Hence our idea of 
God implies his existence. 

In this argument we are supposed to pass from idea to 
existence. But, as both Hume and Kant pointed out, we 


482 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


cannot regard existence as a predicate of the same type as 
perfection. When there is question of the existence or non- 
existence of an object of thought, we must seek some proof 
which connects it with the system of objects to which we 
ordinarily grant existence. To say that a thing exists is 
either to place it within the spatio-temporal complex of objects 
to which we are constantly responding or else to connect it 
with them in some fairly comprehensible and known 
fashion. 

Philosophy of religion has fairly well adjusted itself to 
the unsatisfactoriness of these traditional arguments. C. C. 
J. Webb, an English writer on philosophy of religion, asserts 
that the question is not so much whether God exists as what 
God is. This seems to me an excellent way of putting the 
problem. The essential human problem is this, What kind of a 
world are we in? Is it a friendly wniverse? 

Here, again, let us frankly point out that different philo- 
sophical positions have different implications. It is quite 
obvious that the idealist who looks upon the physical world 
aS phenomenal finds it easier to give an affirmative answer to 
this question than does the physical realist. But we must not 
forget that he does not, and cannot, change the essential facts 
of human life by this distinction. 

It is obvious that we have no right to be dogmatic in this 
tremendously important and difficult subject. There seem 
to be three main currents of thought in these matters which 
we may call the theistic, the absolutistic, and the naturalistic. 
For the theistic view, God is the creator of the world and 
somehow includes it in his power and activity; for the abso- 
lutistic form of idealism, the universe is itself a unified sys- 
tem dominated by mind and values; for the naturalistic, the 
universe is a tremendous spatio-temporal system of which we 
human beings are a localized and evolved part with our de- 
Sires, activities, and adjustments. 

In this connection, it may be well to quote from a recent, 
realistic writer who has a position very similar in certain 


FIRST AND LAST THINGS 483 


respects to evolutionary naturalism and yet believes that the 
traditional idea of God can be in large measure retained. I 
do this all the more gladly that I want the student to realize 
that we are here dealing with ultimate questions with an open 
mind. 

“‘In the religious emotion,”’ writes S. Alexander, ‘‘we 
have the direct experience of something higher than ourselves 
which we call God, which is not presented through the ways 
of sense but through this emotion. The emotion is our going 
out or endeavor or striving towards this object. Speculation 
enables us to say wherein the divine quality consists, and that 
it is an empirical quality, the next in the series which the very 
nature of Time compels us to postulate, though we cannot 
tell what it is like. But besides assuring us of the place of 
the divine quality in the world, speculation has also to ask 
wherein this quality resides. What is the being which pos- 
sesses deity? Our answer is to be a philosophical one; we are 
not concerned with the various forms which the conception 
of God has assumed in earlier or Jater religions. . . . God is 
the whole world as possessing the quality of deity. Of such 
a being the whole world is the ‘body’ and deity is the ‘mind.’ 
... As an actual existent, God is the infinite world with its 
nisus towards deity, or, to adapt a phrase of Leibniz, as big 
or in travail with deity.’’ 1 

Let us frankly admit that this conception of deity is not 
that of popular theology with its demand for the satisfactions 
of emotional needs. But, then, the bigger theologians have 
always qualified this popular notion. They have realized 
that special providences have hardly consorted with an or- 
dered universe or with divine foreknowledge. 

But I cannot forego pointing out that even strict naturalism 
has a place for religion if we mean by religion the concern 
for values. Is not human life an adventure in the creation 
and furtherance of human values? Man is becoming more 
active in these matters and less acquiescent. Do we not have 

*S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, vol. 2, p. 352. 


484 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


an emotional sense of human life, of its joys and sorrows, 
its littlenesses and its greatnesses? 

May I in this connection quote from a work of mine in 
which I tried to show that religion can be weaned from the 
supernatural and stand for social and personal loyalty to the 
tested values of life? ‘‘The religion of the future will in- 
creasingly be concerned with two things, virtues and values. 
The Greek virtues have-been made tenderer by the Christian 
virtues and more steadfast by that training of the will and 
character which we associate with puritanism. The experi- 
ence of the ages has deepened and broadened man, made him 
less hasty in judgment, more aware of his limitations, more 
realistic, more efficient. At the same time, it has added that 
touch of pathos which spiritualizes the beauty of life. We 
believe, also, that it has nourished that sentiment of tender- 
ness for the homely fate of the average man that will some 
day find expression in a fuller democracy than has yet 
dawned upon the earth. But, above all, religion must be 
catholic in its count of values. Wherever there is loyal and 
intelligent endeavor, it will acknowledge the presence of the 
spiritual. It will reverence the philosopher who has found 
salvation in the solution of complex intellectual problems, the 
scientist who has given himself to the whole-hearted study 


of nature, the missionary who has devoted himself to the 


spread of an elevating conception of life, the kindly physician 
who has sought to alleviate human suffering, the social re- 
former who has spent his life in agitating for a saner social 


policy, the artist who has had a vision of beauty and has ~ 


labored to express it in such a way that all men could share 
it, the man and woman who have met the tasks of every day 
with courage and charity.’’? 

Fate and Freedom.—By its very nature, philosophy is 
rich in problems. And such problems are not irritating 
puzzles but rather inexhaustible topics for thought. They 


open up vistas for reflection. Even a study of what people — 


2Sellars, The Next Step in Religion, p. 222. 


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FIRST AND LAST THINGS 485 


have thought in the past is attractive. Fate, predestination, 
determinism, possibility, potentiality, freedom, what a history 
these terms have had! What I shall try to do in conclusion is 
to indicate the proper way of approach to these topics. 
Students should have symposia on subjects like these in order 
to develop mental range and power. 

Let us take the idea of fate as an example. 

Fatalism assumes that some decree or Will has control of 
events so that they arrive in a certain order and inevitably. 
It was this kind of fatalism which dominated Greek dramatic 
thought and still dominates Islam. What would be the atti- 
tude of the philosopher to such a theory? I think that his 
reply must be (1) that there is no evidence for such a theory, 
and (2) that he does not see how such a decree could become 
effective. Is there not here an analogy with a monarchical 
system in society? Predestination would seem to have a 
similar context. 

But is it in any sense correct to say that a man has a 
fate? Do not Hardy’s characters have little control over their 
life and so have a fate? The term fate stands for a very real 
aspect of human life. It means that the individual is buffeted 
about by circumstances and environment. He is a part of a 
very large whole. Thus we may speak of man’s general fate 
as his actual inherited nature and the kind of a universe in 
_which he is. It is man’s fate to be born, to need food and 
water, warmth, love, to live a few decades and then to die. 
In this sense, everything which exists has its fate. Its general 
lines are set for it. 

And then there is the specific fate of an individual, which 
means his career as determined by capacities and circum- 
stances, the way in which the world impinges upon him. 
What a variety this makes possible. Biography is interesting 
from this standpoint. 

But we soon note that this kind of fate does not exclude 
man’s activity. He reacts to his fate, to his surrounding 
environment. Fatalism would mean an attitude of passivity 


486 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


to fate, a denial of selective control, of significant choice. But 
is it not the case that the vigorous and intelligent individual 
is in a surprising measure master of his fate? There are 
obvious degrees here. And we must sense this interaction 
of fate and response, of circumstance and choices in the light 
of valuations. Thus does life move in its zigzag course. It 
is simply the case of organism and environment at a high 
level. And the organism is a complex of endeavors. In 
human life, these become values, objectives. 

And this brings me to the concept of freedom and its com- 
panion, responsibility. Both of these concepts are fascinat- 
ing. 

We must, first of all, free them from their theological set- 
ting. A soul was thought of as a naked reality having an 
innate power of decision, or faculty of will, and gifted with a 
knowledge of right and wrong. Because of these gifts, it was 
responsible. If it freely, that is, without compulsion from 
outside, chose what was wrong, it committed a sin and must 
expect to be punished by its creator. | 

To a modern all this sounds abstract and artificial. We 
want to know what the will is, what the nature of a moral 
decision is, whether there is any assured knowledge of right 
and wrong as commands of a sovereign master. Was not 
this whole view schematic and legalistic? There is no psy- 
chology or sociology in it. Was it not the simple transfer 
to a heavenly lord of the external relations between an earthly 
subject and his master, say, a feudal baron? But the student 
can trace out the inadequacies of such a view. 

Let us in this connection recall the modern theory of 
punishment and of responsibility. People are held respon- 
sible if we believe that they have the capacity to control their 
actions in the light of moral values. It follows that they can 
be given social freedom with the reasonable expectation that 
they will fit into society, And punishment, though complex 
in its motivation, is not a mere matter of revenge. It connects 
up with the desire to control and conserve. 


FIRST AND LAST THINGS 487 


The years of controversy which have raged around the 
question of free-will have clarified many matters. We now 
realize that the setting of the question has shifted. At first 
the problem was whether the will was free from the control 
of deity. The opposite position was predestination. But was 
not this the theological expression of the conflict between 
absolutism and relative pluralism, between centralization and 
decentralization? We soon realize that the context of the 
problem has profoundly shifted. The query now is the indi- 
vidual’s freedom from nature. ‘‘If,’’ he says, ‘‘I am a 
product of my heredity and my environment, how ean I be 
free or responsible for my actions’’? How often have I heard 
students propound this query (!) 

It seems to me clear that this question represents the awak- 
ening to the impossibility of the naked-soul conception of 
personality and selfhood. What are we? Concrete persons 
who are growths in nature at the social level. Each individual 
is a distinct growth from the roots of heredity and environ- 
ment. But we must be careful here and keep our sense of 
internal choice and valuations. Here we are on the inside of 
reality. Simply to say that the self is a product suggests 
that it is a sort of impersonal and mechanical resultant of 
certain forces and that consciousness is an epiphenomenon 
which contains a helpless spectator who feels himself carried 
on down the stream of events but is unable to interfere. Even 
to say that the self is a growth is apt to be misleading for 
the conscious self is again thought of as a spectator rather 
than as a participant in the growth. 

The point to realize is that an individual 7s his personality 
and that his will, desires and values are intrinsic to that 
personality. When we rebel against heredity, that means 
that we wish we had better capacities and, perhaps, better 
health. When we rebel against environment, that means that 
we wish that we had had better opportunities, And both 
wishes are at once natural and futile. We are up against 
what I called our specific fates. But, it will be remembered 


488 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


that I asserted that such a specific fate did not rob us of our 
capacity to select and create along the lines of possibility 
which our nature and circumstances indicated. It is I who 
choose to do this rather than that. I chose it, because I 
desire it and believe it desirable. Only external constraint 
can rob me of this active and courageous choice which gives 
zest to my life. My conscious self is not something which 
merely witnesses the play of physical and organic forces as 
in a dream. Instead, it is felt as a very centre and focus 
of choice. And I believe that this feeling is valid. I want 
something intensely and do my level best to get it. 

Is it surprising that people are puzzled by this problem 
when we remember that we have in our minds the traditions 
of theology, the traditions of dualism, and the traditions of 
epiphenomenalism? Man still thinks of nature as something 
alien and hostile and external. Rather should he think of 
himself as a highly integrated kind of thing which exists in 
nature and which intends to get tts good by wtelligent con- 
duct. We must start where unconscious forces carried us; 
we do have our fate as explained above; but we do have our 
degree of freedom, of self-expression. 

Let us conclude this brief discussion of the free-will con- 
troversy by returning to the protest which, as I said, the 
teacher of philosophy so often hears: If I am a product of my 
heredity and my environment, how can I be held free or 
responsible for my actions? 

We saw that the truth of the antecedent lay in its recogni- 
tion that the self does not create itself out of whole cloth. 
Heredity and environment, theology might say, is the way in 
which God forms the self. What would you have? You 
would need to be a self to create your self as you wanted it 
to be. And the self as you wanted it to be would be another 
self not necessarily grateful for your work. Or if the self 
just sprang into being, you would be no better off, for you 
would have to accept this self of mere chance, Let us now 
look at the consequence of our proposition. 


FIRST AND LAST THINGS 489 


Why cannot I be held free? Take me at any moment and 
I am free in so far as I can carry out my plans. I am not free, 
of course, to be any kind of a self which presupposes capaci- 
ties which I do not possess. We must not have absurd ideas 
of freedom. And I am responsible for my actions if they 
are my actions and chosen by me. In fact, as we have tried 
to show, that is all that responsibility means. Society holds 
those answerable for their actions who have certain capacities 
which normal people possess. It would be foolish for society 
to make demands which pass the limits of a man’s capacities. 
Thus society may be foolish in expecting that simple-minded 
persons can adjust themselves to our complex industrial con- 
ditions. They may need aid and guidance. There is, again, 
such a thing as being too ambitious, making too great demands 
upon oneself. <A fair level of intelligent activity is usually 
best for the individual. 

Many other questions have been raised and discussed by 
philosophy. But it would require a treatise too large for an 
elementary course to explain and analyze them. What we 
have desired to do is to suggest the basic problems and to 
indicate the best methods of attack upon them. While my 
own point of view has necessarily dominated the discussions, 
I have sought to avoid dogmatism. If there is one thought 
more than others which I wish to stress in this last division 
of our subject it is this, that man has in him the power to 
admire and create values and thus to establish himself on a 
high level of living. 

Human life has in it great possibilities; and organized 
society should see to it that, so far as possible, all should 
have a chance to understand, to participate and enjoy. Life 
demands, however, a certain strength of soul, a share of 
adventurous courage, and even a touch of humor. And there 
are veritable tragedies which must be recognized as such. 
Nevertheless, life is by the vast majority recognized to be good. 
In the controversy over the good of life, I would be neither 
a bland optimist nor a morbid pessimist, but a pluralistic 


490 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


realist with a will to improve the possibilities of life in a 
democratic and yet intelligent way. 


REFERENCES 


ALEXANDER, Space, Time, and Deity, vol. 2. 
JAMES, The Varieties of Religious Experience. 
MoGirrert, The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas. 
Warp, The Realm of Ends 

WricuHt, A Student’s Philosophy of Religion. 
WENLEY, Modern Thought and the Crisis in Belief. 
SELLARS, The Next Step in Religion. 

OrTo, Things and Ideals. 

CasoT, What Men Live By. 


QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 


CHAPTER I 


1. Why must a definition of philosophy be very general and stress 
a certain kind of attitude? 

2. What appears to be the chief difference between philosophy 
and religion? between philosophy and any special science? 

3. What does the scientific movement represent in your eyes? 
What are some of its characteristic methods? 

4. Are there good and bad kinds of speculation? Can science get 
along without speculation? Would you eall scientific theory 
speculation ? 

5. Indicate the kind of training that makes for competency in 
philosophy. 

6. Is philosophy a kind of wisdom about life? Or is it insight 
into the nature of things? 

7. Does philosophy have a method of its own? 

8. Why are logic and psychology apt to be central in the philoso- 
pher’s training? 

9. Name some scientists who seem to you to be philosophers also. 

10. Why does the history of human thought bulk so large in 
philosophy ? 


CHAPTER II 


1. What did the Greeks contribute to the world? 

2. How would you describe the attitude of theoretical curiosity ? 
Is there anything corresponding to it in savage hfe? 

3. Why should the individual sit at the feet of the great thinkers 
of the past? 

4. How would you distinguish between mythology and philosophy ? 
Do we still have our popular mythology? 

5. Show that intellectual division of labor was as natural as 
physical division of labor. 

6. What was the weakness of medieval philosophy? 

7. Why have philosophy and science had quarrels? Do you think 
that it was always the fault of philosophy? 

491 


492 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


8. Give the main divisions of philosophy. 

9. What is logic? What is theory of knowledge or epistemology? 

10. What is your present idea of the aim of ontology or meta- 
physics? Do you think that such an investigation can be escaped 
by the human mind? 

11. Show that, in cosmology, science and philosophy should be in 
close cooperation. 

12. Why do we elass ethics and esthetics under axiology or 
theory of value? 

13. Is common sense a fixed, or a changing, outlook ? 


CHAPTER III 


1. Try to discover the outlook on the world your companions have. 

2. Describe the main features of common-sense, or natural, 
realism. What would you call a thing? 

3. What ambiguity are there in the words, see and look at? 

4. Has natural realism been recognized in the history of 
philosophy? : 

5. Does natural realism deserve to be called a system? Can you 
point out any gaps in it? 

6. Why should philosophy stress perception as a starting-point? 

7. Does there seem to you to be a conflict between science and 
natural realism? 

8. Would there be any sound in a forest when a tree fell if there 
were no ears to hear? And how about color if there were no eyes? 

9. If chairs and tables are perceivable objects are atoms also? 
What do you mean by perceivable here? 


CHAPTER IV 


1. State some facts which conflict with the view that you see things 
just as they are. 

2. Is common sense very much aware of the mechanism of 
perception? 

3. Does an object seen in a mirror exist out there? Discuss. 

4, Examine carefully each of the main objections advanced in 
this chapter against natural realism. 

5. Distinguish between the characters, such as color, shape, size 
and weight you discriminate and the thing you perceive. Is the 
thing more than these characters? 

6. Does the breakdown of natural realism imply idealism? 


QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 493 


7. Do you think that the appearances of things may be a partial 
revelation of them? 

8. Is there any standard position from which we can see the thing 
and not its appearance? 

9. Does measurement give you knowledge that perception alone 
cannot? 

10. What is the psycho-physiological theory of perception? Does 
it deal with the mechanism of perception? Does it refute the claim 
to perceive things? 


CHAPTER V 


1. What are the chief values of an historical approach? 

2. Why did Descartes adopt the method of doubt? Was his 
doubt extreme? 

3. What kind of a self did Descartes mean by his “I think, 
therefore, I am’? 

4. Did he really discover a thinking substance? 

5. How would you distinguish between the perceived sun and the 
real, astronomical sun? 

6. What was the Cartesian test of truth? Does it seem to you 
adequate? Does it follow from his kind of rationalism ? 

7. How did Descartes get to the physical world? What effect 
was this indirect relation to the physical world likely to have? 

8. Do your concepts seem to you to be built up gradually from 
perceptual material? Was this Descartes’s view? 

9. What are “ideas” for Locke? 

10. Do ideas of this kind or do beliefs seem to you to be units of 
thought? 

11. What was the weakness of the copy-theory as formulated by 
Locke? Did it assume that we know ideas first and things 
afterwards? 

12. What did Locke mean by material substance? Is this what 
the scientist means by matter? 

13. Distinguish between primary and secondary qualities. 


CHAPTER VI 


1. Why is the term idealism ambiguous? Is idealism in conduct 
the same as idealism in theory of knowledge? 

2. Explain Berkeley’s principle, to be is to be perceived. 

3. What are the two stages in Berkeley’s argument? 


494 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


4. Does the physical world seem to you to be inferred from ideas 
or affirmed in perception? 

5. What do you think that Berkeley had in mind when he said 
that an idea can be like nothing but another idea? Was an idea 
for him a kind of mental entity? 

6. Would you agree with Locke and Newton that matter is inert? 

7. How does Berkeley use this view of matter to refute physical 
realism? 

8. Show that Berkeley’s eriticism of Locke’s view of substance was 
an intellectual advance. 

9. State Berkeley’s construction. On what principles was it 
founded ? 

10. Can you refute Berkeley by kicking an object as Dr. Johnson 
is said to have done? 

11. Where was Berkeley credulous? 


CHAPTER VII 


1. Should we expect skepticism to arise at this point? 

2. What do you understand by phenomenalism? Oppose if to the 
two-substanee view of Descartes. 

3. Why can Hume’s position also be called psychologism? 

4, On what points did Hume tend to agree with Berkeley? Where 
did he differ ? 

5. Do you agree with Hume’s analysis of the self? Against what 
was it directed? 

6. Why is Hume’s analysis of causation classical? Against what 
view was it directed? Can you find anything like it in Berkeley? 

7. How did Hume test ideas like spirit, soul, substance, power ? 
Does this follow from psychologism? 

8. Would you expect a revolt against Hume’s negative results? 
Who in Scotland began such a revolt? Could he go back to Locke? 


CHAPTER VIII 


il 


. What kind of training did Kant bring to philosophy ? 

. Show the influence of Descartes in Kant’s thought. 

. What concession did Kant make to British empiricism? 

. How did Kant seek to bring sense and reason together? 

. What do you understand by the manifold of sense? by the 
forms of space and time? by the categories of the understanding? 
Which of these are a posteriori and which are a priori? 


bo 


Cr fe Co 


QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 495 


6. Show that Kant’s position shows structural analysis along with 
inherited theories. 

7. What do we know according to Kant? Do these phenomena 
exist only in human experience? 

8. What is the thing-in-itself? Can it be called the ghost of the 
physical thing? 

9. Must Kant be called an agnostic realist? What are physical 
things for Kant? 

10. What two kinds of knowledge can you distinguish? 

11. If categories are contributed by an isolated self, can they have 
any meaning for an external world? Was not Kant, then, quite 
logical ? 

12. Can you suggest another origin for the categories? 

13. Show that objective idealism was built largely upon Kant’s 
results. ) 

14, In what fields did the objective idealist do his best work ? 


CHAPTER IX 


1. Explain some of the significant points suggested by this survey. 

2. Do you have a deeper sense of the problems confronting 
philosophy ? 

3. Do you think that Cartesian dualism was historically inevi- 
table? Did it mislead philosophy in any measure? 

4. Why is an empirical survey of consciousness and the knowl- 
edge-claim desirable? 

5. What references, structures and distinctions can you find in 
consciousness ? 

6. Why does the temporal dimension of consciousness work 
against natural realism? 

7. Do the references and contrasts of the coexistential dimension 
favor realism? Interpret such terms as aware of, conscious of, 
contemplate, minding. 

8. What is meant by cognitive relation? Does it mean anything 
more than knowing? 

9, Examine the distinction between thing and idea. 

10. Have ideas, characters or predicates the same nature as the 
objects which we seem to know by means of them? When I say 
that a stone is heavy, can I also say that my zdea of the stone is 
heavy? Are ideas in knowing empirically given? Is the object 
given in the same way? 

11. Can you think of knowing apart from consciousness? 


496 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTER X 


1. Why should we start with the organism instead of with an 
isolated mind? 

2. Show that both stimulus and interpretative response are parts 
of the total process of perceiving. 

3. Point out by means of examples that the whole organism 
selects objects of perception. 

4, Why should we seek to combine the objective, scientific view- 
point with the introspective one in seeking to understand perception ? 

5. Does knowing seem.to you a literal apprehension of an object 
or an interpretation of an object? 

6. What factors can you distinguish in the knowing-situation? 

7. Show that in logical ideas we are within the complete act of 
knowing. That is, that we have selected an object and are inter- 
preting it in terms of discriminated characters. 

8. What has the psychologist meant by ideas? 

9. Contrast the present position with the Cartesian tradition. 

10. Does it seem to you that we decipher the pattern and quan- 
titative aspects of the world? Does this view harmonize with the 
results of science? 

11. Must knowing a thing fall short of being it? 

12. Does this view seem to you in any sense agnostic? Or is it an 
account of the nature and reach of knowledge? 

13. Do we literally share the contents of other minds? Why can 
you say both yes and no to this? 


CHAPTER XI 


1. What is your present understanding of the task of 
epistemology ? 

2. Show that knowing is a complicated natural event which the 
special sciences must take for granted. 

3. Why are idealism and realism so strongly opposed to one 
another? 

4, Connect the various forms of experientialism with the history 
of philosophy. 

5. Does subjective idealism come dangerously near solipsism? 

6. Explain the basic thesis of objective idealism. 

7. Why is it said that objective idealism has an organic logic? 
Explain the logical theory of internal relations. 

8. Give the names of some famous idealistic thinkers. 


QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 497 


9. What is positivism? Is it anti-metaphysical ? 

10. In what respects is Neo-Kantianism opposed to speculative 
idealism ? 

11. Why is pragmatism regarded by many as a typical American 
philosophy ? 

12. Explain the use of the following terms as applied to prag- 
matism : experimental, temporalistic, utilitarian. 

13. State the axiom of realism. 

14. Do you think that neo-realism is nearer natural realism than 
is critical realism? 

15. Do you think that pragmatism, neo-realism and critical 
realism have many points in common? 


CHAPTER XII 


. Can feeling be said to be either true or false? 
. Show the intimate connection between judgment and truth. 

. Distinguish between the meaning of trueness and the criteria 
ded to test trueness. 

4, Iixplain the coherence theory of truth. Show how it is an 
integral part of objective idealism. 

5. Point out ‘the essential features of pragmatism’s theory of 
truth. 

6. Why does Dewey put truly in place of trueness? 

7. What principles in regard to truth do neo-realism and critical 
realism have in common? 

8. Explain the view that, in knowledge, the content is in some 
sense identical with the characteristics of object known. 

9. Why ean this be ealled alternately a correspondence and an 
identity view? 

10. What would be some of the criteria for such a meaning of 
truth? 

11. Why has neo-realism difficulty in accounting for error? 


toe 


oO 


CHAPTER XIII 


1. Name some of the typical problems of ontology or metaphysics. 

2. Why does cosmology with its close cooperation with science 
control ontological speculation ? 

3. Show that one’s epistemology is bound to affect one’s ontology, 

4, Which is the more interesting to the majority, epistemology or 
cosmology? 


498 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


5. What are some of the inherited sharp contrasts of present-day 
thought? 

6. Show that philosophy has been moving from abstract deduc- 
tive systems to an analytic survey of the world as known. 


CHAPTER XIV 


1. Why are materialism and spiritualism called monisms of 
substance? 

2. What has been the weakness of traditional materialism? 

3. Have recent changes in epistemology affected the situation? 

4. What is meant by saying that consciousness is a by-product 
of brain-events? 

5. Does such a view rob mind of its efficacy in conduct ? 

6. Is it meaningful to call consciousness a form of motion? 

7. Name some of the representatives of materialism in the history 
of thought. 

8. Would it be fair to say that traditional materialism was a part 
of the mechanical theory of nature? 

9. In what respects is spiritualism the opposite of materialism? 

10. Does spiritualism depend upon idealistic epistemology ? 

11. What does Bergson seem to you to mean by intuition? 

12. What is panpsychism? monadism ? 

13. If you had to choose between mechanical materialism and 
spiritualism which would you select? 


CHAPTER XV 


1. Does the strength of dualism seem to you to lie partly in the 
stale-mate between materialism and spiritualism? 

2. Show that dualism has been a constant element in Western 
thought. 

3. Is our knowledge of the physical world as intuitive and pene- 
trating as Descartes thought? 

4. Explain some of the technical motives in favor of dualism. 

5. Do you think that the growth of biology and psychology as 
natural sciences has affected the situation ? 

6. What does Pratt mean by dualism of process? 

7. Do you think that animism still underlies the tendency toward 
dualism? 

8. Outline the more forceful objections to dualism. 

9. Show that it is the mind-body problem that ontology is really 
dealing with in controversies about dualism. 


QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 499 


10. What do you understand by the term evolutionary naturalism? 

11. What are some of the pressing conditions it must fulfil to be 
satisfactory ? 

12. Do the sciences of objective observation have their necessary 
limits? 

13. Does it seem to you that psychology is in many ways a unique 
science? What do you understand by introspection? 

14. Is another person’s consciousness observable? Is there com- 
munication elsewhere in nature? 


CHAPTER XVI 


1. Is there good reason to believe that reality has basic charac- 
teristics ? 

2. What would seem to be the relation between these basic charac- 
teristics and the categories of human thought ? 

3. Contrast this view with Kantianism. 

4. Show that there are levels in spatial experience. 

5. Are mathematical elements, like points and lines, constructions? 

6. What is meant by non-Euclidian geometry? 

7. Must we discover by hard work the spatial character of nature? 

8. Distinguish between the essence, the receptacle, and the rela- 
tivity view of space. 

9. Is the physical world necessarily infinitely divisible because 
mathematical space is? 

10. May the world be spatial even though we do not know whether 
it is finite or infinite? 

11. What does the term infinite mean to you? 

12. What is your understanding of a complete void? 

13. Interpret the following terms: unity, plurality, aggregate, 
order, correspondence. 


CHAPTER XVII 


. Does change in the world imply a complete flux? 

. What do you understand by Eleaticism? by temporalism? 

. Describe the ‘specious present.’ 

. Compare the ‘now’ and the ‘here.’ 

Do events seem to you ever to overlap? 

. Can you think of events apart from things? 

. What do you understand by duration? Is it measurable? 

. Show that the mind is in some sense more comprehensive than 


DNAPL wWNH 


500 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


existence. Do you think that the past exists? If it does not exist, 
how can it be known? 

9. Can you think of time apart from change? 

10. What are some of the assumptions underlying the idea of 
creation ? 

11. Show that the ultimate puzzle is that anything is. 

12. Can things change and yet be in any sense the same? Apply 
to human individuals. 

13. What is your understanding of the relativity theory? 


CHAPTER XVIII 


1. Does matter mean material things or an elementary stuff? 

2. Distinguish between the old speculative theories of matter and 
recent experimental theories. Did one prepare the way for the 
other? 

3. May there be something more ultimate than matter? How 
about ether and electricity? 

4, Is energy merely a measurable quantity connected with aks 

5. Point out the generic traits of thinghood. 

6. Is it possible to reinterpret primary qualities as characteristics 
of things revealed in perception and thought? 

7. Why does the scientist tend to look upon color as a psycho- 
logical event? Why not geometrical shape? 

8. Does such a view imply Cartesian dualism as Whitehead 
maintains? 

9, Can physical things be called substances? 

10. Distinguish between constant characteristics of physical things 
and variable characteristics. Which of these two is evolution inter- 
ested in? 

11. What do you understand by chemical properties? by biologi- 
cal properties ? 


CHAPTER XIX 


1. Show that dialectical controversies often start with rigid eon- 
cepts. Apply this principle to the origin of life. 

2. Do lving things accumulate their past? | 

3. Distinguish between design and chance. Is all that is not 
designed chance? 

4. Why was Darwinism epoch-making? 

do. Do you know of any recent advances in regard to the method 
of evolution? 


QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS d01 


6. Show that function and structure go together. Does this fact 
have any bearing upon life? 

7. What is meant by the labile equilibrium of protoplasm? 

8. Distinguish different ideas of abiogenesis. 

9. What are the three hypotheses as to the origin of life which 
have engaged attention? Which one seems to you most suggestive 
for investigation? 

10. What is Moore’s “Law of Complexity”? 

11. Is the term, the mechanical view of life, ambiguous? 

12. What is your understanding of vitalism? Is it dualistic? 

13. Is a third position between traditional mechanism and vitalism 
possible? Can you suggest a name for it? 

14, Is the cure of science more science? 


CHAPTER XX 


1. Is the problem of mind analogous to the problem of life? What 
are the differences? 

2. Why is an historical survey of past theories of mind valuable? 

3. What is animism? Was there a stage before animism? Have 
you heard of such terms as animatism and mana? 

4, What was the outlook of Democritus? Of Epicurus? 

5. In what direction was the influence of Plato exerted? Show 
how Neo-Platonism carried immaterialism farther. 

6. Did Aristotle think of the soul as separable from the body? 

7. Where did Descartes locate his inextended substance? Is there 
a contradiction in the very effort? 

8. Explain the gradual substitution of terms like consciousness 
and mind for soul in psychology. 

9. Do you know anything about the Freudian conception of the 
self? What are complexes? 

10. What is mind for behaviorism? Do you know what a condi- 
tioned reflex is? 

11. Does mind seem to you to be a somewhat different term than 
consciousness? How would you distinguish them? 


CHAPTER XXI 


1. Why is the situation in psychology so unstable at present? 
Was this to be expected ? 

2. Is science necessarily limited to what can be observed 
externally? 


502 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


3. What was the classic tradition in psychology? Can it be 
linked with dualism? 

4. What do you understand by behaviorism? What are its 
assumptions? 

5. Is there any reason why the results of introspection may not 
harmonize with and supplement the external method? 

6. Has behaviorism as yet a fixed meaning? 

7. Does all this mean that we are trying to see the organism as the 
unit for psychology ? 

8. Do you think that epistemology can assist in giving perspective 
in this matter? ‘ 

9. Criticize the inclusive definition of psychology suggested. 

10. Do you think that psychology is a natural science? 


CHAPTER XXII 


1. What is your understanding of the mind-body problem? Do 
you think that we have different meanings for both these terms to- 
day from those held a generation ago? 

2. Why must we distinguish sharply between dualistic and monis- 
tie solutions of the mind-body problem? 

3. Do you think that much depends upon the solution of the mind- 
body problem? For instance? 

4. What does interactionism stress? What are its weaknesses? 

5. Is the denial of a causal relation basie for traditional 
parallelism ? 

6. Why does parallelism tend to lapse into epiphenomenalism ? 

7. What kind of epistemology underlies psychical monism? Do 
you recall panpsychism ? 

8. Does consciousness seem to you a stuff, or a qualitative com- 
plex of events intrinsic to a system? 

9. Explain the double-aspect theory? What are its weaknesses? 

10. Does the double-knowledge theory seem to you to improve 
upon the double-aspect theory? 

11. Must science frankly recognize mind and consciousness as 
facts? 


CHAPTER XXIII 


1. What science expresses the growing sense of the naturalness 
of society? 
2. Why is the primitive group so suggestive for study? 


QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 503 


3. Can we apply the principle of unplanned growth to social 
groups? 
. Show the dependence of social groups upon language. 
. What do you understand by culture? by culture-contacts? 
. Why must society be considered a new kind of thing? 
. In what sense, if any, has society a mind? 
. What are some of the conditions of public opinion? 
. Are arts, industries and forms of religion growths? 
10. How does the group into which he is born affect the indi- 
vidual? Give an illustration. 
11. What do you understand by human nature? Does it change? 
12. What is the error of extreme individualism? of extreme 
collectivism ? 


SANA OAe 


CHAPTER XXIV 


1. What do you understand by the doctrine of levels? Is this 
what is sometimes called emergent evolution? 

2. Explain the possibility of genetic continuity and logical dis- 
continuity in nature. 

3. What do you understand by a law of nature? Do laws rule 
things? 

4. Is nature in your opinion homogeneous or heterogeneous? 
Does this mean pluralism and a measure of free play among the 
parts? 

5. Why should we distrust simple formule in science? 

6. Is design a human method? Should we extend it beyond 
ourselves? 

7. Explain the nature of the Platonic-Aristotelian teleology. Did 
it pass into religious thought? 

8. Why was Darwinism revolutionary? 

9. Are the laws of nature statistically determined or do they 
agree with the strict laws of mechanics? 

10. What does the phrase, ‘Time packs space,” mean to you? 

11. What does internal teleology mean to you? Do human pur- 
poses seem to be forces in the world? 

12. What does Lloyd Morgan mean by nisus? Would it seem 
enough to say that systems have trends characteristic of their ener- 
gies and organization? 

14. In what sense may we hold consciousness to be efficacious? 
Must mind lie back of consciousness ? 

15. Is there reason to hold that there are levels of causality in 
nature? 


504 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTER XXV 


1. Contrast contemplation of the world with active participation 
or doing and suffering. 

2. Show that instinct, desire and feeling are at the foundation 
of participation. 

3. Do you think that different individuals and different social 
groups have distinct scales of value? Illustrate. 

4. Would you take Goethe’s Faust as a symbol of a conflict in 
values ? 

5. In what respects has our view of the cosmos been altered since 
Medieval times ? 

6. What criticisms would you pass on the eloquent passage from 
Balfour? 


CHAPTER XXVI 


1. Define ethics. 

2. State some typical ethical problems. 

3. Give examples of moral categories. 

4. What is meant by a moral situation as against a merely prac- 
tical one? 

5. What are some of the causes of the recurrence of ethical sub- 
jectivism or relativism? 

6. Explain some of the methods used in ethics. 

7. Contrast intuitionalism in ethics with experimentalism. 

8. What is meant by hedonism? What can be said in its favor? 
What against? 

9. Does temperament affect one’s morality? Consider puritanism 
in this regard. Does one’s cultural background affect it? 

10. Contrast “human good” and “duty” as starting-points in 
morality. 

11. Why does ethics lead to an investigation of the nature of 
value? 


CHAPTER XXVII 


1. Recall a ease of “conscience” and analyze it. 

2. Would you say that moral insight replaced custom? 

3. Contrast the formation of scientific judgments with the growth 
of moral judgments. 

4. Is the sense of duty largely the feeling of what we ought not 
to do? 

5. What did Kant mean by the categorical imperative? 


QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 505 


6. What are the shortcomings of conventional morality? 

7. Is the zealous moral reformer in danger of narrowness? 

8. Do you think that one person has the right to dictate to another 
in matters of morals? 

9. Is there danger of moral bigotry just as there is of religious 
bigotry? 

10. Do you think that we are outgrowing supernatural sanctions? 

11. Analyze the idea of responsibility. Why are not insane 
people regarded as responsible? 

12. What is the ethical basis of punishment? 


CHAPTER XXVIII 


1. Show that values are central in both personal and social life. 

2. Is democracy a matter of valuation? 

3. Do values change from age to age? Give examples. 

4. What do you understand by transcendentalism in values? by 
humanism ? 

5. Is the cognition of an object different from its valuation? 

6. Can you value an object without knowing it? 

7. Do objects acquire value-meanings as well as cognitional 
meanings? Is there any sense in which such values are objective? 

8. What is meant by the “Back to Plato” movement in values? 
Is it separable from idealism in cosmology? 

9. Explain G. E. Moore’s theory of good. How would you 
criticize it? 


CHAPTER XXIX 


1. How does the artist transform the things and events of every- 
day life into objects of beauty? Give some examples in both litera- 
ture and painting. 

2. What is an objective? Illustrate in education. 

3. Does the artist seek to reproduce nature or does he express 
himself in form and color? 

4, Take the classes of value suggested in the text and give exam- 
ples of each class. 

5. What are some of the values operative in a university? 

6. What is the fault in what is called commercialism? 

7. Show how the values dominating the life of a group control the 
lives of the members. 

8. Distinguish between conventional values and living values. 


506 PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 


9. How would you distinguish between a value-experience and a 
value-judgment ? 

10. Does reflection and further experience change a_ value- 
experience ? 

11. What are the arguments advanced by those who believe in 
absolute and eternal values? 


CHAPTER XXX 


1. Why must one’s outlook upon the world be a matter of slow 
growth? 

2. Point out some of the difficulties confronting psychical 
research. 

3. Do Leuba’s statistics seem to show that traditional beliefs are 
waning ? 

4. How do you account for the appearance of fundamentalism? 

5. Do people differ in their desire for immortality? 

6. Do you think that people brought up without a belief in im- 
mortality would have the same kind of desire as those who have been 
encouraged to have the belief? 

7. Do you think that naturalists have much the same moral ideals 
as supernaturalists ? 

8. Do you agree with Leuba that ecclesiastical organizations have 
slowed down scientific progress? What positive contribution have 
they made? 

9. Contrast the old and the new naturalism. 

10. Has human life intrinsic meaning? 

11. Analyze the traditional proofs for a deity. 

12. Can the universe be called God? 

13. What do you understand by fate? by fatalism? 

14. Show that man has a measure of freedom and social 
responsibility. 


INDEX 


Athie sf i A’ 


f A * mage ‘ * me ae : iF a) a 7 i ‘ Wetelins Milos 
sae on , a at aa eee 
asta F to OO oe 


iti ndghet tee ren Ea i 


one ih ban cae on ? 


Vs 


ot i Sah, Druk ; 


Ma 


oe f Sion ey Wo 


ies BG. 





INDEX 


Abiogenesis, 279, 280 

Absolutism, 148, 177, 233 

Achan, 429 

Achilles, 294 

Activity, 379 ff. 

Aesthetics, field of, 24; Value in 
Aesthetie experience, 458 ff. 

Aggregate, an, 229 f. 

Agnostic Realism, 140 

Albertus Magnus, 19 

Alexander, S., ref., 114, 151, 169, 
365, 449; quoted, in defense of 
Natural Realism, 57 f.; on value, 
449; on the religious emotion, 
483 

Anaxagoras, 18, 295 

Anaximines, 295 

Angell, quoted, on psychology, 3809 

Animism, 205 f., 298, 295 f., 397 

Apologetics, 481 

Appearance, the Physical Thing 
and, 47 ff. 

Apprehensional Realism, 150 

Aquinas, Thomas, 19 

Archegenesis, 281 f. 

Aristippus, 403 

Aristotle, ref., 16, 19, 155, 249, 
263,.219, 287, 291,296, 297, 299, 
368 f., 374, 399; quoted, on vir- 
tue, 407; Aristotelian tradition 
in ethics, 406 f. 

Arnold, Matthew, ref., 360, 
quoted, on life of poet, 456 f.; 
on human life, 476 

Arrhenius, 281 

Asceticism, 404 f. 

Aspect, Quantitative, 
Chap. XVI, 215 ff. 

Associationism, 85 

Atomism, 188, 249 

Aurelius, Marcus, 295 

Axiology, 24, 387 ff. 

Axiom of Realism, 150 


of World, 


Bagehot, 416 

Balfour, ref., 476; quoted, on 
man’s place in universe, 391 f. 

Behavior, an element in religion, 
8 f.; hierarchy of, 364; of physi- 
cal objects, 202 f.; studied by 
psychology, 308 

Behaviorism, 189, 308, 3381; Dif- 
ferent Kinds of, 314 ff. 

Belief, an element in religion, 8 f. ; 
in Immortality, 471 ff. 

Benn, 18n. 

Bentham, Jeremy, 410 

Bergson, ref., 193, 216, 285, 287, 
297, 397f., 440, 441, 472; 
quoted, on intuition, 193 f. 

Berkeley, ref., 20, 24, 60, 70, 71, 
72, 88, 87, 89, 91, 96, 101, 104, 
LOT i LD 124 130, 140 ero 
LOS, 196,208, 262, . 501s aise 
cussed 72 ff.; quoted, against 
natural realism, 34f.; attack on | 
Lockian copy-theory, 76; state- 
ment of position, 76 

Bode, quoted, on psychology, 308 

Bosanguet, B., ref., 54, 148, 148, 
160, 177, 196; quoted, on the 
aesthetic experience, 454 

Bouglé, C., 449 

Bradley, F. H., ref., 143, 148, 160, 
177, 196, 216; quoted, on spirit- 
ualism, 197 

Broad, C. D., quoted, on the cate- 
gories, 217f.; on mechanism- 
vitalism, 365, 366 

Browne, Sir Thomas, 279 

Browning, Robert, 360, 445; 
quoted, on joy of living, 458 

Brunschvieg, Leon, quoted, on re- 
lation of physics and mathe- 
matics, 222 

Biichner, 189 

Buermeyer, quoted, on art, 455 


509 


o10 


Bullough, 455 
Burnet, 18 n. 
Butler, Samuel, 398 


Cabanis, 189 

Caird, E., 148 

Calkins, M. W., 304 

Can Grande, 391 

Carlyle, 421 

Carr, W., quoted, on truth, 155f. 
Carritt, 455 


Cartesianism, 60 ff.; 325 f. 
Cassirer, quoted, on critical ideal- 
ism, 146 . 


Categorical Imperative, the, 402 f., 
420 

Categories, Kant’s Doctrine of, 98 
ff.; are Subjective, 100 ff.; of 
biology, 290; Need for New, 370 
ff.; Moral, 396 ff. 

Category, of Thinghood, 111; 
Space, a Category of Physical 
Sciences, 222 ff.; Time, a Cate- 
gory of Scientific Knowledge, 
237 ff.; of Consciousness, 325 

Causation, 374f.; Hume’s Treat- 
ment of, 89; First Cause, 242, 
480 

Change, | Chap. XVII, ° 2382.ff.:; 
Characteristic of Nature in 
Time, 239 ff.; continuity of, 272 

Characteristics, constant, 266 ff. 

Charles I, 159 

Chrysostom, Saint, quoted on con- 
science, 401 f. 

Clifford, ref., 380, quoted, on in- 
teractionism, 330 

Co-existential dimension, 112 f. 

Cognition, vs. Existence, 118 ff.; 
vs. Valuation, 4388 ff. 

Cognitive Relation, 110; a closer 
study of, 114 ff. 

Cohen, Morris, quoted, on mythol- 
ogy in science, 370 f. 

Coherence Theory, of Truth, 158 f. 

Columbus, 227, 239 

Compresence, 114, 151 

Comte, 145, 345 

Conation, 88, 321 

Conditioned reflexes, 324 

Conduct, Valuing in Affairs of, 
408 ff. 

Conscience, discussed, 413 ff. 

Consciousness, a Flux, 85 ff.; Ref- 


INDEX 


erences and Distinctions within, 
Chap. IX, 107 ff.; Two Dimen- 
sions of Field of, 112 ff.; Dis- 
tinctions within Individual’s, 
116 ff.; Soul, Mind and, Chap. 
XX., 2odfi.; as qualitative 
events, 317; a variant, 340; so- 
cial, 352f.; Human, Socially 
conditioned, 358 ff.; Purpose and 
the Efficacy of, 379 ff. 
Conservation, Chap. XVII, 232 ff. 
Content, of Perception, 45 
Continuants, 32, 111, 255 
Contrasts, in science and philoso- 
phy, 179 f. 
Convention, Weakness of, 422 ff. 
Copernicus, 476 
Cosmology, def., 24; Theory of 
Levels and Basie Points in, 
Chap. XXIV, 362 ff.; Crucial 
Point in, 362 ff. 
Cosmos, Time and the, 240 ff. 
Criteria, of Truth, 156; of Mo-. 
rality, Chap. XXVII 418 ff.; of 
Value, Chap XXIX, 451 ff. 
Critical Realism, 188, 140, 153 f£., 
169 f.; and psychology, 318 
Croce, 148, 455 
Croesus, 17 
Cudworth, 402 
Culture, Society 
461 f. 


and, 348 ff.; 


Dalton, 249 

Dante, 374, 390, 391; quoted, on 
subject of Divine Comedy, 391 

Darwin, 10, 272, 278, 370) 476; 
481 

Data, Differences between Percep- 
Cist, .oO'f, 

Democritus, atomism of, 188, 249, 
253, 295, 368 

Descartes, ref., 20, 25, 57, 67, 68, 
72, 74, 75, 80, 83, 89, 91, 94, 
101, 107, 123,126; 19372019208) 
213, 218, 228, 298f£, 33074024 
discussed, 60 ff.; compared with 
Kant, 101; quoted, as to system- 
atic doubt, 62; knowledge de- 
pendent on God, 63; acceptance 
of mathematical concepts, 68 f. ; 
famous formula, 193 

Design, vs. Mechanism, 367 ff. 

Determinism, experimental, 284 


INDEX 


Dewey, John, ref., 54, 148, 149, 
160, 162, 441, 449; quoted, on 
true ideas, 161 f.; on language, 
348 

Dickens, 29 

Double-Aspect Theory, 337 f. 

Double-Knowledge Theory, 338 ff. ; 
381 

Doubt, systematic, 62 

Drake, 336 n. 

Driesch, Hans, 285, 286, 287, 366; 
quoted on vitalism, 286; on 
mechanism, 286 

Dualism, 294; Cartesian, 57, 60 ff., 
force 29,7104,-15a, 201,261, 
287, 290, 301, 3838, unfortunate 
effect of Cartesian, 69f.; Epi- 
stemological, 153; vs. Evolu- 
tionary Naturalism, Chap. XV, 
199 ff.; Natural. 199 ff.; Motives 
in Favor of, 202 ff.; Objections 
to, 206 ff.; Dualistic Theories of 
Mind-Body Problem, 326 ff.; 
Metaphysical, 331 f. 

Duclaux, quoted, on origin of life, 
282 


Eaton, quoted, on cognitive unit, 
53 

Eclecticism, scientific, 93 

Eddington, 247 

Edison, 461 

EKgo, 142, transcendental, 96, 100 

Hinstein, 245, 246, 373 

Eleatics, the, 232 

Emergent Evolution, 362 f. 

Emerson, ref., 18, 402, 486; quoted, 
on human life, 888; on values, 
437 

Empiricism, see discussions of 
Locke, Berkeley and Hume; 
Descriptive, 110 ff. ; Radical, 149 ; 
Ethical, 404 

Energism, 251 

Energy, Chap. XVIII, 248 ff. 

Hntelechy, 284, 287 

Epictetus, 17 

Epicureans, the, 295 

Epicurus, 399, 403 

Epiphenomenalism, 
333 ff. 

Epistemology, defined, 22; Present 
Tendencies in, Chap. xh 


BOL fs oL5; 


oll 


138 ff.; Its Nature Restated, 
139 f.; to Ontology, 175 ff. 

Error, Truth and, Chap. XII, 
155 ff. 

Wssence view, the, 223 

Ethies, and Merality, Chap. XX VI, 
suo i. ;> Wield of, 24-9 805 
Methods of Study of, 398 ff. ; 
Theories of Critical Knowledge, 
400 ff.; Supernaturalism vs. Nat- 
uralism in, 424 ff. 

Eucken, 440, 441 

Events, constant, 266 ff. 

Evolution, stages in, 271 ff.; Emer- 
gent, 362 f. 

Evolutionary Naturalism vs Dual- 
ism, Chap. XV, 199 ff. ; or Emer- 
gent, 207, 209 ff.; Conditions It 
Must Fulfill, 211 ff. 

Existence vs. Cognition, 118 ff. 

Experience and Common-Sense, 31 ; 
ing and ed sides of, 115 

Experientialism, 140, 144 ff. 

Extension, 61 f., 194 


Faraday, 38 

Fate and Freedom, 484 ff. 

Fechner, 310 

Feeling, an element in religion, 8 f. 

FKichte, 105, 441 

Field, of Consciousness, Two Di- 
mensions of, 112 ff.; of Percep- 
tion, Involves Construction, 52 ff. 

Vinalism, 374 

First Cause, 242, 480 

Frazer, quoted, on religion, 8 


Freedom, degrees of, 375 f.; and 
Fate, 484 ff. 

Freud, 305, 322 

Free- Will, and Responsibility, 


432 f. 

Fullerton, quoted, in objection to 
Lockian Realism, 69; on Ber- 
keleianism, 82; on Natural 
dualism, 200; on primary and 
secondary properties, 256; on 
Plotinus, 297 f. 


Galileo, 10, 38, 68, 253 

Gentile, 148 

Gomperz, 18n 

Good, Nature and Conditions of 
Human, 406 ff. 

Green, 143 


012 


Group, the Primitive, 345 ff.; the 
Human Organism and _ the, 
347 ff.; What Is the Group?, 
349 ff.; Relation between In- 
dividual and, 353 ff. 


Haeckel, 213 

Hamilton, 151 

Hardy, Thomas, 485 

Hedonism, 403, psychological and 
ethical, 409 f. 

Hegel, 17, 105, 148, 193, 196 

Heine, 356, 360 

Helmholtz, 79, 281, quoted, on sign- 
theory, 70 

Heracleitus, 18 

Herodotus, 17 

Herz, 79 

History, of philosophy, 17 ff.; 
Value of Historical Approach, 
59 f. 

Hobbes, Thomas, ref., 188, 3483, 
404; quoted, on time, 236 f. 

Hobhouse, quoted, on double-knowl- 
edge theory, 339; on mind, 377 

Hobson, quoted, claims of Natural 
Science, 203 f.; on mathematical 
methods, 225. 

Hoernlé, ref., 261; quoted, on 
Whitehead, 262; on behavior, 314 

Hoffding, quoted, on Wundt, 195; 
on Double-Aspect Theory, 337 

Holbach, 189 

Homer, 468 

Hopkins, 278 n 

Hosea, 479 

Hudson, W. H., 460 

Humanism, 436 

Hume, ref., 16, 18, 20, 24, 34, 40, 
60, 62, 79, 82, 92, 94, 96, 99, 101, 
107, 119, 124, 127, 148, 145, 148, 
152, 218, 256, 301, 308, 341, 370; 
404, 480; quoted, against Nat- 
ural Realism, 35; against Lock- 
ianism and idealism, 88f.; on 
content of consciousness, 85 f.; 
criticism of Berkeley’s theism, 
88 f.; on causation, 89f.; dis- 
cussed, 82f.; and Kant, 97 f. 

Huxley, T. H., 281, 334, 380 

Hypothetical imperative, the, 420 


Idea, Locke’s definition of, 65 f. ; 
Berkeley’s discussion of, 76 f.; 





INDEX 


79 f.; Distinction between Thing 

and, 116 ff.; Ambiquity of Term, 

130 ff.; Function of, 160 
Idealism, Rise of, Chap. VI., 72 ff. ; 


Defined, 72; Does not Change 
Our Experience, 79f.; Two 
Kinds of, 141 f.; Objective, 


142 ff., 196; Idealistic Tradition 
of Soul, 302 ff.; and Naturalism 
in values, 436; Its Theory of 
Value, 444 f. 

Immanence, 152 

Immortality, 471 ff. 

Independence, theory of, 152 

Individual, Relation between group 
and the, 358 ff. 

Inge, Dean, quoted, on value, 444 


| Intellectualism, 148 


Interactionism, 299, 327 ff. 
Internal relations, 159 
introspection, Method of, 310 ff. 


James, W., ref. 53, 147, 148, 149, 
152, 160, 370, 441; quoted, on 
true ideas, 161; on the temporal 
experience, 235; on the _ soul, 
302; on efficacy of consciousness, 
380 

Job, 30 

Jones, Sir Henry, 445 

Joshua, book of, quoted, 429 

Judgment, content and act of, 165; 
Moral, 415 ff.; Value- Judgments 
and Valuation, 462 ff. 


Kant, ref. 16, 17, 24, 60, 90, 92, 
107, 124, 142, 144, 146, 192, 196, 
217, 218, 226, 257, 420, 440, 442, 
480; discussed, 93 ff.; his view 
of soul, 302 ff.; as ethical ra- 
tionalist, 402f.; quoted, his 
formulation of problem, 94; ex- 
plaining his position, 97 f. 

Kelvin, 281 

Knowledge, nature and reach of 
human, 21 ff.; Locke’s definition 
of, 65; as givenness in experi- 
ence; Kant’s Theory of, 95f.; 
Two Meanings of, 96f.; Kant 
and Hume Skeptical of First 
Kind of, 97 f.; Knowledge about, 
97; apprehensional view of, 115; 
nature of, Chap. X, 122ff.; 
What Is It?, 125 ff.; mechanism 


> al 


INDEX 


of, 128f.; Reach and Precise 
Character of, 181 ff.; Of Other 
Persons, 184ff.; and Truth, 
155 f.; Time a Category of Scien- 
tific, 237 ff.; Theories of Ethical, 
400 ff: 


Labor, division of, 19 f. 

Laird, J., 150; quoted, on values, 
446 f. 

La Mettrie, 189 

Langfeld, 455 

La Place, 93, 273, 369, 481 

Lashley, 316n 

Lee, Vernon, 455 

Leenwenhoek, 280 

Leibniz, 20, 93, 96, 101, 142, 193, 
19475196) (197, 202, 290, 332, 
483 

Leuba, quoted, on belief in immor- 
tality, 471 f. 

Levels, Theory of, in Cosmology, 
Chap. XXIV, 362 ff. 

Lewes, G. H., 145 

Life, Nature and Origin of, Chap. 
XIX, 270 ff.; Living and Lifeless 
Things, 277 f.; Origin of, 279 ff. ; 
Human Life and Its Problems, 
Chap. XXV, 387 ff.; From the 
Inside, 387 ff.; Has Human Life 
Intrinsic Value, 389 ff.; Values 
Basie for Human, 484 ff. 

Lincoln, 127, 356 

Locke, J., ref. 16, 17, 20, 24, 60, 64, 
Vole | 1), C0, WOU, 180. O41. OT, 
107, 119, 124, 141, 167, 256, 261, 
262, 301; discussed, 65 ff.; 
quoted, in regard to Knowledge, 
65; for belief in external World, 
67; on copy view, 68; on think- 
ing-matter, 300; on soul and 
body, 300 

Lobachewsky, 221 

Loeb, J., 286 

Logic, defined, 11; and science, 28; 
basic for Hegel, 148 


Lotze, quoted, against Natural 
Realism, 35 f. 
Lovejoy, A., quoted, on natural 


laws, 366 f. 

Lowie, quoted, on primitive idea 
of soul, 292 

Lucifer, 391 

Lucretius, quoted, on life, 279 


513 


Mach, Ernst, 23, 152 

Mackenzie, J. S., quoted, on values, 
445 

Maeterlinck, 
437 f. 

Mac Monnies, 209 

Massillon, quoted, on sanctions of 
morality, 426 

Materialism, 184 ff.; and Spiritual- 
ism, Chap. XIV, 183 ff.; History 
of, 187 ff.; reductive, 475 


quoted, on _ values, 


Matter, 184ff.; Chap. XVIII, 
248 ff.; What Is, 248 f. 

Maupassant, Guy de, 452 

McDougall, ref. 285, 304, 336n, 


339; quoted, on primitive soul, 
293; on interactionism, 328 f., 
331; on immortality, 474 

Measurement, number and, 229 ff.; 
systems of, 245 

Mechanism, vs. Vitalism, 283 ff.; 
vs. Design, 367 ff. 

Memory, Can Natural Realism Ac- 
count for?, 51 f. 

Mentalism, 72, 314 

Metaphysics, def., 24, 28 

Methods, of philosophy, 6, 180 f.; 
of Introspection, 310 ff.; of Ex- 
ternal Observation, 312 ff. 

Michelson, A., 245 

Millikan, 274 

Mill, J. S., 108, 148, 218, 404 

Milton, 356 

Mind, Soul, Consciousness and, 
Chap. XX, 289 ff.; The Nature 
of, a Problem, 289 ff.; Primitive 
notions of, 292 ff.; Mind and 
Soul in Ancient Philosophy, 
294 ff.; In Modern Philosophy, 
298 ff.; Relation between Organ- 
ism and} Chap: XXII, «324 ff; 
Mind-Body Problem, 324 ff.; 
Has Society a Mind, 351 ff.; 
Does Internal Teleology Imply?, 
377 ff. 

Mind-Body Problem, 324 ff.; Solu- 


tions offered, 326; Dualistic 
Theories of, 3826ff.; Monistic 
Theories of, 38385 ff.; Double- 
Aspect Theory, 3837; Double- 


Knowledge Theory, 338 ff. 
Mitchell, Chalmers, quoted, on abi- 
ogenesis, 280 f. 
Moleschott, 189 


o14 


Monism, 158, 176 f.; of Substance, 
183 f., 197 f.; Psychical, 335 ff. 
Monism, epistemological, 151, 152 

Montaigne, 17 

Moore, B., 283, quoted, on spontan- 
eous generation, 280 

Moore, G. E., 150, 446, 448; 
quoted, on value, 447, 448 

Moore, J. S., 309n 

Morality, and Ethical Theory, 
Chap. XXVI, 3895 ff.; Methods 
of Study of, 398 ff.; 'Tempera- 
mental Attitudes in, 404 ff.; 
Sanctions and Criteria of, Chap. 
XXVII, 418 ff.; Moral Judg- 
ment, 415 ff.; Weakness of Con- 
vention and Dangers of Novelty, 


422 ff.) Final 5; Sanetion\ of, 
426 ff.; Moral Responsibility, 
428 ff. 


Morgan, Lloyd, 115, 362, 365, 377, 
445; quoted, on emergent evolu- 
tion, 363, on Activity, 377 

Morley, 245 

Muirhead, quoted, 444 

Must and Ought, 420 ff. 

Myths, of creation, 241 f.; 477 


Napoleon, 152 

Naturalism, Dualism vs. Evolu- 
tionary, Chap. XV, 199 ff.; Evo- 
lutionary, 209 ff.; Versus Super- 
naturalism in Ethics, 424 ff.; 
and Idealism in Values, 436; 
The Old versus the New, 475f. 

Natural Realism, 32 ff.; Reeogni- 
tion of, in Philosophy, 34 ff.; 
Not a Theory or System, 386 ff. ; 
Philosophy Should Start from, 
38 f.; and Science, 39 ff.; Does 
It Break Down?, Chap. IV., 
43 ff.; Difficulties Confronting, 
43 ff.; and Memory, 51 f. 

Natural Piety, 365 

Nature, change characteristic of, 
239 ff.; see Naturalism 

Neo-Kantianism, 144, 
146 f. 

Neo-Platonism, 297 

Neo-Realism, 140, 150 f.; and truth 
and error, 169; Its Theory of 
Value, 446 f. 

Newbigin, 349 n 

Newton, 10, 38, 286, 273, 481 


discussed, 


INDEX 


Nietzsche, 440, 441 

Nominalism, 83 

Non-Apprehensional Realism, 1538 

Norton, quoted, on Dante’s cosmol- 
ogy, 390 f. 

Noumena, 97 

Novelty, Dangers of, 422 ff. 

Number, and Measurement, 229 ff. 


Object, a relative term, 122 

Objective idealism, 140, discussion 
of, 142 ff., 156, 158 f., 196 

Objectives, 452 f. 

Obligation, Sense of, 415 ff. 

Observation, Method of External, 
S12 f: 

Occasionalism, 332 

Ontology, def. 24; Problems and 
Methods in, Chap. XIII, 175 ff. 

Order, 242, 258; genetic, 272 

Organicism, 288, 372 

Organism, Perception an Affair of 
the, 122 ff.; Relation between 
Mind and, Chap. XXII, 324 ff: ; 


The Human, and the Group, 
347 ff. 

Organization, 376; and Material 
World, 274 ff. 


Otto, quoted, on naturalism, 210 
Otto, M., 490 
Ought and Must, 420 ff. 


Paley, 369 

Panpsychism, 196 f., 335 f. 

Parallelism, 327, 331 ff 

Parker, D. H., quoted, on art, 455 

Parker, G. H., 373 

Parmenides, 18 

Pascal, 18 

Pasteur, 280 

Patroclus, 294 

Paulsen, quoted, on philosophy, 17 

Pearson, Karl, 28, 145 

Peirce, C. S., 370, 371; quoted, on 
test for ideas, 147 

Perception, and External World, 
Chap. III, 30ff.; Content of, 
a Function of Many Factors, 
45 ff.; Field of, Involves Con- 
struction, 52 ff.; Psycho-Physi- 
ological Theory of, 54f.; Doubts 
concerning Representative, 69 ff. ; 
stressed by Berkeley, 72; Berke- 
ley’s attack upon Representative, 


INDEX 


75; for Hume, 86f.; an affair of 
the organism, 122 ff.; Synthetic 
vs. Kixternal and Introspective 
View of, 123 ff.; Is Usually 
Practical, 125 

Perry, R. B., 117 n., 151, 169, 449; 
quoted, on neo-realism, 152 f.; on 
value-judgment, 463 

Personality, a growth, 321 f.; 355; 
In What Sense a Social Product, 
356 ff. 

Persons, Knowledge of 
134 ff.; Society and, 
XXIII, 348 ff. 

Phenomena, defined, 23, 97 

Phenomenalism, and Skepticism, 
Chap. VII, 82 ff.; 140, 144; dis- 
cussed, 145 f. 

Philosopher, competency of, 13 ff. 

Philosophy, preliminary definition 
of, 1; Science and Religion and, 
Wire eniatory, (Of, “Li ffi; Main 
divisions of, 20 ff.; and science, 
27 f.; Recognition of Natural 
Realism in, 34 ff.; Should Start 
from Natural Realism, 38 f.; The 
Mind-Soul in Ancient, 294 ff. ; 
Mind in Modern, 298 ff. 

Physicists, the first, 18 

Picard, 449 

Pillsbury, quoted, construction in 
perception, 52 f.; his attitude to- 
ward problems, 316; on _ begin- 
nings of intelligence, 320 f. 

Plato Geb 196294." 29h. .297, 
299, 368 f., 374, 399, 4387, 444, 
481; quoted, on soul and body, 
296; on inadequacy of mechan- 
ism, 373; on values, 436 f. 

Plotinus, 297, 299 


other, 
Chap. 


Pluralism, 112, 176f.; scientific. 
371 

Poincaré, H., 28, 145 

Positivism, definition, 238, 140, 
144 f. 


Pragmatism, and temporal dimen- 
sion, 113; discussed, 147 ff.; 131, 
140, 144, 156f., 177, 178; and 
values, 441 

Prall, D., 449 

Pratt, J. B., 365; quoted, about 
religion, 8; on materialism, 185; 
on Dualism of Process, 204 f. 

Predestination, 485 ff. 


515 


Prichard, 150 

Process, Dualism of, 204f.; en- 
tropic and ektropic, 282 f., 271; 
mental, 309 

Properties, Chap. XVIII, 248 ff.; 
Primary vs. Secondary, 256 ff. ; 
constant, 266 ff. 

Propositions, logical, 21; relational 
and attributive, 268 

Psychoid, 287 

Psychologism, 147 

Psychology, New Currents in, 
304 ff.; as a Natural Science, 
Chap. X XI, 307 ff.; Situation in, 
307 ff.; Classic ‘Tradition in, 
309 f.; A Current Paradox in, 
317 ff.; An Inclusive Definition 
of, 320 ff. 

Punishment, 481 f. 

Puritanism, 404 f. 

Purpose, and the Efficacy of Con- 
sciousness, 379 ff. 

Push, Pull, or Internal Teleology, 
373 ff. 

Pythagoras, 18 


Qualities, primary and secondary, 
68, 80, 253 f., 256 f. 


Qualitative dimension, conscious- 
ness, a, 341 
Quantitative Aspect of World, 


Chap. XVI, 215 ff. 


Rationalism, 64 

Ratios, 238, 246 

Realism, Natural, 32 ff.; Recogni- 
tion of Natural, in Philosophy, 
34 ff.; Natural, Not a Theory or 
System, 36ff.; Natural, the 
Starting-Point of Philosophy, 
88f.; Natural, and Science, 
39 ff.; Does Natural Realism 
Break Down, 48 ff.; Difficulties 
Confronting Natural, 48 ff.; 
Early Representative, Chap. V., 
59 ff.; Rationalistic Representa- 
tive, 64; Critical, 188; General 
Discussion of, 149 ff.; and Iden- 
tity Theory of Truth, 164 ff. 

Receptacle view, the, 223 f., 240 

Redi, 280 

Reflection, philosophy a persistent, 
1f.; Begins with Things, 258 f. 

Reflexes, conditioned, 324 


516 


Reid, T., 91 f., 96, 151 

Relation, the Cognitive, 110; Closer 
Study of Cognitive, 114 ff.; Con- 
stant Relations, 266 ff. 

Relativism, ethical, 399 

Relativity, 244f 

Religion, Science, Philosophy and, 
7 ff., 368; Chap. XXX, 470 ff.; 
of the Future, 484 

Rembrandt, 360 

Representative Realism, Early, 
Chap. V, 59 ff.; rationalistic, 64 

Responsibility, Moral, 428 ff.; Free- 
Will and, 482 f., 486 : 

Riemann, 221, 227 

Ritter, W. E., 373 

Ross, A., 279 

Rousseau, 3860 

Royce, J., 143, 160 

Russell, B., 146, 150, 252 

Rutherford, 274 


Sageret, quoted, on scientific plural- 
ism, 371 

Samuel, 294 

Santayana, ref., 120, 449; quoted, 
on idealism, 80; on conscious- 
ness, 186, 381 

Saul, 294 

Schelling, 105 

Schiller, F. C. 8., 148, 160, 441 

Schopenhauer, 196, 252, 441 

Science, Religion, Philosophy and, 
7 ff.; and common-sense, 26 f.; 
and philosophy, 27 f. 

Shakespeare, 2386 

Shelley, 461 

Sidgwick, ref., 108; quoted, on con- 
trast between philosophy and the 
sciences, 12; on natural dualism, 
200 f.; on metaphysical dualism, 
200 

Silberstein, quoted, on kinetic time, 
238 

Singularism, 176 f., 193 

Skepticism, defined, 23; and Phe- 
nomenalism, Chap. VII, 82 ff.; 
Moral, 398f.; Ethical, 427f.; 
in Religion, 479 f. 

Smith, Norman, quoted, on repre- 
sentative realism, 64; on values, 
436 

Society, and Persons, Chap. XXIII, 


INDEX 


343 ff.; and Culture, 343 ff.; Has 
It a Mind?, 351 ff. 

Socrates, 248, 295, 296, 373, 399 

Solipsism, 141 

Solon, 17 

Sophocles, 30 

Sorley, quoted, on ultimate reality, 
445 


Soul, Mind, Consciousness and, 
Chap. XX., 289 ff.; the Mind- 
Soul in Ancient Philosophy, 


294 ff.; Kantian-Idealistic Tradi- 
tion of, 302 ff. 

Space, Genesis of Our Ideas of, 
218 ff.; As Category of Physical 
Sciences, 222 ff.; Divisibility and 
Extent of, 224 f. 

Spaulding, quoted on values, 446 

Specious present, the, 234 

Spencer, 218, 404 

Spinoza, ref., 3382, 337; quoted, on 
parallelism, 332 

Spiritualism, 24, 192ff., 374; 
Hume’s Rejection of Berkeley’s, 
87 ff.; of Leibniz, 101; Material- 
ism and, Chap. XIV, 183 ff.; 
Types of, 195 ff. 

Standards, Are There Absolute, 
Eternal?, 464 ff. 

St. Augustine, 60, 193 

Stoics, the, 295 

Stout, G., ref., 54; quoted, on sub- 
jective and objective time, 236; 
on psychology, 310 

Strong, C. A., 196, 197, 336 n. 

Subjective Idealism, 140 

Subjectivism, ethical, 399, 427 

Substance, Locke’s idea of, 66; 
Berkeley’s attack upon, 78; 
Hume’s Attack upon Mental, 
84f.; 108 f.; Are Things Sub- 
stances?, 265 f. 

Supernaturalism vs. Naturalism in 
Ethics, 424 ff. 

Symons, Arthur, quoted, on art, 
452 


Taylor, A. E., quoted, on philos- 
ophy and the sciences, 12 
Teleology, external, 273; Push, 
Pull or Internal, 373 ff.; Does 
Internal Imply Mind?, 378 ff. 
Temporal dimension, 112 f. 
Temporalism, 48, 232 


INDEX O17 


Theocritus, 468 

Thing, the Physical, and Its Ap- 
pearances, 47 ff.; Thing-in-itself, 
100 f.; Distinction between Idea 
fd. 87110 1.3) Things; Chap. 
XVIII, 248 ff.; Generic Traits 
of Thinghood, 254 ff.; How Shall 
We Think Things, 262 ff.; Are 
Things Substances, 265f.; Liv- 
ing and Lifeless Things, 277 f. 

Thinghood, category of, 111 

‘Thomson, J. J., 274 

Thonless, quoted, on religion, 8 

Time, Chap. XVII, 282 ff.; Genesis 
of Our Ideas of, 234 ff.; a Cate- 
gory of Scientific Knowledge, 
237 ff.; Change Characteristic of 
Nature Known in, 239 ff.; and 
the Cosmos, 240 ff. 

Titchener, E. B., ref., 319; quoted, 
on psychology, 309; on subject- 
matter of psychology, 318 

Transcendence, 153. 

Transcendental Ego, 96, 100 


Truth, and Error, Chap. XII, 
155 ff.; and Knowledge, 155 f.; 
Distinction between Meaning 


and Criteria of, 156 ff.; Coher- 
ence Theory of, 158; Pragmatist 
Theory of, 159 ff.; Realism and 
Identity Theory of, 164 ff. 

Tylor, E., ref., 298; quoted, on the 
soul, 293 

Tyndel ret.,,  213,7. 216, 
quoted, on matter, 189 


280 ; 


Unamuno, 473 
Unconscious, the, 473 
Universe, Is It Friendly ?, 479 ff 


Valentine, 455 

Values, 387 ff.; Has Human Life 
Intrinsic Value, 389 ff.; Nature 
and. Locus of Value, Chap. 
XXVIII, 434 ff.; Basic, for Hu- 
man Life, 484 ff.; Valuation vs. 
Cognition, 489 ff.; Contemporary 
Theories of, 444 ff.; Kinds, Con- 
ditions and Criteria of, Chap. 
XXIX, 451 ff.; Valuation an In- 


trinsic Aspect of Living, 451 ff. ; 
Value in Aesthetic Experience, 
453 ff.; A General Survey of, 
457 ff.; Intrinsic and Extrinsic, 
460; Valuations and Value-Judg- 
ments, 462 ff.; Are There Abso- 
lute, Eternal Standards?, 464 ff. 


Ward, James, ref., 54, 196, 304, 
319, 870, 3871; quoted, on Kant, 
98 f.; on Space, 219; on subject- 
matter of psychology, 318 f. 

Warren, quoted, on double-aspect 
theory, 338 


Washburn, M., quoted, on mind, 


LIG:£: 

Washington, 159 

Watson, Johns ref) si2 toto. 
quoted, on physiology and_ be- 


haviorism, 320 

Webb, C. C. J., 482 

Weber, 18 n. 

Weiss, 315 

Wells, H. G., 478 

Wenley, R. M., quoted, on Kant, 93 

Whitehead, A. N., 260, 261, 262, 
320, quoted, 366 

Whitman, W., 360 

Will, the, 196; a Creative, 378; 
Free-Will and _ Responsibility, 
432 f. 

Windelband, ref., 18 n.; quoted, on 


materialism, 185f.; on values, 
465 f., 466, 467 

Wolff, 93 

World, for Common-Sense, 30 ff.; 
Perception and the External, 
Chap. III, 30ff.; Quantitative 


Aspect of, Chap. XVI, 215 ff.; 

Basie Characteristics of, 215 ff. ; 

Ours Not an [Inert or Static, 

232 ff.; The Material World a 

Domain of Organization, 274 ff. 
Wundt, W., 195, 252, 310 


Yahweh, 429 
Yerkes, 315 


Zeno, 399 
Zeus, 478 





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